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
**Department
of State**
bulletin

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
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Department of State **bulletin**

Volume 84 / Number 2090 / September 1984

Cover: Secretary Shultz

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams

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The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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A Force for Freedom in the Caribbean

President Reagan's remarks to a Caribbean leaders conference at Russell House Student Center at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, on July 19, 1984.¹

a special honor and a pleasure for to participate in this gathering of leaders from the Caribbean. You're among our nearest neighbors and our best friends. Our societies, economies, histories have been intertwined in the earliest days of the Americas. As we face the future together, I think we have good reason to be confident. Four years ago economic prospects were bleak and the forces of tyranny were on the move, emboldened by what seemed to be a paralysis among the democratic peoples of the hemisphere. But by joining together with courage and determination, we've turned that situation around. Now the tide of the future is a freedom tide. The free people of this hemisphere are united and share a common sense of purpose. Nowhere is it more apparent than with the United States and the Caribbean democracies as has been so evident in this meeting today. Over these past 4 years, we've worked to encourage democracy, enhance the economic vitality of the region, and cooperate in the defense of freedom. Now, these are not separate goals. They are mutually reinforcing. President Jorge Blanco pointed that out earlier this year when he observed, "Economic growth, health, education, liberty, democracy, and peace are indivisible and replaceable values." I firmly believe that democratic government is the birthright of every American. And when I say American, I'm talking about all of us in this Western Hemisphere, which together is the Americas. All of us from the North Slope of Alaska to the tip of Tierra del Fuego. And much progress has been made. Today, 26 of 33 independent countries in the hemisphere—countries

with 90% of the hemisphere's population—are democratic or in transition to democracy.

You realize when I refer to "democratic," I do so with a small "d." [Laughter.]

Your own democracies are an example to developing countries everywhere. That's not to say that you don't face great challenges. The worldwide recession has profoundly affected the Caribbean with market prices for key commodities you produce dropping even as the costs of your imports were rising. The United States has been hardpressed economically. But we've done our best to help and provide hope and we'll continue to do so. The United States has a deep and abiding interest in the well-being of its neighbors.

In these last 3 years, we've begun to put our own economic house in order by cutting down the growth of government spending and regulations. We're enjoying high growth, declining unemployment and low inflation. And we've become, once again, an engine for worldwide economic progress. We believe the secret of that success is lower tax rates. And that's a secret everyone can share and benefit from.

At the same time, we've increased our aid to the region and helped strengthen the International Monetary Fund's [IMF] ability to assist countries with debt problems. But let's be realistic, stop-gap measures with the IMF are merely that, temporary solutions. The ultimate solution is strong and steady growth in every Caribbean country.

Our Caribbean Basin Initiative now getting underway gives your people new access to the world's largest and most dynamic government—market, I meant to say. Too much television. [Laughter.] It encourages job-creating business investment for growth and prosperity and is being put into place at a time when a strong dollar and an expanding American economy can translate into greater demand for your products. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is part of our broader, overall economic strategy to improve economic vitality and raise living standards throughout the Caribbean.

We can and must work together to improve the well-being of our people and to ensure our safety as well. I'd like to take this opportunity to congratulate many of you for your courage and leadership in turning back the communist power grab in Grenada last fall. We can be proud that thanks to the unity and determination of our democracies, we saved the peoples of that troubled island, we restored their freedom, we revived their hope in the future, and we prevented danger and turmoil from spreading beyond Grenada's shores. Let us always remember the crucial distinction between the legitimate use of force for liberation versus totalitarian aggression for conquest.

But, what was happening in Grenada was not an isolated incident. The Soviet bloc and Cuba have been committing enormous resources to undermining our liberty and independence. Nowhere is this threat more pressing than in Nicaragua, a country which today marks the fifth year of Sandinista dictatorship. The Sandinista revolution, like Castro's revolution, is a revolution betrayed. And now faced with mounting internal pressures and disillusionment abroad, the Sandinistas have announced an election for November of this year. We would wholeheartedly welcome a genuine democratic election in Nicaragua. But no person committed to democracy will be taken in by a Soviet-style sham election.

The situation in Nicaragua is not promising; but if the Sandinistas would keep their original commitment, permit free elections, respect human rights, and establish an independent nation, conflict in the region would subside.

In the meantime, we have a moral responsibility to support anyone who aspires to live in a true democracy, free from communist interference. If the

democratic peoples do not stand together, we certainly will be unable to stand alone.

Just a few years ago, totalitarianism was on the rise. But there's a new spirit among democratic peoples. Prime Minister Adams described it, when he said, "There is a community of interest among democratic countries which can

transcend ethnicity and differences in economic development." This spirit is a powerful new force for freedom in the world today.

What we do together, as a family of free men and women will determine what the future will be like for our children. If we're strong enough to live up to our shared values, the promise of

freedom and opportunity for the new world will at long last be realized.

By working together, the free people of this hemisphere can make certain that the next century will indeed be our century, a democratic century.

¹Text from White House press release; opening and closing paragraphs are omitted here. ■

News Conference of July 24 (Excerpts)

Excerpts from President Reagan's news conference of July 24, 1984.¹

Q. Mr. Mondale said in his acceptance speech that 100 days into his presidency he would stop the secret war against Nicaragua. I assume that you're going to continue your policy down there in that respect, and he also implied, of course, once again, that you, as President, will be trigger happy and will get us into war. How will you answer both of those?

A. I'm not trigger happy, and having known four wars in my lifetime, I'm going to do everything I can. I think the greatest requirement is to strive for peace, and I'm going to do that.

And, again, I think there was some demagoguery in this. But, it's my understanding that all of you have been given a report—has a kind of a green cover—on the Nicaraguan situation, and it has also been delivered to every member of the Congress.

And believe me, I wouldn't "round file" those. I'd look at them. Because the information is in there, it reveals that everything we've said about the Sandinista government is a proven fact. They are trying to destroy El Salvador by providing the rebels there with the wherewithal to do it. They are a totalitarian government, but you'll also find in there a statement by Ogarkov of the Soviet military. This was prior to our rescue mission in Grenada.

But he openly stated that after all the years of only having a base in the Western hemisphere in Cuba, that now they had bases here in Nicaragua and in

Grenada. Well, they don't have one in Grenada anymore. And I think that it is the responsibility of this government to assist the people of Nicaragua in seeing that they don't have one in Nicaragua.

Q. Vice President Bush has asserted that Mondale and the Democrats don't understand the communist threat in Central America. Do you agree?

A. That they don't understand the communist threat? Well, either that, or they're ignoring it.

Q. Do you think they're ignoring it?

A. They seem to be opposing everything that we've tried to do, including the aid to El Salvador. As a matter of fact, I've been very worried that their niggardly treatment of El Salvador is such that we might see—it's comparable to letting El Salvador slowly bleed to death. And then they would be able to point a finger and say, "Well, see, your program didn't work."

Q. The Polish Government is releasing hundreds of political prisoners in a move that appears to meet one of your conditions for normalizing relations. You have removed some of the sanctions you imposed a couple of years ago. Will you remove others, and if so, when do you think you'll be acting?

A. We're studying what they've done in their legislation on amnesty very carefully right now. Our purpose from the beginning has been, with regard to the sanctions, that we know that in some instances those sanctions are penalizing not only the Government of Poland with which we're not in very

much sympathy, but the people themselves. We don't want to impose hardships on the people.

And if their legislation on amnesty and things of that kind have met the conditions that we laid down—yes, we will meet with regard to lifting the sanctions.

Q. Could the United States continue its defense commitments to New Zealand if it's denied court access for nuclear ships? And, if this happens, would it effect American trade with New Zealand?

A. I don't think that would effect trade. But I do know, and I would rather not get in too deeply to anything—because that is something that will be worked out and negotiate with the new Government of New Zealand. And I have every reason to be optimistic that there won't be any deal to our ships.

Q. If the port access is denied, the Labor Party says it will do, would the United States conclude a separate peace treaty with Australia.

A. I don't want to get into anything that might sound as if I'm pressuring or threatening or anything the kind. So, let me just say that we're going to do our best to persuade the that it is in their best interests as well as ours for us to continue with our alliance, with ANZUS, those countries as we have been.

¹Text from White House press release.

Asia-Pacific and the Future

Secretary Shultz's address before the Council on Foreign Relations in Honolulu on July 18, 1984.¹

Understand the future, you must understand the Pacific. I came to this conclusion in the course of many trips to Asia and the Pacific as a private citizen. And five trips to the region as Secretary of State have strengthened my conviction. In economic development, in the growth of free institutions, and in growing global influence, the Pacific is increasingly where the action is. As important as it was a few years ago, it is more important today. And it will be even more so tomorrow.

Americans welcome this. We see in the growth of this region a vitality that promises a better future for all. When President Reagan addressed the Japanese Diet last November he said:

For my part, I welcome this new Pacific. Let it roll peacefully on, carrying a two-way flow of people and ideas that can break down barriers of suspicion and mistrust and build up bonds of cooperation and shared optimism.

Hawaii, our gateway to the region, offers vivid and dynamic evidence of America's role as a great Pacific nation. The historical westward movement of our population has been enriched by growing diversity of talented immigrants, including so many of Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, and other Asian origins. Our security, as symbolized by the silent testimony of the Pearl Harbor memorial, is inextricably bound to these islands and to events throughout this portion of the globe.

And Hawaii, like our nation as a whole, enjoys a rich flow of two-way movement and trade with Asia and the Pacific. While our trade with the rest of the world last year grew by only one-half percent, trade with this region grew 10 percent, reaching \$135 billion. That means that over one-third of our total world trade is done with Asia and the Pacific—and it exceeds by nearly a quarter our overseas trade with any other area.

Only a few years ago people said that America's interest in Asia was receding; that we were pulling back. Well, in the last few years we have turned that around, and all kinds of people recognize

that fact. As the authoritative Chinese journal, *International Studies Research*, put it, "1983 was a year symbolizing the return of the United States to Asia."

As we look around the region, we see good news in many places, good news for American interests and good news for the people of the Asia-Pacific region. A fresh and confident American foreign policy approach is in tune with the dynamism of the region and has helped foster a string of success stories. Let me run through a partial list.

Japan

The U.S.-Japan relationship has emerged as one of the most important in the world. Today our excellent relations with Japan are particularly reinforced by the warm personal relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone, who have met together four times in just the last year and a half. It is a far cry today from 1960, when the first American Presidential visit to Japan was canceled because of anti-American rioting.

During the President's visit to Tokyo last fall, and in intensive efforts since then, we have worked cooperatively with

Japan's new and more active diplomacy has brought a stronger common interest in arms control. At the Williamsburg summit hosted by President Reagan, Japan participated for the first time in a joint statement on arms control and security—and did so again at the London summit last June.

Although there is more that Japan needs to do, America has benefited from Japan's increased defense capabilities and deepened cooperation with us. Japanese support for U.S. bases in Japan, for example, now exceeds \$1 billion—or more than \$22,000 for every U.S. serviceman stationed there.

China

Relations with China are more solid and stable than ever. We have freed ourselves of exaggerated fears and unrealistic expectations, and we are focusing on the significant interests our countries have in common.

- Last year, President Reagan decided on a major liberalization of high technology trade with China. This move offers significant trade prospects for American exporters and acknowledges our interest in participating in China's economic modernization.

- We have smoothed the way for economic interaction between our two very different systems by negotiating

We have expanded our cooperation with Japan as it has become one of the principal donors of economic assistance to the Third World. . . .

the Japanese to achieve more equitable access for U.S. products to Japan's markets, with solid results in the areas of computers, telecommunications equipment, semiconductors, agricultural products, and many others, as well as access to Japan's important financial markets. Much remains to be done, but there is a record of solid accomplishment.

We have expanded our cooperation with Japan as it has become one of the principal donors of economic assistance to the Third World, not limited to the Asia-Pacific region but including such key countries as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. And Japan is now taking a new and helpful role in the Caribbean.

agreements on important issues like taxation of foreign businesses, textiles, civil aviation, and industrial and technological cooperation.

- China's Minister of Defense and ours have had an important exchange of visits. Careful discussions have begun on ways in which American technology and equipment might better enable China to counter Soviet military intimidation. This is an important development, but it is also an area where we give careful consideration to the concerns of our allies and other friends in the region. During those frigid years when we had no contact with China, we were much criticized. Today we are able to play a constructive role in China's modernization and changing relationship with Asia.

• And, for the first time since normalization, an American President has visited China. President Reagan's trip made an important contribution, not only because of the warmth of the reception and the substance of the discussions but also by the candor and directness with which the President addressed our concerns as well as our hopes.

Throughout our recent development of the U.S.-China relationship, President Reagan has insisted that we not harm our old friends in the course of making new ones. Our relations with the people of Taiwan, although unofficial, are warm and steadily expanding. Last year our two-way trade with Taiwan passed the \$15 billion level.

Korea

Korean confidence in our commitment to their defense was shaken by President Carter's planned withdrawal of U.S. troops. The effects throughout Asia were profound. Today, their confidence has been substantially restored, bolstered most recently by the President's visit. Our policies in support of South Korean statesmanship helped the region to survive the shock of the Rangoon bombing without escalation to far wider violence. In the past, such an event might have led to war. Today, however, we have helped build a safety

To emphasize the importance we attach to Korea, President Reagan within weeks of his inauguration met with President Chun Doo-hwan. Since the release of a prominent opposition figure in early 1981, we have seen important relaxations of authoritarian controls in South Korea, including the release of many more political prisoners, the reduction of restrictions on political activity, and the removal of police control from campuses. Much remains to be done, but even gradual steps toward liberalization are not easy for a country in a virtual state of war, one whose survival depends on maintaining political stability. We regard as particularly significant President Chun's declared intention to turn over power peacefully when his term ends in 1988, for only where peaceful change is routine can genuine political stability prevail.

Southeast Asia

I have just returned from the annual meeting of ASEAN—the Association of South East Asian Nations—whose work is of the greatest importance to our overall Pacific policy. Each of the nations of this remarkable regional group—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and, most recently, Brunei—has a unique importance. They are diverse in almost every respect, except in their common commit-

with ASEAN and similar nations of the Pacific demonstrates our shared concern about their problems and our moral commitment to their integrity. Certainly we have a big stake in their continued success. Our trade reached \$23 billion last year, making ASEAN America's fifth largest trading partner.

We also are gratified by ASEAN's success so far in forcing the world to address the problem of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. ASEAN has developed and won support for a credible political strategy for a peaceful settlement. They have steadily built up the strength of the resistance, though we share their concern that the noncommunist resistance has not grown as fast as the Khmer Rouge, an organization that we all abhor.

We have benefited from the role of the ASEAN countries in providing financial asylum for 1.37 million refugees from Indochina since 1975, and we are proud of our own role in providing permanent resettlement for 650,000—almost half the entire total. It is one of the great humanitarian achievements of our time and one by which our own society has been enriched as well.

This is a success story, but it is a tragedy too. And beyond that, it is a lesson to be learned. Let us not forget that many of our friends in Southeast Asia supported our effort in the Vietnam war. They told us then—as Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew did, for example—that if we faltered in our purpose, the peoples of Indochina would suffer and their neighbors would feel threat come closer. They told us there would be oppression and suffering. They told us there would be boat people. They were right.

Finally, the ASEAN countries have played a substantial part in furthering the subject of the highest national priority: full accounting of our prisoners of war (POWs) and missing in action (MIA) in Indochina. Some progress has been made. The recent return of the remains of eight Americans from Vietnam is significant and welcome event, but it is much more to be done. Just last February, we received a promise from Vietnamese authorities of accelerated cooperation in accounting for missing Americans, along with agreement to resume the technical meetings which provide valuable opportunities for exchanging POW/MIA information. We are pleased that the Vietnamese have recently agreed to have a technical meeting in Hanoi in mid-August, and look forward to accelerated progress on this most important issue.

Our exports to Korea for just a single year now exceed the entire total of economic aid we gave Korea from 1946 until the program ended in 1981.

net of supportive ties and mutual confidence that is a major factor for keeping the peace.

Bolstered by confidence in its security, the Korean economy has been booming, growing 9.3% last year with inflation of only 0.2%. Our exports to Korea for just a single year now exceed the entire total of economic aid we gave Korea from 1946 until the program ended in 1981. Korea's annual purchases of military equipment from the United States are more than half again as large as the military sales credits we provide each year. Korea, in short, is bearing the lion's share of its own defense and is paying its own way.

ment to the peace and economic development of the region. Collectively, they represent almost 300 million people with a combined gross national product of over \$200 billion, a figure that has been growing by more than 7% annually during the whole decade of the 1970s.

Having just met the foreign ministers of these six nations, I can confirm that this is one important part of the world where the United States is respected and where our attention to their problems is appreciated. These countries are understandably nervous that their interests may be affected by our dealings with their giant neighbors to the north—China and Japan. But a look at our record cannot but be reassuring; our cooperative involvement

ZUS

the South Pacific, the focus of our policy is our ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty] alliance, Australia and New Zealand. These are countries that share with us proud traditions of democratic freedom and a willingness to bear the cost of preserving those values. It is significant that these two allies have fought by our side in all four major wars of this century. They have the courage and the vision to keep this and our other alliances strong. They will have done much to ensure the peace we now enjoy.

We recognize that managing a democratic alliance requires mutual respect as well as mutual obligations. It is for this reason that we have taken ANZUS country views seriously into account in formulating our arms control provisions. Arms control, in fact, was an important agenda item in our meetings which concluded on Tuesday in Wellington.

We have been rewarded with a corresponding sense of cooperation and responsibility. For example, when the Labor Party took office in Australia a year and a half ago, they began a searching and serious debate on the costs and benefits of ANZUS. The result of their thorough review was a firm reaffirmation of the value of the alliance and a renewed commitment to it.

With the recent election in New Zealand, we are ready and willing, as I say, to work with the new government and review with our New Zealand allies the profound basis and mutual benefits of our alliance. Indeed, my recent trip enabled me to meet with the new Prime Minister, Mr. Lange, even before he took office. We are confident of an openminded and thorough look at our alliance which will result in a reaffirmation of the importance of an effective ANZUS for the peace of the region and the world. ANZUS is, after all, not simply an isolated alliance for the defense of one portion of the globe, but part of a broader network of relations that together help to hold in check a global threat. In today's world, a threat anywhere one region can become a threat to us all.

The Pacific Islands

The United States is working, along with our ANZUS allies, to support freedom and development for the many peoples of the South Pacific. Some will seek fulfillment in independence and

others in association with larger states. Last year, the United States Senate ratified four treaties resolving old claims disputes between the United States and four small island states. This year, the President has submitted the Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands for congressional approval. We are working with the island states on agreements to regulate tuna fishing and to control the dumping of nuclear waste in their areas.

On a personal note, I stopped at American Samoa on my way here. I was there briefly, in Pago-Pago, during World War II. I have never forgotten

peace, dialogue replaces diatribe, and the good will of their peoples will carry the day.

Freedom alone can work miracles. But in a region filled with historic animosities, threatened by heavily armed totalitarian powers, slowed by the need to gather skills and resources, and—in many cases—only gradually adopting democratic processes, sound policy is a vital ingredient.

The U.S. Role in the Pacific

The Pacific region has benefited from the mature leadership of many of the countries I have mentioned. But it has

... the ASEAN countries have played a substantial part in furthering ... a full accounting of our prisoners of war and missing in action in Indochina.

those people, their pride in their traditions and their aspirations for the future. It was great to go back. They are proud today to be Americans, and we are proud that they are one of us.

I have given you a catalogue of successes. There are, of course, plenty of problems. The Rangoon tragedy reminds us of the depth of North Korean viciousness and the ease with which that peninsula could again become an arena of violence. In the Philippines, despite progress made in recent elections toward restoring democratic processes, major economic and political problems continue. Throughout the region, the threat of growing protectionism threatens all our trade, and the tragedy in Indochina goes on.

Other problems lie just below the surface. In many places, economic progress is fragile. Tensions among ethnic groups within countries and territorial disputes between countries are a constant worry. The region still has one of the highest concentrations of military forces anywhere in the world. Thus, even the most heartening success stories cannot be taken for granted.

But the forces for success are profound, and I am optimistic that success will keep the upper hand. When room is left for individual initiative, peoples and nations will prosper. When democratic progress can be made peacefully, stability will follow. When nations turn to

also benefited from the sound diplomatic, economic, and defense policies of our own country. I am optimistic because I am confident that a strong U.S. role will continue. Most of the success we have seen is the result of the growing strength of the countries of the region themselves. But crucial as this may be, America's role has been singularly important and must be carried forward.

Diplomatically, we are often the country with which others can work best. Our recovery is in many ways the engine of economic growth for the entire region. And our military strength provides the indispensable deterrent essential to maintaining stability and confidence among our friends. America's interests in the region and the interests of our friends require a strong and permanent U.S. presence in every area of the Pacific.

The three keys to sound U.S. policy in the region, therefore, are a free and open world economy, a solid deterrent posture, and an effective diplomacy. We are working hard to obtain all three. To put it another way, the watchwords of our policy, since President Reagan took office, have been: realism, strength, and negotiation. Let me briefly review these with you.

THE SECRETARY

Realism. Realism requires us to acknowledge that economic growth lies at the heart of progress around the Pacific. It requires as well a recognition that the single greatest contribution to the current prosperity of the Pacific region is the recovery of our own economy; indeed, the recovery of our economy has been the engine of our economic recovery spreading ever more widely throughout the world.

It is essential that we point out this reality to others. As I told our ASEAN partners, strong growth in the U.S. economy has been the major factor in their own growth. Increased exports to the United States from ASEAN accounted for over 60% of those nations' total export increase in 1983. The achievement of sustained noninflationary growth in the United States and maintenance of our open markets are of prime importance to the developing world.

Similarly, we must point out the truth about "protectionism." We in the United States do face protectionist pressure, and sometimes we are forced to limit the growth of imports of some products. But our economy is a genuinely open one. We are, for example, the world's biggest market for the manufactured exports of developing countries, taking over 50% of such exports to all industrial countries.

It is time for all to realize that President Reagan has turned the American economy toward productivity and expan-

sive concentrations of military power in the hands of regimes that have shown little hesitation to use force, either directly or as a means of intimidation, when provided with an opening. Vietnam has 1 million men under arms, a staggering number for a country of that size. North Korea is one of the most heavily militarized nations in the world, and it has shown no scruples about putting force to use. Beyond the strategic missiles on land and sea that threaten the United States itself, the Soviet Union has dramatically increased its forces in the Pacific region to include over 50 divisions, 3,000 modern combat aircraft, its largest fleet, and 135 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, poised against the nations of the Pacific area, including ourselves. It has acquired forward facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and has now stationed bombers in Vietnam as well.

Fortunately, nations of the region are facing these dangers realistically and building up their own strength. As a result, we have an increasingly strong ally in Korea that now bears the lion's share of the cost of its own defense. We are hopeful that Japan will steadily move to achieve its own defense goals, which would contribute to greater stability in Northeast Asia and permit greater U.S. flexibility throughout the region. And China, with which we now have a widening and maturing relationship, plays its own special role in lending stability to the region.

and vital air and naval bases. On Okinawa, our Marines are forward-positioned and we have there, as well, an air division equipped with the most sophisticated F-15s and the AWACS [airborne warning and control system]. Our alliance with Australia and New Zealand has been a steady force for peace throughout its 33 years.

Make no mistake; the United States is committed permanently to the Pacific and President Reagan's program to restore America's defense capabilities, giving us the wherewithal to carry out the commitments and perform the tasks essential to peace. We shall not shirk from that role as others take their place beside us. We seek the increased strength of our allies not as a substitute but as a complement to our own efforts.

Negotiation. But a sound economy and a strong military commitment are not enough. Nor can they provide stability and confidence by themselves. They must be accompanied by an active and creative diplomacy and a willingness to negotiate.

It is through diplomacy that we have forged security ties with our democratic ANZUS partners, Australia and New Zealand. It is diplomacy that last week brought together in Jakarta the disparate group of ASEAN nations in their remarkable annual session of give-and-take and enhanced economic cooperation. That cooperation has gone beyond the economic realm to devise strategy to deal with Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and support for the noncommunist resistance. And it is through diplomacy that we build for the future.

On this trip, which I conclude today, we began small but potentially far-reaching steps. In Jakarta, I signed a memorandum of understanding on investment issues with Indonesia. This is only a first such agreement in this field but it means we may contemplate an eventual investment treaty and even in the far future, build toward a general agreement on investment to parallel the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

In a similar vein, during this trip a general subject of the Pacific Basin was addressed formally by a group of governments for the first time. Initial discussions will have a specific focus on human resources development. This is only a start, but its implications for the years ahead could be great.

ANZUS is . . . part of a broader network of relations that together help to hold in check a global threat.

sion once again. We are the beneficiaries, and the world's nations are the beneficiaries. This is a policy I assure you we will continue.

The U.S. economy has performed magnificently. It is a major source of our own and our allies' strength. Economic growth, in turn, is a key to both political and military strength.

Strength. No course of economic development and no effort at diplomacy can succeed in an environment of fear borne by a sense of weakness. The Asian and Pacific region is one of enormous

Only a few years ago, our own position of strength in the Pacific region was in question. No more. President Reagan has made it clear where we stand. And our forces in the Pacific have new muscle.

Our presence in Korea is critical to preventing another war in that peninsula. In the vast reaches of the North, Western, and South Pacific our Navy is an essential element of stability. Two of our most important military facilities—Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base—are in the Philippines. Guam has large

Finally, it is diplomacy that enables us to deal with the world as it is. Our economy flourishes best in conjunction with others who understand the benefits of the free market and put it into practice. Our military's mission is to defend ourselves from those who do not wish us well. It is through diplomacy and negotiation that we are able to foster our interests with adversaries as well as friends. Here in the Pacific we value our association with our fellow democracies and with others who share our goals. We also engage and work constructively—and often to mutual advantage—with those whose view of the world is quite different from ours. Thus, it is through this third pillar of our policy that we have the best hope of forestalling conflict and solving problems before they threaten to overwhelm us.

Conclusion

I have portrayed a scene of success today. It is undeniable. The Pacific and its future are inseparable. I believe that there is no more remarkable story of progress and no greater source of optimism than here in this region. But I have also called attention to the continuing challenge ahead and to the ways we are moving to meet it. There are problems. But we have a lot going for us—not created by luck or chance but by our own endeavor and our own vision. My message today is simply this: our performance, by our strength, by our diplomacy, let us encourage this tremendous momentum toward peace and development in the Pacific.

■ Press release 170 of July 19, 1984.

Secretary Visits Asia; Attends ASEAN and ANZUS Meetings

Secretary Shultz visited Hong Kong (July 7-8, 1984), Malaysia (July 9-10), Singapore (July 10-11), Indonesia (July 11-14) to participate in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) dialogue, Australia (July 14-15), and New Zealand (July 15-17) to attend the 33d meeting of the ANZUS Council [Australia, New Zealand, United States security treaty].

Following are his remarks and news conferences made on various occasions during the trip, the text of the ANZUS communique, and a joint news conference held by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Ministers William Hayden of Australia and Warren Cooper of New Zealand.

NEWS CONFERENCE, KUALA LUMPUR, JULY 10, 1984¹

I would like to express my appreciation to the Prime Minister of Malaysia and his colleagues, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Acting Foreign Secretary, and all the people who have been so gracious to us and engaged with us in discussions of matters of concern to both countries and also have made our stay a very interesting and pleasant one.

This is not my first time to Malaysia, so it is interesting especially for me to see the progress which is right in front of your eyes. My first visit was about 10 years ago when I was Secretary of the Treasury, and I have been here since as a private citizen. I have had a chance to watch the growth of Kuala Lumpur, not only in the city itself but the wonderful highway from the airport here. It is a pleasure to see this tangible evidence of economic development. Again, I am very grateful for the great hospitality that we have had.

Q. Is the United States willing to give more aid of any kind to the non-communist elements of the Kampuchea coalition?

A. The question of Kampuchea has come up in our discussions here, and I am sure it will be a centerpiece in the ASEAN discussions. The United States has basically taken the view that we will support the efforts that the ASEAN countries are making, and we support them diplomatically, and we support them in other ways, some in terms of

direct support to individual countries, especially Thailand as a front-line state. We have had massive support for the efforts over the flood of refugees fleeing the Vietnamese aggression, and in other ways we have been and will continue to be supportive, and I don't want to comment on incremental moves one way or another.

Q. Are there any new views you could share with us on the proposed U.S. talks with the Soviets in Vienna?

A. There are diplomatic contacts practically daily on the subject. I've been, of course, following it very closely, but the situation remains about where it has been for the last few days, namely the Soviet Union seems to be having great difficulty taking "yes" for an answer.

Q. The issue of U.S.-China relations has been brought up with Malaysian leaders and will be brought up again in Jakarta. In yesterday's briefing by Malaysian officials, there seems to be an indication that Malaysia has expressed concern, not just over military collaboration but also technological collaboration which could lead to a defense or military capability and a Chinese threat to Southeast Asia. Has the United States given an assurance to Malaysia, and later to ASEAN, that it will continue to brief them on any major development in U.S.-China relations, and is this consultative procedure now going to be a part of U.S.-ASEAN relations?

A. The meeting that you referred to must be one I wasn't in, because perhaps somebody else talked about those things, but I know that the question of China, and its relationship to the ASEAN efforts in Kampuchea and its posture in Asia generally, is of great interest, obviously, to Malaysia and others in the region. The evolution of U.S. relations with China is also of central interest. We do, as a matter of course, keep our friends advised of what we are doing, and we will certainly continue to do that. It's our view, and I believe widely shared in this part of the world, that the emergence of a good and stable relationship between the United States and China, on the whole, advances the idea of stability in this part of the world, and it is a net plus. The relationship of the

military sort that you mentioned in your question is, of course, in its early stages and focused on defensive matters, and I don't think is, in any sense, a threat to other parts of Asia. Insofar as Southeast Asia is concerned, of course, the center of gravity of the U.S. approach is with ASEAN and the countries, Malaysia obviously included, that make up the ASEAN countries. We have worked very closely with them and will continue to do so.

Q. The Prime Minister has expressed regrets that trade relations between United States and Malaysia have not progressed satisfactorily. What's your view on this?

A. I don't know what the right definition of satisfactory is. If you just take the exports of Malaysia to the United States, if you compare 1983 with 1982, they rose 13%. If you take the most recent figures, which are the first quarter of 1984, and to deal with seasonal factors you should compare it with the first quarter of 1983, it's up by about 50% now. The percentage increases are very large and pretty much across the board as to products, including the often-cited example of textiles, which I think the increase is something on the order of 69%, very large, but that is on a small base. So there had been large increases.

To my mind, what these increases illustrate is the impact of the expansion to the U.S. economy on the economies of countries throughout the world, and, in citing these figures, I would say Malaysia is not an exception, not that numbers like 50% can be typical of anything, that's such a gigantic increase. But I do think that, in a sense, the hero of world economic recovery is the recovery of the U.S. economy, and it has been a very good thing for everybody, including the people of this region.

Q. Several U.S. officials have talked about increasing humanitarian aid to noncommunist factions in Kampuchea. Can you give us an idea of what kind of annual aid in terms of dollars you have been giving and what kind of proposals you have offered?

A. I suppose the most important way in which aid is given—of the sort you have in mind—is very human and personal, and that is the longstanding and heavy involvement of the United States in coping with the large flow of refugees from Vietnamese aggression. I think the total number of refugees over the last 7 years—or what is the time

period of these numbers about since 1975? So say almost 10 years, is like 1,350,000, something on that order, and roughly half of those have wound up in the United States—some 650,000.

We have reached out to this area and I suppose in the tradition of the United States, of being a country made up, in a sense, of refugees. The flow from this part of the world has been taken in, and the most humanitarian thing you can do is to help people when they are really in need, and we will continue to do that.

Insofar as more direct assistance of one kind or another right here, I don't have the numbers right on the top of my head, but if you add up the development assistance of the ASEAN countries, the security assistance, and the more humanitarian—directly humanitarian—aid, it comes to a very large annual number, and we have been having some discussions out here as to what that number is. It depends a little bit on just the things that you include in it, but it's on the order of half a billion dollars or perhaps larger.

Q. There was a report in the local paper to the effect that there was a rapid increase in the Soviet buildup in Cam Ranh Bay. I wonder if you can comment on the implications of this.

A. There is a continuing Soviet buildup of naval forces—in other words, a capacity to project power in this part of the world. And I think it's a matter that should be of concern to everyone; it is of concern to us. And it only emphasizes the importance of strong friendships here, and not only in the case of the ASEAN countries but Australia and New Zealand as well. So it's part of the general Soviet development of their military capability, and I think that shows the importance of having a strong deterrent capability, not only of the United States but in cooperation with our allies.

Q. I understand that the government has reaffirmed its desire to purchase F-16-A's, the relatively advanced aircraft. What is the U.S. feeling about this?

A. I don't believe the Thai have finally made up their minds. They have been given, as have other countries in this region, a thorough briefing on the various so-called FX aircraft so that they can see the characteristics of them, the costs of them, the maintenance problems that they all pose, and so forth. And they will have to look at all of these factors and decide what is in their best

interest in a matter of discussion with us. But as a general proposition, we want to support the efforts of the countries in this region to look to their security. And as to decisions about particular pieces of military equipment, they are made case by case, but as a general proposition, we look with favor on sales to the ASEAN countries.

Q. We understand that the Malaysian position is that an economically strong China will sooner or later lead to a militarily strong China which has the potential of being a hegemonist power in Southeast Asia. That is their concern. What is your response to this line of thinking about China if it becomes economically, and later on militarily, strong as well?

A. I think you have to start with the proposition that China is there, it is an important country, it has been for long time, it will continue to be, and, don't have any doubt in my mind at all that as an economic proposition China will develop. And it seems to be expected that's going to take place. The question is whether that development from the standpoint of stability in this region, is best done with other countries cooperating and being a part of it. As we believe that it is important for our own interest, as a potential trading partner and in the interest of security matters and strategic considerations that are very clear, to have a good working relationship with China. So we start build that up in a way that we think lend stability to this part of the world.

Q. In recent years the Asian region, particularly ASEAN countries has become quite an attractive area for investment for American business compared with other regions of the world. What, in your opinion, could ASEAN governments do to hasten flow of American investment in this region, particularly with regards to Malaysian participation here?

A. Basically the ASEAN countries are doing very well in expanding their economies and in expanding their trade particularly with the United States, in attracting investment.

Of course, the basic conditions that attract investments are: number one, the prospect of realizing a good rate of return on the investment, and number two, being able to sustain it because of confidence that the rules of the game that prevailed when you made the investment are going to stay the same, that you know the conditions that are going to affect you. I think that

thing that can be done that affects these propositions is all to the good. It seems to me that it's taken for granted these days, and is a proper thing, that a country that is the host to an investment expects to get something out of it—not simply just the investment as such. But one of the reasons that foreign investment is welcomed is that the people of the host country learn something; they get trained, they become better able to carry on for themselves. There is a transfer in that sense—the deeper sense of the transfer of technology and managerial and other related capabilities.

But I think from the standpoint of the question what is there to do, it is not as much of a sense of continuity as possible and allowing investment to flow into areas that are potentially profitable.

There is one aspect of this that I like to emphasize, particularly in the light of debt problems that we run into in various parts of the world, not so much in this part of the world as others. Part of the debt problem results from an attitude toward foreign equity investment. It seems to me, needs to be changed. It results from an attitude that when you want to attract resources from another country to come to your country and help in the development of it, you should borrow the money rather than attract it as equity. And countries that did it to excess. When they get into rough weather, as always happens with world economy—it has its ups and its downs—they found themselves debt-heavy, and the debt was difficult to carry, whereas, if the proportion of the resources drawn in from outside were heavier in equity, rather than the equity, so to speak, carries the burden. There is no obligation to pay interest or to pay it back. It's there to participate, and, of course, it's there as a risk capital and hopes to profit well from the posture. So, I think that, just as companies have historically had to look at their debt equity ratio, one of the lessons that we should learn from our experience of the last few years is that countries, too, need to look at their debt equity ratio. And this to my mind is an additional reason why it's healthy to go in equity foreign investment. It gives you greater protection in the sense of long periods that are inevitably going to come when everything isn't booming.

Q. In your opinion, there should be some kind of continuity of foreign investment. In your meeting with American businessmen this morning, did anyone bring up any fears, or are they generally satisfied?

A. They are generally satisfied. No one is perfectly satisfied, so there are always things that they would like to see done.

There are two things in particular that are being discussed with varying degrees of urgency, both following the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. One is an investment treaty, and the other is some discussions that are restarting on a tax treaty. Both of these two things would help in just the way that I cited. An investment treaty would tend to set out the rules of the game as understood between the two countries. And a tax treaty would set up a regime that basically avoids double taxation and makes clear, as between the two countries, which country is going to tax what kind of earning and the individual enterprise. Then those are the rules of the game. As we all know, the tax element in any investment is a very important one. So those are the two particular suggestions that are being discussed, and we hope that those discussions would progress well.

Q. The Olympic Council of Malaysia and the Olympic Council of South Korea and a number of countries have been receiving letters allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan threatening athletes who are going to the Los Angeles Olympics. Has the U.S. Government investigation shown whether it is from any particular country or source, and could you comment on this?

A. I have just heard about these letters from the Ku Klux Klan—or allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan—and they are of such a nature that it is hard to believe they were actually sent by any such organization. And the sentiments they expressed are totally unacceptable. It almost makes you wonder if it isn't a disinformation campaign of some sort. And they will be looked into.

But the main point is that athletes from all over the world are most welcome at the Olympics in Los Angeles. There are a record number of countries that are attending. There will be great care taken to see that the security of all is well provided for, and there is a tremendous effort being made along those lines, as well as in all other aspects of the conduct of the Olympics. Just before leaving on my trip, I met

with the Olympic officials, both the U.S. and international Olympic officials, and we went over all these things. And I think that, on the whole, matters are in very satisfactory shape, and we look forward to a wonderful amateur Olympic games coming up.

Q. Did you mean Soviet disinformation?

A. No, I just—we will leave it at that.

Q. There has been a lot of talk of a Pacific Basin concept, something like a Pacific version of the EEC [European Economic Community]. Do you have any thoughts on it, if it's worthwhile to have some sort of common market here?

A. The idea of a Pacific Basin is sort of intuitively attractive. But I don't know of anyone who really believes that some organization like the European Community is the right sort of parallel, something that attempts to be operational in nature.

On the other hand, there are many who feel that an improved way of sharing information, of identifying common problems, of developing a consensus about how they might be dealt with, and of having that kind of touch between the countries of the region might be useful. We've been exploring that. Ambassador Fairbanks has been out around the Pacific talking with people, trying to gather a sense of their ideas, and it was interesting to us, and quite welcome to us, that the ASEAN countries decided to put this general idea on the agenda of the meetings that will be taking place in Jakarta, and I will be very interested to hear what their views are. But I don't think that any operating sort of formal organization, like the European Community, is the odds at all. And what may emerge, if anything, is something that is much looser and more in the nature of an analytical, information-sharing, consensus-building, problem-identifying kind of organization.

But the area itself is going like gangbusters. It's expanding. It's very dynamic, and maybe that's a good argument for having the government stay away from anything like this. It's doing so well without the benefit of an organization. But at the same time, it may be that there are some things that could be added by a loose form of information-sharing. But this is an idea that will be discussed a lot not only in Jakarta but subsequently. From the U.S. standpoint, we are very interested in taking part in those discussions.

THE SECRETARY

NEWS CONFERENCE.
SINGAPORE.
JULY 10, 1984

It is always a special privilege to come to Singapore because of what Singapore represents in terms of its vibrancy and growth, and, of course, also because it gives me a chance to visit with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, such an extraordinary person. I have had that privilege again this afternoon. I would take this occasion to express my admiration for him, my pleasure at having a chance to talk with him again, and my gratitude for being received so hospitably here in Singapore.

Q. Yesterday in Amman, French President Francois Mitterrand said that the Soviet Union should be involved in the peace process in the Middle East. How do you feel about that, and if the current climate is such, is Soviet involvement either likely or desirable?

A. The Soviet Union has been involved in the turmoil in the Middle East. What we seek is solving the problems there, and we have not seen any evidence of a constructive instinct on their part toward solving the Palestinian problems, toward solving the problems of Lebanon, or other aspects of the Middle East picture. We are always looking for constructive contributions, but we just have not seen any from that quarter.

Q. In view of the Soviet Union pouring arms to the Vietnamese, what is the rationale behind your government's decision not to give military aid to the Kampuchean coalition to fight Vietnamese repression?

A. Our program here is to support the efforts of the ASEAN countries. We believe that they have come about this very intelligently and strongly, not only in terms of their efforts to support the democratic forces in Kampuchea but also in their diplomatic efforts to demonstrate to the world and have the world support the condemnation of Vietnamese aggression and the development of a better life in Kampuchea. So we have felt that the best role for the United States is supporting this good effort, and we will continue to do so.

Q. The State Department has placed a ban on nonessential travel to Bulgaria. Is it because of allegations of Bulgaria's notorious involvement in drug trafficking or because of recent reports coming out on Bulgaria's involvement in the assassination attempt on the Pope?

A. No, the advisory on travel to Bulgaria is simply a precaution to Americans that they are well advised to stay away at a time when there are some tensions. This has nothing to do with the Italian case. It has to do more with the drug case and some of the other repercussions of it.

Q. Most ASEAN members are quite concerned about recent U.S.-China relations and U.S. expectations of China's role in this region. How would you allay such fears?

A. People in the past have been concerned that we are concerned about what we do, but I think that the basic point is that China is an important country in Asia and in the world generally, obviously. The center of gravity of our efforts in this part of the world is on what ASEAN is doing. Nevertheless we think that a constructive relationship between the United States and China lends stability to the region, not the other way around, and to the extent that statements like that assuage people's fears, then so be it.

Q. You said this morning and today that we are not supplying more aid to the Kampuchean coalition because we support ASEAN. Are you saying that we consult with ASEAN, and they do not want us to supply more aid to the Kampuchean coalition?

A. We consult with the ASEAN countries. We discussed this whole question at length today. I did with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew yesterday in Kuala Lumpur, and I expect to have further discussions of it in Jakarta. What I can say is that we believe we are playing a genuinely helpful and constructive part in this effort, and beyond that I am not prepared to go.

Q. The ban on travel to Bulgaria, is that to all Americans or just to government officials?

A. We are concentrating on government officials, but I think all Americans might take note.

Q. There are certain reservations stated by the Indonesians concerning the U.S. agreement in principle to sell arms to China. How sympathetic to the fears expressed by Indonesia will the United States be on this issue?

A. Of course, we will listen to comments that our friends have to make about things we are doing on all sorts of matters. People register their views with us about arms control, about our economy, about all manner of things, including subjects such as that.

We listen to our friends, and at the same time we believe that it is important that the United States develop a stable and mature relationship with China. The new fledgling military relationship is something that is just starting, and the concept of it has entirely to do with defensive arms. I think it is worth calling people's attention to the fact that there is a very large number of Soviet forces ranged on China's northern border, and there are many SS-20 missiles aimed in China's direction. So there are threats that China must be concerned about, naturally, that are different from things that Indonesia may be concerned about.

Q. Do you have any indication that the Soviet Union has been trying to dissuade other countries not in the Soviet area from coming to the Olympics? You suggested that perhaps there was some disinformation involved in this, a letter that went out allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan. Have there been any other indication from other types of channels?

A. I didn't connect that letter with the Soviet Union in any explicit way. I mention it just to note. We have seen some activity designed to try to discourage people, and, of course, we know very well the countries of Eastern Europe were disappointed and are disappointed not to be going to the Olympics. The fact of the matter is that a record number of countries is coming to the Olympics. Let me assure everybody again that strong precautions are being taken to ensure that the situation is a secure one and that the games can go on in a strong and lively competitive spirit and in the spirit of amateur athletics. We all look forward to the Olympics.

Q. Apart from the talks with Lee Kuan Yew on the Kampuchean question, what are the other topics that came up for discussion?

A. I don't want to go into detail about a discussion with a head of state, but general topics that we talked about are certainly things that you would expect. The Kampuchean question was perhaps foremost. We discussed world economic issues, particularly as they bear on the part of the world. The Prime Minister sees very well the connection between what goes on here and what goes on elsewhere, so we spent a good bit of time on that. I called attention to our concerns about the problem of intellectual property. We had a little discussion about that. That was the general range of our discussion.

Q. Again from this morning, you said that the Soviets are having trouble taking "yes" for an answer regarding our going to the Vienna talks. Is the U.S. position that we've accepted without preconditions and that the United States will still go to the Vienna talks even if we can't talk about the reduction of missiles?

A. We have had a proposal to discuss questions involving militarization of space, and the Soviets put forth a series of topics that they thought were equivalent of that concept. We have said we will participate in a discussion of that topic, and we have some ideas ourselves about how the topic should be defined. In our view, things that go through space that are military, like ballistic missiles, ought to be on the agenda, and we intend to discuss them. That is saying "yes" and at the same time suggesting that the way they define the topic is all right, but there are some additional definitions that we think are important.

Q. The Soviets have at various times also suggested that a precondition to those talks would be an agreement to a moratorium on all testing of antisatellite systems. Would the United States be prepared to accept that, or are we not accepting that as one of the conditions?

A. I don't think it is clear that it is a precondition, although sometimes statements are made that make it a precondition. This is just the kind of thing we need to get straightened out, and are trying to get straightened out, in our private diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union.

We think a moratorium on testing is not now, with them having testing and we not having done so, is asymmetrical with respect to its impact. A moratorium on deployment is the sort of thing that is very difficult to verify, and verification is the heart of the problem here. If you don't verify a moratorium, it's hard to know quite what it means. Or, to put it another way, what is important is to get to some discussion of this issue and see what can be made of the issue of verification. Until you do that, it doesn't seem wise to agree to something that you haven't really worked out.

Q. The fact that you drew attention to the question of American intellectual property in your talks with the Prime Minister today reflects a certain amount of concern on your part over the question of computer software piracy in Singapore. Were you interested in hearing the views of

our Prime Minister on this issue, or were you actually advocating that the Singapore Government do something about this?

A. We think that it is a problem, and something should be done about it. I am always interested in hearing the Prime Minister's views, and I did. And I would say that the problem exists in places other than Singapore. It is not just something here. It is a concern that we have with respect to many countries, and I think it is a very legitimate problem that needs to be addressed. It is in the interests of a country like Singapore to address the problem because how that property is to be handled affects the flow of that property around the world, not only here but elsewhere.

Q. At last year's ASEAN meeting, as I recall, you were extremely critical of the Vietnamese, especially on the issue of the return of remains of American servicemen and the general prisoner-of-war issues. Since then, a high-level U.S. delegation has gone to Vietnam. The Vietnamese are, after some fits and starts, releasing some further remains of Americans. How do you now feel about what Vietnam has done or is doing in this area, and could you say a word about what you expect more broadly about U.S. relations with Vietnam in the year or two ahead?

A. Some progress has been made. We welcome it, and there is the prospect of some further progress. We very much want to see that happen. There is a large problem ahead of us. There are many people unaccounted for, possibly even still alive, and so the issue is a very important one.

Insofar as long-term relations with Vietnam are concerned, it represents a major stumbling block that must be gotten out of the way. Even if there were a Kampuchean settlement of some kind that was satisfactory, we would still find this a matter of great concern and would want to see it dealt with properly.

Q. You say that possibly there are some still alive. Has anything been learned in the past year that would give any further indication whether any are alive, or does our information stand precisely where it did a year ago?

A. My statement does not reflect any new information. It is just that there are a large number—some 2,500—that we don't know about, and so there is always the possibility that there may be someone still alive. That is all I meant.

Q. Returning to the intellectual property question, might there be any chance of GSP [generalized system of preferences] quotas being used as a possible lever to gain satisfaction from Singapore and other countries where there is a problem?

A. That proposal has been made as I've heard, and I think that the right way to go about this is to have the kind of discussions that I've had. I hope it will be possible to get it straightened out without going in for that kind of conditionality. It is the sort of thing that tends to arise when a problem nags and nags, and people start feeling strongly about it.

I might say on the GSP legislation, it is something the Reagan Administration strongly supports, and we have been working at that for over a year now, so that the GSP would be extended. It is not progressing well in the House of Representatives, it is not progressing at all. But we want very much to see some action by the Congress so that it doesn't lapse at the end of this year. We will be working on that.

Q. Last September, a joint appeal on Kampuchea was signed by the ASEAN countries. This move was backed by the United States, and the third step in the resolution on the Kampuchean problem was the proposed normalization of relations between Vietnam and the United States. If such a thing should go through, what sort of normalization, what sort of relationship, would the United States establish with Vietnam? Would it include just developmental aid?

A. I'm afraid the prospect of normalization is so far away that it is really fruitless to speculate about it. There is the MIA-POW issue we've spoken of, and right now what we see in Kampuchea is a continued Vietnamese aggression. So far as I can see, efforts to bring about any kind of reasonable negotiation on the subject have run into a stone wall from Vietnam. I think that any thought of normalization with the United States is just miles away.

Q. There were reports a couple of years ago, at least, that there were probably several Americans still alive who chose to stay. Are you referring to that kind of thing or to Americans still alive but in prison?

A. I was making a general observation, in effect, that when you are without knowledge of as many individuals as is the case here that it is always possible that someone may still be alive. That's all, there's nothing, no new information nor any special implication connected with the statement.

STATEMENT. ASEAN DIALOGUE. JULY 13, 1984¹

This new opportunity to carry forward my country's constructive and fruitful dialogue with ASEAN is most welcome; in fact, it is genuinely refreshing to return to Southeast Asia and meet again with my ASEAN friends.

I am delighted to note the addition of Brunei to this association. The United States has a tradition of diplomatic contact with Brunei extending well back into the 19th century.

The accomplishments of all the ASEAN countries, individually and as a group, have captured worldwide attention and admiration. In 1967, at a time when few outside the region rated your prospects very high, you founded this unique organization to promote economic development, in recognition of the importance of regional cooperation and self-help. Through disciplined and creative economic management, your real growth rate has averaged over 7% a year for the last decade. Through realism and courage you have forced the world to address the threat to regional and world peace posed by Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea. You instituted this remarkable annual meeting in early recognition of the importance of serious dialogue between developed and developing countries.

In all these respects the ASEAN countries have distinguished themselves by realism, imagination, and sense of purpose. You face formidable economic problems and the dangers of Vietnamese aggression. You bear a significant burden of refugees for whom you have generously provided first asylum. But your success so far enables you to confront these problems with confidence and makes other nations—my own most definitely included—want to work with you.

Thus, in contrast to so many parts of today's world, ASEAN represents the stability and progress that are the goals of people everywhere. ASEAN, like the United States, faces both opportunities and problems. These meetings give us the chance to consult on both, and that is why we are here. We can take satisfaction from our common record to date. But we cannot rest on our laurels.

Today, I would like to discuss three of the most serious challenges we face together and the principles upon which President Reagan has determined that the United States will address them.

They are principles that provide, I believe, a solid basis for cooperation between my nation and ASEAN.

- The first is **realism**: we must see the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be, facing up to problems as well as opportunities.

- Next is **strength**: no policy can succeed from a position of weakness. Economic vigor, military power, and a strong sense of national purpose are prerequisites to the achievement of our objectives.

- And third, **negotiation**: fortified by realism and strength, we must help to resolve international problems through principled, effective diplomacy.

On these pillars of realism, strength, and negotiation, the United States is at work today in the interest of peace and freedom. On this basis we are prepared to work with ASEAN on the great challenges we face in common.

Preserving Peace and the Challenge of Arms Control

No issue is more important today than preserving peace, and none has higher priority for the United States. Responsible policies to reduce the risk of war and strengthen international stability are a goal shared by all our peoples. The first challenge of arms control is an important part of this effort to preserve peace.

Preserving peace in the nuclear age is a duty we owe all inhabitants of this planet. Ensuring a lasting peace is foremost in President Reagan's mind, for as he has said: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." He said it in China. He said it in Germany. He said it in Japan. He said it in England. He said it in Congress. He said it in the Oval Office. He has said it throughout America. It is the essence of a principle that has the full support of responsible people everywhere.

Much of the debate on nuclear issues focuses on the enormous destructive potential of existing arsenals. President Reagan has led the way in the responsible effort to reduce nuclear arsenals to equal levels, with effective verification. He has proposed the complete elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons—American Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles and Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s. He has rejected Soviet proposals that would simply transfer such weapons from where they threaten Europe to where

they threaten Asia. In the strategic arms reduction talks (START), he has proposed deep reductions in intercontinental nuclear arsenals, focusing on the most powerful categories of weapons—ballistic missile warheads—a goal no previous strategic arms treaty has even approached. Last November, the Soviets walked out of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotiations and in December suspended indefinitely their participation in START. The United States is ready to resume both negotiations at any time and in any place, without preconditions. We hope the Soviet Union also will come to recognize that its interests are best served by returning to the negotiating table as soon as possible.

But the United States has not simply waited for Soviet responses. In addition to our efforts, extending over many years, to negotiate balanced and verifiable arms control agreements, we have made substantial reductions in our own nuclear stockpile, as well as improvements to its safety and security. Both the number and megatonnage of our nuclear arsenal have been substantially reduced. Our stockpile was one-third higher in 1967 than it is now, and its total destructive power has declined by 75% since 1968. In addition, we and our allies have begun a process of reducing the stockpile of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe, bringing it to the lowest level in 20 years. Even in the absence of an INF agreement, at least five nuclear warheads will be taken out of Europe for every new Pershing II and cruise missile introduced. The result will be a net reduction of 2,400 nuclear weapons over the next few years.

America has begun to modernize its nuclear forces, even as we have sought to reduce nuclear arsenals. We have done so after a decade of restraint—restraint unmatched, indeed exploited, by our adversaries. We are modernizing in a way which, in conjunction with our arms control proposals, will enhance stability and reduce the risk of war. Our modernization program provides important incentives for the Soviets to agree to our proposals for equitable and verifiable reductions in arsenals.

In addition to our far-reaching proposals for reducing the level of nuclear armaments, the United States has proposed a number of other important arms control initiatives to reduce the risk of war and halt or reverse the growth in weapons.

In Geneva, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

In Stockholm, together with our NATO allies, we have put forward a package of confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of a European war occurring by accident, surprise attack, or miscalculation.

In Vienna, at the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, we presented, again with our European allies, a new initiative that seeks a common ground between Eastern and Western positions and progress on reducing the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We will persist in our efforts to reduce the risk of war and achieve substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. And we will persevere in our efforts with the Soviets to build a relationship based on realism, restraint, and reciprocity.

Unfortunately, until very recently, the only response of the Soviet Union has been silence or walkout. We hope that their recently expressed interest in negotiations at Vienna represents a change of heart. We have accepted the Soviet offer to begin talks on weapons in Vienna, and we intend to go to Vienna. There are no preconditions attached to our willingness to discuss arms control matters. The Soviets have proposed the same issues and we, too, will have issues we want to discuss. We are now trying to work out arrangements through diplomatic channels.

We want to improve our relations with the Soviet Union across a wide spectrum. We have close and continuous diplomatic contact with them at all levels. President Reagan has called this year a year of opportunities for peace. We are making every effort to ensure that these opportunities multiply and that we make the most of every one of them.

At the same time, we will continue our efforts to strengthen our deterrent forces. This is as important to keeping the peace as the effort to control arms. One of the ironies of the nuclear age is that weapons must be built in order that they not be used. The effectiveness of our military forces in peacetime is of great importance to the avoidance of their employment in war. Our approach has served us well; in the years since World War II, we have succeeded in maintaining the nuclear balance and deterring nuclear war.

Your countries and my country threaten no one. Our military forces are designed to keep the peace, and we are proud of the job they have done. This has called for a considerable effort to fill some of the gaps that had developed in the last decade, particularly in this critical part of the world. President Reagan is determined that those efforts will continue.

The Challenge of Regional Stability

A second great challenge which faces us all is achieving regional stability. This task is every bit as critical as the effort to control nuclear weapons, for the greatest danger of nuclear war arises from smaller wars that could get out of control. The promotion of regional stability thus serves global as well as regional interests. The nations of every region achieving stability meet not only the deepest aspirations of their own people; they also contribute importantly to the avoidance of global conflict, nuclear or conventional. We must never forget, however, that so-called small wars, even if contained within a region, have caused devastating losses in recent decades. Hundred of thousands of lives have been lost, damaged, or dislocated in virtually every quarter of the globe. We must expend every effort to turn energies that are absorbed in conflict toward peace, justice, and lasting stability.

The United States is proud of its part in the system of regional alliances. These alliances—backed by credible military presence—have helped to maintain a remarkable degree of regional stability, even in the face of shocks like the Rangoon bombing which, in an earlier age, might easily have led to war. Our alliances with two of your members, the Philippines and Thailand, contribute to a stability which benefits the entire region, and we are grateful for their contribution. We recognize as well the responsible self-defense efforts of the nonaligned members of ASEAN.

The principles of realism, strength, and diplomacy are the keys to progress in regional disputes. These are the principles the United States has been using in its Central America policy. We seek and we support a regional solution there—one that the nations most threatened by the conflict agreed upon in their meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica. That objective is now embodied in the 21 principles developed in the Contadora process. Behind a strengthened security shield, this approach can provide development, democracy, and an end to attempts to achieve hegemony in

that region via Cuban and Soviet intervention.

The policy ASEAN has adopted in dealing with the problem of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea reflects these same principles. Realism leads you to recognize that Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea threatens the entire region and that no one is safe if such acts of blatant aggression succeed. You recognize the need for strength—political and economic as well as military—to confront Vietnam with the clear choice between bearing the burdens of aggression or enjoying the benefits of cooperation with ASEAN and with countries, like my own, that firmly support you. You have offered Vietnam a realistic proposal for a negotiated political solution, one based on the restoration of Kampuchea's sovereignty and the rights of its people to choose their own government. Such a solution safeguards the interests of the Khmer people and of all Kampuchea's neighbors.

Your appeal to Vietnam is based not only on what is right, but also on what would serve Vietnam's own best interest—if Vietnam would only see its long-term interests more clearly. The regional tensions which Hanoi causes work to its own disadvantage. Vietnam is disastrously diverting its resources from its own development and the welfare of its energetic and talented people. Compared with the relationship Hanoi could have with the rest of the world—with access to markets, new technologies, and foreign assistance, as well as greatly increased diplomatic options—Vietnam's present isolation, resulting from its occupation of Kampuchea, imposes a cruel burden on its own people.

No Vietnamese proposal to date has addressed the underlying issues—withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and creation of a government in Phnom Penh chosen by the Khmer people themselves. It is a given, I think we all agree, that free choice by the Khmer people would not result in a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. None of us wish such an outcome. A Kampuchean government responsive to the Khmer people and to the urgent need for national reconstruction would be a threat to no one and would contribute to the kind of stability so important to Southeast Asia.

I want to convey America's admiration for what has been achieved by ASEAN in obtaining international support for a just settlement in Kampuchea.

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We will continue to do our part, including moral, political, and humanitarian support for the organizations led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann. We will give no support to the Khmer Rouge, whose atrocities outraged the world.

While we are discussing Vietnam, let me reemphasize that an accounting of Americans missing in action from the conflict in Indochina is a matter of the highest priority for the United States. The United States has both a legal and moral responsibility to obtain the fullest possible accounting of almost 2,500 of our men still missing. The American people rightfully expect no less. We deeply appreciate the support you have given us with Vietnam on this problem. It is a problem which demands meaningful cooperation and progress before the American people will permit discussion of normalization with the Vietnamese, even in the context of a Kampuchea settlement.

It is, therefore, in the interest of all of us to persuade Hanoi to come forward rapidly. It is the humane thing to do. The longer this issue lingers, the deeper will be the resentment of the American people. That serves no one's interests and thwarts the goal we all share of moving beyond the tragic history of Indochina to a more hopeful and constructive future. We appreciate the recently announced repatriation of remains. We call on Vietnam in a humanitarian spirit to meet the commitments it made to us recently and accelerate its efforts to resolve the issue. Resolution of this sensitive problem would be greeted as a significant and positive step by the American people and would establish a precedent for future cooperation.

Still another tragedy is the large and continuing flow of people fleeing Vietnamese repression and aggression. Our joint efforts on the refugee issue provide a remarkable example of international cooperation, involving ASEAN, the United States, and other countries whose humanitarian principles have led them to assist in coping with this cruel tragedy. Thailand, which has borne the biggest burden of first asylum, has responded magnificently in providing a haven for close to two-thirds of a million refugees. Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines also have made major contributions to the alleviation of human suffering by providing temporary asylum and processing facilities. The entire international community applauds

you for your unceasing efforts in dealing with this problem, which was caused by Vietnam and imposed upon you.

The United States is proud of the part it has played in resettling Indochinese refugees. Of the 1.37 million refugees who have been resettled around the world since 1975, 650,000—almost one-half of the entire total—have been resettled in the United States. Absorbing such numbers can never be easy, but we are proud to have these refugees come to our shores. Ours is a nation built by people seeking freedom from tyranny. Our country is enriched by the energies and talents of the Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian refugees.

Other nations represented at this conference have also played their part. In fact, the entire refugee resettlement process, from first asylum to final resettlement, represents international cooperation at its finest. If we are to maintain the cooperative nature of this endeavor, all of us must continue to shoulder our share of the burden. We in the United States will do so, and we urge others to do so as well.

One of the tragic effects of the movement of people seeking refuge has been an increase in piracy. Although the number of vicious attacks on helpless refugees—including women and children—has declined, it is still a terrible risk to run for those seeking freedom. I know that all ASEAN governments condemn these acts of piracy and are anxious to find ways to combat this problem. We stand ready to help in any way possible.

The Challenge of Economic Development

We face a third great challenge in concert with all members of the international community—economic development. All the leaders of ASEAN have made economic development a major goal, and it has become a central part of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. But we are all part of a world economy so our efforts must extend beyond the confines of the U.S.-ASEAN relationship.

Prior to the recent London economic summit, [Indonesian] Foreign Minister Mochtar wrote me and others in his capacity as chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, asking me to bear in mind the concerns of the ASEAN countries as the summit leaders addressed global economic issues. It should be clear from the outcome of that summit that ASEAN's concerns were very much on our minds.

Trade Issues. The first topic Foreign Minister Mochtar addressed was trade. We share the view that trade is a major engine of the development process. Trade liberalization is an indispensable element in ensuring that the global recovery will endure and spread. We worked hard to see that the summit declaration urged formal movement on new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade round. In our judgment, a new round will stimulate confidence in the recovery and can offer the prospect of significant benefits to the developing world.

A key objective of a new trade round will be to confront the protectionist pressures that afflict all of us, developed and developing countries alike. On this point, I am sure we are in full agreement. We may disagree, however, on the extent of protectionism now being provided our respective industries.

The United States is frequently accused of bowing to protectionist pressures to the detriment of the developing world. Examples often cited are textile shoes, and steel. We do face protectionist pressure, and occasionally we are forced to limit the growth of imports of some products. I note with pride, however, that the U.S. economy is a genuinely open one, and this openness of great benefit to developing countries. The United States is the world's biggest market for the manufactured exports of developing countries, taking over 50% of such exports to all industrial countries. Even in sensitive industries where protectionist pressure is high, imports have continued to grow, often exceeding the growth in total output in that industry.

The complaint heard most concerns textiles. But during the first 4 months of 1984, textile imports to the United States are 50% above the same period in 1983; in the case of the ASEAN countries, the figure is 107%. A rate of increase like that in a sensitive American industry causes us real problems and brings an understandable reaction in the United States. But the increases are there, nonetheless. The United States has an open market. Imports are a permanent part of our economic life and welcome the benefits they bring.

Protectionism is a danger we all must combat. IMF [International Monetary Fund] studies have made clear the damage that high levels of protectionism have caused to certain developing countries. I agree with those who have raised objections to proposals for the United States for local content

islation. President Reagan's Administration is vigorously opposed to laws but the principle of realism is required here as well, for this is a practice widespread in the developing as well as developed worlds. Nor can we ignore the reality that the average tariff level in the developing countries is 30% compared to 4.7% in developed countries.

A trade issue of particular concern to the United States is infringement of intellectual property rights. American businesses lose hundreds of millions of dollars annually due to the counterfeiting and piracy of records, tapes, and other intellectual property. But the even bigger losers are those nations who fail to offer protection to intellectual property. America's high-technology companies—for example, in computers and computer software—are not going to want to invest in countries where their intellectual property can be stolen with impunity. This will result in a loss to those countries of the types of skills needed to develop a modern industrial sector with well-educated, high paid, skilled workers. This is an issue that concerns us all and which must be addressed quickly.

Growth in the industrial democracies is crucial to the trade and thus to the economies of the developing world—and I wish to emphasize—vice versa. Industrial output in non-oil-producing developing countries is expected to rise 3.5% this year, compared to 1.6% last year. A major part of this recovery is due to the increase in world trade. Achievement of sustained noninflationary growth in the United States and maintenance of our open markets are of prime importance to the developing world. Conversely, ASEAN's prosperity has created new markets and enhanced investment opportunities for American business.

The strong growth of U.S. import demand has been the major factor in the recovery of world trade, with U.S. imports up 13% in 1983 and an estimated 10% for 1984. In the case of ASEAN, increased exports to the United States accounted for over 60% of ASEAN's total export increase in 1983. These percentages are pretty big in anybody's terms, but in terms of ASEAN's economies they are huge, for the American economy is truly enormous.

Commodity Agreements. The second issue mentioned by Foreign Minister Mochtar on behalf of the ASEAN countries was commodities. In practice, commodity agreements often interfere with market forces to the detriment of rational long-term allocation of capital,

land, and labor. Bearing these differences in mind, however, we may be able to turn to negotiation along avenues that can lead to practical and economically productive areas of agreement.

The International Rubber Agreement is one commodity arrangement that we both are able to support. We anticipate that negotiations to renew this agreement will proceed in a good-faith manner. Another example is the U.S.-ASEAN memorandum of understanding on tin that we concluded late last year, directly as a result of the ASEAN dialogue meeting. We intend to follow the same precepts of realism and diplomacy in examining other commodity issues.

Debt and Finance. The third and fourth topics in Foreign Minister Mochtar's letter were debt and finance. Here the London summit participants agreed that their strategy for dealing with the international debt crisis is working as intended. One of the lessons we have learned in recent years is that over-reliance on foreign borrowing to finance development can lead to successively complex problems, especially during an economic downturn. I want to underscore the Williamsburg and London declarations' recognition of the importance of private capital flows to the developing world. Private equity funds can provide an important complement to domestic savings, while avoiding the pitfalls that come with large amounts of foreign debt. Furthermore, as the London summit recognized, foreign direct investment "carries the advantage of being tied to productive capital formation, as well as forming part of the package that includes the transfer of technology and skills." Countries, just as companies, must pay attention to their debt-to-equity ratio. The ASEAN countries you represent have been wise in pursuing, for the most part, sensible strategies of foreign borrowing. The United States stands ready to work with you to improve the climate for increased foreign equity flows. For example, we are prepared to enter into discussions about treaties for encouraging and protecting investment.

Another aspect of the financial side of cooperation is development assistance. While it can never match trade or private foreign investment—let alone investment based on domestic savings—in terms of its impact on the recipient

country, it can play a crucial catalytic role, particularly for the poorest countries. U.S. assistance to the developing world exceeds that of any OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] country. In fiscal year (FY) 1983, the United States provided \$249 million in bilateral economic assistance to ASEAN countries. Together with security assistance, our total bilateral aid was \$424 million.

When one adds in our share of World Bank and Asian Development Bank loans to the ASEAN countries, total U.S. assistance in FY 1983 exceeded \$1 billion. We are the largest participant in the major international financial institutions. We will maintain these flows to the extent that our budgetary conditions permit and we will continue to support the programs directed toward ASEAN of the IMF, the World Bank, and the ASEAN Development Bank.

North/South Dialogue. Mr. Mochtar's fifth point addressed the North/South dialogue. We believe in dialogue; that is why we are here. That is why we support substantive work in the GATT, IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other similar institutions. The forums for the dialogue exist. The institutions for carrying out programs exist. What we must find are practical solutions, working in those forums where constructive action can be taken.

U.S.-ASEAN Relations

Each time I return to this region I am impressed anew with the sense of dynamism I encounter. ASEAN's record of progress over the past decade has been phenomenal. Your average real annual growth is the envy of the rest of the world—developed and developing. Your growth in trade with the rest of the world in the last decade was more than twice that of overall world trade. Your exports have grown from \$14 billion to over \$70 billion in the same period—a most impressive record. Complementing the dynamism of the region is its stability. Much of the developing world must grapple with rapid and uncontrolled change that threatens political and economic institutions. But the countries of this region have become models for balancing stability with controlled and beneficial change.

On this visit, I have been reminded again how our host government, under President Soeharto's leadership, has

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drawn on the traditional Indonesian value of consultation and consensus to construct a stability that stands in stark contrast to the turmoil that followed the 1945 revolution. In Malaysia, I saw a vibrant parliamentary democracy at work, a political system that demonstrates that people from different ethnic groups can work together in harmony to forge a nation. In Singapore, I saw how imaginative leadership combined with the principles of free enterprise can overcome the shortage of natural resources. The Philippines, although still beset by serious financial difficulties, recently held important legislative elections, which showed the Filipinos' deep commitment to the democratic process. I have been heartened by Thailand's impressive political stability and deepened cooperation with my country. And Deputy Secretary Dam felt the promise of Brunei as it celebrated its independence this year.

Today, there is a growing awareness of Asia's importance to the United States. East Asia's rapid economic growth has had a profound impact on our own economy. U.S. investment in ASEAN, currently almost \$8 billion, according to recent Department of Commerce figures, continues to increase, as American business sees new opportunities in ASEAN's expanding free-market economies. The U.S.-ASEAN Center for Technology Exchange provides an opportunity to promote the transfer of technology from the United States to ASEAN firms. America's annual trade with East Asia and the Pacific exceeds that with any other part of the world—and has for 5 years. ASEAN is now the fifth largest trading partner of the United States—with total trade exceeding \$23 billion.

There is a deep human and cultural dimension to our relations as well. This year there are more than 40,000 students from ASEAN nations studying in the United States and the number of my countrymen who visit Southeast Asia and become involved here continues to rise. I, myself, visited this region often as a private citizen and spread the word of the new Southeast Asia to my friends back home. Your societies, your histories, your intellectual and artistic achievements every year become more familiar to Americans and contribute to a lasting bond between us. Behind each statistic there are complex person-to-person contacts that will link our lands and peoples ever more closely in the future.

Southeast Asia is an area that commands U.S. attention within the Asia/Pacific region. In recent years, questions have been raised about the firmness of American purpose in Southeast Asia. Some feared that our withdrawal from Vietnam would lead us to abandon our interests in the region, particularly in ASEAN. The prospect—some years ago—of a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea fed these fears.

Let me assure you that nothing could be further from reality. U.S. security interests are increasingly engaged in Asia and the Pacific. We are committed to an active, constructive, and long-term presence in Southeast Asia.

Our relations with the ASEAN countries are the cornerstone of our policy in Southeast Asia. As the United States develops and expands its relations with other countries, both large and small, in Asia and around the world, we will very much keep in mind our strong ties with the ASEAN region. We do not intend to subordinate our interests in ASEAN to the pursuit of better relations elsewhere.

U.S. relations with the ASEAN region are based upon the perception that we each have a constructive and complementary role to play in dealing with the challenges that confront us. Your combined voices carry authority in the international arena and contribute to the quest for peace and economic justice. Together we can make an impressive contribution to the kind of world all our peoples seek for the future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me say once again what a pleasure it is to participate in this dialogue with you. The discussions we have had here symbolize the dynamism and vibrancy of your countries. The inclusion in our agenda this year of the theme of Pacific cooperation reflects your vision of the opportunity that the future offers to the Pacific region. We share this vision and are prepared to work with you to give it substance. The success of ASEAN, both as a regional organization and as individual countries, stands out as an example for others everywhere. The United States is proud to be associated with our allies and friends in these joint endeavors.

NEWS CONFERENCE, CANBERRA, JULY 15, 1984

First, I want to express my appreciation for the great hospitality shown me here by the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, and others in Australia. We had a very fine working dinner and a lengthy discussion last night, and again this morning a brief private meeting with the Foreign Minister. The meeting this morning will continue on, so we want to, all of us, express our appreciation for this mark of cordiality. Of course I'll be meeting with the Foreign Minister further in New Zealand when we get there tomorrow.

Q. The New Zealand Labor Party abides by its policy in banning nuclear ships from New Zealand waters. Does this mean the end of the ANZUS treaty?

A. I had the chance to talk briefly on the telephone with the newly elected Prime Minister [David Lange], and I expect that we will have a chance to meet. He said that he was going out of his way to come to Wellington, and we will have a chance to discuss the situation. There is a very warm feeling between the people of the United States and, I think, the people of New Zealand, and we will work at the situation. I don't want to prejudge it.

Q. This morning David Lange said on TV that his government would implement his party's policy on banning U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons from New Zealand ports, but he said he did not believe that that would jeopardize ANZUS. Would you accept that view?

A. As I said, I will have discussion with him. We'll have a meeting of the ANZUS group, and we'll make our statements as we go along in that setting. I don't want to prejudge the situation.

Q. But do you express concern over that New Zealand Labor Party policy, whether or not it's put into effect? Do you express concern of the policy itself?

A. ANZUS is an alliance. It is an alliance in the light of the fact that the basic values of freedom, liberty, and the rule of law are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, among other countries in the world. And so we recognize that there are threats to the values and that we have to deter these threats. That is essentially the basis of

alliance. Now for an alliance to mean anything, it has to be possible for the military forces of the respective countries to be able to interact together; otherwise it's not much of an alliance. These are matters that we'll discuss, nevertheless, I think that's just a statement of fact.

Q. Would you be asking for Mr. Hayden to perhaps use whatever influence he has on the New Zealand Labor Party to see the reality of the ANZUS treaty?

A. Mr. Hayden and the Prime Minister, of course, will express themselves from the standpoint of the Australian view of matters, and we'll express the U.S. view of matters. I think that there's a great deal of good will on all sides of this issue, and we'll have to proceed and see what we can work out.

Q. If the New Zealand Government does ban the warships, can we expect to see more of them here in Australia?

A. I don't want to bite on the conjectured speculation. I want to talk with the new leader in New Zealand, and we'll work our way along on these issues. I don't want to engage in excessive speculation.

Q. Do you expect to be able to resolve the issue during the period of ANZUS talks?

A. I think, first of all, the ANZUS talks take place among the governments that are in place in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. We will have a chance to meet with members of the new government, but it hasn't met itself yet. So this ANZUS meeting, I think, comes at a good time. The sense that it affords us an opportunity to meet with a new government, it is the old government that will be in government in place for this meeting.

Q. As you've been aware, the Labor Party's national conference in this country has taken the decision to stop homeporting of American warships in the Australian ports. Is that a matter of concern?

A. We think that the way in which the ship visits and other aspects of our relationship with Australia are basically in very good shape and we have no problems.

Q. Would the United States be contemplating changing the arrangements whereby it makes regular use of Australian ports, particularly the Port

of Fremantle in western Australia, as a result of the decision that was taken last week by the Labor Party conference?

A. As far as I can see from the discussions that I've had here, and we'll continue them, of course, the U.S.-Australia leg of the ANZUS relationship is in very good shape. We have a strong sharing of common values and a sense of the importance of succeeding in maintaining stability in the world and a place where these values can flourish. We share a common view that we must maintain a deterrent capability.

Q. Do you think that this year's ANZUS talks are slightly irrelevant, given that they are taking place with Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Cooper? Shouldn't we really be discussing it with the new Labor government?

A. I think it has fortuitously turned out to be a good time to have this conference because it gives us an opportunity to talk with a new government and to hear their views and to express our views so that these matters can be considered before the new government takes office and starts to take positions as a government. So I think that it's really a good time to be present in New Zealand, and it gives us a chance to be part of this transition that's under way.

Q. Is the United States worried about Australia's depleted defense capabilities and does the United States believe that the balance of power in the ASEAN region could be destabilized because of a lack of defense direction from Australia?

A. We think it's important for all the countries in the various alliances that we have to be looking to their defense capabilities and seeing that they are properly attended to. And, of course, we struggle with that within the United States.

President Reagan has wanted to restore the military balance and that has meant spending a lot of money and on the whole that has gone along successfully. We have had some disappointments in the appropriations process, but there has certainly been a major change in the U.S. defense posture. We work on this same problem with our NATO allies. We talk about it, the responsibilities of the Japanese and so on. So I think it's a general proposition that we have to be looking to our defense capabilities and the same is true from the standpoint of Australia.

I might say that we all recognize, on the one hand, that the nuclear side of strength is a key element in the deter-

rent, and at the same time we recognize the importance of strength in conventional forces and the importance of conventional forces to the nuclear deterrent. It is the case, at the same time, that conventional forces are expensive and so that fact means that you recognize the significance of improvement in conventional capability; you also have to be recognizing that it's going to cost you some money.

Q. Does that mean you are concerned about Australia's [inaudible] defense capability?

A. We are concerned about anything less than adequate all around the world, including with ourselves, and so we are trying to bring about—others are working with us—attention to what the capabilities are. And I don't single out any one country. I just say that we all need to be looking to our capabilities and strengthening them; recognizing, ironically, that it is through strengthening them that we lessen the chance that they would ever be used.

Q. Does the United States regard Australia's defense capabilities as adequate or not?

A. We have an alliance with Australia, as I have said, we feel that there is work to be done on the part of the United States, on the part of Australia, on the part of NATO, on the part of Japan, on the part of people who are standing for freedom and democracy all over the world. We have to be ready to defend these values, and having strength is the best insurance that we can have that the strength will not need to be used. So it isn't simply a problem for Australia. It's a problem for all of us, and all of us working together in our respective alliances.

Q. Congresswoman Ferraro has charged that President Reagan cannot claim one single foreign policy success. I am wondering if you would like to respond to that.

A. Oh, I'm not going to get into a debate with Congresswoman Ferraro, but I think that, as a general proposition, the standing of the United States in the world has been immeasurably strengthened during the Reagan Administration. Here we are in the Australia-New Zealand area, and having just come from a meeting with the ASEAN countries, and earlier this year the President has visited Japan and Korea and China, so if you look at this part of the world, we have very strong relationships here. And the same can be

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said as you look around the world more generally. So there are many problems, they are being addressed in a strong and creative way, and I think the United States is in very good shape.

Q. This is what they call in American journalism a "so-what" question. If the ANZUS alliance is not functioning effectively, what difference does it make beyond the shared values and so forth?

A. Shared values and so forth are not a "so-what" question. The importance of freedom tends to be taken for granted in the United States, in Australia, in New Zealand, in many parts of Europe, and in places that have had it and consider it normal, like breathing the air.

But it's very dramatic to talk to people who are in a country that hasn't had it. For example, this past year, I've had a chance to visit with the leaders of Spain and Portugal, and particularly I remember visiting with Prime Minister Suarez just as he returned from the inauguration of President Alfonsin in Argentina. And he was commenting upon how wonderful it is to have freedom. So, I think that freedom can't be put down as a "so-what" proposition. It needs to be attended to everywhere, and people need to address themselves to the importance of this value and the fact that it is under attack. If we're going to keep it, we have to be ready to deter aggression against it.

Q. Are you suggesting that if the ANZUS pact is not effectively working, Australia and New Zealand would lose their freedom?

A. It is part of an overall proposition, and the all-or-nothing approach suggested by your question, I don't think is appropriate. But at the same time, if we lose some deterrent capability, that increases the margin for error, and we shouldn't do it.

Q. There are reports from Washington, somewhat ambiguous, that the United States has told the Soviet Union in regard to these discussions on space weapons that it would be prepared to delay these talks until after the elections if that suited the Soviet Union. Can you amplify this in any way?

A. The Soviet Union suggested that these talks take place in Vienna in the middle of September, and we have said yes, we'll be there. There have also been lots of questions raised by them, and they keep talking about our election. We don't talk about our election; we talk

about the importance of arms control at any season of the year. So we don't want to delay these talks, but if for some reason they can't conveniently be arranged at the time set, and there's a desire to somehow have them take place after the election, then they'll take place after the election. But our desire is to have them take place in September, as was originally set, but we're not going to sort of hang on that. On the contrary, our interest is in getting them going and getting them going in a constructive way as soon as possible.

Q. Our Foreign Minister just returned from Moscow a month ago. Did you discuss that with him and, if so, did you gain any useful perceptions or information?

A. The Foreign Minister had a very interesting trip to the Soviet Union, not just in Moscow, and he provided us a good read-out from the trip after it was completed. I've had a chance to talk with him further about it on this visit, and I hope that I'll have chances for some further exchanges as we're together over the next few days. I think it's a very valuable thing that he went and got his own impressions and was able to provide those to us. It's part of the continuing dialogue, you might say, of the West with the Soviet Union. And each piece of it is of importance. His visit was quite a worthwhile one, and we're very grateful to him for being willing to share with us his own thoughts and his experiences there.

Q. While in Jakarta, did you raise the question of human rights in principle?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you present a letter to the Indonesian Government from your U.S. Congressmen expressing concern about human rights? If not, why not?

A. I'm from the Administration, and I expressed our concern and there are also things that we are trying to do that we think are helpful on East Timor. We believe that the best way to be helpful and to try to make a constructive contribution is to do it quietly in diplomatic channels and at the same time be ready to do things that may help people in East Timor and provide access to the situation. Those are the lines along which we have been working.

REMARKS, WELLINGTON, JULY 16, 1984⁵

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome Foreign Ministers Cooper and Hayden and the members of their delegations to our Embassy. I believe our first session this morning went very well, and I look forward to continuing in the same spirit during the remainder of the council meeting.

We, of course, have had a very close partnership with the existing and all previous New Zealand Governments and, in the spirit which has characterized our dealings with New Zealand over many years, we hope to continue in partnership with the new government.

My visits to Australia and New Zealand come at a time when the continued strength of the alliance has never been more critical to stability in the Pacific. Soviet naval activity in the Pacific, supported by the growing Soviet air and naval presence on the Pacific rim, continues to increase, probing for weak or vulnerable areas into which it can expand. Our ANZUS solidarity, I believe, has been critical to the failure of the Soviets to project their influence into the Southwest Pacific, particularly among the new island states of the region.

But should the ANZUS resolve ever weaken, should we ever allow our attention to be diverted from potentially destabilizing activities by indecision or belief that opting out of the alliance will decrease the dangers we might face, then I believe we will have handed our adversaries a windfall by default. Our unity is the best deterrence we have, the least expensive, and most effective way we have of convincing any potential adversary that we will always stand together. That is why we stand together, just as the United States stands with our European allies in NATO. Both alliances are communities of nations, bounded by shared democratic traditions, which have voluntarily linked their peoples and institutions into a strong chain of deterrence against anyone who would dominate us. But as with any chain, we must ensure that all the links are sturdy and in good repair.

And I think that is why we are here in Wellington these 2 days, reviewing, as we have every year for 33 years, the Pacific end of the chain, to ensure that we understand each other and our view on mutual defense and other important global and regional matters. But equal

important, we meet to deepen that sense of mutual trust which has always characterized our relations and without which any community of nations united to seek a common goal cannot survive. I am optimistic that we will succeed. In that spirit, I would like to propose a toast to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of New Zealand and Australia.

ANZUS COMMUNIQUE, JULY 17, 1984

The 33rd meeting of the ANZUS Council took place in Wellington on 16 and 17 July 1984. The United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, and Minister of Defence, Gordon Scholes, and New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walter Cooper, and Minister of Defence, David Morrison, represented their respective governments. During their visit the leaders of the United States and Australian delegations called on the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon, and Mr. David Lange, Deputy Prime Minister elect.

1. Council members reaffirmed their commitment to the maintenance of peace, stability and democratic freedoms. They expressed their belief that the ANZUS partnership, based as it is on common traditions and shared interests, contributes to this. They welcomed the increased exchanges that had taken place on political, economic, security and defense issues and agreed that defense cooperation, including combined exercises, joint military and logistic support arrangements, continued to play an essential part in promoting mutual security. Access by allied aircraft and ships to the airfields and ports of the ANZUS members was reaffirmed as essential to the continuing effectiveness of the Alliance.

2. Council members reviewed a broad range of global issues and regional developments of concern to the Alliance. These included the persistent Soviet arms buildup in the Pacific region as well as in Europe; the need for early resumption of arms control negotiations; the continuing aggression and occupation by Soviet forces in Afghanistan; and Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.

3. The Council members gave special attention to arms control and disarmament issues. They recognized that arms control agreements which produced balanced, effective and verifiable reductions in armaments would assist in reducing international tensions and in strengthening international security. They agreed that the early conclusion of such agreements was of the highest importance. Among arms control measures, a substantial reduction of nuclear weaponry to agreed, more stable levels was of the greatest urgency. Council members expressed concern at the Soviet Union's refusal to join the START [strategic arms reduction treaty] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear

force] talks and called for the resumption of those negotiations without delay. They endorsed efforts by several countries, including the United States and Australia, to establish a political dialogue with the Soviet Union and to make progress on arms control. The New Zealand and Australian Council members welcomed the readiness of the United States to resume negotiations at any time and without preconditions on reducing nuclear weapons and its agreement to discuss effective and verifiable limits on anti-satellite weapons with the Soviet Union.

4. The Council members reaffirmed their strong commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreed to intensify their efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through multilateral and bilateral measures. They noted that the third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to take place in 1985. Progress in fulfilling all the Treaty commitments, including Article VI which commits parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, is important to the international non-proliferation regime and the Review Conference.

5. In this context they reaffirmed the commitment of their governments to work towards the goal of a comprehensive and fully verifiable nuclear test ban treaty. They expressed satisfaction that the Western group of countries in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had agreed on a draft mandate for the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee. They urged the conference to move promptly to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee under this mandate.

6. The Australian and United States members affirmed the important contribution of the joint Australian/United States defence facilities to arms control verification, effective deterrence, mutual security and maintenance of the stability of the strategic balance.

7. The Australian and New Zealand Council members indicated that they shared fully the concerns of other countries of the South Pacific region on nuclear issues, including French nuclear testing. They gave an account of the progress made in the discussions among members of the South Pacific Forum on a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The ANZUS partners also noted that the proposed South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone would be discussed further at the 1984 meeting of the South Pacific Forum in Tuvalu.

8. The Council members agreed that a convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, with adequate provisions for compliance and verification, would be an important disarmament measure. The use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq war and evidence of their use elsewhere reinforced the need for urgent conclusion of a convention to ban chemical weapons. The Australian and New Zealand Council members welcomed the recent initiative taken by the United States Government in the Conference on Disarmament.

9. They noted the contribution to world peace and security made by the Antarctic Treaty which is the basis of international cooperation in Antarctica and bans all military activities and nuclear weapons there. They expressed their continued commitment to the Antarctic Treaty system.

10. The Council members agreed that the political and strategic outlook would be greatly influenced by the economic environment and that it was crucial to sustain the economic recovery and to spread its benefits more widely. Equally the debt problem which many countries were facing needed to be managed effectively. The threat to the world trading system posed by the spread of protectionist measures also needed to be resisted. This was particularly so in the field of agricultural trade which suffered from longstanding protectionist measures and the emergence of export subsidization on a scale which threatened markets for many commodities.

11. Council members welcomed the emphasis placed by the major industrialised countries at their recent Summit meeting in London on the importance of global economic interdependence and expressed the hope that the recognition of this interdependence could form the basis for future action. The importance of interdependence was nowhere more evident than in relation to the debt problem which required a careful and balanced approach. Economic adjustment in the debtor countries was seen as an essential condition for solving debt problems. At the same time a cooperative approach was required from the industrialised countries. Assistance to the debtor countries had to be provided under conditions that recognised the political and social difficulties faced by these countries. The increasingly important and central role in the management of debt problems played by the International Monetary Fund was welcomed. Now that some of the most heavily indebted countries were undertaking the first, necessary domestic adjustments, international attention was focusing increasingly on longer-term changes that may be required to strengthen the open trade and payments system, with special attention being paid to the closely linked problems of debt and trade. The work being conducted on these issues by a variety of groups reflected an encouraging convergence of views. Council members considered that this had opened the way for discussion and early agreement on practical approaches to these issues.

12. The Council members reviewed developments in the South Pacific. They welcomed the fact that the area remained one of peace and cooperation and that it was firmly attached to democratic systems and traditional values. Change was being accommodated and new opportunities were being taken up. The independent and self-governing countries of the region were strengthening relationships with one another and with organisations and countries outside the region that had constructive contributions to make.

13. Council members welcomed progress towards self-government in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. They wanted to see ratification on the Compact of Free

Association and termination of the Trust Territory concluded without delay and looked forward to the Micronesian states expanding their links with countries and organisations in the Pacific region.

15. Council members agreed that significant progress has been made in constitutional evolution in New Caledonia, but noted there was a need for continued participation of all parties in the constitutional process. Peaceful resolution of the situation in that territory was of great concern to all countries in the area and Council members noted that it was important for France to maintain and expand its dialogue with South Pacific Forum members on this issue.

16. The Council members agreed on the importance of effective regional institutions in the area. They noted the major political role of the South Pacific Forum in which Heads of Government of Island nations and Australia and New Zealand were able to work towards shared approaches on current issues. Maritime matters, such as fisheries cooperation and development, and possible nuclear waste dumping were of major concern to countries of the region. Council members commended the valuable work being undertaken in these fields by the Forum Fisheries Agency and the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme. Members agreed they would continue supporting and encouraging these regional cooperative endeavors through financial contributions or other means.

17. The Australian and New Zealand Council members underlined the significance of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea for the countries of the Pacific region and stressed the importance of wide adherence to it.

18. Recognising that political stability and cooperation are underpinned by economic security, Council members expressed admiration for the resilience and good management of Island nations which had, overall, enabled Island nations to cope with the effects of global economic recession and natural disasters. They recognised nevertheless that continued bilateral and regional aid, and encouragement of trade and investment were essential to ensure the well-being of the people of the area, and that such help would be mutually beneficial.

19. Council members reaffirmed their desire to work with the Governments of the Pacific Island countries in the interests of the stability and security of the region. Australia and New Zealand intend to maintain and develop their bilateral defence cooperation programmes with, and assistance to, Island governments in fields such as maritime surveillance, civil action, emergency and disaster relief and training. The United States, for its part, will continue to provide assistance in these areas.

20. The Australian and New Zealand members provided details of recent national initiatives designed to reinforce the maintenance of regional security and stability. The New Zealand member explained that the New Zealand Defence Review completed in 1983

placed greater emphasis on the role of the New Zealand Armed Services to provide assistance if requested to South Pacific countries. The Australian member informed the Council that the Australian Government's offer to develop a Pacific patrol boat to meet the Island countries' expressed maritime surveillance needs had been accepted by several South Pacific countries.

21. Council members emphasised their continuing support for the Association of South East Asian Nations and welcomed the contribution ASEAN makes towards the stability and economic progress of the region. The Council members also noted the increasing significance of their own economic and political links with the ASEAN countries.

22. Council members expressed full support for the principles adopted by ASEAN in the search for a lasting settlement in Kampuchea. They reaffirmed their conviction that the conflict in Kampuchea should be settled by peaceful means. They agreed that a negotiated settlement should be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, should take into account the desirability of national reconciliation and should recognise the legitimate security interest of all parties concerned. To this end, they again urged the early withdrawal of Vietnamese troops under conditions that would allow for a peaceful transition and a comprehensive settlement which would enable the Khmer people freely to decide their own future. Members welcomed the continuing humanitarian assistance offered by the international community to the Khmer people.

23. Council members' trade within the Asian/Pacific region is now larger than with any other group of countries. This reflected not only the continuing strong growth in their trade with Northeast Asia, but also an increasingly dynamic element in economic relations with the ASEAN countries. They agreed that the growing strength of trade and investment ties with ASEAN reinforced the importance of political relationships.

24. Recent visits by President Reagan and Prime Minister Hawke to China were discussed. The Council members agreed that China's continued commitment to modernisation and to constructive relations with others in the region was a positive development which should be encouraged.

25. The Council members welcomed the steps taken by Japan to move towards liberalising access to its market and expressed the hope that this process would be maintained and accelerated to the benefit of international trade as a whole. The Council members noted the strengthening of Japan's ties with the nations of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, including its contribution in the field of development assistance. They also noted Japan's commitment to an enhanced capability for self-defense purposes.

26. Council members reaffirmed their commitment to the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Korea. They called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to renounce its policies of hostility

towards the Republic of Korea, as evidenced by last year's bombing in Rangoon, and to accept proposals aimed at reducing tensions on the Peninsula through the implementation of practical confidence-building measures. The Council members reaffirmed their view that direct negotiations between the two Koreas provides the only realistic basis for a durable reconciliation. Noting that a reduction of tensions would considerably enhance regional security, they called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to enter into negotiations with the Republic of Korea as a genuinely equal participant.

27. Council members reaffirmed their opposition to the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and condemned the recent Soviet offensive which had caused considerable suffering and loss of life among the Afghan people. Council members called on the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces in accordance with successive United Nations resolutions.

28. Council members exchanged views on developments in the Indian Ocean region and noted the strategic significance of the region. The Australian Council member informed the meeting that the Australian Government had adopted guidelines for a comprehensive and integrated approach to Indian Ocean issues which included support for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

29. The Council members expressed the concern at the serious loss of life and the risk to peace and security in the Gulf resulting from continuation of the war between Iran and Iraq. They deplored all attacks on shipping in the area and called on both countries to respect the right of free navigation for a non-belligerent shipping. They expressed their support for the security and territorial integrity of all states in the area, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The Council members also urged Iran and Iraq to act with restraint and expressed the hope that the two countries would seek ways of bringing the conflict to an end and restoring peace to this area.

30. It was agreed that the next Council meeting would take place in Canberra in 1985 at a date to be decided.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, WELLINGTON, JULY 17, 1984⁶

Foreign Minister Cooper. Before I open the news conference, I should say just that as chairman, we have had a very good discussion in regard to ANZUS. Obviously, in the circumstances one would have believed going into the conference, it was difficult to approach the issues. We did approach the issue that were before us, and I believe that has been very beneficial. There are so issues that, as the outgoing Minister of Foreign Affairs, I did not promote or provoke. The questions that I believe you are going to ask should be subst

and directed to all elements of ANZUS; not just the particular issue that you may think is the only thing in ANZUS. However, knowing the news media, you will ask what you wish to. I will hand the news conference over to a people. Welcome. It's nice to see a group of people trying to give to the people of the Western alliance—and probably the Eastern bloc—but particularly Australia, New Zealand, and America more news of what we have been talking about here in Wellington in this rather inclement weather.

Q. The communique seems to give fairly clear indication to the incoming labor government of the ANZUS partners' attitude to ship visits. What will Mr. Hawke be telling Mr. Lange, and what will you be telling Mr. Lange of the Australian Labor Party's view on it?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't know what Mr. Hawke will be telling Mr. Lange. You will have to ask him, and if I discuss anything with Mr. Lange, it will be a private discussion. I wouldn't propose to discuss that publicly.

Q. Would you say that you are irritated at the current labor policy?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I leave the Labor Party of New Zealand to develop its own policy just as we develop ours. While we are fraternally associated to the Socialist International and have many sentiments commonly shared because we are both Labor Parties and in countries which are close to one another—and not just geographically—we are nonetheless quite separate and independent entities.

Q. What would you think would be the effect on your antinuclear lobby in Australia on a nuclear-free New Zealand?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I'm not a member of the antinuclear lobby in Australia. On the contrary. So it's not much good asking me what they might think.

Q. Will they take strength from a nuclear-free New Zealand?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I've just explained to you, it's not much good asking me. I'm rather prejudiced in views on that particular subject. You'd better ask them.

Q. If the Labor Party does carry out its policy of banning the visits of nuclear ships here, would it be the end of ANZUS?

Secretary Shultz. We'll have to see what happens. And I think it's better to stay away from iffy questions, to state our positions clearly, and to work with the new government and see if we can't resolve the problem satisfactorily.

Q. In Washington last year, the treaty partners noted the importance of the visits of ships and aircraft to the treaty partners. This year all of the sudden, it is "essential." I was wondering what has happened in the last 12 months to bring about such a change of emphasis.

Secretary Shultz. I think it's just a question of people looking for different words. It's obviously essential to any alliance that military forces of the countries involved be able to have contact with each other, and that's as true today as it has been for 33 years.

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you look at that, I think that it is referring to a nuclear-free South Pacific, and in a different context. I think if you look at what I said in 1982 when the issue of ship visits arose in Australia, when I was leader of the opposition, we made a rather unsteady start, but we established beyond any doubt what our position was within a few weeks. And that was that we recognized that, as far as Australia was concerned, ships visits were essential.

In respect of aircraft, we allow aircraft visits. There are special arrangements in respect of B-52s. That is quite implicit in the last sentence of the second paragraph of page one. At the national conference of the Labor Party last week, the principles I've just outlined to you were principles I staunchly presented and successfully defended. So the attitudes of the Labor Party in these respects has been on the table for some time and adhered to.

Q. Between 1964 and 1976, successive governments in New Zealand—Conservative and Labor—banned visits of nuclear ships. In that same period, for a considerable time, successive Australian Governments did the same thing. Why is it now, in the words of the communique, essential to the continuing effectiveness of ANZUS?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think that your initial proposition is precisely right. At the same time, nuclear-powered ships are becoming more and more common, because it is the efficient way in which to power many kinds of ships and submarines. So they are much more important in the total fleet structure than they were at one time. If you say you ban nuclear-powered ships, you are

referring to a high proportion of the total ships. Beyond that, you shy away from the weapon that has provided the main deterrent and has kept the peace against the Soviet Union's very large nuclear arsenal. So this is part and parcel of what it takes to keep the peace. These are peacekeeping forces, and they represent a substantial fraction of the total.

Q. Is it or is it not essential that your ships be allowed into member nation ports for the continuation of the ANZUS treaty?

Secretary Shultz. Of course. What kind of an alliance is it that military forces of the countries involved are not able to be in contact with each other? Let me ask you to turn the proposition around. In my many visits to this part of the world, I'm thinking back 5, 6, and 7 years ago, people often tackled me, saying, "Is the United States ready to pay the attention to this part of the world that it should? Why don't we see more evidence of U.S. interest? Why don't we see more people here? Why don't we see more of your military presence here to show us that you are really involved?" You have to ask yourself what kind of an alliance would it be if the United States said we wouldn't send our military forces to this area. The whole point of the alliance is that it is a security alliance. The whole part of it is that if one of our countries gets in serious trouble, as reflected in the alliance, we will help each other. That help takes many forms but the essence of it is security; that is what it's about.

Q. There have been suggestions from visiting Congressmen that, should New Zealand ban nuclear ship visits, this could well invoke trade sanctions in the United States against New Zealand export. Is that the policy of the government that you represent?

Secretary Shultz. No, it isn't. The ANZUS alliance is a security and military alliance. That's what we are discussing here. The relationship between the people of New Zealand and the people of the United States is over a century and a half old. It's been a warm and deep relationship for a long time, and it will continue that way. We look forward to working in a cooperative manner with the new Government of New Zealand and any Government of New Zealand that comes along.

Q. Are you able to broaden the scope of ANZUS to make it much more of an economic agreement?

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Secretary Shultz. No. ANZUS is not an economic agreement in any sense. It is a security agreement. That is the extent of it—that is the sum and substance of it—and economic arrangements and cultural arrangements and all sorts of other ways in which our countries are in contact with each other are separate matters.

Q. You referred yesterday to a resolute commitment, such as that embodied in the ANZUS treaty, to come to the defense of a valued ally. If the New Zealand Government carried out its policy of banning nuclear weapons, does that mean that the United States would no longer come to the defense of New Zealand in a controversy.

Secretary Shultz. I have just said at least once that I'm not going to get involved in iffy questions. We have some problems here, and we will work at them, and I think some discussion is called for. There are a lot of aspects to this matter that need to be studied by any new government, I know. I found myself when I entered government that there were a lot of things I found out about that I didn't know when I was not in the government that represent important aspects of this relationship. So at any rate, I think what is called for here is some patience, and we'll try to work our way through these problems.

I might take notice of the fact that a year ago there was a new Australian Government, we took the same approach with the new Australian Government. We had a thorough review of the ANZUS alliance. We had a long and searching meeting in Washington with Foreign Minister Hayden. We had discussions with Prime Minister Hawke in Washington, and I've met with him here. The problems have been worked out in a very satisfactory way. The Labor Government in Australia has adapted it to its needs, and I think it is stronger than ever insofar as Australia is concerned. We'll work at it in connection with New Zealand in the same way.

Q. You talked about review with Australia. Would you consider renegotiations as the New Zealand Labor Party's policy suggests?

Secretary Shultz. I don't think there is anything really to renegotiate about it. But certainly we wanted to stress the alliance and what it means, what it implies, and what the various countries get out of it. And I think that such a thorough examination will lead people to the same conclusion that was reached last year; namely, that it is of

tremendous benefit to all of the countries involved. After all, we are talking about the defenses of a country that is very precious. It is a very precious thing to have freedom, to have the freedom to change government by a vote, to live under the rule of law. There are a lot of people in this world who don't have the rule of law. There are a lot of people in this world who don't have those privileges, and all you have to do is talk to some people who don't have them or talk to some people who have recently acquired them and you find out their significance and importance. What we are talking about here is a treaty that has helped to preserve those values and extend them in this part of the world and which has played its part—just as the NATO alliance has played its part in Europe—in keeping the peace for a long period of time. This is an alliance for peace, and it has worked.

Q. With the need for access by allied aircraft to airfields and ports of ANZUS members, are you looking for restricted access to Australian airfields by B-52 bombers?

Secretary Shultz. No, we are talking about the fact that, for example, there are resupply flights—cargo flights, military cargo flights—that come into Christchurch, say to resupply Antarctic stations. The same thing is true with respect to some facilities in Australia. There are B-52 training flights and through flights of various kinds. It's that sort of thing that is being referred to.

Foreign Minister Hayden. Can I add one note, so there's no misunderstanding. There are special arrangements in respect to B-52s, but Secretary of State Shultz should also have mentioned that we have regular joint military operations of exercise with New Zealand and the United States. They involve air units as much as ground forces and naval units. So in that sense, we've got to have this sort of provision. Otherwise, if there were any prohibition against aircraft movements, there would be no exercises. No exercise, no military association. Therefore, there would not be in any meaningful sense for us in Australia—and I speak only for us in Australia—a military alliance.

Q. In the context of regional security, was the question of a Pacific ready-reaction force discussed? And if so, how wide was the discussion?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I don't know anything about a Pacific ready-reaction force, I'm afraid.

Q. Could you clarify that point? Is it that you believe the agreement is not negotiable?

Secretary Shultz. It is an agreement. And it stands on its feet. And I believe that careful examination, in a realistic and thoughtful way, of what it has accomplished—how it works, what it means to the various countries involved—will lead to the conclusion that it is a very good thing. But, of course, that is up to each country to determine and review for itself. It has stood the test of 33 years. It has stood the test of a lot of change around the world. It has stood the test of changes of government in all three of the countries involved, so it must have something good about it. And I think when you look at it carefully, the good will shines through very, very strongly.

Q. But as far as you're concerned a nuclear-free New Zealand means no treaty as far as we're concerned?

Secretary Shultz. I have tried to state my position on that, and I won't try to restate it.

Q. Aren't you waving a big stick over a fairly small matter?

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't think liberty and freedom and the rule of law are small matters. And the defense of them is the most important thing that we have to do. These matters are the essence of our society in the United States, and I believe—from what I know of the societies of Australia and New Zealand—these values are highly prized. And if you say that you won't defend them, pretty soon you're not going to have them.

Q. So a handful of visits of nuclear vessels to New Zealand ports is vital to the freedom of—

Secretary Shultz. If you're going to have a military alliance, then the military forces of the countries involved have to interact. They have to talk to each other. They have to know the equipment that's involved. They have a plan. They have to exercise. They have to train themselves. All these things are just commonplace. There's nothing aggressive about the forces of the ANZUS alliance. It is a defensive alliance. In order to deter aggression, it has to be a credible deterrent. And a credible deterrent is one that people know is kept up to scratch and is worked on constantly. And that's the essence of what our armed forces do all over the world.

Q. Mr. Shultz has told us that things change once you get to government. That was your experience, particularly with the ANZUS agreement.

What do you think Mr. Lange might have told that might change his mind?

Foreign Minister Hayden. Nothing has changed since we got into government. With respect to ANZUS, we declared before we got into government that we would seek a review. When we got into government, we pursued that. It was, as Mr. Shultz pointed out, a quite thorough assessment of the ANZUS agreement that was conducted in Washington last year. So there was a change in that respect. What happened was that with the experience that we had in government, there was a consolidation of our commitment to ANZUS. There has never been any disagreement between any of the major political parties in Australia in regard to ANZUS.

Anything that might be discussed with Mr. Lange is something for discussion with Mr. Lange, not on the public platform.

Q. Recognizing the importance of the alliance, is it imperative that New Zealand change its stand?

Foreign Minister Hayden. That's for New Zealand to decide, and Mr. Shultz said much earlier that time was needed to sort this problem out. I don't have his exact words. As far as I'm concerned—I quote the situation as Australia sees it, I am not talking for New Zealand—there are other people to that.

Q. If New Zealand was to stand firm, would that put increasing pressure—

Foreign Minister Hayden. You're in the area of hypotheses now and as Mr. Shultz said, he's not in the iffy business, and I'm not in the hypothesis business.

Q. It's no hypothesis. It's Labor—

Foreign Minister Hayden. Excuse me a minute, gentlemen. Let me tell you something. You're out of luck. I've been in this game a long time and I'm not going to be drawn in.

Q. Labor has said here that they won't negotiate their position—

Foreign Minister Cooper. Excuse me a minute, ladies and gentlemen. We have been in an ANZUS conference a year and a half. We had a very wide agenda—East-West relationships, comprehensive nuclear test bans, disarmament, arms control, the problems of conflict in various parts of the globe, the international economic situation and I think we are starting to regurgitate exactly the same questions.

I do believe that if the relationships among the three countries are as we have discussed them—last year in Washington, this year, and on many

other previous occasions—there must be other subjects rather than picking away at this particular one. Because I believe that the U.S. Secretary of State has answered the same question four or five times, and I think that Mr. Hayden is in exactly the same situation. Is there anyone here that is slightly interested in arms control and disarmament, for instance?

Q. Are there any plans for nuclear-powered ships to visit New Zealand in the next 6 months?

Secretary Shultz. We don't confirm or deny anything about any particular ship. And so I'll just have to stick with that policy.

Q. Nuclear-powered ship?

Secretary Shultz. No, not that I know of. Admiral Crowe is here. Is that the right answer?

Admiral Crowe. There are no ships in the next few months.

Q. On this issue of Australian support for the Indian Ocean zone of peace, does that mean that this will involve our projection or nonprojection of power in keeping warships out of the area?

Foreign Minister Hayden. If you've got a zone of peace, it is highly likely that there will be no combatant ships in the area, certainly no outside ones. But we're a long way from that. We're a long way from formulating the principles that people might address themselves to all that we're working toward at the moment, which is as much as we can hope to achieve as the first step, is a consensus for the littoral nations and the superpowers that some sort of conference should go ahead. And when we do that, then we can sit down and start sorting out what the agenda is and what the principles will be. So it's going to be a long task. Now you might be impatient with that. So am I. But I

Status of Conference on Disarmament in Europe

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, JULY 17, 1984¹

Today, I met with Ambassador James E. Goodby, the chief of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. This conference, commonly known as the CDE or the Stockholm conference, involves the United States, Canada, and 33 European nations and is part of the East-West dialogue which originated in the Helsinki accords of 1975.

Ambassador Goodby briefed me on the second round of the conference, which has just concluded, and on the prospects for progress when the talks resume in September. He noted the continuing efforts of the United States and our NATO allies to achieve an outcome which will genuinely increase mutual confidence and reduce the risk of war in Europe. Earlier, in the first round of the conference, the West put forward a package of concrete proposals designed to achieve these goals.

In an effort to achieve progress in Stockholm, I announced in June in my address to the Irish Parliament that the United States is prepared to consider

the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force if the Soviet Union is willing to discuss concrete measures to put that principle into action. We are disappointed, however, that the Soviet Union has so far failed to join the great majority of the 35 participating nations at Stockholm which have demonstrated a desire to begin such concrete negotiations.

I assured Ambassador Goodby that he has my continuing strong support in our efforts to get on with the practical negotiations for which this conference was intended. We will continue to do our best to achieve progress at Stockholm, just as we and our allies are working hard together in other multilateral areas of arms control—such as the East-West conventional force talks in Vienna and the 40-Nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

We are equally ready to seek resolutions to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms control issues on a flexible basis, but there must, of course, be a willingness on both sides to engage in practical discussions. We, for our part, will not be found wanting.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

can't help it. That's the experience that we're running into.

Q. Was there any discussion at the council meeting on your proposal put to ASEAN last week for a conference on Kampuchea to be held in Australia?

Foreign Minister Hayden. No, it went on the back burner. In fact, I think it may have gone over the back of the stove.

Q. Are you happy that this ANZUS council meeting went ahead, considering that the administration that you've been talking with will be out of office next week?

Secretary Shultz. I think we should carry on with our plans. We had a very good exchange of views among us, and I think it's been quite a worthwhile meeting. It's also, I think, a good opportunity to meet the incoming government, and I was struck by the extraordinary courtesy which Mr. Lange extended to me and to Mr. Hayden in coming to the airport and greeting us. It was a very generous gesture on his part, and I'm sure both of us look forward to having a chance to talk with him before we leave. So I think in some ways, it's worked out quite fortuitously.

Q. I'd like to ask a question of Foreign Minister Hayden and Secretary Shultz. Should the ANZUS treaty become ineffective, would you seek to create some bilateral security arrangements between Australia and the United States?

Foreign Minister Hayden. We see it as effective right at this point, and as I said earlier, I'm not in the area of hypothesis. If anything happens later on, I guess we would look at it. At this point, it hasn't happened.

Secretary Shultz. Ditto.

Q. Could you tell me what happened at the conference on the issue of French nuclear testing?

Foreign Minister Cooper. We've really left that to a great degree to the forum in Tuvalu. We're aware of the situation in regard to possible moves toward a South Pacific nuclear-free zone, but I think that it might be a good idea if you directed that question to Mr. Hayden, in regard to the initiative the Australians have taken in this area.

Foreign Minister Hayden. We have protested regularly, in fact on every occasion there has been a nuclear test, to the French and publicly. They continue to test. They make it clear that the program is in place, and they will pursue it. I would hope that one day they will be able to carry out laboratory tests. I'm

not sure how you do that—it will be very interesting—but until then, they will continue to test in the South Pacific. I guess that's a long time.

At our recent national conference, one of the decisions taken was the decision that there would be no further exports of uranium to France while it continues to carry out these nuclear tests. That decision was effective forthwith. It involves the cancellation of contracted uranium sales in excess of \$130 million. In turn, I expect that will involve a fairly substantial compensation payment from Australia. And although this is not enforceable as law, I think there's a general feeling there will be an obligation to meet it.

Q. Last year our Prime Minister—our out-going Prime Minister—said that he'd been given a date as to when the French testing would end. Do you know the date?

Foreign Minister Hayden. No. I spoke to the French afterwards, and I got the impression that they didn't. They said quite explicitly they didn't have any date in mind.

Q. You called for a report on the prospect of mainland France nuclear testing being carried out there. Have you had that report back yet?

Foreign Minister Hayden. I read that in the *National Times* and the guy who wrote it is over there [pointing]. He keeps telling me I told him, and I keep saying I didn't so I've decided I'd better fix it up by putting in a request for such a report, and I did that 2 weeks ago.

Q. Returning to the French nuclear testing question. There are some documents that fell out of the back of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here in Wellington some weeks ago that suggest New Zealand doesn't take a very strong line in opposition to that testing. Indeed, it featured, in part of the recent trade talks as a trade-off if those documents are to be believed. Do you find that a matter for regret?

Foreign Minister Hayden. These are New Zealand foreign affairs documents? I don't know anything about them.

Foreign Minister Cooper. I find it a matter of regret that journalists would believe anything that fell out of *The New Zealand Times*. They are not authentic. They were taken by one official, in my belief. They were given to the media. They had a slant on them, and to suggest that I, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Trade, had an under-the-counter deal with the French Foreign Minister or the French Trade Minister or Agricultural Minister, is absolutely nonsensical, and you should be aware of that.

¹Held at the U.S. Embassy (press release 166 of July 18, 1984).

²Press release 162 of July 12.

³Press release 164.

⁴Press release 171 of July 20.

⁵Made at the luncheon for the ANZUS council (press release 196 of July 19).

⁶Press release 174 of July 23. ■

Proposed Outer Space Negotiations

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
JUNE 29, 1984¹

The U.S. Government has taken note of the statement by the Soviet Government proposing a meeting of delegations in September to begin negotiations on "preventing the militarization of outer space." The militarization of space began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be deployed. The U.S. Government, therefore, draws attention to the pressing need for the resumption of negotiations aimed at a radical reduction of nuclear weapons, on a balanced and verifiable basis.

Therefore, the U.S. Government has informed the Government of the Soviet Union that it is prepared to meet with the Soviet Union in September, at any location agreeable to the Soviet Union and the government of the country where the meeting is held, for the following purposes: (1) to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons can be resumed and (2) to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on antisatellite weapons. We will also be prepared to discuss any other arms control concerns or other matters of interest to both sides.

We will continue contacts with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels on arrangements for these September talks.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 27, 1984²

This morning's TASS statement misrepresents our position, which is that we have accepted the Soviet proposal for discussions in Vienna in September without preconditions. Our preparations are continuing vigorously, and we expect to be in Vienna. We do not believe that such discussions are impossible, and we are continuing to deal with this subject through private diplomatic channels.

The U.S. finds it very disturbing that the Soviets portray the United States as responsible for the breakdown of the nuclear negotiations in Geneva when the world knows the Soviets walked out of those discussions. Already existing nuclear systems deserve our most urgent attention. If the Soviets do not choose to listen to our views on this subject, they need not, but, for us, and for mankind, this subject is too important to ignore. This U.S. approach does not represent a precondition. We will take whatever the Soviets say on antisatellite weapons seriously and respond constructively. We simply point out that we wish to restore exchanges on the subject of offensive nuclear arms. The world has a right to expect the U.S.S.R. and the United States to maintain such discussions.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 1, 1984³

The United States had made clear to the Soviet Government in a series of high-level messages that it accepts the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal and is prepared for serious talks in Vienna on outer space, including antisatellite weapons. We have expressed our view that the problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship but that we have no preconditions for the Vienna agenda.

Despite this clearly stated, positive and on our part, the Soviet Union has alleged that the United States has rejected the Soviet proposal. The latest Moscow press briefing repeated these charges, despite the clear statement of the U.S. position in a series of high-level messages conveyed to the Soviet Government in diplomatic channels.

In our communications with the Soviets, we have stated our view that their proposal for a conference on the "militarization of outer space" is an "excellent idea" and that we are prepared to have a U.S. delegation in Vienna on September 18 to engage in such negotiations.

We recently presented a proposal for a possible joint Soviet-American announcement on the content and objective of the Vienna talks. This proposal states explicitly that the aim of the talks should be to work out and conclude agreements concerning the militarization of outer space, including antisatellite systems and other aspects of this issue.

In response to the Soviet proposal of a mutual moratorium on antisatellite tests from the outset of the talks, the United States expressed a readiness to have our negotiators consider what mutual restraints would be appropriate during the course of negotiations. The latest Soviet statements have converted this proposal into a precondition, a

transformation which suggests a disingenuous Soviet approach. We continue to believe that possible mutual restraints are an appropriate subject for the negotiations. The joint statement, however, should not prejudice the outcome of these negotiations.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position regarding the opening of arms control talks between our two countries in Vienna. From this latest Soviet statement, it appears that the Soviets were not serious about their proposal. We regret this. As noted above, we have consistently accepted their proposal to meet in Vienna. We prefer that this matter be dealt with in diplomatic channels.

¹Made by Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 2, 1984).

²Text from White House press release.

³Made by Ambassador McFarlane (text from White House press release). ■

The U.S.-China Trade Relationship

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Address before the National Council for United States-China Trade on May 31, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

I don't need to tell you who are gathered here today that doing business in China is seldom doing "business as usual." You who have been engaged in doing business in China have, indeed, been doing business as extraordinary: under special and ever-changing circumstances and in a still uncertain investment climate. But most extraordinary is the contribution that your endeavors make to U.S. foreign policy; and it is that contribution which I would like to acknowledge at the outset here today.

Building a Comprehensive Relationship

When President Nixon traveled to China in 1972, our economic and cultural relations were almost nonexistent. The focus of the relationship was almost entirely our shared strategic concerns over Soviet power and expansion. By contrast, during his recent trip, President Reagan devoted perhaps 50% of his

discussions with the Chinese Premier to economic and trade concerns. Our countries have developed a vital and growing economic relationship. This organization and some of the people in this room had a good deal to do with that growth.

Some would go so far as to say that the remarkable growth in our economic ties has brought us to a point where economic interests have replaced strategic interests as the focus of our relationship. That, however, would be wrong. Our economic relations are, indeed, extremely important. But our strategic interests also remain as important today as they were when President Nixon opened the way to China.

We do not expect an alliance with China, nor are we playing cards. Indeed, we don't think that a successful long-term relationship—and that is what we seek—can be built on a basis that makes our relations with one country dependent on tactical shifts in our relations with another.

Rather, our strategic relationship rests on common concerns about the growth of Soviet military power and the tendency to use that power—whether by

the Soviets themselves, as in Afghanistan, or by their allies and proxies, as in Kampuchea. We have some important differences with China on international questions, differences that the Chinese are at pains to highlight, lest we—or others—forget that China has an independent foreign policy. But our common concerns create important common interests in resisting Soviet pressures and in seeking changes in Soviet policies that would genuinely reduce tensions in the region and in the world. This remains a central element in our relations.

We also have increasingly important cultural ties with China. The Chinese have sent some 12,000 of their brightest students to study in this country, and we have extensive exchanges of our own in China. These exchanges may be our most important legacy to the future ties between our countries. These students will one day form a core of understanding that will speed our efforts, just as our relations in the early 1970s were spurred by a long history of ties before 1949.

In short, we have today neither a predominantly economic nor a predominantly strategic relationship but rather a comprehensive one, in which each element reinforces the others. Indeed, the economic progress that your group has helped to build, important in itself, is also an important element in the strategic equation.

Over the last 12 years, our bilateral relationship with China has grown richer and deeper, the range of our cooperative endeavors broader, and the opportunities for future cooperation more numerous than before. Both sides have put aside the myths, unrealistic expectations, and, frankly, the impossible demands of the past. As Secretary Shultz has said, we seek a relationship that is no longer subject to the alternating cycles of euphoria and depression that have characterized the past, but one which rests on a stronger, more stable foundation. Of equal significance, we seek such a relationship without sacrificing the principles and friendships our nations value.

The distance we have traveled and the benefits we have gained from improving relations with China are perhaps most clearly seen not in what is but in what was. We need only think back to the open hostilities of the 1950s or to the antagonism of the 1960s to realize the costs that a return to confrontation in our relations would impose.

The Trade Dimension

Today, I would like to discuss the dimension of our relationship with China that is of particular interest to this group—trade. In trade, as elsewhere, we have too often been the victims of our own euphoria. Often, in the past, people have been mesmerized by the thought of a market with four times as many consumers as our own. We have an obligation equally to avoid wishful thinking and jaundiced pessimism and to judge prospects realistically.

The unembellished record to date is itself impressive. Since normalization of relations, our two-way trade has grown fourfold, from \$1.1 billion in 1978 to \$4.4 billion last year. Our trade has, to be sure, not grown steadily. U.S. exports, particularly of agricultural products, have been volatile.

While our total trade with China does not involve large sums in terms of our overall trade worldwide, trade with China can be, and is, very important to particular enterprises and sectors of our economy—some of which are well represented in this room.

Today, I would like to discuss three principles that seem to me particularly important as guides for the government's approach to this important area of our relationship.

First, that an economically modernizing China is in both our countries' interests.

Second, that it should be the role of the government to facilitate and further trade, though not at the expense of our security.

Third, that in the trade area, as in other areas, it is important that both sides live up to the agreements that they make.

I need hardly elaborate for those in this room the economic benefits a modernizing China could bring to U.S. business. But, as I suggested earlier, economic benefits are only part of what we might hope for from a modernizing China. We believe that an increasingly prosperous China will be more stable, more secure, and more able to resist outside pressure and intimidation. That serves American interests as well, both globally and regionally. A modernizing China that is more integrated with the world economy will develop important trading ties to other Asian and Pacific nations. Such ties help to reinforce the constructive trends in China's international role, trends from which the United States and our friends and allies in Asia benefit.

The Chinese see our willingness to cooperate in their modernization efforts as an important element in their prospects for success and in our relations. We have declared ourselves—and shown ourselves—willing to help.

The President made the most tangible expression of his desire to see China modernize last spring, when he directed that China should be treated as a "friendly, nonallied" country with respect to exports of high technology. Guidelines published last November raised the levels of technology that would generally be made available to China in seven important product categories. The level of permitted exports of computers, scientific instruments, and microelectronic manufacturing equipment, to name three important examples, were raised significantly. Roughly 75% of all applications we are now receiving for high-technology exports to China are processed under the new, expeditious guidelines. And we are working now on liberalized guidelines for 10 additional product categories which should cover a further 10%–15% of license applications.

As expected, the new policy has helped to encourage a healthy increase in U.S. high-technology exports to China. In 1982, approximately 2,000 export licenses were approved, with a total value of just over \$450 million. In 1983, there were 3,300 approvals, valued at approximately \$1.1 billion. In the first quarter of 1984 alone, 1,170 licenses were approved, and the value of license high-technology exports to China for all of 1984 could surpass \$1.5 billion.

The sheer volume of license referrals has placed a considerable strain on the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls] mechanism. Since the new guidelines were published last November, U.S. referrals to COCOM have more than doubled. Despite this, however, we and our COCOM partners have succeeded in increasing the rate of COCOM approvals so that the backlog of U.S.-China submissions has remained steady at about 300. We believe that processing times—now generally 60–90 days—can be reduced.

This council has played an important supporting role in the liberalization of export controls for China, and I welcome your continued input into this process. Chinese leaders have made it plain that they regard our adoption of a more liberal policy as a turning point in the relationship, with considerably

bader implications than its purely economic effects.

A second principle concerns the proper role of government in trade. It's largely up to individual businesses and groups like this one to make trade a reality—a function you are performing with remarkable results. But government certainly has a role to play in removing unnecessary obstacles and, where possible, in promoting trade. We are doing that, and we will continue to do so with due awareness that in certain areas security considerations are an important factor.

The tax treaty, which we signed in Beijing last month, is one important effort to help provide a more predictable environment for businessmen and investors. During Premier Zhao's visit in January, he and the President signed an industrial and technological cooperation accord, and shortly after the President's visit we followed up with the conclusion of two work programs under the accord—in the fields of metallurgy and telecommunications and electronics. These and other work programs will give our firms an opportunity to participate at an early stage in the planning process of Chinese ministries. And, as most of you know, we will be mounting a presidential trade mission in a few months to give a boost to trade opportunities, particularly for our firms engaged in aerospace industries.

We will continue to work hard to achieve an investment agreement. Americans have invested about \$85 billion in joint equity ventures and several times that much in other forms of investment. U.S. oil companies will be investing hundreds of millions more in onshore exploration and major investments in coal are also likely. China welcomes foreign investment, not only as a source of capital but also as a very efficient vehicle for technology transfer. Our fifth round of negotiations will take place in September. Meanwhile, our Overseas Private Investment Corporation plans to organize an investment mission to China later this year.

We should also note that China has taken steps of its own to improve the conditions for investment. Some of these—such as its patent protection legislation, organization of economic zones, joint venture laws, and tax provisions—are remarkable, considering the enormous differences in our juridical philosophies and legal systems. Nonetheless, more needs to be done if China is to continue to attract American investors.

In these and other ways, we seek to increase trade, but our efforts must not and will not come at the expense of our security. That is why, even though our technology sales are liberalized, restrictions remain, not just for China but for other friendly countries as well. That is why we will continue to work cooperatively with our COCOM partners, so that we do not weaken the unique institution which is vital for controlling exports to the Soviet Union.

Perhaps nowhere have we had to go to such pains to take security concerns into account as we did in the long negotiations to reach an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. This agreement, which was initialed last month in Beijing, took over 3 years to negotiate. It will soon be submitted to the President. When approved by him and signed by both countries, it will then be forwarded to Congress, where it must lie for 60 days of "continuous session" before it can enter into force. We anticipate full examination and discussion of the text of the agreement on the Hill.

The implementation of the agreement will further advance our cooperation with China's modernization efforts, and at the same time it will permit U.S. companies to compete for a share of China's ambitious nuclear power program.

But the arduous negotiating process that lies behind this agreement and the mandatory approval process ahead are necessary because the possibility of trade, while enticing, cannot come ahead of our interest in halting nuclear proliferation. The proposed agreement advances that interest in important respects. During the course of our negotiations, China took several significant steps to clarify its nonproliferation and nuclear export policies. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January and has stated that, thereafter, it will require IAEA safeguards in its nuclear exports. Premier Zhao has stated authoritatively that China will not assist other countries to develop nuclear weapons. In addition to its other features, the agreement itself will provide a framework for continuation of discussions with China on nonproliferation matters. We believe the agreement is a real advance and deserves and will receive full bipartisan support.

A third principle of our economic relationship has to do with the importance of abiding by agreements. What needs to be said can be said briefly, but it is nonetheless important. This is not, generally speaking, a problem in our dealings with China. But it has, frankly,

been a disturbing aspect of our grain trade. Although China was our best customer for wheat in the period 1980–82, China reduced its grain shipments to 3.8 million tons in 1983, 2.2 million tons short of its obligation under our long-term grain agreement. The Chinese have implied at various times that reduced purchases were a response to U.S. import restrictions on Chinese textile imports or other factors having nothing to do with the agreement. We find unacceptable this unilateral attempt to condition performance on matters unrelated to the agreement, and we have made our position clear. We are pleased that the Chinese have assured us that they will make up the 1983 shortfall and meet their 1984 obligation.

If we continue to follow these three guidelines—cooperating on China's modernization; facilitating trade while protecting our security; and abiding by agreements—we can build a sound foundation for growing economic ties between our two countries. Such growth is both good business and good foreign policy.

Conclusion

In the short term, there is reason to believe that trade will recover this year as our high-technology exports continue their momentum and as the Chinese meet their grain purchase obligations. Premier Zhao recently told us that we can expect our traditional bilateral surplus, which evaporated last year, to return.

In the longer term, the most important factor in the growth of U.S.-China trade remains the rate of China's own economic progress. As China prospers, we can expect our bilateral trade to grow, as it has with the many dynamic economies of Asia.

While China grows, there is a natural complementarity in some areas of our economies which holds promise for the future. China will continue to want imports of some agricultural products, notably grains. The United States has grain surpluses. China has its own industrial base and badly wants to improve the efficiency of its industry. The United States has technology and management to offer. China is determined to develop its energy resources and to use them efficiently. The United States has capital and the technologies of energy extraction and utilization.

What are the prospects for China's growth? Surely, more growth is on the way, though its pace is by no means

clear. China's most noteworthy progress has come as a result of the introduction of the "responsibility system" in agriculture. But progress is also being made, more slowly, in the industrial sector. The Chinese themselves acknowledge that they still have enormous problems, both structural and systemic. But they have turned in an impressive performance so far—6.5% average annual growth since 1979. And they seem determined to continue to deal with their problems pragmatically.

China's economic modernization was one of the primary subjects of the President's speeches during his recent trip to China. Understandably, the American press paid the most attention to portions of the speeches that noted the differences between us or that the Chinese media regrettably did not cover. The President's most important speech, the

one at the Great Hall of the People, was about America's involvement in China's modernization. That speech was warmly received. Indeed, it was interrupted repeatedly with loud applause. Extensive portions were televised for audiences throughout China.

In one of the most important passages of this speech, the President said:

Today, I bring you a message from my countrymen. As China moves forward in this new path [of economic modernization], America welcomes the opportunity to walk by your side.

That is perhaps the overriding message of the President's trip. It is the message that won him so warm a reception and that promises so much in future cooperation between our peoples. The President was the messenger—it is you who will deliver the goods. ■

Taking Stock of U.S.-Japan Relations

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

It is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of our nation's most important bilateral relationships—that with Japan. The hearings on U.S.-Japan relations that you held in 1982 made a major contribution to illuminating the importance of this relationship and the problems and opportunities within it. I would like to commend your subcommittees for holding these new hearings to bring not only the Congress but also the American people up to date on where we stand in our relationship with Japan and where we are going.

I have studied carefully the questions that you have posed for these hearings and believe that they can be grouped into three general categories. It is around these three categories that I would like to present my testimony today.

First, how does the Administration view the nature of our relationship with Japan?

Second, what have been the major developments in our relationship over the past 2 years?

Third, what are the challenges and opportunities of the future and how do we intend to deal with them?

THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN

The President's historic trip to Japan last November successfully conveyed the preeminent importance that we attach to our relationship with Japan. Given its economic power and its growing international role, Japan clearly has become one of the most important countries in the world to us. While bilateral trade problems garner significant attention—legitimately so—and often generate inordinate controversy, our overall policy toward Japan transcends these issues and is based on three developments.

First, we have worked to achieve a close bilateral relationship, with Japan as an equal partner. The past decade has brought a significant expansion of Japan's economic and technological prowess; an increase in its defense awareness and capability; and a greater interest and involvement in international political and economic affairs. Of course, there still are differences in our relative political, economic, and military posi-

tions in the world. But we approach and conduct our relationship as equals.

Second, because of our combined economic and technological impact on the world, our relationship has grown beyond the bounds of the bilateral and become global in scope. This was the theme of Secretary Shultz's landmark Shimoda speech last September, when he referred to our new relationship with Japan as an "international partnership." While our combined impact on the world is measured primarily in economic and technological terms, in the future it will have a greater political dimension as Japan assumes a greater international role and associates itself more actively and closely with the political and security goals of the West.

Third, Japan is becoming increasingly assertive in global matters and is forging a new international role for itself. During most of the postwar period, Japan pursued an international role that was quite similar to our own throughout most of American history—pursuing economic interests and eschewing political involvement. But, particularly since the events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Japanese have come to realize that their own well-being is affected directly by political and security developments elsewhere in the world. The implications are clear—the days of "economic giant, political pygmy" are over. The United States wishes to encourage this trend toward a greater international political and economic role by Japan, within the framework of a continued close bilateral relationship.

When many people look at U.S.-Japan relations, the focus is on the problems in our relationship and not on its successes. But I believe that if we step back and take a look at our overall relationship, we would determine that it is the best that it has ever been and that the problems that we have are the exceptions and not the rule.

First of all, it is the general consensus of Administration officials and long time observers of U.S.-Japan relations that our defense relationship with Japan has never been better. We forget too easily the scenes of years past, when our mutual security relationship and the presence of U.S. bases caused tremendous political upheavals in Japan. Today both the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the presence of U.S. military bases are accepted by the large

majority of the Japanese people. Beyond that, more Japanese are coming to accept and appreciate that our bases in Japan contribute not only to the defense of Japan but also to our mutual interest in maintaining peace and stability throughout the Asian region and globally.

Second, we have with Japan one of the broadest and most diverse scientific relationships that we have with any country in the world—both in the private sector and between our governments. Our science and technology relationship with Japan is not a one-way street either. As one example, U.S. companies that have signed cross-licensing agreements with Japanese companies now receive more patents back from Japan than they send there.

Our educational and cultural relationship with Japan is another aspect of our relationship that we hear little about—again, because everything is going so smoothly. There is a renewed interest in Japan and Japanese studies in the United States. We have one of our most active youth exchange programs with Japan. We have over 1 million Japanese tourists a year visiting our country. Now we even have a 24-hour-a-day television satellite relay between our two countries. Japanese viewers wake up every morning to a live 5-minute news report from New York describing events in America.

The one area in our relationship where we continue to have well-publicized problems is bilateral trade. Yet even here I would argue that, even though difficulties in access and market penetration remain, the Japanese market is more open now to most American products than it was even 20 years ago. Although the common perception is of a closed market, Japan actually is our largest overseas market. Last year, it bought \$23-billion worth of American products, equal to our exports to France, West Germany, and Italy combined. Japan is our best overseas market for agricultural products, yet only one-fourth of our exports to Japan are in that category. Japan is a major market for U.S. manufactures; in fact, it buys more manufactures from us than West Germany does. Japan is our first second largest market for a wide range of manufactured goods, such as chemicals, commercial aircraft, photographic supplies, medical and scientific equipment, and pharmaceuticals. In addition, Japan buys \$10-billion worth of American services from us, and we run a surplus with Japan in services trade.

Beyond that, Japan has increasingly invested in the United States. This direct and portfolio investment creates employment, helps finance our government's deficit, and makes money available for our banks to lend to American companies and consumers. In 1982, Japan transferred \$20 billion in capital back to the United States, an amount almost equal to our merchandise trade deficit.

I do not deny that we still have trade difficulties with Japan. We do, and we must deal with them. My point is to indicate that we have made progress in resolving these problems within the context of our overall healthy economic relationship. The Administration will continue to address trade problems diligently as they arise. The size and complexity of our trade—\$63 billion in two-way merchandise trade in 1983—guarantee that we will continue to have trade problems in the future, especially as both countries develop their potential in the high technology area.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST 2 YEARS

The past 2 years have been one of the most active and productive periods in U.S.-Japan relations. The President's meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone last week in London marked their fourth meeting in 18 months. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe have met 10 times in that same period. The President, the Vice President, and nearly every member of the President's Cabinet have visited Japan. In one very busy week in early May of this year, we actually had the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, all making separate visits to Tokyo.

But as much as our life at the State Department is centered around preparations for meetings, we recognize that frequent meetings do not represent progress in themselves. There has been significant movement in all aspects of our relationship with Japan. Let me look first at our economic relationship.

U.S.-Japan Trade

Historically, the U.S. Government has taken a product-by-product approach to U.S.-Japan trade, dealing with the contentious issues of the moment. In the 1950s, we were concerned about clinical thermometers, one dollar blouses, and cotton typewriter ribbons. In the 1960s and 1970s, the products shifted to tex-

tiles, color TVs, and specialty steel. Today, we worry about computer software, telecommunications equipment and services, and fiber optics. Historically, as we resolved each problem, another industry, another product, and another problem would come along.

While continuing to work to achieve greater market access for specific products and services, the Reagan Administration has taken a broader, longer term view that seeks to deal with the underlying issues in the Japanese economy and industrial structure that limit our access to Japan's market. There are a number of examples of our success in this regard.

Standards Laws Reform. In terms of its direct and long-term impact on a wide range of U.S. exports, Japan's reform of its standards and product-approval laws is one of the most significant actions that it has taken. In response to U.S. concern, Japan passed major revisions of its standards and product-approval laws in May 1983, making it possible for U.S. firms to apply directly for approval without going through Japanese agents. We are now working actively to allow product testing to be conducted in the United States by American firms and are seeking the ability for U.S. companies to help participate in designing Japanese standards. As the door opens wider, we hope more American companies will take advantage of those fundamental changes and become reliable suppliers to Japan. At the same time, should problems arise, we want to be alerted so that both sides can work to deliver the full potential of this opening.

Transparency. The gradual movement toward transparency in Japanese procedures and decisionmaking also will have a long-term impact. Basically, in a number of ways Japan is moving toward a "sunshine law" approach, allowing U.S. firms to participate in actions that affect their access to and ability to compete in the Japanese market on an equal footing. The Japanese Government has agreed to transparency in a number of ways over the past 2 years. For example, U.S. firms can now make their views known in developing Japanese standards; Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) has agreed to procedures which should allow U.S. firms to participate in its research and development work; and the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan has been invited to testify before a Japanese Diet committee, as have

representatives of the U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Embassy. The Japanese have even expressed a willingness to allow us to make our views known to their industrial deliberation councils, which will provide them the U.S. perspective on potential changes before they can be implemented. Further, the Japanese Government's April 27 package of trade measures and its joint report on capital markets/yen-dollar publicly stated that efforts toward greater transparency in some areas will continue.

Capital Market Liberalization and Internationalization of the Yen. In terms of its far-reaching international impact, this is the most significant action that Japan has taken during the past 2 years. In the Regan-Takeshita statement of last November, Japan agreed to further liberalize its capital markets and to promote a greater international role for the yen. The U.S. Treasury-Japanese Finance Ministry report on yen/dollar exchange rate issues, approved by Treasury Secretary Regan and Minister Takeshita and released on May 29, commits Japan to a number of important measures with far-reaching foreign exchange and other implications. It is a landmark agreement, and some financial experts have already labeled it the most important development in Japanese finance in 100 years. Once the measures are implemented fully, Japan's capital markets will be more open than those of any other country in the world except the United States. The yen will then be able to play a role in international finance commensurate with Japan's status as the second largest industrialized democracy and should reflect more closely its true value as determined by international markets.

Voluntary Restraint Agreement on Automobiles. Japan's voluntary restraints on auto exports over the past 4 years have given U.S. companies a needed breathing space to retool and invest, and this is having a long-term impact on the competitiveness of the U.S. automobile industry. Today, Detroit is offering a better built car than it ever has, and to meet the Japanese challenge it will continue to have to do so. At the same time, Japan's auto makers are coming to the United States to invest in production facilities, providing jobs to our workers and further stimulating U.S. competitiveness. Honda has announced it will double its production; Toyota has established a joint venture with GM; Nissan plans to add cars to its

truck production line in Tennessee; and Mazda and Mitsubishi also are considering manufacturing in the United States.

High Technology Working Group. In order to deal with issues on the cutting edge of technology, we have established a high-technology working group. It serves as an "early warning system," seeking to head off trade and investment problems before they arise. Far from being solely a forum for discussion, it already has a number of concrete successes to point to, such as Japanese agreement on an import promotion program for semiconductors and agreement on the mutual elimination of tariffs on semiconductors. The excellent working relations established between U.S. and Japanese participants in this group have enabled us to make good progress on the software protection issue and value-added networks—again, heading off problems before final action is taken. A unique feature of this group is that American and Japanese industries, such as the semiconductor sector, participate in the meeting with government officials. Industry-to-industry contact thereby is facilitated.

Reinstitution of Regular Economic Consultations at the Subcabinet Level. In order to engage in a continuous and high-level dialogue with the Japanese on economic issues, we have reinvigorated the Economic Subcabinet Consultations, led on the U.S. side by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis. We have been holding meetings every 6 months and have turned out the highest level attendance ever. The consultations have served as an excellent forum to let the Japanese know, at a high level and in a comprehensive manner, our concerns and priorities; to head off issues before they become real problems; or to approach outstanding issues in a nonconfrontational manner better designed to attain mutually agreeable resolutions. Under the subcabinet consultation mechanism are the trade committee and a new investment committee which was established at the time of the President's trip in November to promote and facilitate two-way investment. These two committees also serve as an excellent means to make our positions known to the Japanese in a comprehensive fashion.

Industrial Policy Dialogue. We have instituted discussions with Japan on industrial policy, trying to determine how Japan's industrial policies work and how they may distort trade or encourage trade. We believe that these discussions already have provided us

with a better understanding of Japan's industrial policies and at the same time have impressed clearly upon the Japanese the concern we have with any industrial policies that inhibit trade. I hope that out of this dialogue will come mutual understanding of the role of government in promoting industrial development and of a joint commitment that industrial policies should not have conscious trade-distorting effects.

Energy Cooperation. Another step which will have a long-term impact on our economic relationship with Japan is the joint statement on energy cooperation issued during the President's trip. In this, Japan commits itself to consider seriously trade and investment in U.S. energy resources—particularly coal and liquefied natural gas. Both governments committed themselves to facilitate private sector contact so that cooperation and trade can be expanded. We recognize that, in the end, market force will be the determining factor in Japan's decisions to invest in and buy U.S. energy resources, but we believe that the provisions of the joint statement, when fulfilled, will have a positive impact on our balance of trade over the longer term.

Exchange Rates. Of all these measures that deal with Japan's underlying economic structure and approach toward imports, we believe that the most significant action over the past 2 years—and the action that will have the greatest long-term impact—is Japan's movement toward greater liberalization of its domestic capital markets and a broader international role for the yen. The prevailing exchange rate also has the effect of making Japanese goods more price competitive compared to U.S. products, not only in the U.S. and Japanese markets but also in third-country markets, thereby affecting our global trade balance. Experts do not expect the yen to appreciate immediately against the dollar, given other factors. However, we believe that over the longer term the yen should appreciate because of Japan's perceived economic strength and political stability. Furthermore, U.S. investment in Japan will be encouraged because a wider range of instruments will be available to finance such investment.

Trade Packages

As I stated earlier, this Administration also has continued to deal with the question of access by specific U.S. products and services to the Japanese market. During the past 2 years, the Japanese Government has issued three trade

packages that seek to reduce trade friction and increase our ability to compete in the Japanese market on a fair and equitable footing. By far the most significant of these packages from an American point of view was that announced on April 27 of this year, at the conclusion of the followup process led by the Vice President. During the Vice President's followup, we sought to address a number of trade issues of importance to the United States. Specifically, these included beef and citrus quotas, tariffs, high-technology issues (renewal of the NTT agreement, unimpeded access to telecommunications value-added networks, protection of computer software, and satellite procurement), energy cooperation, general investment questions, and capital market liberalization/internationalization of the yen. The Japanese Government package addressed each of our concerns. Overall, this package was responsive to our interests, although we were disappointed that certain items, such as tariff cuts on forestry products, were not included. The main elements of the April 27 package are:

On the general question of market access—reducing trade barriers and opening Japan's market further—Japan promises to take additional steps to simplify and improve standards and certification systems, to promote imports, and to accept foreign test data. Prime Minister Nakasone's statement accompanying the package said that the Japanese Government considers it important to conduct "even more vigorous" such policy measures as market opening, import promotion, encouragement of investment to and from Japan, and so forth.

On tariff reductions, it indicates that tariffs for a number of products of interest to the United States will be abolished or reduced in Japan's fiscal year 1985. Cuts on color photographic paper and reduction to zero in farm machinery (hay balers) are among the major items on the U.S. request list. Cuts on two other major items—wine and paper products—have since been realized for implementation over the next 3 years. As I indicated, there were cuts on forest products, a major economic and political disappointment. Two items from the U.S. "long list"—raw furskins of mink and untanned magnesium—are included, as well as auto emission catalysts.

On tobacco, there is legislation pending before the Diet that privatizes the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Monopoly Corporation, which will give U.S. companies the right to import and distribute tobacco products on their own account and to set prices with Ministry of Finance approval. The tobacco item is a bright spot in the package which could significantly expand opportunities for U.S. products.

On agricultural quotas, a satisfactory new 4-year beef and citrus agreement was reached April 7, which will lead to an approximate doubling of U.S. exports to what already is far and away our best overall market for these products. An agreement on quotas and tariffs on other agricultural categories, such as fruit juices, was reached April 24.

On high technology issues:

- *Computer software*—the Government of Japan agreed not to seek new legislation during this session of the Diet, thereby effectively continuing copyright protection. The package notes the need for "international harmony" and indicates that Japan will not take any further action on this issue without coordinating the viewpoints of the other developed countries. We will continue to consult on this key issue so that copyright protection will be continued.

- *Telecommunications*—the package refers to legislation which liberalizes the telecommunications market in Japan. Restrictions on foreign investment in Japan's value-added network were eliminated, and licensing requirements were changed to notification requirements. The package commits the Japanese Government to ensure simplicity and transparency in its notification procedures and fair competition between the new, privatized NTT and other telecommunications firms. These changes are a major step forward for an open Japanese telecommunications market. Implementation will be important.

- *Satellites*—Japan revised its satellite procurement policy, stating that private firms now will be able to purchase communications satellites from any source after the passage of the telecommunications legislation. Furthermore, when NTT is privatized the government will open the way for it to purchase satellites in a nondiscriminatory way, while ensuring consistency with its national space development policy. Japanese Government agencies will be able to procure foreign satellites

not necessary for autonomous development of space technology. We intend to continue to press for full open procurement.

On energy cooperation, the package repeats the Japanese Government's agreement to send a Japanese coal mission to the U.S. in May and to facilitate private sector interest in Alaskan gas feasibility studies. A Japanese coal mission came May 14–15 and, while there were no immediate results, the two private sectors established an ongoing committee to continue their dialogue.

On investment, the package accommodates our objectives. It establishes an "expediter" mechanism to relay investment information and assist foreign companies wishing to invest in Japan. It also establishes an investment "ombudsman" to settle investment grievances. The Prime Minister's statement included a clear indication that Japan welcomes direct foreign investment, and the government is sending a mission to the United States to promote investment in Japan. I might point out, in this connection, that the Japan Development Bank is now making low interest loans available to foreign companies investing in Japan, even for sales offices for U.S.-made products.

On other issues, the package states that the Japanese Government will work with the Japan Federation of Bar Associations to reach an early resolution of the lawyers' issue. It is noteworthy that reference to the lawyers' issue was included, as we believe it commits the government to show concern and responsibility for a matter that legally is under private jurisdiction.

Defense and Security Cooperation

Another area in which we have made significant progress over the past 2 years is Japanese defense and security cooperation. I stated earlier that experts believe that our security relationship has never been better than it is today. I agree. I spoke earlier of the tendency in U.S.-Japan relations to focus not on what is going right but on the areas where we have problems. This is equally true in defense. A number of years ago, the focus in the security relationship was on mutual security cooperation—problems relating to our mutual security treaty and our bases in Japan. Today, one seldom hears about this because

almost everything is going very smoothly. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan are accepted by a broad majority of the Japanese people. The environmental and social problems connected with the American military presence in Japan have largely abated.

The issues that do arise in our security relationship pale in comparison to the issues of years past. Japan provides these bases to us rent free and, in addition, contributes over \$1.2 billion annually to their support. This amounts to over \$23,000 for every American soldier and sailor in Japan, which is more than three times the NATO contribution. It is a tangible manifestation of Japan's cooperation and its ongoing commitment to promote security in the Pacific region.

The focus in our security dialogue today, therefore, is not on our bases in Japan but on Japan's own direct defense efforts. We need to remember that Japan's defense policies throughout the postwar era—concentrating on economic recovery and growth, abjuring the exercise of political power, and renouncing military power—accorded with U.S. policy desires and represented the foreign policy most likely to be accepted, not only by the Japanese people but also by Japan's Asian neighbors.

Today, however, we believe that the situation has changed, and that Japan's defense policies are changing with it. Over the past 2 years, there has been a significant change in Japanese attitudes toward its own self-defense. First of all, there is a greater awareness of the Soviet threat to the region, and recent public opinion polls in Japan confirm this. The existence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) is now accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people. Most of the opposition parties have changed their attitudes on the JSDF; while still claiming that the JSDF is unconstitutional, even the Socialist Party now says that it is legal.

But the most important change over the past 2 years is what I perceive as a new understanding in Japan of the real reasons why an enhanced defense effort is necessary. For many years in our security relationship, Japanese governments very often took the steps that they did in the defense arena and justified them to their own people by saying that they were necessary for the sake of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Increasingly in Japan, government leaders, politicians, and opinionmakers have

come to realize that this is something that must be done, not simply to "pacify the Americans" but because it is in Japan's own national interest. There, therefore, has been a qualitative difference in the way the Japanese Government and people look at defense issues.

There has been a quantitative difference as well. This Administration, as you know well, does not focus on defense spending *per se*. Our concern is not with input but with output—Japan's ability to fulfill the defense roles and missions that it has set for itself, and with which we agree. In the face of severe fiscal constraints, Japan has made a major effort to provide the resources necessary to implement its defense goals. Increases in Japan's defense budgets have averaged about 5% in real terms during the years of the Reagan Administration. (By comparison, our own defense spending increased by 8% annually in the same period and that of our NATO allies by only 2%.) During the last Diet session, the government passed what basically is a no-growth budget, with an overall increase of only 0.5%. Yet in the middle of this austere budget, defense spending rose by 6.55%. Both we and the Japanese Government recognize that this level of spending will not be sufficient to allow it to implement the Mid-Term Defense Plan or, within this decade, the defense roles and missions that it has set out for itself. But we recognize that the Japanese Government is making a consistent effort to enhance its self-defense capabilities in the face of political and fiscal constraints.

Another major achievement during the past 2 years is the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Technology Transfer, which was signed just before the President's visit last November. This agreement will permit the export of Japanese technology to the United States to be used for military purposes, and I should note that the United States is the only country to which Japan will permit the export of militarily applicable technology.

International Political and Economic Cooperation

The third area in which we have made significant progress in our relationship with Japan during the past 2 years, and the area that forms the centerpiece of our vision of the future of U.S.-Japan relations, is international political and economic cooperation. I mentioned earlier the Secretary's landmark speech

last September before the Shimoda conference, in which he indicated that the time had come to stop thinking of our relationship with Japan as a simple bilateral relationship. Given our combined impact on the world, the Secretary said that we should now look upon our relationship with each other as an "international partnership." In his historic speech to the Japanese Diet, the President amplified this theme on behalf of our nation when he told the Members of Japan's Parliament that we should come together to become a "powerful partnership for good."

The basis for this thinking is clear. Together the United States and Japan account for one-third of world gross national product (GNP) and one-half of free world GNP. Our combined share of world trade is 22%. American and Japanese banks together make over one half of all internationally syndicated commercial loans. The United States and Japan already rank as the first and second largest sources of resource flows (official assistance and private lending) to the Third World and the first and third largest donors of official development assistance. We soon shall be the first and second largest shareholders in the World Bank, and we are the first and second largest contributors of refugee assistance. We are universally recognized as leading sources of technology. Japan and the United States are in the forefront of those calling for new international trade round.

But it is not simply Japan's economic and technological strength that leads us to call for an "international" partnership. As I indicated earlier, Japan is moving toward a greater international political role. Neither the United States nor any other country is pushing Japan in this direction; Japan is moving on its own and in accordance with its own national interests. However, it is in our interest to recognize that our relationship with Japan is now entering a new phase, and that we should work to establish new patterns of association with Japan, based both in theory and in practice on close cooperation and respect. This we have done successfully during the past 2 years, and there are a number of examples of how the United States and Japan have worked together on an international level.

- The close working relationship established between the President and Prime Minister Nakasone helped lead to the success of the Williamsburg summit.
- Coordination of our approach to East-West relations across the board has led to enhanced Western solidarity.

a general Soviet policy and arms control negotiations and helped stem the flow of high technology goods to the Soviets.

- Increased Japanese foreign aid to nations of strategic importance—such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt—has promoted economic development in those countries and enhanced political stability.

- Japan's impressive cooperation with us at the time of the Soviet shoot-down of the Korean Air Lines flight 007 proved Soviet responsibility, aided a combined search and recovery operations, and condemned the Soviet action.

- Japan worked with us to provide diplomatic support to South Korea in the face of the Rangoon bombing and the north's proposal for tripartite talks.

- Japan has worked actively to prevent escalation of the Iran-Iraq war.

- Japan has been cooperative on Third World debt issues and has extended support to the Philippines to aid in the financial crisis it faces.

- Japan has indicated a willingness to join the President's African aid initiative and help promote development in the Caribbean Basin area.

Finally, I should add that we and the Japanese work actively on a daily basis to consult on a wide range of international political and economic issues. The Japanese Embassy is among the most active in Washington in its diplomatic contacts with the State Department and other executive branch departments, and I am sure that the reverse is equally true about our Embassy's contacts with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In addition, senior specialists in the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, usually led at the Assistant Secretary level, meet on a regular basis to exchange views and discuss our respective policies toward major regions of the world. So far this year, we have held extensive consultations on the Middle East and Africa, and later this year we will meet to discuss developments in Latin America and Europe.

THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE FUTURE

As we look toward the future, the United States has a number of specific policy goals to:

- Strengthen U.S.-Japan cooperation and consultation on a wide range of international political and economic

issues in order to promote peace and international security, not just in Asia but throughout the world;

- Continue to strengthen our mutual security relationship, while stressing the importance of Japan's making a larger and accelerated contribution to our common defense burden;

- Continue our major efforts to achieve greater and more equitable market access to Japan and work together to maintain the free trade system and counter protectionist sentiment in the United States and Japan;

- Consult and cooperate closely with Japan in our mutual efforts to foster an open world trade and investment system and to promote economic development and financial stability in the developing nations; and

- Continue to expand our educational, cultural, and scientific relations.

As we seek to accomplish these goals, I see three major challenges before us:

- Gaining a strengthened commitment by both countries to the free trade system;

- Ensuring that we treat Japan as we would any other ally and friend; and

- Using the fundamentals and overall importance of our relationship to solve the more transitory problems of the moment.

I mentioned earlier that, in the case of defense, we are convinced that Japan is now genuinely and sincerely moving in the direction of an enhanced defense effort. Japan's intentions or motives are not in doubt. Unfortunately, I cannot yet say the same about our trade problems. There still is a widespread perception that Japan is not committed to allowing our companies and products fair and equitable access to its market and that Japan makes concessions only begrudgingly and under pressure. Two editorial comments from opposite ends of the Pacific reflect this notion well. In describing the capital market discussions, Japan's *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* described on March 27 of this year what it called Japan's

... conventional negotiating style in dealing with the United States, namely, the style of "delaying, haggling and seeking to minimize changes in the status quo." If this style continues, the U.S. dissatisfaction will increase rather than diminish, resulting in a further aggravation in U.S. frustration, and this cycle will never stop.

Two weeks later, the *Washington Post* commented on the beef and citrus discussions, saying

By resisting desperately on minor matters such as beef imports, and pushing them to the brink of crisis before compromising, Japanese negotiators create an impression of obduracy. It does not serve Japanese interests to encourage Americans to think of trade with Japan as a one-way street in which even the most modest concessions are made grudgingly and only after inordinate delay. . . . That impression is damaging to Japan. . . . In the beef case, the Japanese allowed the dispute to drag on much too long at too great a political cost.

Another challenge in the future is to learn how to treat Japan as we would any other ally or friend. The quotations I just used illustrate how perceptions in both countries focus on pressure and on response tactics. This is not the only way to conduct business. Calm, consistent attention to issues before they are politicized should work to eliminate the cyclical and emotional swings in our relationship. We have, with few exceptions, attempted to do just that during the past 3 years. In my view, we must build upon this approach so that future generations of leaders will not be so embittered by the battles that a mature dialogue and the accomplishment of other important objectives in our relationship become impossible.

Particularly in trade matters, I welcome the fledgling indications that some circles in Japan see it as in their own national interest to open completely to foreign products and services. The leaders of Japan have to foster this growing recognition.

In terms of international political cooperation, however, the obligation is more on our side. If we want Japan to work together with us as a close and equal partner on the international stage, we must act accordingly. We must treat Japan as an equal, consult closely, and be willing to listen—and in some cases modify—our policies and actions when Japan disagrees. In the global economic arena, Japan already is speaking its mind openly to us. However, Japan has been less willing to do the same in international political affairs. When the day comes when it does so, it may come as a shock to many Washington policymakers who are accustomed to a quieter Japan. That day will come, and I hope that we will be flexible and mature enough to receive it as a sign of a successful policy.

The final challenge that we face is to make sure that, when we deal with

Japan on transitory individual issues, we keep our overall interests in mind and affirm the importance of our relationship to help achieve progress on those outstanding issues. Our trade interests are important to us, but they are not the only part of our relationship. Conversely, our security interests in Japan are extremely important to us, but this does not mean that we should ignore our interest in securing equitable access to Japan's market. We should not be forced to choose, Solomon like, one aspect of

our relationship over another. Our relationship with Japan is without question one of our most important and vital relationships, and it will be increasingly so in the future. If we keep the overall importance of that relationship in mind, we can make even greater progress in resolving outstanding issues.

¹The completed transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Asia Security: Economic and Political Dimensions

by William A. Brown

Address before the U.S.-Asia Institute on June 18, 1984. Mr. Brown is Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Although formed only a few short years ago, the U.S.-Asia Institute has already made a large contribution to a deepening of understanding between the peoples of the United States and Asia. Your leadership, headed by your distinguished chairman, Mr. Kay Sugahara, and ably assisted by co-founders Esther Kee, Joji Konoshima, and others, is outstanding. Your organization, through its research, symposia, and publications, serves as a wise adviser in meeting the challenge of achieving better relations between the United States and the countries in the East Asia and Pacific region.

Overview

The subject for my address today is the political and economic dimensions of U.S.-Asia security. That ancient and very wise Chinese sage, Lao Tzu, said: "He who knows does not speak. He who speaks does not know." I, therefore, ask your kind indulgence.

Ever since immigrants from Europe and Asia settled the West Coast, the United States has necessarily looked to both East and West. World War II accelerated the trend away from paying so much more attention to Europe toward one of greater balance and concern. Our future is as tied to events in East Asia as it is to our more traditional relations in Western Europe.

These last four decades since the end of World War II have witnessed great changes that have drawn the United States ever closer to East Asia. Peaceful trade and commerce have expanded to such a degree that U.S. trade with the East Asia and Pacific region has outstripped our trade with Europe. The dynamic growth of the Pacific nations has transformed them into major markets for U.S. products, services, and capital.

There have been two major wars. And we have learned our lessons. We are resolved to maintain our military posture and presence as a Pacific power so as to deter armed aggression against our allies and friends in the region. Immigration patterns have shifted; in recent years, along with Latin America, the largest number of immigrants have come from Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the former Indochina countries. These hardworking people greatly enrich our culture and economic life.

Economic Dimensions

Let me now comment on the economic dimensions of U.S.-Asia security. No society can be truly secure without a strong economy. A flourishing economy provides the necessary resources for a strong defense. Breakthroughs in the private sector often have application in defense-related industries, but more generally, a growing, vibrant economy has certain intrinsic advantages: it motivates people to become involved, to increase production, and to be concerned about the quality of the product. It also

stimulates education, and a better educated workforce results in a better educated fighting force.

The Republic of Korea is a good example of the correlation between economy and security. While North Korea has maintained over the years a 20% of GNP spending rate for so-called defense, South Korea, because of its expanding economic strength, now is at rough equivalence in military expenditures. If the trend continues, there is no doubt the South will right the current imbalance in military forces. Although the U.S. guarantee for the Republic of Korea's security is an important factor in this equation, the commitment of the South Korean people to hardworking economic growth is the key ingredient to an increasingly strong defense posture.

On a broader plane, our growing economic ties with our friends and allies in the East Asia and Pacific region provide additional benefits from a security standpoint. Commerce is a very strong tie that binds. It helps cement relationships and makes it that much harder for adversaries to drive a wedge between us. Across the sealanes of the Pacific today are shipped a great deal of each market country's wealth. They have become, in fact, the sinews and arteries of a larger system, and—needless to say—crucial to the security of this system and its parts.

Such close and very extensive economic ties inevitably produce some friction, and I suppose our trade with Japan—one of our closest and most important friends in the world—is the best case to illustrate this. There are some important trade problems, and issues such as Japan's quotas and high tariffs on agricultural and forestry products are illustrative of the difficulties that we have in achieving the same kind of access to Japan's market that Japanese companies have to ours. We will continue to emphasize strongly to the Japanese the importance of removing its remaining barriers to the export of U.S. goods and services. And yet, such problems must be kept in perspective. Because our economic ties are part of a much wider, deeper relationship, with a security dimension, we must never let disputes eat away at the trust so necessary for cooperation to meet common threats.

I beg your indulgence to cite a few statistics to show just how phenomenal the growth in our economic ties has been over the last few years.

- U.S. investments in the region rose an estimated \$4 billion in 1981 to \$26.6 billion.

- Also in 1981, before the recession, the \$128 billion trade with East Asia and the Pacific signified a 12.2% increase over the previous year. This compares with a 10.9% growth in our worldwide trade.

- In 1982, in the recession, trade with the region declined 1% compared to a 7.8% decline worldwide.

- In 1983, the first year of recovery, the \$136.5 billion trade with East Asia and the Pacific was up 8% compared to a 0.5% worldwide. It is now 24% larger than our trade with Western Europe and comprises 30% of our total trade. ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] by itself is our fifth largest trading partner behind Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the European Community.

Political Dimensions

Let me now turn to the political dimensions of U.S.-Asia security. No society can be secure if it is torn by internal strife. No society can successfully cope with threats from the outside if it is weak within. And political strength derives from governments being responsive to the needs of their people. Over 20 years ago, Dr. Sun Yat-sen asked:

Is there any just reason why we should oppose autocracy and insist on democracy? No, because with the rapid advance of civilization people are growing in intelligence and developing a new consciousness of freedom. . . . Which is more appropriate, autocracy or democracy? If we base our judgment on the people's intelligence and ability, we come to the conclusion that the sovereignty of the people is far more suitable to us.

Just as our society today is influenced by Asian religious and cultural traditions, so too have Asian societies, especially after shaking off the yoke of colonialism, been influenced by Western political ideas.

We are justifiably proud of our democratic system and feel most comfortable in dealing with others who are similar values. Happily, many countries in the region have attained or are moving toward stable democracies. The institutional growth and broad acceptance of Japanese democracy, for example, is something in which the Japanese people can take pride, and we will continue to applaud—and encourage in appropriate ways—movement toward freer societies in the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere. Our unique relationship with Australia and

New Zealand is based upon shared history, values, and generally compatible interests and objectives. Anchored by the ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States pact] treaty, our contacts with these two old friends continue to be close and harmonious. We are encouraged by the political growth in the Western tradition of the emerging nations of the South Pacific. We look forward to full self-government in the not too distant future for the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau.

Southeast Asia provides an interesting example of the dynamic interaction between political, economic, and security factors. Two decades ago, our Southeast Asian friends' foremost threat was communist subversion fostering internal disorder. The economic and political progress of these countries has reduced this threat in most countries to manageable proportions. Finding their ability to penetrate and influence internal developments sharply curtailed, both the Soviet Union and Vietnam have turned to conventional military forces and intimidation as their principal policy tools. The resulting threat is real and must be met. But the wave of the future clearly does not lie in the regimented societies where experience starkly reveals the central weakness of their governing systems. Such one-dimensional systems provide neither economic nor political incentives or development.

The U.S. Role

There is a psychological dimension of the U.S. security role that I would also like to touch on briefly. For a time after the Vietnam war, there were many who feared that isolationism would again move America to withdraw from her commitments as a Pacific power. Many were concerned that U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific would resemble that so well-described by Winston Churchill, speaking about his own country in the mid-1930s: "Decided only to be unde-

cided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be impotent."

Events fortunately proved that America was not returning to isolationism. While the lessons of the Vietnam war will provide debate material for years to come, the negative consequences of that war are plain for all to see—namely a Vietnam under repressive rule which invaded, occupies, and now even colonizes parts of its neighbor Kampuchea; provides the Soviets with air and naval facilities in the region; and is responsible for the flight of more than a million and half refugees from Indochina since 1975.

Such consequences challenged the United States to respond, and I believe we have. Our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand are stronger than ever. Our political ties to new friends, such as China, and old friends such as the ASEAN states, are crucial in dealing with both security and economic challenges. As Secretary Shultz stated before the World Affairs Council of San Francisco last year, the U.S. role in the East Asia and Pacific region is unique. "We are the one nation of the region with both a worldwide view and the capacity to implement a worldwide policy. As a great power, we have great responsibilities. We have borne them well, and we must continue to do so. . . . The United States will remain a Pacific power. Although specific tasks may change, our overall responsibilities will not be diminished in importance nor shifted on others."

It is not just happenstance that over the past year, the President of the United States has made two major trips to Asia—to Japan and the Republic of Korea, and to China, and hopes to be traveling to Southeast Asia as well. The President has a deep and abiding commitment toward strengthening U.S. ties to the Pacific. As he commented recently in Beijing: "I see America and our Pacific neighbors going forward in a mighty enterprise to build strong economies and a safer world." ■

World Economic Prospects

by W. Allen Wallis

Address before the American Chamber of Commerce in Santiago on July 27, 1984. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

I am happy to be in Santiago. This is my first visit, and I am impressed already by the beauty of the city and the hospitality of its people. In addition, it is an honor and a pleasure to have this opportunity to address you.

I will first discuss prospects for the world economy and U.S. policies to sustain, strengthen, and spread the economic recovery on a global basis.

Second, I will discuss the effects of recovery on developing countries, a subject that this audience may find of particular interest.

Finally, I will comment on problems related to international debts.

U.S. Recovery and Global Outlook

Largely as a result of the strong U.S. recovery, the world economy is in much better shape than it was a year and a half ago. The recovery is increasingly picking up strength in the other industrialized economies, international trade is again growing, and we have passed the worst of the current debt problems of some developing countries.

With strong growth in U.S. incomes and production, the U.S. market for foreign goods expanded rapidly during 1983. The value of imports in the fourth quarter was 19% above a year earlier and grew a further 13% in the first quarter of this year. This growth induced a recovery in global international trade. The strong dollar has substantially improved the competitive position of our trading partners, allowing them to take advantage of the growth in our market and to compete effectively in third-country markets. The widening of the U.S. trade deficit, estimated at a \$30-billion increase, is a measure of the stimulus provided to other countries. Perhaps as important as this trade stimulus has been the psychological impact of the U.S. recovery. Even though recession and financial crisis continue in too many countries, the United States has achieved a strong upturn. Our growth has strengthened confidence and has eased concern about the world financial system.

The U.S. recovery seems likely to continue to be robust throughout 1984. Consumer confidence is high and, according to recent surveys, businesses plan the largest real increase in investment spending since 1977—over 9%. Real output grew 9.7% in the first quarter. The preliminary estimate of real GNP [gross national product] indicates growth in the second quarter at the more sustainable rate of 5.7%. We expect that growth will continue at a moderate and sustainable pace for the rest of the year.

Except for Canada, whose recovery has paralleled that in the United States, the upturn in the rest of the industrialized economies has been less vigorous than in the United States. Nevertheless, there is increasing evidence that the rest of the industrialized world is recovering.

The strength of this recovery varies, of course, from country to country. Growth is greatest in those economies which have taken prompt and effective action against inflation. In Japan, where inflation in consumer prices has been only about 2%, growth is estimated to have been about 4.5% from the fourth quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1983. Both Japan and Canada benefit from rapid growth of their exports to the United States and should sustain strong growth in 1984. In Europe, growth improved in 1983, notably in Germany and the United Kingdom, but was still disappointing. Germany, which has brought down its inflation rate to about 3%, had a rather sluggish recovery in 1983 of 3%, but probably will grow more than 3% this year. Europe's relative slowness to recover reflects, in large measure, the continuing problems of France. The French economy should start to grow this year, so the growth of Europe as a whole should strengthen in 1984. The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] now expects European growth to reach 2.25% this year, up more than one percentage point from last year.

Just as the recovery in the industrialized economies has been based on success in reducing inflation, so our ability to sustain it will depend on success in keeping inflation from accelerating again. The signs so far are good. U.S. consumer prices have risen by only about 4.5% in the last 12 months, only one percentage point above the previous 12 months and far below the double-digit rates of increase in 1979

and 1980. The low rate of inflation during the past year has been reinforced by falling energy prices and agricultural prices. The inflation rate for other goods and services is about 5%, a level we expect to see during the remainder of 1984. With a stable monetary policy keeping expansion under control, continued moderation in the growth of wage rates and further good performance in productivity should help keep inflation down.

The outlook for inflation in the rest of the OECD is similarly good. Even the high-inflation countries, notably Italy and France, are showing significant improvements. Consumer prices for the OECD as a whole are expected to continue to advance at about a 5% pace in 1984.

Another factor affecting the economic outlook will be the exchange rate of the dollar. Recent movements in this rate have been dominated by international capital movements. With net international capital flows swinging sharply toward the United States in 1983, the dollar appreciated further despite a widening deficit in both trade and current account. The trade-weighted average value of the dollar rose during the year to a fourth quarter level 6.5% above a year earlier and 26.5% above 1981. (Adjusted for differences among countries in rates of inflation, the corresponding increases were 4.5% and 20.3%.) There is, however, a good deal of doubt that the present level of the dollar will persist, in view of the prospects for a further widening of the U.S. deficit on current account.

If the value of the dollar should fall—and far be it from me to predict whether it will or will not—the effect on the world economic outlook would be mixed. For the United States, our international competitiveness would be improved, stimulating our exports and products which compete with imports. Our prices, however, would rise faster for a while. In the other industrialized countries, efforts against inflation would be assisted by a fall in the dollar, but they would need to rely more on domestic demand and less on their exports for their growth. On balance, an orderly decline of the dollar would probably not affect the size of the recovery in the industrialized countries much, but it would affect its composition.

These facts that I have cited show the U.S. recovery is strong and sustainable, that recovery is spreading through the world, and that trends in international trade are encouraging.

Effects on Developing Countries

What will be the effects of recovery on developing countries? Obviously, the recovery in the industrialized world brightens prospects considerably for the developing countries. A number of these countries have had severe debt problems and have had to make major adjustments in imports to deal with their financial crises. Non-oil developing countries are estimated to have cut their current account deficits by about \$20 billion a year. A major contributor to the improvement was the gain in these countries' trade balance with the United States—about \$13 billion. About \$9 billion of this was due to increased exports to the United States. The trade balance between the United States and Chile, for example, moved from \$837 million in favor of the United States in 1980 to \$241 million in favor of Chile in 1983.

The IMF [International Monetary Fund], assuming only a moderate 4.25% rate of growth for the industrialized economies in 1984, projects growth in the dollar value of their imports to be about 7.5%, in sharp contrast to declines in the previous 4 years. Exports of non-developing countries are expected to increase about 10.3% in 1984. The strength in the U.S. economy, which is much greater than was anticipated, may make this figure even higher. Although expansion in a number of developing countries will be limited by financial constraints and the need for further adjustments of their policies, on the whole growth should improve this year. The best estimates by the World Bank are that growth in the developing countries as a whole will rise to about 3.75% in 1984, compared to less than 1% last year. As you know, growth in Chile—which was a negative 0.8% last year—is projected by the Chilean Government to be in the 4%–5% range in real terms this year. Thus, prospects are bright for developing countries overall—at least for those with sound economic policies.

If the global recovery is to be sustained and strengthened, steady, non-inflationary growth within individual countries is required. The United States has made substantial strides, but we still have more to be accomplished. For example, the United States needs to cut its fiscal deficits, as do many other countries. European countries, in particular, can improve their prospects by increasing the flexibility of their labor markets. All countries need to establish credible, non-inflationary monetary policies. Many developing countries need to free up

their economic structures, adopt realistic exchange rates, and encourage redeployment of resources to the foreign trade sector.

Effects on International Indebtedness

In conclusion, some remarks about international indebtedness. In the latter part of 1982, major international debt problems came to a head. There was widespread fear of defaults which would lead to grave damage to the world financial system. But these difficult problems have been managed through international cooperation involving debtor and creditor governments, private lending institutions, and the International Monetary Fund.

Countries with heavy burdens of debt service may have prolonged periods of adjustment ahead. We believe, however, that the worst of the world debt problems may be behind us. We have proven that the major industrialized nations, working in cooperation with the IMF and major international banks, are able to coordinate their policies to assist those nations unable to service their debts.

For their part, many debtor countries have shown the ability and will to act responsibly and to take appropriate action to redress their balance-of-payments positions. Chile, of course, is among the countries in this category. We are seeing significant reductions in the current account deficits of many nations, with the total current account deficits of non-oil developing countries having been cut very substantially from 1982 and 1983. In the case of Chile, the current account deficit was slashed from almost \$5 billion in 1981 to about \$1 billion in 1983. With the IMF quota increase now in place, establishment of enlarged general arrangements to borrow, and the provision of new loans to the IMF by members of the Bank for International Settlements and Saudi Arabia, we are pleased to see that the IMF has been adequately financed to conduct its important task.

We are now entering what I hope will be the final phase of the debt problem. It is in this phase that the debtor countries will have to work out their debt problems and resume reasonable rates of economic growth.

This phase will require action by both debtors and creditors in a number of areas, including:

First, the continued application of now-established procedures to assist those countries whose debt problems are just emerging;

Second, continued adjustment by the debtor countries;

Third, provision of adequate capital inflows to those countries making adequate adjustments, including the important provision of financing for trade;

Fourth, continued economic recovery in the industrialized nations, control of protectionism, and new efforts to liberalize the world trading system.

The problem of excessive dependence on borrowed capital can only be resolved effectively by the developing countries themselves. However, international direct investment can help. To reduce the likelihood of future debt crises, foreign direct investment must become a more important source of capital for the developing countries.

I remain confident that we will be able to respond to emerging debt problems. Procedures for dealing with these problems are in place and the members of the international financial system, both governments and commercial banks, have shown the necessary resolve and flexibility. Economic readjustment is difficult and expensive but the economic future of most major developing countries is bright if they follow appropriate policies. Both they and we have a stake in the preservation and strengthening of the international financial system, which can serve as an efficient global allocator of investment funds.

Conclusion

In summary, worldwide economic recovery is under way, led by the strong recovery in the United States. World trade is expanding. The benefits are spreading to the developing countries. Those with market-oriented development policies are receiving the greatest benefits from the expansion and will continue to do so. The problems of protectionism and indebtedness pose challenging tests to both the developed and developing countries. These tests can best be met by cooperation and negotiation. The challenges of sustaining growth in the world economy do not require us to devise radical new economic instruments or strategies. What is needed is an application of sound economic principles, good sense, and a great deal of patience. ■

The Bretton Woods Legacy: Its Continuing Relevance

by Richard T. McCormack

Address at a conference commemorating the 40th anniversary of the signing of the Bretton Woods agreements in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 13, 1984. Mr. McCormack is Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

I am here today to acknowledge the debt of people of my generation to the work done here 40 years ago. My generation has never known soup kitchens or bread lines or depression of the type experienced in the 1930s. This is due in no small part to the outstanding work that was done here in setting up an international monetary system toward the end of the Second World War.

Forty years ago, a group of distinguished and farsighted men erected what has become a living historical landmark of international economic cooperation. The structure they erected enabled the world economy to achieve an unprecedented four decades of reconstruction, growth, and change. Today, the Bretton Woods institutions, having proven both resilient and flexible, are in the forefront of our efforts to resolve current international economic problems.

Some of those who helped to build this structure 40 years ago are here tonight. We pay tribute to them and their fellow architects and salute the men and women who, over the subsequent 40 years, worked within and built upon the foundation laid down here.

The wisdom and farsightedness of the architects of Bretton Woods are the more remarkable when we consider the background against which they labored. It is sometimes noted that their conference took place soon after the landing of the Allied forces in Normandy. But, as you know, the gestation period of the Bretton Woods structure began earlier, when the alliance was struggling for its very survival. Remarkably, despite preoccupation with the course of the war, these men were able to look to the future and to see that a totally new cooperative international monetary and

financial structure was needed to rebuild the world economy and secure a lasting peace.

Developing a Stable Monetary Order

What did the Bretton Woods founders believe they had accomplished? How successful were they? What elements of their design are most relevant to our concerns today? Let me begin with the quote from U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau reproduced in our program: "What we have done here in Bretton Woods," Morgenthau said, "is to devise machinery by which men and women everywhere can freely exchange, on a fair and stable basis, the goods which they produce with their labor." A commonplace observation? Perhaps it seems so today. But compare the ideal to the then-existing reality.

The interwar period had left international economic intercourse in virtual anarchy, with countries attempting to defend themselves against external shocks (and, indeed, to export their unemployment to others) through all kinds of devices—exchange rate manipulation, multiple rates and exchange controls of various kinds, import barriers, and restrictive bilateral agreements. In this context, Morgenthau's simple claim must have seemed visionary indeed.

The first order of business, then, was to bring countries together in a structure that would substitute stability, cooperation, and open markets for the existing chaos. At the same time the founders wanted to leave individual countries scope to pursue their legitimate individual economic objectives. Balancing these two goals—discipline and cooperation versus freedom of action—was one of the most fundamental and difficult problems facing the negotiators 40 years ago.

The Bretton Woods founders believed that these goals could best be reconciled within a system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates. They had very much in mind the experience of the interwar period with its turbulent spells of flexible exchange rates and "beggar-thy-neighbor" devaluations. Therefore, in their system, countries were committed to the maintenance of exchange rates within narrow margins around agreed

parities, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was to exercise discipline over changes in these parities.

Did Bretton Woods Fail?

Although this exchange rate structure provided the foundation for the world's monetary system for almost 30 years, it is now generally believed to have had fatal defects which caused it to be abandoned by the major countries a little more than a decade ago—in practice, in 1973; in law, with the second amendment to the IMF articles in 1976.

Many learned writers have written countless pages on the reasons why this happened. The consensus, as I understand it, is that the system proved in practice to be too rigid in the face of changing conditions. Currency convertibility, fixed exchange rates, and independent national macroeconomic policies become increasingly inconsistent with growing economic interdependence. The Bretton Woods escape hatch—adjustment through major exchange rate realignments only after fundamental disequilibrium had clearly emerged—proved unworkable in a world economy where vast amounts of capital can move relatively freely across the exchange markets to hedge or speculate on an anticipated realignment.

Of course, the Bretton Woods founders did not foresee—they could not reasonably have foreseen—the vast increase in funds free to cross and recross national borders over the postwar decades. And it is clear at least some of them gave far less weight to the benefit of free capital movement than to those of free trade. To their credit, the founders viewed their arrangements as experimental, not immutable. If anything, those who followed ought probably to have modified the system at an earlier stage, before it collapsed.

Did the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system signify that the founders failed in their efforts to construct an international monetary system? In terms of their most fundamental objectives, the answer is no, they did not fail.

After all, the original exchange rate system provided sufficient stability and confidence over a quarter century so that nations could move from the chaotic, restrictive, prewar system to successively greater currency convertibility, vastly reduced barriers to the flow of goods and services, and freer capital movements. Largely under the aegis of the IMF, the major trading

ountries of the world have adopted a regime of free financial flows among nations. These developments together provided the foundation for a rapid expansion of trade and interdependence, in turn helping to produce an astonishing recovery from war and a sustained increase in production and material well-being. The removal of exchange controls in accord with the Fund's articles has been instrumental in achieving the six-fold increase in world trade (in real terms) that has occurred since the end of European reconstruction in 1953. Economists, of course, complain about the misallocation of resources which occurred with the growing exchange rate misalignments of the latter part of the period; these misalignments reflected our failure to introduce more flexibility into the operation of the system as conditions changed.

Even more important, gains from that earlier period—convertibility and open markets—were not lost as the system was transformed by the *force majeure* of the marketplace to a more flexible exchange rate system. Compare this evolution with the monetary disintegration of the interwar period, and you will see clearly the lasting benefits of Bretton Woods. The fundamental principles of international monetary cooperation survived and are still operating as we work to improve our economic performance with the present exchange rate arrangements. The principles that exchange rates and other international monetary issues are a matter for mutual concern, not unilateral decisions; stable domestic policies are fundamental to international monetary stability; and that the repercussions of one country's policies on another country's well-being cannot be ignored are still the core of our present system. This is one lasting legacy—more important than the details of any exchange rate system—that the Bretton Woods founders left us.

The IMF and the Debt Crisis

They also left us with an institution—the IMF—that is at the center of our efforts to deal with current international financial problems.

In recent years nations all over the world have found their efforts to manage their economic affairs swamped by a unique combination of adverse circumstances—dramatically increased oil prices followed by worldwide inflation, a collapse in commodity prices, the worst

world recession since the 1930s, and historically very high interest rates. When oil prices shot up, the first reaction of oil-importing developing countries was to borrow to stave off immediate economic dislocation. And with liquidity abundant and real interest rates low or negative in the late 1970s, they continued to borrow. Thus, by the end of 1982, when the crisis peaked, their indebtedness had reached \$600 billion, having quadrupled in a decade. At that point, we were confronted with a widespread debt crisis, as nation after nation sought IMF assistance and debt relief.

Some observers argue that the Fund began to take on a new role in this crisis, that of financial organizer for troubled debtor nations. Indeed, for a troubled world, I know for certain that it has become the linchpin of our strategy for dealing with this crisis, a strategy endorsed last year by the Williamsburg summit. The IMF is

crucial to four of the basic elements of that strategy and closely related to the fifth.

First, the Fund obviously provides its financial support to troubled nations.

Second, it is the one institution with the expertise, experience, and international acceptance to encourage and guide debtor governments toward sound adjustment of their domestic economies to the new world realities. Such an adjustment program is unquestionably the most vital step in addressing a country's financial crisis, because it sets the economy on a sustainable economic path for the future.

Third, emergency official lending to debtor nations is almost invariably bridged to an approved IMF program.

Fourth, adequate continuing flows of commercial bank financing, especially following a crisis, require the imprimatur and, increasingly, the encouragement of the IMF; later such flows depend crucially on the success of

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs

Richard T. McCormack was born in Bradford, Penn., on March 6, 1941. He received his B.A. degree from Georgetown University in 1963 and Ph.D. *magna cum laude* from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland (1966).

Mr. McCormack began his career as a staff member of the Peace Corps and has been a consultant to a number of other U.S. Government agencies and private corporations.

From 1969 to 1971, he served at the Executive Office of the President in a number of capacities. As a senior staff member of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, he was responsible for drawing up the plans for the subsequently established White House Council on International Economic Policy. Mr. McCormack also served as special assistant to former Governor William Scranton at the INTELSTAT negotiations at the State Department in early 1969. He was at the American Enterprise Institute from 1975 to 1977.

In 1977 Mr. McCormack was deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Economic Affairs. Following his tenure at the Treasury, he was a consultant to the White House office of the Special Trade Representative, where he analyzed potential international commodity agreements.

From 1979 to 1981, Mr. McCormack served as a legislative assistant to Senator Jesse Helms. And from December 1981 until his confirmation by the Senate, he was a consultant to the Department of State on international economic matters.



(Department of State photo)

He was sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs in February 1983.

Mr. McCormack is the author of *Asians in Kenya* and a number of other articles and monographs on foreign affairs. ■

the IMF supported adjustment program. (I might add that debt reschedulings, both official and private, also necessitate the assurance of eventual repayment provided by a sound IMF program.)

The fifth element of the debt strategy—strong industrialized-country economic recovery with open markets—obviously is not the direct responsibility of the IMF. Nevertheless, it is of great significance to the success of the Fund's objectives, and I can assure you that the Fund's managing director, for one, has not been timid about making his views known to the industrialized nations whose policies govern the course and strength of the recovery.

Thus, it is clear that the Fund has become "a" and perhaps "the" key actor in managing the debt crisis. Certainly in handling this grave problem it provides an invaluable tool which we would in all probability have to create ourselves if the Bretton Woods participants had not had the foresight to do it for us.

Finally, if the performance under the current exchange rate system is to be improved, then we must have greater convergence in economic performance among major countries toward more stable and noninflationary economic growth in the interests not only of the domestic economy but the international economy. The Fund must have a central role in this effort. In particular, we are trying to strengthen the process of Fund surveillance over all countries' policies—not just those in debt to the Fund. The Fund will certainly be centrally involved in any future evolution of the system.

The IBRD and Changing Development Needs

Let me return now to Secretary Morgenthau's statement. He went on to say that: "We have taken the initial steps through which the nations of the world will be able to help one another in economic development to their mutual advantage and further enrichment of all." He was talking, of course, about the second Bretton Woods institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), whose primary objective would be to provide or support long-term loans for the reconstruction of Europe and the development of low-income countries. The IBRD, of course, was never intended to supersede private investment but to stimulate or supplement the financing of specific projects that could not be privately funded.

In the event, the magnitude of postwar reconstruction turned out to be beyond the resources of the IBRD. With this job largely taken over by the Marshall Plan, the Bank turned its attention to the problems of the developing world.

Over the years the Bank has responded to the changing needs of both its borrowing and lending members. For example, once focusing on capital infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, and telecommunications, the Bank now pays greater attention to social infrastructure needs and to those investments which directly affect the population and serve to make them more productive. Institutionally, too, the IBRD has evolved to meet the manpower training needs of borrowers. In 1955 the World Bank created the Economic Development Institute to promote education and training. Then in 1956 the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established to promote growth in the private sector and to mobilize domestic and foreign capital for this purpose.

In 1960, specifically to meet the development needs of the poorer borrowers and to lend to them on terms that would bear less heavily on their balances of payments, the International Development Association (IDA) was established; the following year the IFC articles were amended to allow that agency to make equity investments.

To address the dynamic complexities of an interdependent world economy, the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and the IMF established in 1974 a Joint Ministerial Committee on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, better known as the Development Committee. Today this committee through task forces is providing a forum to examine both concessional and nonconcessional flows to developing nations and to look at the effective use of those resources. The committee is also the focus of informed debate over the importance of trade to growth in developing countries.

Confronted in the 1970s with an international debt crisis, the World Bank has already accomplished much to alleviate development problems and to assist its borrowing members to manage their economies.

For example, since 1980, a remarkably short time for a multilateral institution, the World Bank has, among other activities:

- Initiated the structural adjustment loan to support programs in developing countries for specific policy changes and institutional reforms designed to achieve a more efficient use of resources;

- Increased soft project lending;
- Developed and implemented a special action program to provide financial measures and policy advice for countries already pursuing appropriate policies;

- Emphasized the needs of sub-Saharan Africa—lending to sub-Saharan Africa was more than 30% of fiscal year 1981–83 lending; and

- Developed and implemented the "B" Loan, designed to increase commercial bank participation in less credit-worthy nations.

Even with these and other recent changes, however, the Bank recognizes more may need to be done. Despite the fact that the current international situation is improving, recovery is only slowly coming to the Bank's less developed members. The Bank is concerned that the need for internal borrower reforms together with unpredictable external conditions beyond the control of borrowers may make debt management and continued development of borrowers highly tentative.

Beyond considering additional mechanisms to assist borrowers, the Bank is reexamining its coordination with the IMF. Bank use of structural adjustment loans, increased nonproject lending, and the longer term IMF involvement with countries has blurred the distinctions between its activities and those of the IMF. Although there always has been good coordination between the two institutions, their changing roles underline a need for strengthening Bank-Fund coordination.

The Bank is working to meet these challenges. Specifically, it is now conducting a review of its current activities, their effectiveness, and possible future actions. Management plans, I understand, to present a coherent plan of action on the future role of the Bank in the spring of 1985. With the Bank's history, I believe we can confidently expect the Bank will continue to meet the challenges presented by a dynamic world economy.

Conclusion

We are here celebrating the achievement of the drafters of the pathbreaking Bretton Woods agreements, which have constituted an essential foundation for postwar economic cooperation. I have reviewed some of the major accomplishments of these institutions, which have been indispensable for the enormous economic gains we have achieved in the past four decades. I have also mentioned some of the ways in

which these institutions are moving to meet the critical challenges of today. We must ensure that these institutions remain as vital and effective in dealing with future problems as they have been in the past. We must also rededicate ourselves to the task of building public support for these institutions and their objectives. For if they have been vital to

managing the expansion of the world economy over the past 40 years, we can be sure that they will be even more imperative in our increasingly interdependent world economy of the future. This, more than anything else, is the tribute we owe to the founders of Bretton Woods. ■

U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations

**RESIDENT'S REMARKS,
JUNE 27, 1984¹**

rs. Billington, Hamburg, Ellison, and Johnson thank you for bringing your distinguished group to the White House. When I heard that you would be meeting at the Smithsonian to discuss U.S.-Soviet exchanges, I was eager to share my thoughts with you on this timely and important topic.

First, I want to congratulate the Woodrow Wilson Center and the Carnegie Corporation of New York; certainly nothing is more worthy of our attention than finding ways to reach out and establish better communication with the people and the Government of the Soviet Union.

For many months, I have encouraged the Soviet Union to join with us in a major effort to see if we could make progress in these broad problem areas: reducing the threat and use of force in solving international disputes, reducing armaments in the world, and establishing a better working relationship with each other.

At the United Nations, at the Japanese Diet, at Georgetown University, and at the Irish Parliament, I have explained our efforts to reduce arms, particularly nuclear arms, and to establish a useful dialogue on regional issues. Let me describe to you some of the many efforts that we're making to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We've informed the Soviet Government that we're prepared to initiate negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and we've completed our preparations for these negotiations. We've proposed to resume preparations to open consulates in New York and Kiev. We've taken steps to revive our agreements for cooperation in environmental protection, housing, health,

and agriculture. Activities under these agreements have waned in recent years, because there've been no meetings of their joint committees to plan projects. We've proposed that preparations begin for such meetings in order to increase the number of active projects.

We're in the process of renewing several bilateral agreements that otherwise would have expired this year. And we've agreed to extend our fishing agreement for 18 months, and we're looking at possibilities to increase cooperation under the terms of the agreement.

We've proposed that our Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation be renewed for another 10 years and that preparations begin for a meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission.

The U.S. Navy delegation held talks last month with their Soviet counterparts in accord with our agreement on avoiding incidents at sea. And we've agreed to extend this useful agreement for another 3 years.

We're reviewing the World Oceans Agreement, which has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research, and we'll give careful thought to renewing the agreement prior to its expiration. And we've made proposals in several other areas to improve dialogue, foster cooperation, and solve problems.

We've proposed a fair and equitable resolution of our differences on the maritime boundary off Alaska. We've proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in which astronauts and cosmonauts would carry out a combined exercise in space to develop techniques to rescue people from malfunctions in space vehicles. And we're currently conducting another round of talks on consular matters, trying to improve visa procedures and facilitate travel between our two countries.

We've suggested discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on

search and rescue procedures to assist citizens of all countries lost at sea. And we've made progress in our talks on upgrading the Hot Line, proposing discussions on potential nuclear terrorist incidents, on establishing a joint military communications line, and on upgrading embassy communications in both countries. We've also suggested regular high-level contacts between military personnel of our two countries.

So, as you can see, we've offered comprehensive and sensible proposals to improve the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and our working relationship. And if the Soviets decide to join us, new avenues would open, I think, for your efforts.

It's still too early to judge the results. A few proposals are near agreement. Many others are still under discussion, and some have been rejected—at least for now.

Meaningful contact with a closed society will never be easy. And I'm as disturbed as you are by recent reports of new measures taken by Soviet authorities to restrict contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners. These restrictions come on top of intensified repression of those brave Soviet citizens who've dared to express views contrary to those of the Soviet political elite.

The people of the Soviet Union pay a heavy price for the actions of their government. In fact, we all pay a price. When the Soviet Government takes repressive actions against its people and attempts to seal them off from the outside world, their own intellectual and cultural life suffers. At the same time, the rest of the world is deprived of the cultural riches of the Soviet people. What would classical music be without a Tchaikovsky or literature without a Tolstoy or chemistry without a Mendeleev.

Civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible. The Soviet insistence on sealing their people off and on filtering and controlling contacts and the flow of information remains the central problem.

When Soviet actions threaten the peace or violate a solemn agreement or trample on standards fundamental to a civilized world, we cannot and will not be silent. To do so would betray our deepest values. It would violate our conscience and ultimately undermine world stability and our ability to keep the peace. We must have ways short of military threats that make it absolutely clear that Soviet actions do matter and

that some actions inevitably affect the quality of the relationship.

These reactions do lead to a decrease in contacts with the people of the Soviet Union, and this is a dilemma. However, our quarrel is not with the Russian people, with the Ukrainian people, or any of the other proud nationalities in that multinational state. So, we must be careful in reacting to actions by the Soviet Government not to take out our indignations on those not responsible. And that's why I feel that we should broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better.

But our proposals to do that are not a signal that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We'll continue to demonstrate our sympathy and strong support for the Afghan people. The United States will support their struggle to end the Soviet occupation and to reestablish an independent and neutral Afghanistan.

Nor do our proposals mean that we will ignore violations of the Helsinki Final Act or plight of Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, Anatoli Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov, and so many others. The persecution of these courageous, noble people weighs very heavily on our hearts. It would be wrong to believe that their treatment and their fate will not affect our ability to increase cooperation. It will, because our conscience and that of the American people and freedom-

loving people everywhere will have it no other way.

I know these thoughts do not resolve the dilemma we face. But it is a dilemma for all of us. And I'll value your advice.

I don't think there's anything we're encouraging the Soviet leaders to do that is not as much in their interest as it is in ours. If they're as committed to peace as they say, they should join us and work with us. If they sincerely want to reduce arms, there's no excuse for refusing to talk, and if they sincerely want to deal with us as equals, they shouldn't try to avoid a frank discussion of real problems.

Some say for the Soviet leaders peace is not the real issue; rather, the issue is the attempt to spread their dominance by using military power as a means of intimidation, and there is much evidence to support this view. But it should be clear by now that such a strategy will not work. And once they realize this, maybe they'll understand they have much to gain by improving dialogue, reducing arms, and solving problems.

The way governments can best promote contacts among people is by not standing in the way. Our Administration will do all we can to stay out of the way and to persuade the Soviet Government to do likewise. We know this won't happen overnight, but if we're to succeed,

you must stay involved and get more Americans into wider and more meaningful contact with many more Soviet citizens.

It may seem an impossible dream to think there could be a time when Americans and Soviet citizens of all walks of life travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, look up friends and professional colleagues, work together in all sorts of problems, and, if they feel like it, sit up all night talking about the meaning of life and the different ways to look at the world.

In most countries of the world, people take those contacts for granted. We should never accept the idea that American and Soviet citizens cannot enjoy the same contacts and communication. I don't believe it's an impossible dream, and I don't think you believe that, either.

Let me just conclude by saying thank you, and God bless you for what you're doing.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, JUNE 27, 1984²

In his speech today to participants in the Smithsonian's Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, the President refers to several proposals we have made to establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union.

New Exchanges Agreement

We have been discussing a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation and will present a draft to the Soviets for formal negotiations in the very near future. The previous agreement, often referred to as the "Cultural Agreement," lapsed in 1979. It was one of a series of 2-year agreements going back to 1958. Our new draft would provide for resumption of official support for *inter alia* exchanges of major exhibits, academic, cultural, and sports individuals and groups and reactivation of film presentations. The American team in the formal negotiations will be headed by Ambassador Arthur Hartman in Moscow.

New Consulates General

In 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish new Consulates General in Kiev and New York City. We already have a Consulate General in Leningrad and the Soviets have one in San Francisco. Following

U.S.-Soviet Consular Agreement

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUG. 1, 1984¹

On August 1, 1984, representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Consular Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchanged diplomatic notes concluding the latest round of the U.S.-Soviet consular review talks. The agreement brings to fruition a series of discussions on consular matters conducted in 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1984 and resolves a number of issues to visas and the functioning of the diplomatic missions of the two countries.

The issues involved were essentially technical ones, to be resolved on the basis of mutual benefit. The agreement will facilitate the travel of participants in educational exchange programs, expedite the issuance of certain categories of visas, and improve conditions for the travel of diplomats in the two countries

by allowing them to enter and leave through two additional cities beyond the three currently provided for.

The talks were proposed by us as part of the President's effort to expand contacts and to move forward on bilateral issues that can be resolved to our mutual benefit, as he mentioned in his June 27 remarks on U.S.-Soviet exchanges, and it seemed to us that the Soviet side approached them in the same spirit.

The U.S. delegation was led by Raymond F. Smith, officer-in-charge of the Bilateral Relations Section of the Department of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs. The Soviet delegation was headed by Ivan Gorokhov, Deputy Chief of the Consular Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

he Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. Government suspended the agreement for new Consulates General. At the time of the suspension, we had an advance team in Kiev for nearly 2 years and were approximately 6 months away from officially opening the Consulate. The Soviets had a similar team in New York. Both advance teams were withdrawn. Since that time, we have discussed the Consulates issue on numerous occasions, focusing over the past year on concrete steps that could be taken to pave the way for opening these Consulates. We have recently proposed to move forward and suggested we send a team to Kiev to inspect available property.

Environmental Protection Agreement

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection was signed at Moscow on May 23, 1972, by President Nixon and Chairman Podgorny. The agreement has been renewed three times for 5-year periods and is due to expire May 23, 1987. Activities under the agreement have included seminars, joint publications, exchange visits, and joint projects in several topics including protecting endangered species, modeling of long-range air pollution, and earthquake prediction. EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus has assumed the U.S. co-chairmanship of the Joint Environmental Committee and will seek to use this forum as a means to reinvigorate the agreement. Mr. Ruckelshaus is currently representing the United States at the multilateral Conference on the Environment in Munich, where he has discussed the agreement with Soviet officials.

Housing

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cooperation in Housing and Other Construction was signed by President Nixon and Chairman Kosygin on June 28, 1974, in Moscow. We decided in December 1983 to renew the agreement for a third 5-year period effective June 28, 1984. Besides exchange visits and seminars, the agreement has supported joint projects in construction techniques in extreme climates and unusual geological conditions, sewage treatment in a permafrost environment, and fire prevention in the design of construction materials. The President's decision to expand the activities under the agreement will lead to the convening of the first Joint Housing Committee meeting

since 1978 and to an increase in the already extensive private sector involvement in joint projects. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel Pierce, Jr., will lead our efforts under this agreement.

Health

The United States and the Soviet Union entered into cooperation in the health area through two agreements signed in the early 1970s: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Medical Sciences and Public Health (signed May 23, 1972, at Moscow by Secretary of State Rogers and Minister of Health Petrovsky) and the Agreement on Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development (signed at Moscow June 28, 1974, by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko). The Health Agreement has been extended until May 23, 1987, while the Artificial Heart Agreement will run until June 28, 1987. The President has directed that steps be taken in the near future to strengthen cooperation under these agreements through a renewal of high-level visits, joint committee meetings, and the initiation of new projects and possibly new agreements. The timing for such steps has not yet been set. The agreements have provided for joint research *inter alia* on laser treatment of glaucoma, congenital heart disease, mechanically assisted circulation in artificial hearts, and cancer treatment and prevention.

Agriculture

Signed at Washington June 19, 1973, by Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Agriculture Agreement has been extended three times and will not expire until June 19, 1988. The Department of Agriculture will now reactivate the agreement (which has been dormant the past several years) through a joint committee meeting, high-level visits, and initiation of new projects. Earlier the agreement has supported plant, animal, and soil science research (germ plasm studies) and exchange of grain-related economic information. Exchange visits, especially those involving the private sector, had been particularly active. All of these programs will be reinvigorated.

Fishing Agreement

In April, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend the existing fisheries agreement for 18 months (as opposed to the two previous 12-month extensions). Final approval is currently pending before Congress. The

Fisheries Agreement was initially signed in November 1976. The Soviet Union does not, however, have a directed fishing allocation. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States terminated allocations to the U.S.S.R. to fish within our 200-mile zone. (The Soviet Union had been receiving a direct allocation of between 400,000 and 500,000 MT a year). Soviet processing at sea of fish caught by U.S. fisherman as part of an existing joint venture was allowed to continue since it benefited U.S. fishermen. The United States is currently reviewing the U.S.-U.S.S.R. fishing relationship to determine whether mutually beneficial steps can be taken to increase cooperation.

Long-Term Cooperation Agreement

The United States has proposed to extend for 10 years the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement to Facilitate Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. The agreement was signed by Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev during the 1974 Moscow summit. It is scheduled to expire June 28, 1984. The principal provisions of the agreement call upon the parties to use their good offices to facilitate cooperation in economic, industrial, and technical areas. In practice, the agreement has been exclusively economic and has facilitated certain business dealings between the two countries. If the agreement is extended, our exception is that there will be a meeting of the Working Group of Experts under Article III to examine prospects for trade. If that meeting is successful, then a Joint Commercial Commission meeting will be held when practical.

U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)

The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea established certain "rules of the road" to govern special situations involving naval surface vessels and aircraft of the two nations. It also set up agreed-upon, navy-to-navy channels for the prompt resolution of any problems arising under this agreement. Senior officers of the U.S. and Soviet Navies meet on an annual basis for a general review of the implementation of the agreement and discussion of ways in which it might be strengthened. The most recent review took place in Moscow in late May. At that time, the U.S. and Soviet sides agreed to a renewal of the INCSEA agreement for another 3 years.

World Oceans Agreement

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. World Oceans Agreement was signed in 1973 and renewed for 3 years in 1981. It has been useful in promoting joint oceanographic research and has involved seminars, exchange visits, and joint ocean research cruises. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has taken the U.S. lead on this agreement. The agreement comes up for renewal in December.

Maritime Boundary

The United States and the Soviet Union have a difference relating to the precise cartographic depiction and location of the boundary line established by the 1867 convention ceding Alaska. The difference relates to the fact that the United States depicts the 1867 convention line as the maritime boundary by arcs of great circles, while the Soviet Union depicts the convention line by rhumb lines. We have proposed a fair and equitable resolution to the issue. Three rounds of technical level discussions have been held and a fourth round is expected soon.

Space Rescue Mission

The U.S. proposal envisages cooperation between NASA and Soviet space officials on a joint simulated space rescue mission. A space shuttle would rendezvous with the Soviet space station to practice procedures that might be necessary to rescue each other's personnel. Details of the proposal would have to be worked out.

Consular Review Talks

The session of U.S.-Soviet consular review talks currently underway in Moscow is the latest round of a series of discussions which began in 1976, when representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met to attempt to resolve a number of consular issues outstanding between the two countries. Those issues primarily involved visa questions and administrative matters relating to the functioning of our diplomatic missions. The discussions have taken place in Moscow in 1976 and in Washington in 1979 and 1983.

Search and Rescue Talks

In October 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard was authorized to take the initiative to open direct lines of emergency communications with the Soviet maritime

rescue authorities in the Pacific. As a result of subsequent exchanges in June 1983, agreement was reached to hold a working-level meeting on a broad range of search and rescue topics. This meeting was scheduled for early December 1983, but was postponed at the request of the Soviet side. We have proposed rescheduling this meeting.

U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements Talks

On the basis of the President's proposals of May 1983, a U.S. team has met with Soviet counterparts three times to discuss possible means by which U.S.-Soviet communications—for use in both times of crisis and calm—might be strengthened. The most recent meeting was in Moscow in late April. On the basis of those talks, significant progress has been made in working out agreement with the Soviets on the desirability of upgrading the existing direct communications link (the Hot Line) with secure facsimile transmission capabilities, which would increase the speed, reliability, and versatility of that system. We expect another meeting shortly. Additionally, the United States has put forward proposals to upgrade the communications capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet Embassies in each other's countries, to establish a joint military communications link to handle the exchange of time-sensitive technical data, and to facilitate consultations in the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident.

U.S.-Soviet Military Contact

With the exception of the special navy-to-navy talks under the 1972 INCSEA agreement, there has been no channel for high-level military exchange between the United States and Soviet Union outside of specifically arms control-related talks since the one-time meeting of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with their Soviet counterparts during the 1979 Vienna summit. Earlier this year, the President suggested to the Soviet leadership the desirability of exploring the possibility of regularizing some form of contact and discussion between those responsible for defense matters on both sides for the purpose of increasing mutual understanding and minimizing the potential for misinterpretation and miscalculation.

Human Rights Cases

Andrei Sakharov. Dr. Andrei Sakharov, a physicist and Academy of Sciences member who played a major role in the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, has spoken out at length in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union. In 1975 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for those efforts. Since 1980 he has been required to live in internal exile in the closed city of Gorky. In early May he began a hunger strike to obtain permission for his wife, Yelena Bonner, to travel abroad for necessary medical treatment; there has been no confirmed information of any sort on his health or his status since that time.

Yelena Bonner. A doctor by training, Yelena Bonner is the wife of Dr. Sakharov and was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group. She has served as his main channel of communications to the outside world during his exile in Gorky. She is also believed to have begun a hunger strike in early May to obtain permission to travel abroad for vital medical treatment; she suffers from both a heart condition and serious eye problems.

Yuriy Orlov. A founder and leader of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Yuriy Orlov was long active on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union. He was a founding member of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International and a participant in unofficial scientific seminars organized for refusenik scientists. He was arrested in February 1977 and convicted in May 1978 of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Earlier this year he completed 7 years in a strict-regime labor camp and began 5 years of internal exile.

Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is a long-time activist on behalf of human rights and Jewish culture in the Soviet Union. A founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Shcharanskiy was also a leader of the Jewish emigration movement and a liaison between Western newsmen and Soviet dissidents. In March 1977 he was arrested and in July 1978 was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "treason." He is currently in Chistopol Prison; his wife, Avital, lives in Israel.

¹Made in the East Room at the White House to participants in the Smithsonian Institution's Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 2, 1984).

²Text from White House press release.

U.S.-Soviet Union Expand ‘Hot Line’ Agreement

**PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
JULY 17, 1984¹**

I am happy to be able to announce today that we and the Soviet Union have reached agreement to expand and improve the operation of the direct communications link, or the "Hot Line."

This agreement is a modest but positive step toward enhancing international stability and reducing the risk that accident, miscalculation, or misinterpretation could lead to confrontation or conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

With the addition of a facsimile capability, we will not only be able to exchange messages faster, but for the first time we will be able to send graphic material such as maps or pictures which would play a crucial role in helping to resolve certain types of crises or misunderstandings.

The negotiations which led to this agreement began about 1 year ago (August 1983), based upon a series of proposals that we first made in May 1983.

In developing this and other initiatives designed to reduce the risk of war due to accident, misunderstandings, or miscalculation, we had the benefit of excellent advice from a number of key congressional leaders, including Senators Warner and Nunn and the late Senator Jackson.

I see this agreement as both an appropriate technical improvement to the "Hot Line," which has served both our governments well for over 20 years, and as a good example of how we can, working together, find approaches which can move us toward a reduction in the risks of war.

**WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,
JULY 17, 1984¹**

The United States and the Soviet Union today formally agreed to add a facsimile transmission capability to the direct communications link (DCL), commonly known as the "Hot Line." This step—the second major technical improvement to the "Hot Line" since it was established in 1963—will enhance the capability of the system and thus its potential to help resolve crises and avert misunderstandings.

The agreement was initiated at the State Department this morning by Acting Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam and Soviet Charge Victor F. Isakov. Chairman of the U.S. delegation in the talks on communications improvements was Mr. Warren Zimmerman of the State Department, who was until recently Deputy Chief of Mission of our Embassy in Moscow. The Deputy Chairman for the United States was Mr. Stuart Branch who has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications. The U.S. delegation included other officials of the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council staff. The Soviet delegation was headed by Mr. A. M. Varlanskiy, a Chief of Administration in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Communications. Other members of the delegation included officials of the Communications Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

The addition of facsimile transmission capability to the "Hot Line" will enable the U.S. and Soviet heads of government to exchange messages far more rapidly than they can with the existing teletype system. In addition, they will be able for the first time to send graphic material over the DCL. The precise, detailed, and often easily interpreted information offered by such graphic material as maps, charts, and drawings could be essential to help resolve a crisis or misunderstanding.

Prior Negotiating History

In June 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in a memorandum of understanding to establish a direct communications link for use in time of emergency. Each agreed to ensure prompt delivery to its head of government of any communications received over the DCL from the other head of government. The memorandum of understanding was negotiated and signed by the heads of the U.S. and Soviet delegations to the 18-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The DCL was activated in August 1963.

Eight years later, the DCL was updated by a September 30, 1971, agreement negotiated by a special working group of the two SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] delegations and signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister. This agreement provided for the addition of two satellite

circuits to the DCL, one using the Soviet Molniya II satellite system and the other the U.S. INTELSAT system. Those two circuits became operational in January 1978.

A second special working group of the two SALT delegations simultaneously negotiated a related Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which was signed on the same day, September 30, 1971. This agreement provided for each party to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launch extending beyond its national territory in the direction of the other and for each to notify the other immediately in the event of certain situations which could create a risk of nuclear war. The parties agreed that they would use the DCL to transmit urgent information in situations requiring prompt clarification.

The Reagan Proposals

In May 1983, President Reagan proposed to the Soviet Union three measures to improve the bilateral communications network between the two countries: the addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the "Hot Line;" the establishment of a joint military communications link (JMCL); and the establishment of high-speed data links between each government and its Embassy in the other's capital.

The Secretary of Defense had recommended those proposals to the President following a full and complete study of possible initiatives for enhancing international stability and reducing the risk of nuclear war. That examination, which involved all concerned U.S. Government agencies, was mandated by the Congress in the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983. The Secretary of Defense transmitted its results and recommendations in his April 1983 *Report to the Congress on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability*.

U.S.-Soviet negotiations on improving bilateral communications links opened in Moscow in August 1983. Subsequent rounds have been held in Washington in January 1984, in Moscow in April 1984, and the one just completed in Washington in July 1984. Those discussions have now resulted in a U.S.-Soviet accord to add a facsimile transmission capability to the direct communications link.

DCL System

The direct communications link will now consist of:

- Three circuits (two satellite circuits plus one wire telegraph circuit);
- One Earth station in each country for each satellite circuit; and
- Terminals in each country linked to the three circuits and equipped with teletype and facsimile equipment.

19th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, JULY 9, 1984¹

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am submitting herewith a bimonthly report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question.

Since my last report to you there have been several developments in the Cyprus question worthy of note. On April 17 the self-declared Turkish Cypriot "state" announced the formal exchange of ambassadors with the Government of Turkey. We strongly opposed this development and declared publicly our concern that it could set back the U.N. Secretary General's efforts in the search for progress. We also repeated our opposition to any diplomatic recognition of the self-declared entity.

On May 8 I informed the Congress that the Administration intended to request authorization for a "Cyprus Peace and Reconstruction Fund" of up to \$250 million to be utilized on Cyprus at such time as a fair and equitable solution acceptable to both Cypriot communities is reached, or when substantial progress is made toward that goal. I intend this commitment to be a symbol of the shared concern of the Administration and the Congress for promoting genuine progress on Cyprus. I was pleased that a committee of the House of Representatives has included this fund in an authorization bill it is considering.

On May 11 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 550 which condemned the Turkish Cypriot community for several actions it had taken. We found it necessary to abstain on the resolution, believing its language unlikely to contribute to the goal of a negotiated settlement. We reiterated to the Council our continuing opposition to the Turkish Cypriot community's declaration of statehood and our determination to see progress made under the aegis of the Secretary General. Following passage of that resolution Secretary Shultz's Special

In keeping with the principle of confidentiality concerning communications between heads of government, the precise number of times that the heads of state have used the system has not been discovered. We do know that it has proved invaluable in major crises. U.S. Presidents have cited its use during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

Cyprus Coordinator, Richard Haass, and other Administration officials undertook intensive consultations with both Cypriot parties, with U.N. officials and others on the potential for progress on the question.

On June 15 the Security Council met again on Cyprus, this time to renew, unanimously, its mandate for U.N. peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The resolution approved on that date is identical in text to the previous renewal in December, 1983. Following the vote the Turkish Cypriot representative told the Council his community could not accept the resolution but would continue its cooperation with the U.N. forces on the same basis as that announced by the Turkish Cypriots in December, 1983. We view this continuation of the vital U.N. peacekeeping mandate as a positive sign that the parties to the Cyprus question do intend to continue the search for a solution. I am enclosing a copy of the Secretary General's report to the Council on UNFICYP activities.

At the time of the June Security Council vote the Turkish Cypriot side pledged to maintain the unoccupied status of the city of Varosha and presented to the Secretary General its latest ideas on possible next steps toward a solution. We welcomed the Varosha announcement and hope the ideas presented, as well as the comprehensive framework presented previously by the Government of Cyprus, can assist the Secretary General as he resumes efforts under his good offices mandate.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 16, 1984). ■

Food for Peace Day, 1984

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, JULY 10, 1984¹

Thirty years ago today—and you've probably been told this several times—President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law Public Law 480, the Food for Peace program. And 10 years before the signing ceremony which took place here at the White House, President Eisenhower launched the Normandy invasion. And only the year before the signing ceremony, he was first sworn in as President. It's possible that on July 10, 1954, Ike thought most of his great moments were behind him. But that was not so, as this program proves, for in time it grew to become one of the greatest humanitarian acts ever performed by one nation for the needy of other nations.

I'm delighted to welcome here today Ike's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, who was present when the Food for Peace bill was signed. Welcome. Glad to have you here.

Food for Peace is still the largest food aid program in the world. Over the last 30 years, it's delivered almost 653 billion pounds of food to people in over 100 countries. It's helped bring hope and new economic opportunity to more than 1.8 billion people. Statistics are, by their nature, dry, but bear with me for a moment as I give you just a few more—with the hope that they haven't been given to you already.

Food for peace has delivered 27,000 tons of food a day to recipient countries for three decades now. And the value of those U.S. farm products exceeds \$33 billion—more than \$3 million a day over the history of the program.

All of those numbers give us a sense of the scope and the magnitude of this program. But its great contribution is that it's an instrument of American compassion. And it also reflects America's practicality. We recognized 30 years ago that people who are hungry are weak allies for freedom. And we recognized, too, that except in emergencies, hand-outs don't help. From the beginning, recipient countries paid for a significant part of the food they received.

The businesslike approach is one of the strengths of this program. We've never attempted to make countries

which receive our food become dependent on our aid. In fact, we've used our aid to foster economic development around the world. And that is an important reason why, over the years, many of the nations that have received our aid have eventually become major commercial partners.

In the early days of Food for Peace, the major recipient nations were the war-devastated economies of Europe: Italy and Spain, West Germany and Japan. And with time and with the help of Food for Peace, those economies regained their strength. They began to pay cash for American farm commodities. Many of these countries have become our top commercial partners. Eight of our top 10 agricultural markets are former recipients of Food for Peace aid. And Japan is now our number one agricultural market on a cash basis. And that has not only been good for the American farmer and the American economy; it's been good for our international relations.

Food for Peace has been very important in spreading good will and generosity throughout the world. When droughts and flooding from the *El Niño* weather disturbances destroyed food crops in Peru, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries last year, Food for Peace took the lead in providing emergency relief. During the 1966 famine in India, roughly 60 million people are estimated to have been sustained for 2 years by food for Peace shipments.

Today we face a severe and widespread famine in Africa, which is threatening the lives of millions. And, once again, Food for Peace is saving lives. We've already agreed to provide over \$400 million for food assistance for Africa in this year alone. And I want to announce today a major initiative to help the starving people of Africa and the world. It's a new program to help us deliver food more quickly and smoothly to those who suffer the most from the ravages of famine.

I will shortly propose legislation to create a \$50 million Presidential fund allowing us to set aside existing foreign aid resources to meet emergency food needs. By prepositioning food stocks overseas where the requirements are the greatest, we can respond to emergency situations more rapidly and effectively. I will also propose authority to allow the Food for Peace program to reduce the burden of transportation costs on the

most needy countries. And all this is aimed at reducing the loss of life to acute hunger in the Third World.

Food for Peace has come to embody the spirit of American voluntarism. The Federal Government has developed a strong partnership with the private sector to help feed malnourished infants and children, to help mothers and the aged and the disabled. This cooperative effort with private and voluntary organizations includes such agencies as CARE and Catholic Relief Services, and many other groups are helping also.

In short, the Food for Peace program has become a wonderful means by which a nation of abundance has helped those in need. It's helped us expand agricultural markets, get needy allies back on their feet, and help potential allies become strong allies for freedom. Food for Peace has helped to coordinate the charitable impulses of the private sector. It's helped feed the weakest people in the world.

And this record of progress is the result of what happened 30 years ago today, when Dwight Eisenhower picked up a pen and signed a piece of paper that quietly—and, with no great attention from the wise, he changed the world. I think Dwight D. Eisenhower would be very proud of what the Food for Peace program has accomplished. I certainly am, and I'm proud to be able to mark with you its anniversary today.

May Food for Peace continue its great work; may it continue to be administered wisely; and may we continue to combat hunger and malnutrition throughout the world.

I thank you all again for being here, and God bless you.

And, now, I'll sign this proclamation which designates today, July 10, 1984, as Food for Peace Day.

PROCLAMATION 5220, JULY 10, 1984²

July 10, 1984, is the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480). This legislation, signed by President Eisenhower, began the largest food assistance program ever undertaken by one country on behalf of needy people throughout the world, the Food for Peace program.

The productivity and abundance of U.S. agriculture have made this generosity possible. During the thirty years of this program, more than 300 million tons of agricultural commodities and products valued at approximately \$34 billion have been distributed to over 150 countries. This food has helped reduce world hunger and improve nutritional standards.

The Food for Peace program has served as an example for other countries which have joined the United States in the effort to provide food aid to needy people. It has served as a model for others to follow and continue to meet changing needs and situations.

The Food for Peace program has accomplished multiple objectives to combat hunger and malnutrition abroad, to expand export markets for U.S. agriculture to encourage economic advancement in developing countries, and to promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States.

In recognition of the accomplishments of this program, the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 306, has designated July 10, 1984 as "Food for Peace Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of that day.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim July 10, 1984, as Food for Peace Day, and I call upon the people of the United States to commemorate this occasion with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and ninth.

RONALD REAGAN

¹Made at the signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 16, 1984).

²Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 16. ■

Extending Voluntary Departure for El Salvadorans

by Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittee on Rules of the House Committee on Rules on June 20, 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.¹

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today. As every member of the subcommittee knows, and indeed as every American must by now be well aware, El Salvador is a country troubled by poverty, violence, overpopulation, and a history of oppression. For a number of years, Salvadorans have looked for economic opportunity elsewhere. Prior to the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, a large number were living in Honduras. Through the 1970s and early 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans have come to the United States. The increased violence in El Salvador prevalent since 1980 no doubt increased the incentives to leave the country, as have the economic difficulties which the war has only worsened.

The United States is thus confronted with a number of significant immigration issues regarding El Salvador. It is difficult for Salvadorans to get visitors' visas to the United States and difficult for them to get immigrant visas as well. We face a very significant amount of illegal immigration from El Salvador, and a large quantity of asylum applications. How do we deal with the asylum applications? To those not entitled to asylum, how do we respond to their desire to live in the United States?

Asylum Policies

The asylum issue is in a sense an easy one. U.S. law, in incorporating the definition of a refugee contained in the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, set forth the standards by which an asylum application must be judged. We apply these standards and a limited number of aliens, irrespective of their nationality, can meet them. This is true of asylum applicants from El Salvador. This has occasioned much criticism of the Administration's asylum policy toward El Salvador, but in fact we have no "asylum policy" toward El Salvador or any other country; we apply the same standards to each. In the last few months recommendations for

the approval of applications from Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been running at roughly the same rate; and though, of course, there are variations for both countries, about 10% of applications can meet legal standards. This reflects no policy decision, nor does it reflect the state of our bilateral relations with either government; it simply reflects the fact that asylum applicants must meet the legal standards in order to be granted asylum. We are well aware that much criticism could be ended were the number of Salvadoran asylum applications that are approved higher. But, to approve asylum applications for partisan political reasons would ignore the law. We recommend in favor of applications that meet the standards and against those that do not.

Deportation Considerations

The argument is then made that all Salvadorans, even those who do not qualify for asylum, should not be deported to El Salvador but rather allowed to remain here. As you know, the Administration does not concur with this view. All suspension of deportation decisions require a balancing of judgments about their foreign policy, humanitarian, and immigration policy implications.

In the case of El Salvador, the immigration policy implications of suspension of deportation are enormous. Here we have a country with a history of large-scale illegal immigration to the United States. Can anyone doubt that a suspension of deportation would increase the amount of illegal immigration from El Salvador to the United States? An intelligent and industrious Salvadoran weighing a decision to try illegal immigration to the United States knows that one of the risks is deportation, which might occur before he has had a chance to earn back the costs of the journey. If we remove that possibility of deportation, it is simple logic to suggest that illegal entry becomes a more attractive investment.

Of course, not all Salvadoran migrants to the United States are solely or primarily economic migrants; some are refugees who may be and have been granted asylum, and they do not need suspension of deportation to be pro-

tested. So, by definition, when we discuss suspension of deportation for the group which is not eligible for asylum, what we are discussing is whether people who emigrate from El Salvador to the United States illegally should be permitted to reside here. If one says yes to this question then we do not have an immigration policy with regard to El Salvador. We have abdicated the responsibility to have one.

It was the failure of our government to have a coherent approach to refugee flows that prompted the Congress to pass the Refugee Act of 1980. It was the specific intent of the Congress to end nationality-specific measures that provided benefits for persons from one country and left other persons with similar claims in limbo. It was also the Refugee Act that made part of our law the UN High Commissioner's definition of refugee that requires each asylum application to be examined on an individual basis.

We believe our government should avoid single nationality legislation. We also believe passage of immigration reform legislation provides long-term solutions to some of our immigration problems. Many Salvadorans, as well as persons of other nationalities, will be permitted to achieve legal resident status through provisions of the amnesty.

Some groups argue that illegal aliens who are sent back to El Salvador meet persecution and often death. Obviously, we do not believe these claims or we would not deport these people. Twice, in recent years, the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador has tracked deportees to determine if they were being persecuted; we concluded that they were not. Last year we asked some officials of Tutela Legal, which is the human rights office of the Archdiocese of El Salvador, whether they believed there was a pattern of persecution of deportees. They replied that they did not. It is noteworthy that these accusations, which are lodged by some American activist groups critical of U.S. policy in El Salvador, find no echo nor did they find their source in complaint from Salvadoran human rights groups which have never made this claim. And that stands to reason. El Salvador is a country, as noted above, in which emigration abroad is a common and respected means of self-improvement, and it is engaged in by hundreds and thousands of Salvadorans, by perhaps quarter of the population. I submit that the notion that the people being deported are easily identifiable when

they return to El Salvador is false, and the notion that they are automatically innocent is equally false.

The subcommittee will be interested to learn that, in part, in response to the great interest expressed by Chairman Romano L. Mazzoli, Senator [Alan K.] Simpson, and others, we have continued to study the treatment of deportees. The Embassy in San Salvador was sent the names of nearly 500 deportees, selected at random. Efforts were made to contact every one of them in order to see what happened to them after their return. We have been able to locate or find out about roughly 50% of them, using Salvadoran employees so as to draw a little attention as possible to this whole survey.

We have now completed the study and we will be happy to share the specific information gathered as soon as the final report is ready for release. I can tell you, though, that we found no evidence of mistreatment of those Salvadorans interviewed, or among those whose welfare was verified through contact with family members or friends. One interesting note is that 21% of those who were located are, according to family or friends, already back in the United States.

We have confirmed that one detainee was killed. His wife reports that the guerrillas killed him for his earlier involvement with government security forces. A letter sent to the address furnished by a second person was returned marked "deceased." The Embassy was unable to obtain any further information.

I would not suggest to this subcommittee that we have completed here the definitive scientific study and that no further efforts are needed. But surely there must come a time when any observer concludes that this alleged pattern of wide-scale abuse of deportees is supported by evidence.

Humanitarian Assistance

I am sometimes asked why the United States does not do anything to solve the humanitarian problem of poverty and displaced persons and violence in El Salvador. This is a startling question, when you consider the enormous amount of American diplomatic and political effort aimed at bringing democracy and peace to El Salvador, and the extraordinary amounts of economic aid which we give and increased amounts which the Administration has urged upon Congress.

Our proposal of \$341 million in economic assistance for FY 1985 to El Salvador is certainly a valuable response to the humanitarian problem there. I do not believe that the appropriate response to the problems of poverty or violence in El Salvador is to allow any Salvadoran who wishes to simply live in America instead—any more than I think this is true for Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran, Uganda, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Vietnam, or Zimbabwe. My point, of course, is that in a very large number of countries millions of people, and indeed, tens of millions, face lives which any American can only view as desperate. How do we respond? We respond with our willingness to allow hundreds of thousands to legally immigrate to the United States. We respond with our asylum and refugee programs, which are the most generous in the world. We respond with our foreign aid program, now totaling \$8.89 billion including the

pending supplemental request. And we respond with various political and diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes and reduce violence. It does not seem to me that a sensible response can be to say that all these people, if they can make it to the United States, can stay. We can and we must do very many things to address the urgent and desperate humanitarian needs of tens of millions of people throughout the world, but one thing we really cannot do for them all is tell them to move to America.

I therefore respectfully suggest that the current policy is an appropriate one, combining large amounts of economic assistance, energetic diplomatic efforts, and the grant of asylum to those with a well-founded fear of persecution.

¹The completed transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Persecution and Restrictions of Religion in Nicaragua

by Elliott Abrams

Address before the United Jewish Appeal on June 28, 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

As I am sure everyone here knows, on July 20, 1983, President Reagan drew attention to the plight of the tiny Jewish community of Nicaragua at a White House conference. "Virtually the entire Jewish community of Nicaragua has been frightened into exile," the President declared. "Their synagogue, which had its doors torched by Sandinista supporters in 1978, has since been confiscated and turned into offices of a Sandinista organization."

Needless to say, the President's remarks provoked a firestorm of controversy. The Nicaraguan Government and its apologists in this country, and some Americans who should know better, indignantly denied that the Sandinistas were anti-Semitic. Some of the President's critics even accused him of fabricating anti-Semitic allegations in order to win support for U.S. policy in Central America. For this reason, I am

very pleased to have been asked to speak to you this afternoon on the Jewish community in Nicaragua.

Overall Religious Conditions

Before turning to the fate of Nicaraguan Jewry, however, I want to spend just a few moments discussing freedom of religion in general in Nicaragua. My reason for doing so should be obvious. If it were the case, for example, that the Government of Nicaragua scrupulously respects the rights of Catholics, of Protestants, and of Indians, then even if there were well-documented incidents of anti-Semitism in Nicaragua, I think many of us would be inclined to give the Sandinistas the benefit of the doubt and to attribute such incidents to vicious and misguided individuals, rather than to the government. On the other hand, if it turned out that virtually all non-Jewish religious groups in Nicaragua were being persecuted, then it would stand to reason that the Jewish community would also be subjected to persecution. To believe otherwise would be to argue, in effect, that the Sandinistas are philo-Semitic, and no one, not even the Sandinistas, have made that particular argument.

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What, then, is the overall situation with regard to freedom of religion in Nicaragua? As I am sure all of you know, about 85% of the Nicaraguan population is Catholic. If you have been following the situation in Nicaragua you also know that the Sandinista regime and the Catholic Church are locked in a bitter struggle. You are probably aware that the Sandinista government has openly challenged the influence of the Catholic Bishops of Nicaragua, especially that of Archbishop Obando y Bravo. You know that the regime has denied the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church the traditional opportunity to broadcast the Mass on television during Holy Week and has openly insulted the Pope. You know that government-organized mobs have interrupted Masses, harassed churchgoers, threatened priests, and physically attacked members of the clergy. You know that 100,000 Nicaraguan Catholics attended a rally on Good Friday this year to demonstrate their support for the church and their hostility to the regime. And you know that in a homily to some 4,000 Nicaraguans several weeks ago, the head of the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference, Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, said, "The tragedy of the Nicaraguan people is that we are living with a totalitarian ideology that no one wants in this country."

Because of the great strength of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, the Sandinista strategy has been to infiltrate, censor, and control it, rather than to eradicate it outright. The Sandinistas have actually launched a two-pronged attack on the Catholic Church as an institution. On the one hand, they have taken a series of steps aimed at silencing and undermining the episcopal hierarchy of the church in Nicaragua. Simultaneously, they have supported the formation of a rival "popular" or "people's" church subservient to the regime.

In response, Nicaragua's Archbishop Obando has condemned "those who are trying to divide the church" and spread the idea that there is "one bourgeois church and another church for the poor." The Vatican has become so alarmed at the attempt of the Sandinistas to divide the church in Nicaragua that the Pope issued a Pastoral letter on June 29, 1982, which criticized advocates of the "popular church." Despite that fact, the Sandinistas and their supporters in the church continue to portray the official church hierarchy as "bourgeois" and "oppressors," attempting to polarize the

faithful and create, in effect, a new church controlled by the regime.

If the Sandinistas have been forced to adopt a somewhat indirect approach in their efforts to undermine the powerful Catholic Church in Nicaragua, they have been under no similar inhibitions in dealing with the far less powerful Nicaraguan Protestant churches. Among the Protestant groups harassed by the Sandinistas are the Seventh-day Adventists, the Mennonites, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the Moravian Church. By August 1982 more than 20 Managua Protestant churches had been seized by Sandinista-led mobs. Some, but not all, of the confiscated properties were returned, but only on condition that the ministers refrain from criticizing the government. In addition, the Salvation Army was forced out of Nicaragua in August 1980, after ominous verbal threats from authorities, and, finally, instructions to close up the program and leave the country.

Perhaps the most tragic case of government persecution in Nicaragua, however, is that inflicted on the Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians of Nicaragua's isolated Atlantic coast. Most of the members of these tribes are members of minority Protestant churches, especially the Moravian Church. Living in isolation from most of Nicaragua, they have had little to do with any government. The Moravian missionaries filled the gap by providing most of the schools, hospitals, and support organizations that maintained the area.

The campaign of persecution against the Indians has thus far been directed largely at their religious leaders and institutions. In attacking the Indians' religious leaders, the Sandinistas are attacking their source of unity and strength.

Upon coming to power the Sandinistas sealed off the entire Atlantic coast. Travel to the region was allowed only by special permit. Indians were drafted into the militia. Those who refused were shot or forcibly relocated. Villages were forcibly evacuated and then burned. By midsummer 1982, the Sandinistas had destroyed 55 Moravian Churches.

In November of 1982, the Misurasata Council of Ancients (elders), the legitimate representatives of the people of the three tribes, officially denounced the Sandinista government before the Organization of American States.

In summary, then, when we examine the state of religious freedom in

Nicaragua for Christians, the following pattern emerges: harassment and subversion directed against the powerful Catholic Church, brutal and undisguised repression against the far weaker Protestant churches. All of which is to say that in relation to the churches, the Sandinistas have behaved the way Marxist Leninists always behave: they have sought to destroy the weaker churches, and to subvert the more powerful churches.

Jewish Persecution

With this background in mind, let me turn now to the situation of the Jewish community in Nicaragua. A principal source of information about Nicaraguan Jews is Rabbi Morton Rosenthal of the ADL's Latin American Affairs Department. When Nicaraguan Jews came to the ADL and informed it that being Jewish was a major factor in their forced exile and loss of properties, the ADL made representations on their behalf, in 1981, to the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua. The ADL hoped that through "quiet diplomacy" it could obtain some clarification from the Nicaraguan Government about the reasons for the confiscations and the forced exiling of the Jewish community. After 19 months having concluded that the Government of Nicaragua was not going to respond to any of its questions, the ADL publicized the plight of Nicaragua's Jews with an article by Rabbi Rosenthal entitled "Nicaragua Without Jews."

Rabbi Rosenthal points out that the Jewish community in Nicaragua has always been small, numbering about 5 families at its peak. Jews began coming to Nicaragua in the late 1920s from Eastern Europe. They dedicated themselves to farming, manufacturing and retail sales and made significant contributions to Nicaragua's economic development.

Nicaraguan Jews never encountered anti-Semitism until the Sandinistas started their revolution. Even before Sandinistas came to power they began threatening Jews. A favorite tactic was to anonymously phone Jewish homes with warnings that "We are going to you Jews," claiming that Nicaraguan Jews were responsible for Israeli arm sales to the Somoza regime. Graffiti by Sandinistas was widespread, with attacks on Jews and their religion. One was "Death to the Jewish Pigs." The Sandinista initials—FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front]—in red and black left no doubt as to who was responsible. Another slogan painted on

synagogue walls, and elsewhere, by Sandinista supporters was "Israel, Jews and Homo—The Same Thing."

In 1978, the synagogue in Managua was attacked by five Sandinistas wearing face handkerchiefs. They set the building on fire by throwing gasoline in the main entrance doors, shouting [PLO Palestine Liberation Organization] victory slogans and anti-Jewish defamatory language. As the doors caught fire, two members of the community, at prayer during Sabbath services, ran through a side door. The Sandinistas met them with a show of automatic weapons and ordered them inside. The two members of the congregation, incidentally, were both survivors of the Nazi concentration camps.

When the Sandinistas came to power in July 1979, the storm broke. Some members of the Jewish community were advised to leave "for their own safety." Others, who had gone abroad during the last months of the revolutionary struggle, found that they were unable to return. The Nicaraguan Jews went into "exile" mainly in the United States, Israel, and other countries of Central America.

Isaac Stavisky, a textile engineer who was born in Nicaragua, said, "I was willing to return to my native country and engage in my usual activities, but I was stopped cold." It was suggested that he refrain from returning for his own safety because he and his brother-in-law were considered enemies of the revolution.

The president of the Jewish community, Abraham Gorn, was jailed after the Sandinista victory. Gorn, who was then 70 years old, was falsely accused of stealing some land and forced to sweep streets during the 2 weeks of his confinement.

Nicaraguan Jews claim that Jewish-owned property was among the first to be confiscated by the Sandinista government, while Nicaraguans of Arab descent, because of the close PLO-Sandinista relationship, were able to remain in Nicaragua and continue their business activities, often similar to those engaged in by Jews.

The Sandinistas also commandeered Managua's synagogue and covered the four Stars of David at the front entrance with propaganda posters, and the interior with anti-Zionist posters. And even after the tiny Nicaragua Jewish community had fled, the Sandinistas continued to engage in blatant manifestations of anti-Semitism. In July

of 1982, for example, *Nuevo Diario*, a Managua newspaper which closely adheres to the government line, published an article under the headline, "About Zionism and the Palestinian Cause." It spoke of "synagogues of Satan" and denounced Jews "who crucified Jesus Christ and . . . used the myth of God's chosen people to massacre the Palestinian people without mercy."

Two days later, July 17, 1982, the same paper charged that "the world's

money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power, they control political power as now happens in the United States." The paper even went so far as to claim that President Reagan's support for Israel stems from the fact that he "must have Jewish ancestry."

Admittedly, we know of no laws in Nicaragua that are aimed specifically at Jews. There may well be no "official"

Captive Nations Week, 1984

PROCLAMATION 5223, JULY 16, 1984¹

Once each year, all Americans are asked to pause and to remember that their liberties and freedoms, often taken for granted, are forbidden to many nations around the world. America continues to be dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. If we are to sustain our commitment to this principle, we must recognize that the peoples of the Captive Nations are endowed by the Creator with the same rights to give their consent as to who shall govern them as those of us who are privileged to live in freedom. For those captive and oppressed peoples, the United States of America stands as a symbol of hope and inspiration. This leadership requires faithfulness towards our own democratic principles as well as a commitment to speak out in defense of mankind's natural right.

Though twenty-five years have passed since the original designation of Captive Nations Week, its significance has not diminished. Rather, it has undeniably increased—especially as other nations have fallen under Communist domination. During Captive Nations Week we must take time to remember both the countless victims and the lonely heroes; both the targets of carpet bombing in Afghanistan, and individuals such as imprisoned Ukrainian patriot Yuri Shukhevych. We must draw strength from the actions of the millions of freedom fighters in Communist-occupied countries, such as the signers of petitions for religious rights in Lithuania, or the members of Solidarity, whose public protests require personal risk and sacrifice that is almost incomprehensible to the average citizen in the Free World. It is in their struggle for freedom that we can find the true path to genuine and lasting peace.

For those denied the benefits of liberty we shall continue to speak out for their freedom. On behalf of the unjustly persecuted and falsely imprisoned, we shall continue to call for their speedy release and offer our

prayers during their suffering. On behalf of the brave men and women who suffer persecution because of national origin, religious beliefs, and their desire for liberty, it is the duty and the privilege of the United States of America to demand that the signatories of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords live up to their pledges and obligations and respect the principles and spirit of those international agreements and understandings.

During Captive Nations Week, we renew our efforts to encourage freedom, independence, and national self-determination for those countries struggling to free themselves from Communist ideology and totalitarian oppression, and to support those countries which today are standing face-to-face against Soviet expansionism. One cannot call for freedom and human rights for the people of Asia and Eastern Europe while ignoring the struggles of our own neighbors in this hemisphere. There is no difference between the weapons used to oppress the people of Laos and Czechoslovakia, and those sent to Nicaragua to terrorize its own people and threaten the peace and prosperity of its neighbors.

The Congress, by joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), has authorized and requested the President to designate the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning July 15, 1984, as Captive Nations Week. I invite the people of the United States to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities to reaffirm their dedication to the international principles of justice and freedom, which unite us and inspire others.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and ninth.

RONALD REAGAN

¹Text from White House press release. ■

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policy of anti-Semitism. But as Rabbi Rosenthal has stated, the Nicaraguan situation demonstrates that one does not need official policy in order to persecute a small community. It can be effected far more subtly by threat, intimidation, and confiscation, thus avoiding the condemnation that Nuremberg-type laws would invite.

In light of these facts, and also in view of the government's behavior toward Christians and Indians in Nicaragua, I do not think any sensible person can fail to conclude that the Sandinistas are indeed anti-Semitic. What remains to be answered, however, is why they are anti-Semitic? What have they got against us?

Nicaragua's Anti-Semitic Rationale

I think there are two explanations for Sandinista anti-Semitism—a general explanation and a specific explanation. The general explanation is that the Sandinistas—as they themselves have frequently proclaimed—are communists, and, as such, share the general communist antipathy toward Jews. The specific explanation is that the Sandinistas have long enjoyed a close relationship with the PLO, from whom they have undoubtedly picked up anti-Jewish beliefs and attitudes. Let me elaborate briefly on both these explanations.

The simple fact is that one of the wellsprings of our belief in human rights and the dignity of man is the Jewish tradition. This tradition asserts that all humans are created *b'Tzelem Elohim*—in God's image. From this it follows that men are not to be used simply as means to an end; rather, each is an end in himself. Every person has an equal right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness by virtue of his humanity alone. Everyone has his place in the sun, and neither the place nor the sun was created by the state.

For communists and their allies, however, the notation that a man or a woman can have a greater loyalty to God than to the state is completely unacceptable. Atheism is not an incidental or peripheral element of their ideology, but its very core: Communist and radical parties claim for themselves the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience which Jews and others believe reserve to God alone. Such parties also seek to control all political, economic, social, cultural, and other developments in their societies, and that which they cannot control, they seek to destroy. For this reason, communism can perhaps best be

understood as a modern form of idolatry—an attempt to establish the party as the final arbiter of truth, justice, and morality.

Because Jews are unwilling to abandon their own way of life and submit to totalitarian governmental controls, they invariably arouse the enmity and hatred of communists everywhere. Because they recognize an authority higher than the state, they are persecuted. And because the State of Israel is a model of a vigorous, successful, and thriving polity organized along democratic principles, it, too, naturally arouses the enmity of communists everywhere. Hostility to Jews and hostility to human rights are two sides of a single coin and are characteristic of communist regimes in general.

As to the long-standing PLO-Sandinista collaboration, this has been documented at great length by the ADL, by the U.S. Government, by Israel, and in an excellent pamphlet entitled "Castro, Israel and the PLO" published by the Cuban-American National Foundation. Suffice it to say that Jorge Mandi, a Sandinista spokesman, told a reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Watan* (August 7, 1979), "There is a long-standing blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution. . . . Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970s, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the 'Black September' battles."

The brutal fact of the matter is that we face a world in which many countries are ruled by systems of despotism and repression. In this world, Jews have enemies, America has enemies, liberty has enemies, democracy has enemies. And they are one largely coherent group. This group views world politics in terms of what it calls the struggle against "Imperialism, Zionism, and Colonialism." Imperialism, of course, refers to the United States. Colonialism refers to our allies in the Third World, and includes countries such as South Vietnam, which has already been destroyed, and Turkey and El Salvador, which have at

various times been targeted for destruction. And Zionism refers to the State of Israel, and—let us be quite clear about this—to the Jewish people as well. To them, the enemy of humanity is the same enemy whether he salutes the Stars and Stripes or the Star of David.

It is, therefore, no accident, to borrow an old Marxist phrase, that the Sandinista hymn declares, "We will fight against the Yankee, the enemy of humanity." It is not an accident that U.S. troops unearthed on Grenada an agreement between the New JEWEL Movement and Castro's Communist Party of Cuba, stating the two are united by "active solidarity . . . against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, and racism." It is not an accident that the honored guest at the Sandinista's first anniversary celebration was Yasir Arafat, to whom Interior Minister Tomas Borge declared "We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and that the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas." It is not an accident, in short, that whenever communists are in power, Jews are persecuted, Israel is attacked, and the United States is vilified.

Conclusion

I began my remarks this afternoon by quoting President Reagan's remarks on Nicaraguan Jewry. He concluded by saying "Please share the truth that communism in Central America means not only the loss of political freedom but of religious freedom as well." I would like to take this opportunity to endorse the President's words. The small Jewish communities throughout Central America understand that communism poses a real threat to their very survival as Jews. They understand that the Nicaraguans and the Cubans must be stopped from exporting revolution. They recognize that the bitter fate which befell their brethren in Nicaragua might easily be theirs, as well. And like the embattled Jewish communities in Israel and the Soviet Union, they look to us, the American Jewish community, for support and understanding. We cannot let them down. ■

Human Rights in Cuba

Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 27, 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.¹

The history of Cuba over the last 25 years is one of the great tragedies of modern times. It is the history of a gifted and industrious people, whose hopes for freedom and democracy have been cruelly and systematically denied. It is the history of a liberal and democratic revolution which overthrew the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, only to be betrayed by an even more ruthless dictator. It is the history of one of the greatest tyrants of our time, Fidel Castro, who promised the Cuban people that he would restore democracy and respect for law and human rights, but instead established a dictatorship which has brought ruin and misery to his people.

Cuba has been ruled for 25 years by one man, Fidel Castro, and a group which seized power in 1959. The Communist Party dominates all aspects of daily life, controlling the means of production and distribution of all goods, services, and information; public communication, public welfare, and education; as well as national defense, foreign relations, and public security. Under these circumstances, the human rights of Cubans are systematically denied, subordinated to the aims of the Cuban Communist Party, as defined by its "Maximum Leader," Fidel Castro.

Legal System Abuses

Executions to discourage political dissent, for example, which began when Castro seized power in 1959, continued throughout 1983. There are credible reports of summary executions following secret trials of civilians for alleged political offenses by military tribunals. A member of Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, was reported to have been executed in August 1983 for allegedly preaching "propaganda to incite armed rebellion." A 23-year-old student, Carlos Alberto Gutierrez, was shot for belonging to a group caught painting anti-government slogans on walls.

Cuban police commonly round up persons in nighttime arrests. Friends, neighbors, and family members have no knowledge of their fate and frequently are too intimidated to ask. Usually these persons are tried and sentenced in secret, but sometimes they are interrogated and released. In 1983, several Cuban-Americans "disappeared" while in Cuba visiting relatives. No information regarding their detention or whereabouts was provided to the U.S. Government nor to their relatives who inquired about them. In one case, an individual was arrested and held incommunicado for 3 months. Upon being released, he reported that he had been interrogated about alleged espionage and counter-revolutionary activity.

Conditions in Cuban political prisons are barbaric and include the use of torture. Political prisoners who refuse "re-education" are subject to particularly harsh penalties, including the denial of clothing, medical attention, and communication with friends and relatives outside prison. One former political prisoner, Jose Rodriguez Terrero, who was released in August 1983, spent 22 years in Cuban prisons, including months at a time confined naked in a tiny cell called a "drawer" which forced the prisoner to curl up in an embryo-like position. Also included among the forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in Cuban prisons is the placing of a prisoner in a small, sealed, unventilated room, and totally isolating a prisoner from other prisoners and from the outside world. The use of psychiatry for repressive purposes has been reported by Dr. Abdo Canasi. He received a 10-year jail sentence for his exposure, and since his release from confinement he is denied permission to leave the country.

The Cuban legal system does not provide internationally recognized standards of due process for defendants, and is used to impose criminal sentences on individuals who have been imprisoned for political reasons, including lawyers attempting to defend political prisoners and those trying to establish free trade unions. For example, in January 1983, a Cuban court sentenced five persons to death for having tried to organize a "Solidarity-style" trade union movement in Cuba. Subsequently, Cuban authorities arrested the attorneys who sought

to defend the five labor organizers. Groups such as Americas Watch and Amnesty International have estimated that there are over 200 political prisoners in Cuba; other estimates put the figure at about 1,000. Americas Watch also estimates that there are between 1,500 and 2,000 former political prisoners to whom the Cuban Government continues to deny employment. In its 1983 report, Amnesty International has drawn attention to the fact that other political prisoners are refused permission to leave Cuba, even when other countries have been willing to give them visas.

Restrictive Liberties

Freedom of speech and the press do not exist in Cuba. All media outlets are owned by the government or party-controlled organizations and operate strictly according to Communist Party guidelines. No criticism of the policies of the government, the party, or the leadership is permitted. Artistic expression is also covered by these restrictions, which require that artistic works serve to reinforce the goals of the government. Foreign publications, except those from other communist countries, are not available. Even private expression of differences with government policies is repressed by an informer network operated by the politicized block committees, known as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution [CDR]. Those who violate the prohibitions against criticizing the government are imprisoned, and even those suspected of potential opposition can be incarcerated or detained in prison after the expiration of their sentences under the so-called *ley de peligrosidad*.

Freedom of assembly does not exist in Cuba either. No free trade unions are allowed to function. The Communist Party operates a so-called "trade union" federation called the Confederation of Cuban Workers, which acts to enforce labor discipline, encourage higher productivity, and reduce labor costs, rather than to defend workers' interests. The rights to bargain collectively and to strike are not recognized. In the last year, over 200 workers have been prosecuted for trying to organize strikes in the sugar and construction industries. Five trade unionists were condemned to death. But, according to reports, their sentences were reduced to 30 years after their cases became public knowledge. The Cuban Government,

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after at first denying the facts, has said the "terrorists" received severe sentences. At the recent conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague, the Cubans defended the sentences, explaining they were necessary to block any possible attempts to set up a Solidarity-style organization.

Antireligious Activities

The Cuban Government also enforces an active antireligious policy. In the early years of the revolution, the extensive Catholic educational system was destroyed by the government and hundreds of priests were expelled from the country.

Today, a network of formal and informal restrictions has the effect of limiting religious activity. The official state ideology of atheism is taught on all levels of the educational system. Specific constitutional and statutory provisions are designed to restrict religious observance and education.

Among other restrictions on religious practice enforced by the Cuban Government are discrimination against religious believers in educational and employment opportunities, prohibition on religious media, and restriction on the construction of new churches. Political meetings and work obligations are regularly scheduled to conflict with religious observances. Cuban law prohibits the observance of religious events when they conflict with work obligations or patriotic celebrations. The July 26 national holiday, commemorating the attack on Batista's Moncada barracks in 1953, has been promoted as a replacement for Christmas, and the availability of toys for children has been limited to the 26th of July period to the exclusion of Christmas. Similarly, Holy Week observances are preempted by the week-long celebration of the battle of the Bay of Pigs.

Emigration Restrictions

Freedom of emigration also does not exist in today's Cuba. Although Castro claims that Cubans are free to emigrate, and though some left Cuba, as in the Mariel exodus of 1980, the Cuban government routinely refuses to allow citizens to leave the country; there is thus a backlog of some 200,000 Cubans who have applied to emigrate. Those who opt to leave Cuba lose their jobs, ration cards, housing, and personal possessions. Then the emigrants are subjected to government-orchestrated mob

attacks call "assemblies of repulsion" and are required to work in agriculture until they leave the island, a period that can extend indefinitely. As an example of the extent to which people will go to leave Cuba, in early 1983 three young Cubans seized a small group of American tourists in Villa Clara province and held them hostage to force the Cuban Government to permit the Cubans to depart the country. The Americans were subsequently freed, and the young Cubans reportedly sentenced to death (later reportedly commuted to 30 years in prison).

The Cuban Government still refuses to permit the departure of some Cubans who sought asylum in the Venezuelan and Peruvian Embassies in Havana more than 3 years ago. Persons who have attempted to flee Cuba by seeking refuge in diplomatic missions have been arrested and sentenced to terms of up to 30 years. According to an *Agence France* press report, for example, the noted Cuban dissident, Ricardo Bofill Pages, was arrested on September 27, 1983. In April, Bofill had sought refuge in the French Embassy, but was instructed to leave the embassy after the French Ambassador received assurances from the Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, that he would be allowed to leave the country. Subsequently, two *Agence France* press personnel who tried to interview Bofill were put under house arrest and expelled from Cuba after 9 days.

The case of Cuban Ambassador Gustavo Arcos Bergnes is also instructive. Arcos fought and was wounded at Castro's side during the attack on Batista's Moncada barracks. When Castro took power, Arcos was named Cuban Ambassador to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. But, in the mid-1960s he was recalled and imprisoned for 4 years for his democratic beliefs. In 1979 his son was gravely injured in a motorcycle accident in Florida. The U.S. Congress appealed to the Cuban Government to allow Arcos to visit his son. The appeal was refused. Months later, Arcos was charged with attempting to leave the island without the necessary papers and was given a 7-year prison sentence.

The reverse policy, forced emigration, can be just as cruel. Suddenly, in 1980 the emigration gates were opened. During the rush that followed out of the port of Mariel, when 125,000 Cuban "boat people" fled to our shores, the Castro government shipped along common criminals and many of Cuba's

psychiatric patients. The American Psychiatric Association denounced this action on September 28, 1980, saying it was:

... Deeply concerned about the plight of numerous recent refugees who have been identified as mentally ill. There is growing evidence that many of these Cuban citizens were bused from Cuban mental hospitals to the Freedom Flotilla to the United States. If this is the case, the transplantation of these patients constitutes a grossly inhumane act since it deprives the patients of their right to psychiatric treatment within the context of their culture and primary language.

To date the Cuban Government is still refusing to take back any Marielitos—including those who seek voluntarily to return.

Standard of Living

The Cuban Constitution states that "the home is inviolable." Nevertheless, no aspect of an ordinary Cuban's private life is free from government surveillance. Telephones are monitored, mail is opened, and one's comings and goings are monitored 24-hours-a-day by block wardens in the neighborhood Committee for the Defense of the Revolution. Meetings, parties, and other activities are subject to particularly intense scrutiny. Listening to foreign radio and television broadcasts is dangerous because of the surveillance by CDR members. A jamming signal to interfere with Voice of America broadcasts has been noted in the Havana area and presumably is used in other urban areas.

The Cuban Government has never allowed international groups to visit Cuba to investigate human rights conditions. Organizations such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch, which have sought access to Cuban political prisons, have been rebuffed. No domestic human rights organizations are permitted to exist. Human rights activists in Cuba who are not in jail are forced to carry out their activities clandestinely and must rely upon international nongovernmental agencies for support and publicity. If apprehended by the authorities, they are subject to prosecution under Article 61 of the Cuban Constitution, which states "None of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to what is established in the constitution and the law, or contrary to the existing and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Violations of this principle can be punished by law."

Although apologists for Castro sometimes claim that some human rights violations were necessary in order to bring about the rapid modernization of the Cuban economy, in fact, Castro's dictatorship has deprived the Cuban people their opportunity for a better economic future. In 1958, Cuban income per capita was the fourth or fifth highest in the hemisphere. Independent studies have repeatedly shown that per capita economic growth in Cuba is among the lowest in the hemisphere. If present trends continue, by the end of the century Cuba will be one of the least developed countries of the Americas.

Castro's betrayal has also cost the Cuban people their independence. In 1959, Cuba paid its own way. Now even a stagnant standard of living can only be maintained with huge Soviet handouts—\$4.7 billion in economic aid alone in 1982, \$25 billion over the last 7 years. At this aid is no bargain for Cubans. In return, Cuba sends combat and support troops to countries where the Soviets seek to establish a sphere of influence. In Angola and Ethiopia they spill their blood and that of Africans to protect leftwing dictatorships from the hands of their own people. All told, there are some 70,000 Cubans, the so-called "internationalists," who serve the Soviet Union's interests in foreign lands. It comes as no surprise, then, to learn that as a result of 25 years of communist control, more than 1 million Cubans—over 10% of the island's inhabitants—have fled their homeland. Deprived of their civil and political liberties, their national independence, and their hopes for a better future, Cubans have demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the regime through the only means available to them—by "voting with their feet."

Conclusion

In a broad outline, is the state of human rights in Cuba. It is not a very pretty picture. Neither, for that matter, is a new picture. The facts about Cuban repression have been available for many years now. Yet for just as many years, not a few intellectuals and journalists have been systematically denying these facts. Although I will not attempt to describe this rather disgraceful episode in any detail, I cannot resist giving one example of the kind of wild misinformation about Cuba which has been used to shield the regime from international censure. I quote from a book published in 1975 by two prominent

Americans, Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, titled "With Fidel: A Portrait of Castro and Cuba."

... Castro's Cuba is prosperous and its people are enthusiastic, reasonably content, and optimistic about the future. Perhaps the overriding impression of three trips to Cuba is the enthusiasm and unity of the Cuban people. They are proud of their accomplishments and sing songs about themselves and their country that reflect this self-pride. . . . The people work together and work hard—for what they believe to be good for their neighbors and therefore their country.

One of the reasons why I welcome the hearings your committee is holding on the human rights situation in Cuba is that I hope they will serve to correct

misinformation of this sort. For too many years, Fidel Castro has posed as a champion of progress, and has succeeded in concealing the oppressive, totalitarian nature of his regime. Simply by telling the truth about Cuba, we can help to expose Castro as the tyrant that he is. At the same time, by telling the truth we demonstrate our solidarity with the principal victims of Castro's regime—the long-suffering and much-abused Cuban people.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Human Rights Situation in Zaire and South Africa

by Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21, 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.¹

Africa presents a difficult challenge to U.S. human rights policy. Single-party states, lack of a free press, and freedom of speech; weak judicial institutions, poor prison conditions, and the use of force to control dissent are all too often the rule.

ZAIRE

You have available the 1983 human rights report [Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983] which sets out Zaire's record in detail; you can see that it is a troubled one. In my remarks this morning I would like to describe the political, historical, and cultural context for understanding the human rights situation in Zaire. I would also like to discuss why we believe it is important to maintain a strong relationship with this strategically important country.

Strategic Importance

As you are well aware, Zaire has long been a friend and key regional partner of the United States and the West. It has consistently worked with us, the

most recent examples being the responsible role it played while on the UN Security Council and its strong support for the Government of Chad in its struggle against the Libyan-backed invasion. Zairian minerals, notably copper and cobalt, are important to the West. Zaire's strategic relevance, which is due to its large size and population as well as its common borders with nine African countries, has never been more apparent than now, as we work toward political solutions in southern Africa. Stability in Zaire is crucial if the delicate process now underway is to be maintained. Stability in Zaire is also the key to stability in central Africa.

Zaire lived its first years of independence under extremely difficult conditions. During the colonial period no Zairians occupied positions of responsibility and very few received a university education. Belgian policy had been to control life tightly and suppress dissent in the Congo. Zaire's people were poorly prepared to take over the responsibility of governing themselves. Judicial institutions, disciplined police forces, and bodies of law and regulation based on normally acceptable standards of human rights did not survive the shocks of the post-independence period. Rather, independence unleashed powerful forces that Zaire's fragile political structure was unable to accommodate. Hundreds of ethnic groups, competing geographic regions, and different ideologies clashed against the backdrop of East-West

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rivalry. Violence and anarchy were the order of the day from 1960 until 1965. Cases from this period were heard as recently as 1977 and 1978, with the two invasions of Shaba province by exiled ex-Katangan gendarmes backed by Angola and the Soviets. Zairians still suffer the emotional and social consequences of these traumatic events. A desire not to relive the tribulations of that time goes a long way toward explaining the internal stability that Zaire has enjoyed in the years that President Mobutu [Sese Seko] has been in power. As the United States could well have to become involved again if instability recurred, a stable government in Zaire is very important to us.

Current Conditions

I have briefly mentioned Zairian history in order to give some context to my comments on the current human rights situation there, which has serious shortcomings. Arbitrary justice and problems caused by low-paid and ill-disciplined security forces plague the country. Prison conditions are poor with inadequate food and medical care. People remain in preventive detention for long periods of time during investigation, because of shortages of lawyers and magistrates and insufficient funds for such services as transportation between prisons and courtrooms. As in most Third World countries, the press is controlled and the flow of ideas is restricted. In addition, the country has a single-party political system which does not espouse Western democratic principles. President Mobutu's response to continued political activity by ex-parliamentarian activists who champion a second political party—a violation of Zaire's constitution—was internal exile for the leaders and the arrest of key supporters, some of whom are still in jail. Thus in Zaire, as in most African countries, it is not possible to call publicly for a change in government and retain one's civil liberties.

Blemished as Zaire's human rights record is, I would like to point out that progress has been made. For example, a positive area that is little noticed is Zaire's acceptance of 250,000 refugees from neighboring countries. There was a general amnesty last year which resulted in the release of political prisoners and in the return of several prominent exiles. The ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] has been able to visit some Zairian prisons. There have been few if any summary ex-

ecutions or disappearances in recent years. Human rights conditions in Zaire have improved over the past 20 years, albeit fitfully rather than steadily. Political opponents may be exiled to small villages or periodically arrested, but they are not killed or imprisoned for life, as is unfortunately true in much of the Third World. Zaire is very sensitive to the views of the Administration and the Congress on human rights, and our concern has had a positive effect. Although Zaire has a long way to go, the government has shown it has the capacity to listen to others and change.

It is important to keep in mind that the United States has broad interests in Zaire and is dealing with its government on a number of key issues. We consult on Chad where Zaire has given invaluable military and political assistance to the Habre government. When Zaire was on the UN Security Council in 1982-83, it was very supportive of U.S. objectives. We also consult in the economic area, where the government has undertaken major reform steps. In 1983 Zaire successfully implemented several reforms suggested by the IMF [International Monetary Fund], including an 80% devaluation of the zaire and the institution of a floating exchange rate. Controls on wage increases and the liberalization of price controls have also been adopted. The budget deficit has been brought under control in spite of low tax revenues because of severely depressed copper and cobalt prices. The successful implementation of these reforms led the IMF to approve \$350 million in new drawings for Zaire and official creditors to reschedule Zaire's debt in December. In reviewing the situation in Zaire we see that they have taken the steps we have recommended to all countries on the continent—adoption of a realistic exchange rate, removal of price controls on foodstuffs to encourage production, control of the budget, and encouragement of the private sector.

U.S. Assistance Projects

Respect for human rights forms a part, albeit an integral part, of our bilateral agenda with Zaire. In our dialogue with President Mobutu and his government, our Ambassador and other high-level officials—including Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs Chester A.] Crocker—consistently point out the importance which we attach to observance of human rights. In addition to our representations from the highest levels

down, we are taking specific steps to promote observance of human rights in Zaire. Part of our assistance effort is directly targeted on projects designed to promote human rights. One example is a program financing the printing and distribution of the penal code to increase knowledge of individual rights and privileges under Zairian law. We have also approved funding operations of the Center for Continuing Legal Education in Kinshasa. We have provided resources for a series of magistrate training seminars to strengthen the quality and scope of judicial services.

There are, of course, limits to what we can do concerning full observance of human rights in Zaire. We can and do press the Zairian Government privately and we can and do target our assistance on creating conditions under which human rights can prosper. We cannot as far as some would have us and support the opposition group which has sought to form a second political party in Zaire. This would constitute a direct intervention in Zaire's politics, in violation of its constitution, and would, we are convinced, result in worsened relations and diminished U.S. influence in the human rights field.

Human rights concerns are central to our policy toward Zaire, and are on the aspect of a complex and critical bilateral relationship. We have other policy goals which must also be taken into account including political and strategic stability in Zaire and the region and the development of Zaire. To protect our interest and achieve our goals we must maintain our influence and deal with Zaire cooperatively and on the basis of respect. This approach will, we believe, be the best human rights policy as we and will maximize U.S. influence in Zaire.

SOUTH AFRICA

Turning to South Africa, I intend to present to this committee as factual a picture as possible of recent developments on the human rights front in South Africa—both positive and negative developments. A portion of the information I am providing here is drawn from the 1983 human rights report on South Africa prepared by the State Department, which, I might note, has been praised by the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, American Watch, and Helsinki Watch as "one of the State Department's more successful efforts to portray the human rights situation in another country." I will attempt to update that report by

describing developments which have taken place since it was prepared in December. Finally, I will attempt to give some idea of how these factors affect U.S. policy toward South Africa.

As we observed in the 1983 human rights report, South Africa is a multiracial country whose present constitution codifies the system of apartheid under which the white minority holds a monopoly of power in the country's national political institutions. The result has been a parliamentary democratic system run by the 16.2% of the population which is white. Persons of "colored" (mixed blood) and Asian descent have no legal right to political participation at the national level; and the overwhelming black majority has also been denied national political participation, except through the device of tribally defined "homelands" or "national states" created by the South African Government without regard to whether blacks live in or wish to be associated with these areas.

Institutional Reforms

South Africa has introduced a new constitution which will include a limited national franchise for South Africans of colored and Asian descent. This constitution, approved by a 2-1 margin by white voters in a referendum held last November, is scheduled to go into effect September 3 of this year. Although it does not allow for participation by blacks in the central government, the South African Government has stated that the constitutional reform process does not rule out further developments which could include extending participation in national political processes to South Africa's black majority. Considerable debate is underway in South Africa over the meaning and direction of these constitutional reforms.

Regardless of whether or not the new constitution represents reform of apartheid or only its rationale and legitimization, the practice of apartheid remains the basis for the organization of South African society. Apartheid institutionalizes political and economic control by the white minority. Discriminatory laws and practices—such as legislation limiting South Africa's black citizens to source-poor homelands, the influx control laws, the Group Areas Act, the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts, and so forth—are woven throughout the fabric of South African society. The South African Government has also enacted legislation that, in the name of

security, curtails the civil liberties of those persons of all races whose statements, actions, or associations are viewed as a serious challenge to the established order.

In 1983 some improvements in the human rights climate took place. On July 1, for example, 54 persons were unbanned, reducing the number of banned individuals to 12, the lowest number in recent years. The South African Government took tentative steps to recognize the right of blacks to live permanently in urban areas under certain conditions. Black labor unions continued to grow under the government's labor law reforms.

... a socioeconomic process is underway which is contributing dramatically to the bargaining power of South Africa's black population as well as to the perception of white South Africans that the status quo is untenable.

On the other hand detention without charge or trial and "bannings" of individuals, organizations, publications, and gathering continued. Despite orders given by the South African Government in 1982 for more humane treatment and care of detainees held under security laws, several died due to mistreatment by police officials, or allegedly committed suicide in 1983. For the first time, however, action was taken against police and prison personnel who abused their power.

We concluded in December 1983, that while one can point to some positive developments in recent years, South Africa's fundamental human rights situation has changed little. There remains no effective judicial remedy against the denationalization of blacks into "independent" tribal homelands or against forced resettlements. Indefinite detention without charge or access to attorney and other judicial acts without due process, such as banning, continue. The 83.3% of South Africa's population which is not white suffers from pervasive discrimination which severely limits political, economic, and social life.

Recent Policy Developments

What has been the picture thus far in 1984? Let me outline some important recent developments, both positive and negative, which have taken place. On the positive side:

- The efforts at limited power sharing under the terms of the new constitution are moving forward. The new tricameral parliament will sit in an abbreviated session during the month of September. Although blacks remain excluded from the system, for the first time legislation concerning blacks will no longer be the prerogative of the white parliament, but will require the concurrence of the Asian and so-called colored chambers. In addition, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning recently told parliament that the South African Government does not view the new constitution as final, and it

is widely recognized that the issue of black political rights must be addressed.

- A Parliamentary Select Committee is reviewing the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts, seemingly with an eye toward the modification or repeal of both.

- In late April 1984, the Minister of Cooperation and Development announced the withdrawal of the new legislation governing the movement of blacks in South Africa, the highly contentious Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Act. Its demise is partially attributed to the fact that the bill could have put in question the permanent residence rights of urban blacks qualifying under Section 10 of the current law, the Urban Consolidation Act, including beneficiaries of the Rikhotso decision.

- In February, the South African Government announced its intention to open central business districts in urban areas to business people of all races. At the same time, a recommendation was made that segregation of public facilities would be discretionary rather than mandatory.

- No new banning orders have been issued since August 1983. The number of banned persons remains at 12.

- In early May 1984, the South African Government announced its willingness to relax the provisions of the

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Prisons Act governing press coverage of prison conditions, shortly before an investigative committee released findings which shocked the public.

- On February 22, 1984, Sergeant J. Van As of the security police was sentenced to 10 years in prison for shooting Paris Malatji while in detention for interrogation. Van As was the first security policeman prosecuted for an incident carried out in the line of duty.

- In April 1984, three policemen at the Dirkiesdorp Police Station were fined for their role in the death of Thomas Manana, who died while in custody in early 1983.

- On January 1, 1984, the amendment of the Defense Act which provides for alternative service for religious objectors went into effect. The amendment also created the Board for Religious Objection which determines the status of religious objectors to military service. Alternative service for conscientious objectors still does not exist. As of February 14, 1984, 51 people had been classified religious objectors. They were all Jehovah's Witnesses.

- The situation in the "independent" homeland of the Ciskei has quieted, although conditions there are still unsettled and more than 30 people may still be in detention.

- A new Matrimonial Property Act, designed to raise the status of white, colored, and Indian women before the law, is under consideration by parliament and may be passed during the present session.

- Venda security police continue to intimidate individuals they regard as threats to state security. They use surprise visits, unexpected searches, and long questioning sessions in their own offices to frighten people.

- In February 1984, Samuel Tshikhudo died of illness while in detention in Venda after being held since November 1983 incommunicado.

- Resettlement remains a mixed picture. A decision not to remove the people from St. Wendolin's in Natal is offset by the earlier removal of the residents of Mogopa. The residents of Badplaas, Leandra, Driefontein, Huhudi, and Crossroads, among other places, still live under the threat of removal. The South African Government has not abandoned the idea of the cession of Ingwavuma and Kangwane to Swaziland, which would result in the "removal" of large black populations. Minister of Cooperation and Development Piet Koornhof admitted in early May that about 2 million black persons have been resettled by the South African Government since 1960. On April 27 the Prime Minister stated that "forced removals" would no longer take place in the future. This would appear to mean that henceforth the government will attempt to induce people to move by offering better housing, facilities, and job opportunities elsewhere. But this would seem to signify a change in methods rather than a departure from the policy of completing the process of "consolidation."

Thabang Ntshiwa received a sentence of 3 years, of which 18 months were suspended for 5 years, for advising, advocating, and encouraging the aims of a banned organization. Ntshiwa owned a mug which carried ANC slogans. Also in December 1983, Sister Mary Neube received a 12-month prison sentence for possession of banned literature. Eight months of the sentence were suspended for 5 years. On the other hand, however, on April 2, 1984, Constable Nienaber was acquitted of murder in the April 1983 shooting death of Dreifontein community leader Saul Mkhize. The court found that Nienaber acted in self-defense, and that Mkhize was "arrogant and impolite." Also, members of the white far rightwing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging received suspended sentences in October 1983 for charges of treason and possession of illegal weapons, despite having been caught with a large weapon cache including AK-47 assault rifles, explosives and ammunition.

- The South African Government has refused permission for banned Pastor Beyers Naude to travel to Europe to receive an award.

- The initial findings of extensive private research reveal that black South Africans suffer from vastly inferior standards of health, nutrition, housing, income, and education as compared to whites.

In short, we must conclude, as we did in December, that we are dealing with a mixed balance sheet; that despite certain improvements, the established system of comprehensive control over the lives of most South Africans remain substantially in effect. Nevertheless, there is a process of change underway with major implications for the future of that system. This is a fact which objective observers cannot deny. Those who say that the situation is totally unchanged, or has gotten worse, fail to take this into account. Nothing could make this more evident than the ferment surrounding the new constitution which reflects a clear consensus among white South Africans that genuine change must occur if they are to survive. With the expansion of parliament to include the Indian and so-called colored South Africans, a door has been opened and cannot be closed.

One of the major factors underlying this process of change has been the dynamic of economic growth combined with demographics. Whites increasingly realize they cannot run their economy

Regardless of whether or not the new constitution represents reform of apartheid or only its rationalization and modernization, the practice of apartheid remains the basis for the organization of South African society.

However, there have been negative developments as well.

- Detentions continue; as of May 31, 1984, a total of 286 persons had been detained in South Africa on political or security grounds including 137 in Transkei due to recent student unrest, 30 in Ciskei, and 1 in Bophuthatswana, so-called "independent" homelands. Overall, the number of persons remaining in detention as of May 31 is 38, the lowest figure for some time.

- Prison sentences for treason and security convictions vary considerably. Carl Niehaus, a white university student, was convicted of high treason and sentenced to 15 years in prison for his activities on behalf of the African National Congress [ANC] and the South African Communist Party. His fiancée, Johanna Lourens, was sentenced to 4 years for her complicity. Two professed ANC members were convicted of high treason and attempted murder in early April. They received 10-year prison sentences. In December 1983, Mathews

without more skilled labor, which blacks are being trained to supply in ever greater numbers. Black awareness of their growing bargaining power in the workforce is reflected in the spread of black trade unions. Simultaneously, black purchasing power is also on the rise, and a distinct black middle class is in fact being formed with the ability to exercise important leverage in the South African marketplace. Those who believe that the formation of a black middle class will result in political stagnation, or to some perceived vested interest in perpetuation of the status quo, fundamentally misread what has always motivated human beings, namely, a desire not just to obtain a higher standard of living but also to exercise the freedom which that higher standard—but does not always—make possible. In short, a socioeconomic process is underway which is contributing dramatically to the bargaining power of South Africa's black population as well as to the perception of white South Africans that the status quo is untenable.

5. Policy Toward South Africa

I would now like to turn to the question of how this situation affects U.S. policy toward South Africa. U.S. policy with regard to apartheid is clear. Morally, the South African system is completely contrary to our values. Morally "repugnant" is the word President Reagan used to describe it. Politically, apartheid nurtures instability which is contrary to American interests in southern Africa. Our national interest compels us to promote peaceful but genuine evolution away from apartheid and toward a system of government based on the consent of all South Africans, regardless of race.

As we engage in this effort, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that just as a lasting basis for national stability requires evolutionary change toward government by consent in South Africa, so, by the same token, we are not likely to see internal change proceeding at an adequate pace and by democratic means if escalating violence and across frontiers polarizes the politics and deepens domestic divisions within South Africa itself. Thus, the carefully negotiated agreements involving South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique which have been reached in recent months hold immense potential for the future of peaceful, genuine, evolutionary change within South Africa itself. This is

precisely one of the principal reasons why U.S. diplomacy has been so deeply involved in trying to establish a climate in which such agreements could be reached.

Remarkably, there are elements at all levels of South African society which are themselves engaged in the effort to promote peaceful change, to find a solution to South Africa's problems which somehow steers between the extremes of continued repression and the anarchy of racial conflagration. One of the fundamental but least well known facets of U.S. policy toward South Africa is the degree to which we are involved in supporting organizations and individuals who have committed themselves to peaceful change in South Africa. Such support, in a tangible form, complements our moral and political opposition to apartheid.

This year alone, with the support of Congress, we have devoted over \$10 million in U.S. funds to programs designed to uplift those disadvantaged by apartheid: programs to provide black South Africans with scholarships for university study in the U.S., programs to assist blacks in qualifying for a university education, programs to assist the emerging black entrepreneur with acquiring management skills, and programs to train black trade unionists in effective union organization and bargaining skills. As these efforts gain momentum, we hope that they will increase the overall bargaining power of South Africa's blacks in the context of the growing demand within South Africa's economy for skilled workers.

Congress has helped lead the way in providing the resources and imagination for these sorts of programs. Most recently, Congress passed a \$1.5 million Human Rights Fund for South Africa, which provided funds for small grants to be made by the U.S. Embassy in South Africa to organizations which promote human rights. To date our Embassy has allocated \$197,650 on 23 projects, which have supported activities such as research on the legal status of black women, farm schools, education, and pensions; the purchase of resource materials for centers which study legal questions; training for labor unions; and establishment of facilities where people can meet to discuss human rights topics.

Support for peaceful change within South Africa is not limited, I would add,

exclusively to the public sector. The activities of those U.S. firms which have joined the Sullivan code, employing enlightened management practices and providing substantial benefits to their employees outside the workplace, are setting the pace for progress in the way blacks are treated by employers in South Africa. To date, U.S. firms have spent over \$78 million on improvements for black employees and their families.

As I indicated, these efforts are intended to complement the political facets of U.S. policy: our strict adherence to the arms embargo on South Africa, our refusal to recognize the so-called "independence homelands," and our firm rejection of apartheid. But in addition, fundamental to our ability to influence events in South Africa is our capacity to communicate with the government's leaders. With them lies the responsibility for shaping South Africa's future. They have the power to determine the speed and the context of reform.

Let me be plain: we do communicate with these leaders, and frankly. If we choose to speak in confidential channels, we also do so firmly. No South African leader has the slightest doubt about the strength of American feelings when essential human rights are abused.

But we must recognize that we are dealing with another sovereign nation, and by no means the only country in the world to abuse human rights. We cannot dictate to that nation's leaders how to conduct their internal affairs, though we certainly can, and do, offer our own reactions to what we see. We have chosen the path of constructive involvement in efforts to promote peaceful change in South Africa. Even if the pace is too slow to suit those of us who would prefer to see white South Africans join tomorrow before a stunned world in sharing gladly the wealth and control of their nation with all their fellow citizens, one must nevertheless concede that our course is perhaps the only realistic one. We intend to fulfill our commitment to promoting peaceful change toward government based on the consent of all South Africans in the months and years ahead.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The ANZUS Relationship: Alliance Management

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Address before the Conference on the American Effect on Australian Defense at the Australian Studies Center of Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, on June 24, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and United States security treaty] is an alliance of democratic nations committed to peace. These two facts about the alliance—our commitment to democratic freedom and our commitment to peace—are so fundamental to ANZUS that they would be worth noting at the outset even were they nothing more than very broad statements of purpose. But so far from being mere shopworn generalities, these two facts have great practical significance from the basic role and function of our alliance—and even for its day-to-day management—significance which is often not sufficiently appreciated.

It is because our nations are democracies that the commitments we make to one another are of great practical consequence and also why they are so reliable. For our three nations, vulnerable as we are to the infirmities that are alleged to afflict democracies in the conduct of their affairs, our alliance commitments are important in bringing a fundamental continuity into our relations. But it is also because these commitments represent the commitments of whole nations to one another—not the mere whim of arbitrary rulers—that it is possible to rely on them. There is no task more fundamental to alliance management than the constant nurturing of public support.

Our collective commitment to preserving peace is no less profound in its practical implications for our alliance. It is perhaps to be expected that so much of the discussion of ANZUS concerns questions about what would happen and how the various parties would respond in the event of war. The treaty itself, of course, contains important commitments of mutual assistance in the event of armed attack. Yet it is no depreciation of the importance of those commitments to say that the foremost goal of the alliance is to prevent those

commitments from ever having to be called upon. The operation of the alliance in peacetime is every bit as vital as its operation in time of war—indeed, even more so. Particularly in a nuclear age, the task of preserving peace is fundamental to alliance management.

The Determination of National Interest in a Democracy

The old aphorism that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests, is still a popular one, but it contains as much concealed falsehood as apparent truth. Viewing the flux and perfidy of 19th-century alliances, it was certainly plausible—and perhaps even somewhat comforting—to believe that geography, historic rivalries, and economic interests provide the constants in a nation's decisions, while policies and alliances form and founder around these fixed goals. A nation, so this view goes, may be obsessed by a particular threat, must have particular ports or trading opportunities—or, conversely, may have no interest in a distant land—and should form its alliances in whatsoever way will promote these ends.

The notion of permanent interests, impermanent friends, left a great deal to be desired as a model for the conduct of international relations, even in the 19th century. And in a nuclear age it is a very dangerous basis for democratic nations to conduct their affairs.

Among its other weaknesses, the notion of permanent interests leads to the dangerous fallacies of permanent disinterest and predictability. These can all too often be used to excuse neglect, a seductive choice for peace-loving democracies that sometimes fail to recognize the aggressive designs of others.

Why, so the argument goes, must a nation spend valuable resources to defend against distant challenges? Why maintain forces without a visible threat? If grand political and military goals are constant, there is no need to reassess defenses and alliances will naturally tend themselves. If decisions are always logical, the need to prepare for unexpected contingencies is quite small.

But we know from long, historical experience that alliances are hard to put together and to keep, that illogical and unpredictable decisions are all too common, and that circumstances can change radically, often without a shot being fired. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Sino-Soviet split, the attempt to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, even a coup in the small island of Grenada, created new strategic interests and shifted political and military thinking abruptly. Uncertain or ambiguous political commitments, even where interests seemed otherwise clear, led to bloodshed in 1914, in 1939, in 1950, and even in 1982.

I believe that countries, and in particular democracies like the United States and Australia and New Zealand, do have permanent interests. But they are not only or principally the geo-strategic interests on which past debate has centered. Our nations' permanent interests are as much or more in justice and the rule of law, in democracy and freedom, and in peace.

In pursuit of these goals, we have permanent "friends" as well: continuity, reliability, and strong alliances with other nations that share the same values. Surely nations that defend freedom and the rule of law have a sound foundation for the elements of such permanent friendship. But these foundations will only be maintained through consistency, responsible policies, and a commitment to cooperation. The burden of maintaining such cooperation and policies in the first half of this century was too heavy to avoid world conflagration. We must avoid such mistakes in the nuclear era.

I would like to discuss today the role ANZUS plays in protecting all of our interests in peace and freedom—both in regional context and as an important factor in the calculation of world peace. For these issues are intricately linked.

Preserving Nuclear Peace

Effective alliances require a fundamental faith in the responsibility of our allies. As no issue is more important today than preserving nuclear peace, responsible policies to this end are a crucial element in preserving confidence among our countries. For this reason, we would like to begin a discussion of managing ANZUS with a brief word about managing this great issue of our time: the threat of nuclear war.

Surely, it is a topic on which much has been said. The dangers of nuclear

war have become common political topics worldwide. In my own country, no issue takes greater precedence. Preserving nuclear peace is a duty we owe not just to our friends and fellow countrymen but to all the inhabitants of this planet.

"A nuclear war," President Reagan has said, "cannot be won and must never be fought." He has said it in China. He has said it in Germany. He has said it in Japan. He has said it in England. He has said it in Congress. He has said it in the Oval Office. He has said it throughout America. The essence of President Reagan's policy on preventing nuclear war can be crystallized in this phrase. It is a principle that has the support of responsible people everywhere.

Much of the public debate on nuclear issues focuses on the enormous destructive potential of existing arsenals. President Reagan has led the way in the responsible effort to reduce nuclear arsenals.

- He has proposed the complete elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons—intermediate-range missiles—and in negotiations with the Soviets, he has rejected any solution that would simply transfer such weapons from where they threaten Europe to where they could threaten Asia.

- In the strategic arms reduction talks (START), he has proposed deep reductions in intercontinental ballistic missiles, a goal no previous strategic arms treaty has even approached.

Unfortunately, the Soviets tied progress in START to preventing INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] deployments in Europe, deployments that our NATO allies requested in 1979 to offset massive Soviet deployments of new missile, the triple-warhead SS-20. Last November the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations and in December suspended indefinitely their participation in START, apparently due to their frustration over their failure to prevent NATO's own counterdeployment of intermediate-range forces. We are ready to resume both negotiations at any time and any place, without preconditions. Our proposals are fair and workable. All the elements for an agreement are on the table. We hope the Soviet Union will also come to recognize that its interests can best be served by returning to the negotiating table as soon as possible.

But the United States has not simply waited on Soviet responses to control nuclear weapons and to reduce their destructive potential. We have acted on our own to this end. Improvements in our nuclear forces over the years have made them safer—less vulnerable to surprise attack, less prone to accident or to unauthorized use, less susceptible to seizure by terrorists. These improvements in our nuclear forces are well known, though insufficiently acknowledged by those who propose to freeze all changes to those forces. What is perhaps less well known is the fact that these improvements have made it possible to reduce the destructive potential of our nuclear forces over the last 20 years.

Both the number and megatonnage of our nuclear arsenal has been substantially reduced. Our stockpile was one-third higher in 1967 than it is now, and the total yield has declined by 75% since 1960. The stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has also been dramatically reduced. The United States and NATO allies withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe in 1980, and we agreed in 1983 to withdraw an additional 1,400 weapons over the next several years. These reductions will be realized even if we have to carry through with the deployment of ground-launched and cruise missiles, as NATO decided in 1979 that it would do if no agreement with the Soviet Union to ban or limit those weapons can be reached. For each new weapon that would be deployed in that event, we have withdrawn an old one. Thus, when all NATO withdrawals are taken into account, we will have withdrawn a total of five weapons for each new one that we may introduce under the 1979 decision.

Yes, America has begun to rebuild its nuclear forces, even as we have sought to reduce them. But we have done so only after a decade of restraint—restraint unmatched, indeed exploited, by our adversaries. And we have done so only to avoid the more destabilizing situation when an adversary might be tempted by forces susceptible to a successful first strike.

The United States has consistently taken responsible positions on reducing the level of nuclear armaments—positions worthy of our allies' support. The United States also has undertaken a number of other important arms control initiatives to reduce the risk of war and halt or reverse the growth in weapons.

In Geneva, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in April a draft treaty for a

comprehensive ban on the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

In Stockholm, together with our NATO allies, we have put forward a package of confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of a European war occurring by accident, surprise attack, or miscalculation.

In Moscow, we have proposed a strengthening of U.S.-Soviet communications through a technical upgrading of the hotline to help contain possible crises.

In Vienna, at the mutual and balanced force reduction talks we have, again with our European allies, presented a new initiative this April that seeks to find a common ground between Eastern and Western positions, and to make progress on reducing conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

These, too, are worthy of our allies' respect and support.

A Commitment to Peace and Freedom

The public debate on the levels of nuclear weapons is an important one. But whether our forces freeze at current levels, or gain or diminish slightly, the potential destruction remains unacceptable.

The public debate on how we prevent nuclear war is, therefore, of even greater relevance to our fate, but unfortunately, attracts less attention. The prospects of preventing nuclear war depend on far more than just nuclear weapons themselves. Peace will depend on a stable nuclear deterrent, but it will also depend on preventing the regional conflicts that can, unexpectedly, lead to wider confrontations.

Herein lies the second great challenge for preserving our freedom and world peace. Our alliance commitments play a crucial role in meeting that challenge.

The initial and most basic step in the effort to preserve peace and freedom is the national decision to make the attempt—and the national will to persevere. My country, like Australia and New Zealand, considered itself for most of its history secure behind vast ocean frontiers. Even after World War I, we maintained this illusion. Only after the painful lessons of World War II did we learn, as smaller nations like Norway also learned so painfully, that neutrality does not ensure safety. Since that time, each of our three countries has faced up to the high costs of isolationism in an interconnected world; each has committed

itself to the search for peace beyond our borders, not merely in home waters but in the Pacific and in areas as distant as Africa and the Middle East.

In the aftermath of our difficult experience in Vietnam, America had a renewed flirtation with a reduced international role, even with isolationism. There were strong feelings in America to draw back into ourselves. We considered withdrawing our troops from Korea and other lands where they are vitally needed. We considered reducing our fleet in the hope that we could "swing" ships as needed from one theater to another, ignoring the very real possibility that this could increase the chances of a two-ocean challenge and, even more immediately, would have significantly reduced the U.S. presence in the Pacific.

But with the steady growth of Soviet military forces and the increasing and alarming tendency of the Soviets to use that force, either directly themselves—as in Afghanistan—or indirectly—as in Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Chad, and elsewhere—we emerged from our Vietnam experience with renewed determination, restored confidence, and a heightened sense of realism.

Our determination and confidence led us to begin to rebuild our forces and to speak more forthrightly for freedom. Our heightened sense of realism gave us a clearer view of the dangers posed by our adversaries and a desire to further the increasing self-reliance among our friends, including those in Asia. If most of Asia is largely peaceful despite the increase in Soviet activities and capabilities, surely it is due in part to our renewed role and the growing strength of friends.

America's return to a more vigorous role in the world is testimony to the staying power of democracies in foreign affairs, a quality that has often been questioned by political theorists, including that most brilliant analyst of democratic politics, Alexis de Tocqueville. Our alliances were one of the key factors that kept America from straying from its course. Without these alliances, we might well have accepted a lessened role—to the detriment of all our countries. Through the alliances, we maintained a clearer view of where our true interests and responsibilities lie.

Indeed, not just America but the democracies in general have succeeded to an extraordinary degree since World War II in maintaining a constancy of policy. During this same period, the

world on the whole has also enjoyed an extraordinary period of peace among the major powers, a peace of critical importance in the nuclear age. Both of these achievements are, in large part, a tribute to the strength and vigor of the West's interlocking set of alliances. In the circumstances, I believe, a heavy burden of proof falls on those who would weaken a system of alliance that has contributed so much to the maintenance of nuclear peace.

This is not to say that our systems of alliances cannot be improved upon. Constant efforts are still required, and complacency can be as dangerous as excessive anxiety. But our alliances on the whole make an invaluable contribution, and no one has as yet put forward a surer way of preserving the peace. Certainly the isolation of each nation for itself is not such an alternative.

ANZUS reflects our countries' joint determination to avoid the dangers and painful lessons of isolationism or neutralism. Each of our nation's commitments eases the burden of commitments, real and psychological, of the others. Our joint pledges give each of our pledges added meaning.

The question is not so much whether any one ANZUS country could prosper as a neutral under the umbrella of others' active roles but whether the other countries would choose to continue active roles once one chose to withdraw. There are Americans who continue to question our role in NATO, despite strong European commitments, because of what they see as inadequate defense spending. I have little doubt that such questions would increase dramatically if the European commitments themselves came into serious question.

Today, our three countries' commitments remain firm. Only last year, the ANZUS review confirmed that the treaty "remains relevant and vitally important to the shared security concerns and strategic interests of the three partner governments." Let there be no doubt in the mind of any potential adversary that an armed attack on an ally would require, and would receive from the allies, full and prompt fulfillment of the ANZUS security commitment including, when necessary, military support.

The national security of each of us is a fundamental interest of the others and requires adequate and appropriate response to threats or attacks on allies from any source. In the case of an attack on Australia, for example, our commitment remains firm whether the at-

tack should come from the Pacific or Indian Ocean approaches. Our commitment to the defense of our allies is not limited to any particular threat; it applies to any potential aggressor.

In the Falklands crisis when our NATO ally, Great Britain, was wrongfully attacked by a Latin American friend, America did everything it could to negotiate an end to the crisis. But when negotiations failed, we took a strong stand on behalf of our wronged ally, despite the predicted high costs of such a stand. We were strongly committed to doing what was right in support of our ally—even though we were under no treaty obligation to do so. (NATO does not extend to the South Atlantic.)

The U.S. presence in the Pacific over the past 40 years has been a stabilizing one that has served the interests of our friends and allies in the region. ANZUS has been one of the critical factors supporting this stability. In the last 40 years, as well, countries of the region have made great progress toward democracy and the rule of law. These, too, are stabilizing factors. While these conditions prevail, it is difficult to see a situation in which ANZUS members would be called upon to fulfill their commitments in a dispute involving another friendly power. Indeed, a weakening of ANZUS or the consequent weakening of the U.S. role in the Pacific is one of the few events that could conceivably make such hypothetical imaginings a reality. ANZUS is not weaker because its members have other commitments. These commitments do not conflict, they interlock; and in so doing, they help to prevent conflict.

By our alliances, we add ever greater echoes of support to alliances throughout the free world. There are, for example, no direct political or legal linkages between ANZUS and the Five Power Defense Arrangement. However any potential aggressor in Southeast Asia must take into account that ANZUS alliance interests would be threatened by an attack engaging Australian and New Zealand forces there.

A strong NATO strengthens deterrence globally to the advantage of ANZUS. But equally, the health of ANZUS is vital to the global Western alliance—especially given the increasingly important locations of both Australia and New Zealand. It would be a mistake to underestimate the moral and political influence of this alliance of three of the world's oldest democracies.

Some argue that alliances are dangerous in the nuclear era. But an unlimited nuclear war will leave no corner of our world safe and secure. No nation can hide its head in the sand and count on being spared—a point made on June 6 in Parliament by [Australian] Prime Minister Hawke.

The enjoyment of freedom cannot be separated from the responsibilities of freedom—responsibilities the three ANZUS countries have shouldered squarely. Clearly, there are risks associated with engaging directly in deterrence through active cooperation in a major alliance. The United States has willingly assumed such risks on behalf of allies. We have done so because we believe, as Prime Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Hayden have recently eloquently argued, that such risks are significantly less than those associated with the weakening and failure of deterrence.

Managing ANZUS

Since there is the will to take alliances seriously, the problems of managing an alliance come into full play. ANZUS, like NATO, provides the elements for peace. Alliance management is the art that is meaning into the framework that the treaty provides.

Successful alliance management depends on our success in meeting five critical challenges.

First, as an alliance of democracies, ANZUS inherits the challenges democracies face in running a coherent foreign policy. Policies that do not sustain public support will fail. Needed policies that lack public support can go unrealized. In short, alliance management requires an open and informed public debate led by citizens mindful of the great, not just the immediately visible, threats the future holds.

Second, an effective alliance among free vital democracies requires extensive, ongoing contacts at all levels of government and society. The need for coordinated political and military activities requires close official ties and long institutionalized consultative processes. But they also require lively, informal public commentary and personal interchanges (including conferences like this one). Together these ensure a constant flow of information and views on potential problems, as well as a full awareness of each other's concerns, interests, capabilities, and objec-

tives. Only through such exchanges can alliance managers reach decisions that serve a common purpose.

Such exchanges cannot be turned on and off as crises arise and recede. To be effective, they must continue at all levels over time and reflect the high degree of mutual confidence derived from experience and personal contact.

Fortunately, the management of the ANZUS alliance in all three capitals provides precisely that kind of consultative relationship. At the so-called working levels, there are literally daily contacts between both civilian and military officials, including a thoroughly institutionalized sharing of intelligence and related assessments. At a higher level, there are frequent major meetings of senior officials to exchange views on issues of immediate concern to the alliance.

Most importantly, there is the ongoing dialogue—through meetings, correspondence, and communications—between ministers in the three capitals. The annual ANZUS Council meeting provides a vital element that links political leaders and symbolizes the significance of the relationship.

On the military side, even without a pattern of integrated commands and military forces as in NATO Europe, ANZUS alliance managers over the years have built up a pattern of close defense cooperation which assures that ANZUS forces can operate together quickly and effectively, if that is ever necessary. Key elements of this cooperation are joint exercises between our forces, especially our navies.

The third challenge of alliance management is to meet the need for continuity and long-term consistency of policy. President Reagan came into office committed to demonstrating that the United States is a reliable ally and partner. Accordingly, while he has brought strong views of his own to the definition of new policy areas, he has shown great respect for commitments made by previous administrations. That element of continuity between administrations is essential to effective management of alliances between democracies.

I could cite examples as far afield as the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa to make my point, but let me stick for now to some of more direct concern to ANZUS. In the area of arms control, President Reagan maintained the U.S. commitment to both

tracks of the 1979 NATO decision, while offering his new and imaginative proposal on the "zero option" for the arms control track. He announced that the United States would observe the limits of the unratified SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks] Treaty while seeking to negotiate a better substitute for it. With respect to China policy, the President has made very clear his determination to maintain the framework provided by previous U.S. commitments in this area, at the same time that he has worked to put that critically important relationship on a more realistic and stable basis. The views and concerns of our NATO and ANZUS allies were, and are, important in shaping U.S. arms control policy. And I can say from direct personal involvement that ANZUS views were of great importance at critical junctures in the development of this Administration's China policy.

Fourth, there is a need to accept the mutual burdens as well as the mutual benefits of alliance. It is in the nature of alliances that the precise levels of the burdens and benefits will shift over time. Concerns that another partner is getting a "free ride" plague every alliance in some form. Indeed, alliances can be endangered as much as strengthened by too fervent an effort to make all burdens precisely equal at any given moment to the benefits received. What is important to a healthy alliance is that the burdens be shouldered by all parties as needed and when needed, and that the benefits be shared as well.

Article II of the ANZUS treaty binds the partners "separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." Because the ANZUS democracies, as the NATO allies, are dedicated to preserving the peace, not fighting a war, there is a tendency in all our countries to resent spending resources for defense that seems unnecessary at the time. Yet, when the danger becomes evident, it may be too late or seem too provocative to begin to rearm. There, once again, a well-informed public is essential.

Domestic political pressures and miscalculations in Argentina led to a wholly unexpected war in the Falklands—a war for which Britain was just barely prepared. British naval planners, prior to the Falklands, assumed that their forces would be used relatively close to home, that they would never have to engage without allies, that land-based air support would always be available, and that landings against hostile forces would not be needed.

These comfortable assumptions lowered Britain defense spending. But an unpredictable world made them predictably dangerous.

The United States, for its part, is in the midst of a substantial effort to increase its conventional forces. We have done so not to provoke, but to defend; not to escalate, but to provide the means by which problems can be contained. By strengthening our conventional deterrent we help to increase our options and reduce the risks of nuclear war. In this defense effort, too, we have kept our allies closely informed.

The United States attaches critical importance to the opportunity to use Australian and New Zealand ports that provide ready access to the South Pacific and Indian Oceans. We view Australia's and New Zealand's willingness to allow us use of their ports as part of their contribution to ANZUS. We also value efforts to assure standardization or interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, share intelligence, exchange personnel, and consult on problems. The maintenance of

U.S. presence in the region, and the demonstration of our ability to operate effectively with our treaty partners, are tangible physical evidence of our treaty commitments. All of the ANZUS nations share in this effort and all benefit from it.

Another and critical element of defense cooperation is that involving the joint facilities in Australia. Although the subject of bilateral agreements between Canberra and Washington, they clearly are within the spirit of the provisions of the ANZUS treaty. Indeed, such is noted in the agreements.

There is, of course, considerable public speculation about the use of these facilities, including gross distortions or misunderstandings of related U.S. defense strategy. The simple truth, as clearly and forcefully enunciated by Prime Minister Hawke on June 6 in Parliament in Canberra, is that these facilities contribute to arms control, effective deterrence, mutual security, and to stability in global strategic relationships. Verification, early warning, and the ability to control our nuclear forces and communicate with them are critical

to both stable deterrence and to arms control. In addition, this capability could be critical in preventing some bizarre accident from turning into an unintended catastrophe. For all of these reasons, the facilities are an important, even essential, part of the West's critical and deeply felt commitment to maintain world peace—perhaps the greatest single challenge of this or any century.

Fifth, as alliance managers in all three capitals have recognized from the outset of ANZUS, our treaty relationship is only part of the many-faceted relations between our countries—commercial, historic, cultural, and personal. They are all important. They all affect the course of the relationship and each other. As we approach problems in any one area, we must be careful to see them in the perspective of the entire relationship. If we do so, we will continue to have a strong reservoir of good will and self-interest from which problems can be solved. At the same time, we will recognize that each element of the relationship is a part of the whole and that each is important and worthy of our best effort for consultation, compromise, and deference to the interests of all.

For alliance managers the essential task, whether in Washington, Canberra or Wellington, is to maximize cooperation to mutual advantage when we are on common ground and to contain differences—legitimate though they may be—through the kinds of compromises necessary in an effective working partnership. By so doing, we can assure that competition in commerce and difference in other areas do not threaten cooperation linked to our most fundamental shared interest—mutual national survival.

Conclusion

Relations between America, Australia and New Zealand are truly broad and vital. Our personal, commercial, and cultural ties, and a common political heritage dedicated to preserving and enhancing individual liberty, have forged uniquely close relations—relations Americans value deeply. As President Reagan said almost exactly a year ago "Our ties are a precious tradition, reflecting our many concerns and shared values."

The ANZUS commitment is not limited to paper. It resides in the hearts of Australians, New Zealanders, and

African Refugees Relief Day, 1984

PROCLAMATION 5216, JULY 9, 1984¹

The United States and the American people have a long and proud tradition of helping those who are in need. In Africa, the needs of refugees cry out for continued attention. So, too, do the needs of the host countries who, despite their own limited resources, have accepted the refugees in the best tradition of humanitarian concern. Their generosity has led them to make great sacrifices.

We in the United States are mindful of the burdens that are borne by the refugees and their host countries. We are dedicated to the cause of meeting their needs now and in the future. We fervently hope that the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, which begins July 9, 1984, will lead to a sustained effort by the international community to help African countries effectively cope with the refugee burden. Our own efforts have been and will continue to be in support of the African refugees and their host countries.

In order to heighten awareness in the United States of the needs of Africa's

refugees and the needs of their host countries, the Congress, by H.J. Res. 604, has designated July 9, 1984, as "African Refugees Relief Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of that day.

As we reflect on the situation of refugees and their host countries, I hope Americans will be generous in their support of voluntary agencies that provide relief and development assistance to Africa. Further, I wish special consideration be given to the extraordinary hardships borne by women refugees, their children, and other vulnerable groups. The innocent victims of civil strife and war deserve our special concern.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim July 9, 1984, as African Refugees Relief Day.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 9th day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and ninth.

RONALD REAGAN

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 16, 1984. ■

Visit of Sri Lankan President Jayewardene



(White House photo by Michael Evans)

Americans alike—in our affection for another and in our profound belief in the rule of law. Our treaty commitment naturally requires that our actions be in accordance with our constitutional processes, but our deep ties ensure that these processes will be swift and supportive and embody the full spirit of our peoples—the type of commitment democracies require and from which democracies profit. Speaking for the United States, I can say that Australians and New Zealanders should be assured that if any emergency confronts them, the American system is capable of decisive action—and willing to render it.

The ties between our peoples will always remain a powerful force. But what the future holds for ANZUS may profoundly affect life within each of our nations. Will freedom remain a vibrant force, uplifting peoples throughout the world? Or will freedom itself be a positive, cowering in remote lands in the hope that it is too small to note? In the end, even that would prove a futile hope.

Our freedom and world peace depend primarily on our own commitment to our mutual defense and the rule of law. The choice before us is not between peace and freedom. By promoting freedom we build what is ultimately the most secure foundation for peace as well. Nor can we choose peace at the expense of freedom. Life in a world of totalitarian powers would not be peace, nor would peace between them long endure.

I believe our countries have the will to preserve freedom. There is an old saying: "If I am not for myself, who will? But if I am for myself alone, what am I?"

I believe our countries know what we are—we are trustees of freedom. In the end, we can do more to protect that freedom and to build a safe and just world:

- If we are strong, then if we are weak;
- If we proceed with reason and courage, then if we hang back until desperate responses no longer suffice;
- If we are united, then if we stand alone.

The path we must follow is an arduous one—one not without risk. But a few routes are quicker, and none is better. There are no shortcuts. ■

President J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka made a state visit to the United States June 16–23, 1984. While in Washington, D.C., June 17–20, he met with President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made at the arrival ceremony and dinner toasts made by Presidents Reagan and Jayewardene on June 18.¹

ARRIVAL CEREMONY²

President Reagan

President Jayewardene, Nancy and I are very pleased to have this opportunity to welcome you and Mrs. Jayewardene to the White House.

Although our two countries are on opposite sides of the globe, we share a common bond in the great institution of democracy. Sri Lanka has a remarkable record among nations which won their independence in the aftermath of World War II. You've held elections at regular intervals, and with almost equal regularity, your own hard-fought reelection in 1982, as a notable exception, your people, through their votes, have removed from power the governing party. And in

what distinguishes Sri Lanka as a truly democratic country, losers as well as winners accept the verdict of the people. The true winners are, of course, the people of Sri Lanka.

I'm told that in your embassy here in Washington, pictures of every Sri Lanka head of government since independence—those from your own party, as well as the opposition—are respectfully displayed. This is the kind of democratic spirit essential to the success of human liberty, the hallmark of democratic societies.

Understanding and appreciating your personal commitment to democratic ideals, it is a pleasure for us to have you as our guest. You underscored this heartfelt commitment during your first visit here in September of 1951, during a gathering of the representatives of nations who had fought in the Pacific war. Some at that San Francisco conference insisted that Japan should not be given its full freedom. They argued that Japan should remain shackled as a punishment for its role in World War II. As the representative of Sri Lanka, you spoke out for the principle of freedom for all people, including the Japanese. You quoted Buddha, the

great teacher, and said that "hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love."

We share your dedication to freedom and good will. This is more than political theory; it's a way of life. This spirit makes it natural that our two nations should be friends.

Unfortunately, not everyone shares these values. Recently, we were reminded of the menace of those who seek to impose their will by force and terror. Two American citizens were kidnapped in Sri Lanka and threatened with death. I want to take this opportunity to thank you personally for your diligence and for your resolute handling of this difficult situation. The skill and courage that you demonstrated helped free our countrymen and, at the same time, prevented the terrorists from achieving their goal.

During that time of tension, you wrote to me, and I want you to know how much I appreciated your sharing your thoughts. You wrote, "I hope that the international community will be able to eradicate terrorism, which has become a major challenge to those of us who believe in the democratic process." Well, I speak for all my countrymen—and after the economic summit I recently attended in London, I know this sentiment is shared by the people of all the democracies—when I say the free men and women of this planet will never cower before terrorists. Human liberty will prevail and civilization will triumph over this cowardly form of barbarism.

We applaud your determination not to yield to terrorism in your own country, as well as your efforts to find through the democratic process a peaceful resolution of communal strife. There is no legitimate excuse for any political group to resort to violence in Sri Lanka, a country with a strong democratic tradition and peaceful means to resolve conflict.

As a nation of many races, religions, and ethnic groups, we Americans know from experience that there is room for all in a democracy. Dividing your country into separate nations, as some would have you do, is not the solution. Instead of separating people, now is the time to bring them together. In the same spirit you spoke about in San Francisco three decades ago—of love, not hatred, a united, progressive Sri Lanka can flourish and live in peace with itself and the rest of the world.

We wish you every success in your search for reconciliation and a better life for all your people. And their lives are improving. Your leadership has increased productivity and brought down

unemployment, has created exciting, new opportunities for your citizens. Sri Lanka is among those enlightened nations that understand incentives hold the key for greater economic growth and personal opportunity. I believe your people and their children will reap rewards for many years to come, thanks to the bold economic steps that you've taken.

We're pleased that Americans are playing a part in this effort. Your endeavors to improve your people's economic well-being continues to have our solid support. Your country has vast potential.

Sri Lanka is an example of independent people determining their own destiny and a country which the United States is proud to count among its friends. Mr. President and Mrs. Jayewardene, welcome to America.

President Jayewardene

President Reagan, Madam Reagan, ladies and gentlemen, I'm glad that Mrs. Jayewardene and I were able to accept the invitation extended by Mrs. Reagan and you to visit your great country.

We have come a very long way from home. Yet, already we feel we are among friends who believe and try to follow common ideals for the welfare of humanity.

This is not our first visit. We came in September 1951 to your west coast to attend the Japanese peace treaty conference held at San Francisco. I came as my country's representative. I received then a full measure of praise and gratitude from members of the U.S. Government of the day—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and others who attended the conference—for helping to secure the acceptance by the conference of the peace treaty with Japan. The Japanese leaders, Prime Minister Yoshida and others, were equally grateful. Those alive are still so.

I mention that because the thinking of the people of my country, which was expressed by me on that occasion, was that we should not ask for reparations from a fallen foe who had harmed our land and people also; that we should forgive those who were our enemies, quoting the words of the Buddha that "hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love," which you, also, Mr. President, just quoted. I pleaded that we should restore to Japan the freedoms of democracy. Those were the ideals which inspired us then and inspire us now.

Our history and civilization have survived in an unbroken sequence from the

fifth century B.C. for 2,500 years. There were glimpses of modern democracy even then, as in the appointment of mayors to our ancient cities. The ruins of state buildings still contain carvings in stone where the cabinet of the kings and their ministers sat. We were the first in Asia in 1865 to select members to the municipalities that governed our major cities and, in 1931, under universal franchise, to exercise our right to elect the government of our choice.

We also have, in our country, an unbroken, historical record, extending over the same long period, of a line of heads of state, monarchies of different dynasties from Sri Lanka and abroad, including India and the United Kingdom of two Presidents, one selected and one myself, elected by the whole country. I happen to be the 193d in the line of heads of state from 483 B.C. to date.

In our modern history, we cannot forget the contribution made by an American, Col. Olcott, when he helped the Buddhist leaders of Sri Lanka a hundred years ago to establish a movement for the revival of education, through schools owned and managed by the Buddhists themselves, and thus laid the foundation for the revival of Buddhism and the movement for freedom.

The United States of America, since it was born out of a revolution which freed it from foreign rule, has not been known to be hankering after territory supporting imperialism. Sri Lanka has been for 53 years a practicing democracy, where the freedoms of speech and writing, of electing governments by universal franchise at regular intervals, and the independence of the judiciary and of the opposition are safeguarded.

Fundamental rights which are justifiable are guaranteed under the constitution. Though there are occasions when emergency powers have had to be exercised, fundamental freedoms remain intact. Democracy cannot, however, live and survive on a diet of words alone. The people require food for their stomachs, clothing for their bodies, and roofs over their heads.

In the nonaligned world of developing nations, which covers the whole of Central and South America, the whole of Africa, the whole of Asia from the Mediterranean Sea to the seas of China and Japan, there are very few countries which could be called a democracy, such as your country. Ours is one. That is why the assistance that developing nations of the world receive from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is appreciated, though there are many matters on which we

el there should be change to help them exist as free countries.

We in the developing world have problems similar to those who live in the developed world. We have deficit budgets, high interest rates, old valued currencies, and unstable exchange rates. These are the classical examples of the symptoms that affect both the developed and developing nations.

Those who speak so eloquently on behalf of the developing nations have been pressing for the opening of commodity markets of the developed world to their manufacturers without protective laws, stable prices for all products, and rescheduling of debts borrowed for development. Consider these requests with sympathy and generosity.

In our own case, with the aid received, we have been able to commence and have almost completed the largest development program—which in our long history has ever been attempted by a king or president—a program possibly unequalled in magnitude by any development program in any country in the contemporary world or earlier. This was possible due to the effects of my government, which was elected to office in 1977 in an election conducted by our opponents, the previous government. We obtained 51% of the votes and won five-thirds of the seats in the legislature. And subsequently since then, we have won five elections, including the presidential election, byelections, district council elections, local elections, and a referendum.

We have, however, our problems. Some of them are unique to our country—excessive rains, sometimes floods, landslides, cyclones—some common to all countries, but still difficult for us to bear.

Another and a modern problem, and one of universal occurrence today, is terrorism. This happened in the extreme north of our country, where a group of misguided people of Tamil birth, who were favored by the American people in the latter half of the 19th century by the erection of schools and hospitals, seek separation from a united Sri Lanka. There are more Tamils living in the east than among the Sinhalese, the major community, than in the regions that seek separation who do not support them. My party holds 10 out of 12 seats in the eastern province, which separatists seek to join to the north.

The terrorists are a small group who speak by force, including murder, robberies, and other misdeeds, to support the cause of separation, including the

creation of a Marxist state in the whole of Sri Lanka and in India, beginning with Tamil Nadu in the south. Since we assumed office in 1977, members of the armed services and police, politicians who leave the ranks of the separatists and join us, and others, and innocent citizens numbering 147 have been murdered in cold blood.

I'm glad that your country is taking a lead in creating an international movement to oppose terrorism. If I may suggest, it may be called a United Nations antiterrorism organization. It is vital—it is essential that the developed world helps us with finances, that we help each other in this sphere, and that all nations cooperate to eliminate the menace of terrorism from the civilized world.

I was very happy when I read your address to the Irish Parliament on June 4th. You made an appeal to nations to reform the principle not to use force in their dealings with each other. You said the democracies could inaugurate a program to promote the growth of democratic institutions throughout the world. You spoke on behalf of hundreds of millions who live on the borderline of starvation, while nations will spend next year a trillion dollars on the manufacturing of armaments for destruction of human beings and their products.

At meetings of members of the Commonwealth in Sydney, in New Delhi, at meetings of nonaligned nations in Havana and in Goa, New India, I have never failed to express similar ideas. Nonviolence is "Maithri" compassion, and the great teacher whom I follow, Gautama Buddha, and the great teacher you follow, Jesus Christ, and India's great son, Mahatma Gandhi, preached and practiced the doctrine of non-violence successfully.

Let your great and powerful nation take the lead in implementing these ideals, and the world will remember that the President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, preached the laying down of arms not through fear, but by the strength of the conviction that to follow right for right is right, without fear of consequence, is a way for civilized man to adopt. The voice of America will then become the voice of righteousness.

I thank you, Mr. President and Madam Reagan, for inviting us and giving me this opportunity of speaking to you, and for entertaining us so hospitably.

DINNER TOASTS

President Reagan

Mr. President, Mrs. Jayewardene, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen, it's a special pleasure to have you with us. Sri Lankan leaders, including yourself, have been to our country before. Tonight, however, is the first time that a Sri Lankan chief of state has been an official guest at the White House. It's our honor to have you with us, and Nancy and I hope your visit will be followed by many more.

Our talks this morning reflected the cordial and cooperative relationship which exists between our two democracies. When your government was first elected in 1977, Americans were excited by your bold program for economic development. And you've led your country in a new direction, and by doing so, you've created new opportunities for your people and expanded the potential of every Sri Lankan.

The accelerated Mahaweli River project is part of your effort, as is freeing the Sri Lankan economy from the controls and redtape that stifled progress and economic expansion. One innovation of particular interest to me is the creation of a free trade zone. This practical approach to development with its open market is attracting investment and unleashing the energy of the private sector. And I hope those over on Capitol Hill who claim enterprise zones won't work here in our country will take notice of the progress that you've made.

We in the United States are happy that we've been able to contribute to your progress. Our Agency for International Development is working with you in the river program and encouraging Sri Lanka's private enterprise sector. With the incentives that you now offer to investors, your country is attracting business and capturing the attention of American entrepreneurs and investors. I think we can look forward to growing cooperation between our governments and our people on many levels.

U.S.-Sri Lankan cooperation comes in many forms. Last year the Peace Corps began a program to assist in the upgrading of Sri Lanka's English-language teaching skills. And today we signed a science and technology agreement which provides an umbrella for increased collaboration. We look forward to the early completion of negotiating on a tax treaty and on a bilateral investment treaty. All this reflects the extraordinary relationship that we're building, a relationship of trust and trade that will benefit both our peoples.

We understand Sri Lanka's choice, as a small developing country, to remain nonaligned in matters of foreign policy. We respect genuine nonalignment. Your country consistently has been a forceful voice for reason and moderation in nonaligned councils. Your strong opposition to unprovoked aggression in Afghanistan and Kampuchea has swelled the international chorus calling for restoration of independence for these two brutalized countries. We hope that Sri Lanka will remain a strong moral force in world politics.

And today, we came to know one another better and to understand more fully our objectives and concerns. Your visit has undoubtedly strengthened the bond between our two countries, and it's laid a basis for even closer, more cooperative relations between Sri Lanka and the United States in the future.

Finally, I'd like to thank you again for the elephant—[laughter]—a magnificent present that you gave us today. The elephant happens to be the symbol of the President's political party, and by coincidence—[laughter]—we happen to be also that smart. [Laughter]

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you to join me in a toast to President and Mrs. Jayewardene, and the prosperity of our relationship with Sri Lanka.

President Jayewardene

Mr. President, Madam Reagan, ladies and gentlemen, I don't mind President Reagan telling the public that the gift of the elephant was accidental. [Laughter] But privately I know it's something else. [Laughter] The elephant led my party to victory in 1977. I received 51% of the votes. Any party that gets 51% of the votes must win an election. And I hope you will have the same luck in the months to come.

I came here as a stranger, but I find—already I feel I am among friends. I've heard that the American people are very friendly people, hospitable people. Both qualities have been proved during the last few days. I'm surrounded, I understand, by film stars. Those whom I saw in my youth were rather different. They were Charlie Chaplin, Laurel and Hardy, Fatty Arbuckle—[laughter]—and Mary Pickford.

I remember a story about Laurel and Hardy. They joined the French Legion. They were waiting in the inspecting line. The sergeant came and said, "What are you doing here? Why do you join the French Legion?" They said, "We joined the French Legion to forget." "To forget what?" "We've forgotten." [Laughter]

I haven't forgotten about the help your country has given us during the last few years. But I didn't come here to ask for help. That's not my way. I'm waiting to hear Mr. Frank Sinatra sing "My Way." [Laughter] That's one of my favorite songs, but I understand he didn't like it. [Laughter] I used it in part of my election campaign and asked the people to vote for my way, which they did.

Your country is, as far as the Americans go, young. Our country is old, very old. We go back to the fifth century before Christ. We had Ambassadors at the court of Claudius Caesar. You'll find it recorded in Pliny's letters. He even mentions the name of the Ambassadors. We had sent delegations to China in A.D. 47, and I understand the gift sent by our king to the Emperor of China were water buffaloes and hump cattle. The great Chinese

pilgrims Hsüan-tsang and Fa-Hsien came to our country in the fourth century A.D. and the sixth century A.D. So did Sinbad the Sailor, Marco Polo, and Ibn Batuta.

For the first time, Westerners came in the 16th century and the Portuguese came as tourists but stayed for 150 years. After that came the Dutch and then came the English. And we are no longer once again, a free country. We wish to be friendly with all and the enemies of none. That is my policy and the policy of our people.

We would like the people of America to understand us. In the long history of Sri Lanka, there have been difficult periods. There have been murders; there have been assassinations; there have been riots; there have been good deeds and bad deeds. Last July we had one of those bad periods. But in time to come it will be forgotten.

Sri Lanka—A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Sri Lankan(s). **Population** (1983): 15.3 million. **Annual growth rate:** 1.8%. **Ethnic groups:** Sinhalese 74%, Tamils 18%, Moors 7%, Burghers, Malays, Veddahs 1%. **Religions:** Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity. **Languages:** Sinhala (official), Tamil (national), English.

Geography

Area: 65,610 sq. km. (25,322 sq. mi.); about the size of West Virginia. **Cities:** *Capital*—Colombo (pop. 1,262,000). *Other cities*—Jaffna (270,600), Kandy (147,400), Galle (168,100). **Terrain:** Low plain in the north; hills and mountains in the south. **Climate:** Tropical.

Government

Type: Republic. **Independence:** February 4, 1948. **Constitution:** August 31, 1978.

Branches: *Executive*—president (chief of state and head of government), elected for a 6-year term. *Legislative*—unicameral 168-member Parliament. *Judicial*—Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, High Court, subordinate courts.

Political parties: United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Communist Party/Moscow Wing (CP/M), Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP). **Suffrage:** Universal over age 18.

Flag: On a yellow background, a red and green stripe on the staff side; on the remain-

ing two-thirds is a yellow lion holding up a sword, centered on a red square.

Economy

GNP (1981): \$4 billion. **Annual growth rate** 1982 est., 4.8%; 1981, 4.2%; 1980, 5.8%; 1979, 6.3%. **Per capita income:** \$266. **Average inflation rate** (1982): 10%–15%.

Natural resources: Limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, phosphate.

Agriculture (24% of GNP): *Products*—tea, rubber, coconuts, rice, spices. *Arable land*—59%, of which 38% is cultivated.

Industry (18% of GNP): Consumer goods, textiles, chemicals and chemical products, milling, light engineering, paper and paper products.

Trade (1981): *Exports*—\$1.069 billion (tea \$335 million), petroleum products (\$1 billion), textiles and garments (\$156 million). *Major markets*—US (\$146 million), UK (\$63 million), FRG (\$63 million), Pakistan (\$56 million), communist countries (\$85 million). *Imports*—\$1.831 billion: petroleum (\$448 million), machinery and equipment (\$201 million), sugar (\$147 million). *Major suppliers*—Saudi Arabia (\$273 million), Japan (\$258 million), US (\$129 million), Iran (\$111 million), UK (\$111 million), communist countries (\$52 million).

Official exchange rate (March 1983 rupees = US\$1).

Taken from the *Background Notes* of June 1983, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: J. D. Adams. ■

I see in one of your newspapers
 re is an advertisement in which some
 ople are trying to make us remember
 t day. It was a fatal day; several peo-
 were killed. It was not done by the
 vernment; it was done by a gang of
 oligans, about which we are very
 y sorry. I'm trying to forget it. I'm
 ing to make our people not com-
 —some of them—such incidents
 ain. I hope we will succeed.

I remember when one of your
 representatives came to see me and had
 ch with me. I told her—she is your
 representative in the United Nations
 ganization—"A leader must know only
 o words." She said, "What's that?" I
 d, "Yes and no." And I think Presi-
 nt Reagan knows those two words
 y well. Once you say yes or once you
 y no, stick by it. Whatever happens,
 ver change. That has been my policy,
 d it has succeeded.

Therefore, we're surrounded by
 ends. We've been very happy the last
 w days. I have a few more days to
 end. I hope to spend some time in the
 dian settlements at Sante Fe, not for
 y other reason but because those were
 stories I read in my youth, about
 ffalo Bill and the various tribes. I'm
 cinated by the fact they were the
 est human settlements, as far as I
 ow, in the continent of America, and
 great people. And we must give them
 elping hand as we must give every
 e, every tribe, every human being,
 atever his caste, religion, or race, a
 ping hand.

We're all human beings. We extend
 affection, not only to human beings
 t even to animals; to the little
 phant that we have gifted to you.
 at is the philosophy which we have
 rned in our country; that is the
 philosophy which, if I can, I'll spread
 oughout the world. And I find in you,
 r. President and Madam Reagan, two
 y good disciples.

Thank you very much for entertain-
 g us. May your country prosper. May,
 the morning and in the evening, at
 ghtfall, may the name of President
 agan and Madam Reagan, never be
 gotten.

May I drink to the health of Presi-
 nt Reagan, Madam Reagan, the
 vernment and people of the United
 ates of America.

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments to the OAS

by J. William Middendorf II

*Statement made in the Permanent
 Council of the Organization of American
 States (OAS) on July 18, 1984. Am-
 bassador Middendorf is U.S. Permanent
 Representative to the OAS.*

The U.S. delegation wishes to raise the
 matter of the solemn commitments
 made to the Secretary General of this
 body by the Sandinista junta 5 years ago
 on July 12, 1979. This is not interven-
 tion—this is reviewing our own role
 after commitments made to it by a
 member state. As a result of these com-
 mitments and our own OAS resolutions,
 we brought down a sitting government.
 Tomorrow will be the fifth anniversary
 of the date that the junta took effective
 control of Managua; but, regrettably,
 very little progress has been made in
 putting into effect these commitments.

You will recall that these com-
 mitments were made as a response to
 the resolution of the 17th Meeting of
 Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign
 Affairs of member countries of the OAS.
 According to Document 25 of this body,
 published June 30, 1981, this resolution
 "for the first time in the history of the
 OAS, deprived an incumbent member
 government of legitimacy" when it asked
 that the Nicaraguan Government be "im-
 mediately and definitively" replaced.

The resolution in question said that
 a solution to Nicaragua's problems was
 exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
 Nicaraguan people but then proceeded
 to dictate how the problems should be
 settled. In addition to demanding a sit-
 ting president's ouster, the resolution:

- Said that a "democratic" govern-
 ment was to replace the existing govern-
 ment. Its composition was to include
 "the principal representative groups
 which oppose the existing regime and
 which reflect the free will of the people
 of Nicaragua";
- Said that the human rights of all
 Nicaraguans, without exception, should
 be respected; and
- Called for the holding of free elec-
 tions as soon as possible, leading to the
 establishment of a "truly democratic
 government that guarantees peace,
 freedom, and justice."

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs
 went on to urge the member states to
 take steps that were within their reach
 to facilitate an enduring and peaceful
 solution of the Nicaraguan problem
 based on these points "scrupulously re-
 specting the principle of non-interven-
 tion."

They also asked that member states
 promote humanitarian assistance to
 Nicaragua and contribute to the social
 and economic recovery of the country.
 Many countries responded with an open
 heart, including my own, with the
 United States donating \$118 million in
 the first 2 years.

I would note that this 17th Meeting
 of Consultation has never formally ad-
 journed but only recessed. Given the un-
 precedented involvement of all of us in
 the process that brought the Sandinista
 regime to power, the member nations
 have a continuing interest—indeed, a
 responsibility—in monitoring the situa-
 tion in Nicaragua to see whether or not
 the Sandinista government has, indeed,
 carried out the commitments it so
 solemnly made to us in 1979.

It is in this context that I propose to
 examine the record here today, in order
 to see exactly what has been happening
 in Nicaragua since the Sandinista junta
 assumed power there.

Here are the commitments which
 the junta made to the Secretary General
 in its letter of June 12, 1979:

- "... our firm intention to
 establish full respect for human
 rights. . . .";
- "... our decision to enforce civil
 justice in our country . . . to let justice
 prevail for the first time in half a cen-
 tury. . . ."; and
- "... call Nicaraguans to the first
 free elections that our country will have
 in this century. . . ."

To do justice to the full historical
 record, there were two other promises
 contained in the same letter, one which
 spoke of a peaceful and orderly transi-
 tion from the Somoza government to the
 Sandinista junta and another permitting
 so-called collaborators of the Somoza
 regime, except those responsible for so-
 called genocide, to leave the country.
 But I will concentrate here on the mat-
 ters of human rights, civil justice, and
 elections.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of
 Presidential Documents of June 26, 1984.

²Held on the South Lawn of the White
 House where President Jayewardene was ac-
 corded a formal welcome with full military
 honors. ■

It should be noted that those who signed for the Sandinista junta were Commandante Daniel Ortega, Violeta de Chamorro, Commandante Sergio Ramirez, Alfonso Robelo, and Moises Hassan. Violeta de Chamorro is no longer a member of the junta, and Alfonso Robelo is in exile in Costa Rica, where he is an outspoken critic of the junta of which he was once a member.

Commitment Number One— Human Rights

"... [O]ur firm intention to establish full respect for human rights. . . ."

Nothing has demonstrated the callous disregard of human rights by the Sandinista regime so much as their treatment of the Miskito Indians. Approximately 20,000 Miskitos—one-third of the entire Miskito population—have crossed the border into neighboring Honduras thus far, where they live in refugee camps. They have been victims of the Sandinistas' constant campaigns against them.

It all began with efforts by the Sandinista government to try to force the Miskitos into adapting their way of life to a preconceived Sandinista model. Many of these human rights offenses are detailed in a report just released by the OAS General Assembly on June 4 transmitting a report by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission dated November 29, 1983.

Miskitos have been forcibly relocated from their traditional villages. In a few cases where they resisted, they were killed. Many were force marched to the new area and not allowed to take their belongings with them. In other instances, the government appropriated their farm animals for itself. On February 18, 1982, the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua, headed by Managua's archbishop, directed a message to the people and Government of Nicaragua denouncing the human rights violations against the Miskitos.

The Miskito Indians long ago adopted the Moravian Church as their primary religious institution. The Sandinistas have harassed the Moravian Church, calling some of its ministers "counterrevolutionaries." They have been asked to change their sermons into vehicles of support for the Sandinista revolution. Church services have been interrupted by Sandinista troops looking for so-called counterrevolutionaries. A Moravian hospital, the only one serving a wide area of eastern Nicaragua, was confiscated by the government and

turned into a military headquarters, according to the Miskitos. Many Moravian pastors—out of fear, frustration, or both—have taken refuge in Honduras. Amnesty International, an organization which was highly critical of the previous regime, denounced the Sandinistas in September 1983 for this sort of behavior.

Miskito organizations say their villages have occasionally been bombed by Sandinista planes. Efforts have been made to force them to join the Sandinista militia.

Presumably for security reasons, some Miskitos who were ocean fishermen have been prohibited from fishing, cutting off their livelihood and their principal source of food.

The Miskitos had always maintained their land as communal property of the tribe. The Sandinistas have broken up some of these communal holdings, making them property of the state.

Smaller tribes, such as the Sumo and the Rama, have also suffered similar violations of their human rights at the hands of this so-called peoples' government.

But by no means have human rights violations been limited to indigenous peoples. As you will recall, the Pope, on his visit to Managua, was treated with unheard-of rudeness. Sandinista militants set up a parallel loudspeaker system over which they heckled the Pope and attempted to drown out his sermon. Most of the areas close to the Pope were assigned to these militants, and ordinary Catholics who turned out to receive the Pope's blessings were kept at a distance.

This is a fitting illustration of how the Sandinista government has treated the Catholic Church.

Another example has occurred in recent days with the expulsion of 10 foreign priests from Nicaragua. The ostensible excuse for their expulsion was that they somehow had something to do with a protest demonstration against the house arrest of yet another priest, Father Luis Amado Pena. But a majority of them were not even at the demonstration in question, which, at any rate, was a peaceful demonstration led by the country's archbishop, the sort of a demonstration which would be routinely permitted in any truly democratic country.

The Pope, in commenting on this action, said: "I ask the Lord to illuminate the minds of those responsible so that they may reverse this decision, openly

harmful to the church and the needs of the Catholic population of Nicaragua."

In recent years, the Archbishop of Managua, Monsignor Obando y Bravo, has not been able to have the traditional holy week services broadcast on radio and television because the government wanted to subject the process to prior censorship, a demand to which the Archbishop understandably refused to accede. In a crude ploy, a priest, who is the spokesman for the archbishop and director of the Catholic radio station, was accused of having sexual relations with the wife of another man, stripped naked, and paraded in public where Sandinista mobs jeered at him while government press photographers and television crews, which "just happened" to be on the scene, took pictures. The programming of the Catholic Church's radio station has been severely restricted. All Marxist-Leninist governments eventually reveal themselves as atheistic—even though in the case of Nicaragua, a few misguided priests hold high government positions—and these governments use their institutions to promote atheism.

The Sandinistas have attempted to infiltrate Catholic youth groups, and when this largely failed, they set up their own so-called "peoples' church." In November of 1983, all Nicaraguan churches closed for a day in protest against attacks by Sandinista youth mobs on numerous churches.

The Nicaraguan Permanent Committee on Human Rights has itself been a victim of Sandinista government excesses. The former president of the commission, Jose Esteban Gonzalez, made trip to Italy in 1981 where he denounced the existence of political prisoners in Nicaragua. On his return to Managua number of supporters and colleagues came to the airport to receive him. They were never allowed to get near him but instead were roughed up and spat upon by Sandinista mobs. Only the presence of the Venezuelan Ambassador prevented Gonzalez himself from getting roughed up, but he was arrested a week later anyway.

The current president of the Nicaraguan human rights group, Mar Patricia Baltodano, told the Inter-American Human Rights Commission May of this year that Sandinista laws have institutionalized the violation of human rights. The setting up of so-called Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are really attempts to limit the freedom of the individual Nicaraguan by instituting a control system over the population at the neighborhood level.

Freedom of the press also suffers in Nicaragua. The only independent newspaper, *La Prensa*, has had its publication suspended by the government on numerous occasions and is subject to prior censorship. On countless days, the paper has been so heavily censored that its editors decided not to publish.

A recent example of this happened on July 10 when *La Prensa* attempted to report on the expulsion of the 10 priests. An incident which I have already discussed. Three items—one reporting on the government's cancellation of their residency permits, another on Catholics condemning the expulsion, and a third on the fact that they were allowed to leave carrying only the clothes they wore—were censored. Therefore, the editors decided they could not print the information for that day.

The lack of the right for families to determine how their children will be educated, which we in the United States consider a fundamental human right, has been denounced by the Nicaraguan Parents' Association. The Sandinista government tries to use education to brainwash the young against the ideals their parents and even to get them to announce their parents' lack of revolutionary zeal to the authorities in some cases. Intellectual freedom and the freedom to belong to independent labor unions are also restricted in today's Nicaragua.

The human rights of farmers have suffered from Sandinista agricultural policies. The so-called Economic and Social Emergency Law decreed in late 1981 has made the state the only purchaser of farm products. Thus, the farmer can only sell his produce to the government and only at the government's price. Many small farmers have been ruined by this policy, and Nicaragua must now import some foods which it was previously self-sufficient. At the same time, a large bureaucracy has been established in order to control the activities of the populace, soaking up money which would normally be available for investment in agriculture. Even the newspaper *Nuevo Diario* has complained about the amount of money used to support the bloated Sandinista bureaucracy. All of the foregoing demonstrates that the commitment to "... our firm intention to establish full respect for human rights. ..." has thus far been grossly violated.

Commitment Number Two—Civil Justice

Let us turn our attention to the second Sandinista commitment to "... let justice prevail for the first time in half a century. ..."

Presumably, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court, under the original Sandinista plans, was supposed to have complete autonomy in the judicial area, and lower courts would be dependencies of it. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission in 1981, as well as an international commission of jurists, said that the judicial branch in Nicaragua should be independent from the legislative and executive branches of the government, not to mention the Sandinista party.

But, in reality, other courts have been established which have nothing to do with the concept of judicial independence as we know it. The Supreme Court has no authority over them. One of them is the so-called Peoples' Court at the neighborhood level. These courts spend their time ferreting out so-called counterrevolutionaries in the neighborhood. For example, a neighbor who does not show up for a meeting to promote the Sandinista cause may find himself labeled a counterrevolutionary by one of these courts.

The right of *habeus corpus* in Nicaragua must be questioned. As in Cuba, people who have been jailed for so-called political crimes are often not released when their sentences have been served. New judges owe their jobs to the Sandinistas and are not about to show any independence on the bench.

There exists no constitution, as such. There was the Economic and Social Emergency Law of 1981 which in 1982 became the State of Emergency. This State of Emergency has been routinely extended every time it was about to expire. Under this system, all laws are issued by government decree. The State of Emergency does not provide for the right of the individual to a defense in a court of law in some cases and in others suspends the civil rights of the individual. This has been denounced by Amnesty International.

Commitment Number Three—Elections

So much for Sandinista justice. Let's turn now to commitment number three, dealing with elections.

We see that elections have been scheduled by the Sandinista government for November 4 of this year, 2 days before our own. As we once had high

hopes for the new Nicaraguan Government 5 years ago, can we now have high hopes that at least this commitment will be fulfilled? This is, in itself, a welcome development, but there are some disturbing statements on the record which lead one to question just how open this election process will be. In the letter of July 12, 1979, the Sandinista leaders committed to the OAS to "call Nicaragua to the first free elections our country will have in this century." This was in reply to the resolution of the 17th Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs which had said free elections should be held as soon as possible, leading to the establishment of "a truly democratic government that guarantees peace, freedom and justice."

Yet on August 25, 1981, Commander Humberto Ortega said that elections would not be to contest power but to strengthen the revolution. On July 7 of this year, less than 2 weeks ago, Commander Carlos Nunez Tellez said on *Radio Sandino*:

The electoral process is the result of a political decision made by the FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front], its revolutionary leaders, and the government to reinforce the historical popular plan. There is nothing more alien to the electoral process than sectarianism, dogmatism, and other vices that are characteristic of certain so-called democracies.

Elections in Guatemala

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JULY 4, 1984¹

We have noted with pleasure the record turnout of Guatemalan voters in the July 1 Constituent Assembly elections. The bipartisan U.S. observer team and our Embassy in Guatemala report from visits throughout the country that the process was fair and open, well organized, and orderly. We applaud the Government of Guatemala for taking this important step in carrying out its commitment for a return to constitutional practices and the unprecedented response of the citizenry to the opportunity to participate in their political process. We wish the Guatemalans well as they prepare a constitution and proceed with elections for a new government next year.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 9, 1984. ■

Government spokesmen have said in the past: "There are only two types of Nicaraguans, Sandinistas and counter-revolutionaries." Does that mean that candidates and voters for other parties will automatically be labeled counter-revolutionaries? And what kind of treatment will that cause them to receive on the part of the government?

The neighborhood control committees are called Sandinista Defense Committees. They have set up an informer society, modeled on the East German plan and with East German agents controlling their internal security. They have the power to deprive a citizen of his food ration card, for example—a card, by the way, which was never needed in Nicaragua until this government came along. These Sandinista Defense Committees also control access to schools, medicine, and health care.

It is also worrisome that the army is called the Sandinista Army, and other branches of the armed forces are similarly named. Thus, the security forces are intimately linked with one of the political parties which will be running in the elections—the Sandinista party.

The electoral council which has been set up is made up exclusively of prominent members of the Sandinista party. Will they be fair to the opposition parties?

And will the state of emergency be lifted for the elections?

Will the opposition parties be able to campaign without interference by authorities or by Sandinista-sponsored youth mobs?

Will opposition parties have equal access to radio and television as compared with the Sandinista party? Will they be able to have party representatives at the polls?

Will the Sandinistas allow international observers to move freely about the country during the election process? How will the ballots be counted and how will results be relayed to election headquarters?

We also note that, as time has gone on, the government has arbitrarily concentrated more and more power in the hands of the Sandinista party. What was once the Government of National Reconstruction is now the Sandinista Peoples' Revolutionary Government. Will the Sandinistas allow this process to be reversed, or are we in for a sham election in November just before our own general assembly?

We have seen how the Sandinistas of Nicaragua have thus far failed to live up to their commitments to the OAS of 5 years ago. It is a shame that the people of Nicaragua, so hopeful in 1979 that their situation would improve, have seen their revolution betrayed by a group of leaders who have aligned themselves with international communism and whose principal concern has been to maintain themselves in power and, indeed, to export communism to their neighbors virtually from the day they took over. We in the OAS, which was deeply involved in the process by which

the Sandinistas took power, have a grave responsibility to monitor the fulfillment of these commitments.

In June 1979 a respected scholar on Latin America, Dr. Constantine Menges wrote: "The defeat of the Somoza Army by the Sandinistas will be followed by a Cuban-type process from which the pro-Castro guerrilla leaders will emerge as the only group with real power." Five years after he wrote this, and 5 years after the Sandinistas' commitments to the OAS, it developed that he was prophetic. ■

President Meets With El Salvador's President

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT.
JULY 23, 1984¹**

During his brief visit to Washington today, El Salvador's President Jose Napoleon Duarte met with President Reagan this morning at 11:00 for half an hour, with the Vice President present. From the State Department, the meeting included Secretary Shultz and U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering.

Following his meeting with President Reagan, President Duarte went to the Hill to meet with House Majority Leader James Wright. We believe he was also seeing Jamie Whitten, chairman of the Appropriations Committee; and Clarence Long, chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee; and possibly others.

Following his meeting on the Hill, President Duarte was to return to New York City. He's there for meetings with UN officials, the Americas Society, and others.

President Duarte gave a full readout of the meeting, discussing his assessment of developments in El Salvador, his very successful trip to Europe, and the Administration's efforts during the current 3-week congressional session to secure pending FY 1984 supplemental funds and complete congressional action on the Central American Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative. We have nothing to add to what he said.

As you know, we still hope to secure that portion of the FY 1984 supplemental request which has not been acted on (for El Salvador this includes \$134

million in economic assistance and \$11 million in military assistance) and the Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative plan request for all of Central America which includes for FY 1985 \$1.376 billion (\$1.12 billion in economic and \$256 million in military assistance for the region). Of the \$1.37 billion requested, \$473.6 million would be for El Salvador—\$341.1 million would be for economic assistance and \$132.5 million would be for military assistance.

The Administration in February requested a supplemental appropriation \$659 million to begin meeting the most urgent needs identified by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America; \$312.7 million in the FY 1984 Supplemental (\$134 million in economic and \$178.7 million in military assistance for El Salvador).

As you know, some \$61.7 million urgently needed military assistance for El Salvador was passed by the Congress. The remaining \$117 million in military assistance and \$134 million in economic assistance have not been acted upon and, at this point, are both urgently needed by the Government of El Salvador, as are the \$266 million in economic assistance and \$142 million in military assistance requested in February for other countries in Central America.

We will be striving for House action on our requests for the Henry Jackson plan and the supplemental funds for El Salvador.

¹Text from White House press release. ■

Cuba as a Model and a Challenge

Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr.

Address to the Americas Society
New York City on July 25, 1984.
Mr. Skoug is Director of the Office of
Urban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs.

Paradoxical Neighbor

Our neighbor Cuba is a country of
paradoxes.

- It is a small island, but it has the foreign policy and the military establishment of a major power, committed by the deepest instincts of its leadership to projecting its system and its point of view abroad.
 - Although it strives unceasingly for leadership of the Nonaligned Movement, Cuba is more closely aligned with the Soviet Union than many members of the Warsaw Pact, providing unique military services in kind in return for economic and military assistance.
 - It has, especially in recent years, become an avowed advocate of Latin American unity, but it has a history of intervention in the region and maintains close ties to subversive forces in every Latin American country.
 - Its economy literally lives off the massive infusion of foreign aid, but it presents itself as a development model for others.
 - Its leaders sometimes assert that they welcome democratic trends perceived in the hemisphere, but there is still unfortunately not the remotest indication of such a trend in Cuba itself.
- Out of these ingredients there has emerged a, so far, durable mixture of the traditional Latin American *caudillo* and the 20th century European concept of the party-state. The pyramidal Cuban leadership remains dedicated to its own long held concept of world revolution, asserting its independence of, but increasingly dependent on and contained by its bonds to, the U.S.S.R. It is a leadership disquieted by the apathy and sometimes active dissent of its own citizens but unwilling or unable to change its fundamental approach. It remains committed to projecting itself as a model for others. It sends its sons to fight and die thousands of miles from home in the name of proletarian internationalism. It funds, arms, trains, and unleashes revolution but craves recognition as a proponent of a stable international order.

Cuba wields influence far beyond its size though perhaps still beneath the aspirations of its leaders. Its human resources are impressive. We need to look carefully at the model it projects and the challenge which it poses for us in Latin America and the Caribbean. For the leadership of revolutionary Cuba, "*Nuestra America*" starts at the Rio Grande and ends on Tierra del Fuego. Its target is this immense region, from which Cuba would like to dispel U.S. influence or at least diminish it.

Cuba's leadership, which has changed surprisingly little in composition over the past quarter century, came to power with two quintessential objectives. It wanted to maintain power in Cuba itself while effecting a thoroughgoing social transformation, whatever the cost. And it wanted to carry the revolutionary struggle abroad to the Caribbean, to Central America, to South America, and even to Africa. Whatever the price in human suffering, no one can question the determination with which each of these two basic objectives has been pursued by Cuba's leaders down to the present day.

There has been from the outset a third motivation, an apparently visceral animosity for the United States. To the extent that this was calculated, it was perhaps because it was thought that the achievement of the two primary objectives would inevitably bring the Cuban revolutionaries into conflict on both counts with American power. To the extent that it was irrational, it has been even harder to address. In June 1958 the Cuban "Maximum Leader" wrote from the Sierra Maestra to a confidante that after the revolution had come to power, he would begin a longer, larger war against the Americans. He told her he had come to understand that this was his true destiny. It would be a serious mistake to regard this as rhetorical. It is among the most prized memorabilia of the Cuban revolution. After a quarter century it still seems to be valid.

The Cuban-Soviet relationship, which is now so fundamental, is derived from these motivations and logical only in light of revolutionary Cuba's own objectives. The intent of the revolutionary leadership in Havana to confront the United States in Cuba and abroad in pursuit of its twin objectives led natural-

ly and even inevitably to the decision to invite the Soviet Union to the Western Hemisphere. From the standpoint of the Cuban leadership, the U.S.S.R. was and is a necessary evil. Moscow had its own reasons for accepting Cuba's invitation. The course of this relationship has not always been smooth, especially at the outset, but it has evolved into a symbiotic one, where each is essential to and derives unique benefits from the other. As the mutual costs have risen, so have the perceived benefits. Like the two basic objectives and the anti-American bias, the Soviet connection has been central to the evolution of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies alike. It is as much of the fabric of today's Cuba as the Sierra Maestra. And it is instructive that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union—once it began—has been largely unaffected by any changes or trends in U.S.-Cuban relations, including temporary thaws in the relationship between Washington and Havana.

The basic conflict in U.S.-Cuban relations that began in 1959 stems primarily from Havana's foreign policy and only indirectly from events in Cuba. It is true that at the outset our attention and expectations were directed mainly to certain domestic actions by the Castro government, such as expropriation of U.S. property, execution of prisoners, and the unforeseen introduction of the communist system, stimulating massive flows of refugees to our shores. It would at present be quite conceivable, in theory at least, for Cuba to have a repressive domestic system and yet not promote turmoil in the region or align itself militarily with the rival global superpower. If Cuban foreign policy were really noninterventionist and non-aligned, Cuban-American relations would still be less than harmonious, but such a Cuba would not clash with U.S. foreign policy interests throughout the region.

In historical practice, the foreign and the domestic policies of the Cuban Government, however, spring from the same imperative. Cuba still sees a mission and arrogates to itself the right and even the duty to support revolution and "national liberation" in other states. When conditions are deemed appropriate, the Cuban revolution is a model for others. It is not passive. Cuba craves emulation. The model need not, of course, be accepted in every detail. The Cubans have grown aware through trial and error that conditions differ from country to country. Doubtlessly with an eye both to their own experience and to their privileged access to the Soviet

treasury, they caution radical regimes in third countries to keep their lines open to Western trade and assistance and not to expropriate too quickly all private enterprise or to alienate or eliminate all other institutions. But these have been essentially prudent tactical considerations, designed to ensure the survival and firm implementation of a one-party state system in third countries, such as Nicaragua and Grenada, based on well-known Leninist principles. The Cuban leadership envisions the rise of societies imitative of Cuban practice, alienated from the United States, friendly to the U.S.S.R., and looking to Cuba for ideological leadership. In the short run, however, where societies are not yet ripe for revolution, Cuba is content to use its power to encourage other states, particularly in Latin America, to rally together against the United States.

The Cuban Model in Appearance and Reality

Since Cuba proselytizes, we need to know what it is, and, perhaps more important, what it seems to be. Cuba offers would-be leaders in other countries the example of a hierarchical one-party system, supported by ubiquitous organs of control and punishment and by a near total monopoly over the dissemination of knowledge and ideas. It offers to would-be emulators a command economy which assigns nearly everyone some form of employment, at least if it wishes them to be employed. The fact that the economy does not respond well to the needs of the population, that it is a perpetuation of monoculture and closely integrated into and totally dependent on subsidies from the Soviet orbit is not always readily apparent to others. For domestic support the model relies heavily and successfully on national consciousness-building enterprises like nationalized sport and culture. It appeals to visceral nationalism by calculated distortion of past history and contemporary events. Revolutionary Cuba has long assigned the United States the same universal malevolence which Hitler arrogated to the Jews. It pretends to, and to a certain degree practices, a more egalitarian distribution of the social product than is customary in Latin America. It lays great stress on so-called socialist achievements, particularly in health and education. In this respect—as with many others, too—Cuba distorts and belittles the achievements of the past so as to improve the appearance of the present. In short, Cuba offers to proponents of radical change a model for

seizing and holding power without need for periodic popular ratification and for altering society unrestrained by legal or ethical limitations.

There is one essential element of the Cuban model which could not be widely replicated. Cuba's economy could not exist but for Soviet subsidies. These are on the order of \$12–\$13 million dollars daily for economic aid alone. Thus those who might wish to emulate the Cuban experience cannot truly do so unless they can persuade the Soviet Union to provide a similar degree of massive support.

Moreover, the Cuban reality is somewhat different from the point of view of those who must live it. The costs are very high. The benefits are less evident. The Cuban system since 1959 has been one-man rule. The same individual is now President of the Council of State, President of the Council of Ministers, First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The "Maximum Leader" projects his views across all aspects of Cuban society. From bovine genetics to college textbooks, from sugar cultivation to nurses' uniforms his views are normative. To challenge them, even to provide well-intended advice, is not recommended. Unsurprisingly, in these circumstances innovation does not flourish in Cuba and practices are slow to change.

Second, Cuba is a militarized society with one-quarter million men under arms and another million men and women in the militia. In addition, as Havana International Radio recently stated, every able-bodied Cuban must know his mission in a war situation. The economy, it stated, "... is being prepared so it can accomplish its objectives in times of war and adapt its development to defense interests." Militant Cuba devotes its Sundays neither to the spirit nor to rest nor to recreation but rather to military drill. Cuba possesses the most experienced and most highly mechanized fighting force in Latin America. Its leaders speak often of the need to defend Cuba, but Cuba's substantial combat experience has been acquired almost exclusively on far away foreign battlefields such as Bolivia, Angola, Grenada, and the Horn of Africa. As Cuban Politburo member Jorge Risquet described it recently (Havana International Service, June 15, 1984) when he decorated Cuba's "internationalists": "You have traveled thousands of miles from your fatherland, your homes, and your families to raise the Cuban and internationalist flags in the heart of Africa."

The essence of Cuba's political organization is reflected in Article 61 of the Constitution of Cuba of 1976, according to which:

None of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens may be exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution or the law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Violation of this principle is punishable by law.

This last is understatement. No organizations or movements are permitted in Cuba to oppose the political will of the leadership. There is no organized dissent, no effective institutional or historical limitations on the exercise of power. No parties other than the Communist Party are tolerated. There is no freedom of the press or speech, no real possibility through culture or the intellectual arts to satirize the leadership. The Catholic Church and Protestant churches exist but cannot provide a rival orientation or challenge the dictum of Article 61. It is not surprising that the "Seventh Report of the Organization of American States on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba," published last October, concluded that the structure of the Cuban state is totalitarian.

Over 1 million refugees since 1959 have found the way out of Cuba to other shores, especially to the United States. Less fortunate has been the fate of those who stayed behind but who sought to resist the party-state. The Cuban leadership has singled them out for exemplary punishment. Vengeance is unrelenting on those who dare to resist the system. Nowhere else in Latin America have so many been punished so long. There are still in Cuba, at present, hundreds of prisoners who have spent more than 15 or even 20 years in prison because they opposed the regime and refuse to acknowledge their "crime" and accept the new order. Like the recently released poets Jorge Valls and Arma Valladares, they have passed the best years of their lives free in spirit but to the world.

Despite these punishments and despite the evident will and capacity of the regime to deal harshly with dissent it continues to manifest itself. In January of 1983, for example, we learned of the trials and sentencing—some originally to death—of a group of some 50 Cubans who apparently wished to form a trade union on the model of the Polish Solidarity. Arrests and trials of their lawyers and judges followed. After that, the former President of

and, at the time, Minister of Justice, Oswaldo Dorticos, committed suicide. The veil of secrecy that surrounds Cuba makes it difficult to obtain reliable information about dissent and dissenters, but we know enough to conclude that the spirit of freedom still exists in Cuba.

It is clear that whatever Cuba has produced since 1959 has been wrought at the price of inordinate human suffering. But what has, in fact, been produced which could justify this regime? The Cuban revolutionaries took over talking about an end to monopoly and to foreign domination of the Cuban economy. They spoke of economic growth and egalitarian living standards. In 1984 Cuba is more dependent on the West than before. In 1983 more than 90% of Cuban trade was with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, only some 10% with the West. Were not for subsidized Soviet purchases of Cuban sugar and subsidized Soviet oil, along with deliveries of Soviet and West European equipment, the Cuban economy could not function. Even so, per capita economic growth in Cuba has been among the lowest in the hemisphere. It is often forgotten that Cuba on the eve of Fidel Castro was a highly advanced society. In 1952 Cuba had the third highest per capita gross national product of the 20 Latin American republics. In 1981 it ranked 24th. Only in the equalization of living standards have the aspirations of the Cuban revolutionaries been reached to some degree, albeit at a modest level. Even so the elite has perquisites denied the great majority. For example, in Cuba—which rations clothing to its citizens—recently staged an international fashion fair, the Cuban authorities explained that the “fashions” would be for export or sale in “specialized” stores open to diplomats and tourists. They did not explain that the Cubans buy in such stores, too, and that clothing is not always made in Cuba but in the “socialist camp.”

While leading the Cuban delegation to the June 1984 CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] summit meeting in Moscow, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez cited China, Mongolia, and Vietnam as the least developed countries within the COMECON area. For Cuba, which in 1959 had a standard of living that rivaled Spain, it is a bizarre sign of progress to be equated with Mongolia and Vietnam and to see accentuated those programs which promise to perpetuate Cuba's stagnation.

Cuba—A Profile



PROFILE

People

Noun and adjective: Cuban(s). **Population** (1981 census, preliminary data): 9.7 million; 67% urban, 30% rural. **Avg. annual growth rate:** 1.2%. **Density:** 86/sq. km. (224/sq. mi.). **Ethnic group:** Spanish-African mixture. **Language:** Spanish. **Literacy rate:** 96% of physically fit between ages 10 and 49. **Health:** Infant mortality rate—slightly less than 25/1,000. **Life expectancy—**70 yrs. **Work force:** Agriculture—30%. Industry and commerce—45%. Services—20%. **Government—**5%.

Geography

Area: 114,471 sq. km. (44,200 sq. mi.); about the size of Pennsylvania. **Cities:** Capital—Havana (pop. 1.9 million). **Other cities—**Santiago de Cuba, Camaguey. **Terrain:** Flat or gently rolling plains, mountains up to 1,800 m. (6,000 ft.), and hills. **Climate:** Tropical; avg. annual temperature 24°C (76°F).

Government

Type: Communist state. **Independence:** May 20, 1902. **Latest constitution:** 1976.

Branches: *Executive*—president, Council of Ministers. *Legislative*—National Assembly of People's Government, headed by Council of State. *Judicial*—subordinate to Council of State.

Political party: Communist Party (PCC).

Suffrage: All citizens aged 16 and older, except those who have applied for permanent emigration. National elections were held in 1976 for the National Assembly of the People's Government, and municipal elections for local assemblies were held in 1981.

Administrative subdivisions: 14 provinces, 169 municipalities.

National holidays: Jan. 1, Revolution Day; May 1, International Workers Day; July 26, Moncada Barracks Attack anniversary.

Flag: White star centered on red equilateral triangle at staff side, 3 blue and 2 white horizontal stripes in the background.

Economy

GNP (1979 est.): \$9–11 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1980 est.): –1% / +1%. **Per capita income** (1981 est.): \$900–\$1,100.

Natural resources: Metals, primarily nickel.

Agriculture: Sugar, tobacco, coffee, citrus and tropical fruits, rice, beans, meat, vegetables.

Major industries (17% of labor force): Refined sugar, metals. **Other industries:** Oil refining, cement, electric power, food processing, light consumer and industrial products.

Trade: *Exports*—\$4.7 billion (f.o.b. 1981): sugar and its byproducts (83%), nickel oxide and sulfide (10%), tobacco and its products, fish, rum, fruits. *Major markets*—USSR, Eastern Europe, China. *Imports*—\$5.4 billion (c.i.f. 1980 approx. figures): capital equipment (33%), raw materials (33%), petroleum (10%), foodstuffs and consumer products (20%–25%). *Major sources*—USSR, Eastern Europe.

Official exchange rate: 1 Cuban peso = US\$1.28.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and various specialized agencies, including General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA); observer, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA); International Sugar Council; Pan American Health Organization (PAHO); nonparticipating member, Organization of American States (OAS) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); Latin American Economic System (SELA); Group of 77; Nonaligned Movement.

Taken from the *Background Notes* of April 1983, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: J. Darnell Adams. ■

Cubans are still rationed to three-quarters of a pound of meat per person each 9-11 days. There recently have appeared billboards in Havana admonishing the population to think not of consumption but of development. In other words, perhaps, to think less of the fact that a Cuban is entitled to a ration of one pair of shoes a year and more of the future development of the shoe industry. But even the notion of industrial development is belied by the facts. According to the World Bank, manufactures accounted for 5% of Cuba's exports in 1960 and the same percentage in 1980. By way of contrast, Jamaica's went from 5% to 53% in the same period, Brazil's from 3% to 39%, Costa Rica's from 5% to 34%, and Paraguay's from 0% to 12%.

The Cuban elite boasts of achievements in the fields of health and education, speaking in terms of being a "medical power" in the world. It is beyond dispute that Cuba has health facilities superior to those in many other countries. But Cuba was a leader among Latin American nations before 1959, in part due to its close association with the United States. The first great health revolution in Cuba was introduced by the United States in 1900. Havana and yellow fever were synonymous in the 19th century. In 1900 there were 1,400 known cases of yellow fever in Havana. In February 1901 William Gorgas commenced his campaign to eliminate the disease. In 1901 there were 37 cases, and in 1902 there was no yellow fever in Havana. Deaths from malaria in 1900 were 325. In 1902 they were 77.

Cuba was a healthy country long before it aspired to be a "medical power." In 1960 it already had 1 physician for each 1,060 inhabitants—only Argentina and Uruguay had more. In 1980 when Cuba had 700 inhabitants per physician, Argentina and Uruguay had 530 and 540 respectively.

In 1960 life expectancy in Cuba was already 63 years. It gained 10 years to 73 by 1980. But in the same period greater gains were made by nine Latin American countries and similar ones by three others. Infant mortality, according to the 1977 *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, was 32 per 1,000 live births in Cuba in 1960, the best in the region and better than Spain and Italy. In 1980 it was 19. In the same period Jamaica had gone down to 16. Percentage decreases better than Cuba's 41% were achieved in 11 other states. As Professor Norman Luxenburg of the University of Iowa has written, Cuba in 1958 had twice as many physicians for its 6.6 million inhabitants

(6,421) as the rest of the Caribbean Basin had for 19 million. Even if Cuba today does have the 15,000 doctors which it claims, the rate of growth since 1958 is less than that between 1948 (3,100) and 1958 (6,421) when the number doubled in 10 years.

In sum, the Cuban system may appeal to certain would-be strongmen, but it is not a successful development model. It is a model, perhaps, for retention of political and military power but not for economic growth and human well-being.

However, the Cuban revolution has another side, its foreign policy accomplishments. Here the record is more complex. Cuba in the past decade has finally gained some of the revolutionary success which long eluded it after 1959. Lacking freedom and economic progress itself, Cuba has, nonetheless, grown into a force which challenges the potential development of the open society in Latin America.

The Cuban Challenge

The revolutionary process that was successful in Cuba was applied repeatedly by Cuba to other states in the region after 1959. In the beginning, expectations were simplistic, costs modest, and results slim. Cuba viewed its neighbors with hostility and as proper targets for revolutionary bands. This interventionary policy, which earned Cuba few friends in the region and even strained ties to Moscow, was put in abeyance after the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967. But the revolutionary zeal of Cuba has continued as an integral part of the Cuban system. It is anchored as Article 12(c) in the Cuban Constitution. It has—in connection with Cuba's more mature relationship with the Soviet Union and its pretensions to leadership in the Third World—become a more sophisticated challenge to the rival concept of the open society in the Western Hemisphere.

Especially since the early 1970s, Cuba has moved ever more definitively into the Soviet sphere. In view of the drastic change in the terms of trade between sugar and oil, the barter relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union has become marked by increasing Soviet subsidies and mounting Cuban economic dependency. Cuba owes the Soviet Union vast soft currency debts it cannot repay. Indeed, the Soviet Union and its East European allies must supply greater subsidies, expressed in unbalanced trade accounts, to sustain Cuba's economy.

But if Cuba, on the one hand, has creased in cost for the Soviet Union, it also has increased in strategic value. The decade of the 1970s witnessed the appearance of Cuban combat troops engaged on African battlefields. Particularly in the case of Ethiopia, this Cuban presence served Soviet interests in a way which no European ally of the U.S.S.R. could or would have done. Cuba's military success in Africa, at least in the short run, was in stark contrast to what had, until then, been a pattern of failure in Latin America. Moreover, after its lonely endorsement of the Soviet crushing of the Prague spring 1968, Cuba has been unfailingly supportive of Soviet foreign policy, even when this allegiance has cost Cuba respect among countries which truly are nonaligned.

At the end of the 1970s, when Cuba perceived new opportunities closer to home, two vital elements had changed from the situation prevailing in the 1960s. For one, the Soviet Union was now supportive of Cuba's renewed revolutionary activism and was also prepared to underwrite the massive buildup of the Cuban Armed Forces, which has been taking place since the end of 1980. This, together with Soviet activities in and around Cuba, has increased tensions and would be an element in any major East-West conflict. The second factor is that Cuba has learned to differentiate its own Latin American policy objectives. In the long run, probably, Cuba envisions transformation along Marxist-Leninist lines for every state in the region, but the Cuban leadership has learned to order its strange priorities. Cuba now has the option of cultivating better diplomatic relations with the states of the region, tinging thereby to stimulate a Latin American consciousness against the United States and to cultivate its own general acceptance as a normal member of the international order.

Yet, anchored by its bonds to the Soviet Union, Cuba maintains close relations with virtually every radical or revolutionary group in the region, supplying training, money, weapons, and counsel and providing the nexus between the revolutionaries and the Soviet Union. At the same time, it assesses the relative value of its associations with various Latin American government and particularly the degree to which these governments can be made useful to Cuba. Cuba thus seeks to be both a mecca for subversives and a focal point for rallying their governments against the United States.

the examples of this situation in the 1980s are many.

In the case of Argentina, Cuba hastened to show its firm support of the until-then despised Galtieri regime when the battle for the Falklands began. The ideology of the Argentine military regarded the Cubans less than the threat to be seen in the forefront of a new culture against the Anglo-Saxon. An additional reward for Cuba has been the generous trade credits which both the Argentine military regime and its successor have supplied to the Cuban economy.

Once the momentum of the Falklands issue was lost, Cuba—which was obliged in August 1982 to ask Western creditors to reschedule part of its \$3-billion Cuban hard currency debt—seized upon the general financial crisis in the region to promote Cuban parity with other Latin American nations. This, incidentally, shows again that adept Cuba is at exploiting even its own problems for political gain.

- In the case of Colombia, the Colombian Government admitted having aided the M-19 revolutionaries who ousted the Turbay Ayala government, which Havana was maintaining friendly normal diplomatic relations. Recently Cuba showed its influence in a new way. The head of the Cuban Government requested that Colombian terrorists release the kidnapped brother of the President of Colombia. The terrorists heeded this request from an individual whom they apparently respect and esteem. The obvious lesson is that the voice which can stay the terrorist's hand can also permit it to strike.

- The focus of Cuba's foreign policy, however, is presently on Central America. Cuba primarily wishes to see a Sandinista government in Managua consolidated as a permanent force on the American mainland with its fundamental approach in close harmony with the Cuban system. Communist Cuba视s a communist Nicaragua. It also would like to see the revolutionary forces in El Salvador come to power through the process of a negotiated settlement, sharing power on a transitional basis until Leninist-style control can be established. Cuba's immediate attitude toward the other states in the region seems to be dictated primarily by how they react to the struggle in Nicaragua and in El Salvador. For example, it is largely irrelevant to the Cubans that elections

take place in Guatemala. What is essential is that Guatemala stay out of the conflict at its very door or else bear the brunt of Cuban displeasure. The same policy was followed in the case of Honduras, where Cuban actions were keyed to the stand taken by Honduras toward the two conflicts on its borders. Cuba—which has trained revolutionaries from almost all countries in the hemisphere—was able to send such forces into Honduras. The invaders were defeated, but they demonstrated the same principle as applied in Colombia and elsewhere. The government which displeases Cuba, whether or not it has normal diplomatic relations with Havana, can expect armed retaliation.

Cuban officials occasionally say they favor the democratic trend in Latin America. But this putative endorsement of something which Cuba has never permitted its own people is suspect. Free elections are clearly not seen by Cuba as the answer to questions in Central America or even as a useful step forward. They are not likely to be seen as relevant in other countries once there exist concrete prospects for revolution on the Cuban pattern. Rather, it appears that Cuba, if it welcomes democratic trends at all, does so only where it can envision prospects of winning from within or where the elected government supports foreign policy objectives which, at least in the short run, are consistent with Cuba's own. In either case, however, there is no reason to believe that Cuba will suspend its close ties to revolutionary forces in any country, forces which Cuba can help to bring to power when conditions are appropriate or which can be used as a threat to compel or to persuade.

The United States and Cuba

The underlying issues between the United States and Cuba have their genesis in Cuba's revolutionary posture and its close alignment with the Soviet Union. Cuba has indicated on many occasions that neither of these pillars of Cuban policy is open to discussion. Its behavior consistently underscores this reality. It is Cuba's unique role as a linchpin between Soviet power and a Latin America in transition which introduces strategic and ideological considerations into conflicts which could otherwise be resolved or at least ameliorated on their own terms. Cuba facilitates Soviet military power on our

doorstep. That is why foreign policy is at the root of our differences with Havana and why so much of our policy toward Cuba is directed toward its restraint.

In the 1970s there were good faith efforts by the United States to improve this relationship. Interest sections were established to facilitate direct communications between the two parties. The U.S. trade and financial embargo was relaxed. Cuba released some political prisoners and permitted the return of Cuban-Americans who had left Cuba as "worms" and came back as "butterflies," pouring dollars into Cuban coffers. But this movement did not and could not touch the main thrust of Cuban policy. Having gone into Ethiopia in 1977 at Soviet behest, Cuba in succeeding years engaged itself in Nicaragua and El Salvador and exploited the seizure of power by the New JEWEL Movement in Grenada. In so doing, Cuba demonstrated the depth of its determination to reconstruct the Western Hemisphere along the lines of its own model.

The attitude of the U.S. Government toward Cuba remains one of serious concern about the militarization of Cuba and about Cuba's stimulation of revolutionary violence in this hemisphere and elsewhere. After Grenada it is likely that Cuba has some better appreciation of the risks of uncontrolled violence and of the limitations of its own power and that of its allies, but there is no convincing indication that the overall thrust of Cuban foreign policy has been or will be altered. Cuba remains militant and prone to stimulate violent change.

There remains, however, a willingness on our part to resolve those problems with Cuba which Cuba may wish to resolve and for which there is a reasonable basis for mutually satisfactory solutions. One example is the problem of the Mariel excludables who came with the boatlift of 1980 and who are ineligible to remain in the United States for substantive reasons. We have also tried to engage Cuba in talks about problems of radio interference. In both cases we were and are prepared to deal with Cuba on the basis of equality and mutual respect and to make concessions in order to resolve problems. There are perhaps other issues of this nature where progress could be made if Cuba is so interested.

It is occasionally asked if there can be an improvement in overall U.S.-Cuban relations. Such an improvement can hardly be a goal in itself. There are some bilateral issues, relatively free of

ideological content, which can be resolved. But the differences of principle between the United States and Cuba are profound. There is unfortunately no sign yet that the Cuban leadership is reconsidering its own world view or is beginning seriously to address those issues which set it apart from a region which is striving for greater freedom and economic well-being.

Assuming that these circumstances continue, we shall continue to work with friendly nations to meet the Cuban challenge and to overcome it until that day when the constructive genius of Cuba can be turned to the commonweal of all who inhabit this hemisphere. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation, Civil

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S. Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Italy, June 27, 1984.

Bill of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels Aug. 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.
Denounced: U.K. for Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and dependencies, Hong Kong, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands, effective Oct. 20, 1984.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. Ratification deposited: Togo, June 4, 1984.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, May 31, 1984.

Commodities—Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.¹
Ratification deposited: Brazil, June 29, 1984.

Human Rights

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.²

International covenant on civil and political rights. Adopted at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.²
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 27, 1981.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction. Done at The Hague Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1983.²
Extended: Canada to Province of Newfoundland, July 5, 1984.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the International Maritime Organization. Signed at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Accession deposited: Vietnam, June 12, 1984

Prisoner Transfer

Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. Signature: Italy Mar. 20, 1984.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: July 17, 1984.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to INTELSAT, with annexes. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 17, 1984.

Operating agreement relating to INTELSAT, with annex. Done at Washington Aug. 20, 1971. Entered into force Feb. 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Department of Posts and Telecommunications, Malawi, July 17, 1984.

Shipping

United Nations convention on the carriage of goods by sea, 1978. Done at Hamburg Mar. 31, 1978.¹
Ratification deposited: Hungary, July 5, 1984.

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (TS 778), with annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 1953. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953, for the Protocol, July 7, 1955, for annex to Protocol; for the U.S. Mar. 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. TIAS 6418.
Accessions deposited: Cameroon, June 27, 1984.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, as extended. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980. TIAS 9664, 10467.
Withdrawal: Bangladesh, effective June 23, 1984.

Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally pro-

tected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 853
Accession deposited: Greece, July 3, 1984.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983.²
Ratification deposited: Portugal, July 6, 1984.

Trade

Agreement on implementation of art. VI of GATT (antidumping). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650.

Agreement on import licensing procedures. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788.
Acceptances deposited: Singapore, June 20, 1984.

UNIDO

Constitution of the UN Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.¹
Signature: Guyana, July 17, 1984.
Ratifications deposited: Guyana, Ireland, July 17, 1984.

Wheat

Food aid convention, 1980 (part of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, as extended (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force June 30, 1980. TIAS 10015.
Approval deposited: European Economic Community, July 23, 1984.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.²
Accessions deposited: Liberia, July 17, 1984; Mauritius, July 9, 1984.

BILATERAL

Antigua and Barbuda

Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peacekeeping force for Grenada. Effectuated exchange of notes at Bridgetown and St. John's Nov. 30, 1983 and Jan. 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 27, 1984.

Australia

Agreement extending the agreement of C 16, 1968 (TIAS 6589), relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Canberra Apr. 16 and May 11, 1984. Entered into force May 11, 1984; effective Apr. 16, 1984.

Canada

Convention with respect to taxes on income and capital, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980.

Protocol with related notes. Signed at Ottawa
Jan. 14, 1983. Second protocol. Signed at
Washington Mar. 28, 1984.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: July 16, 1984.

Treaty relating to the Skagit River, Ross
Lake, and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the
Columbia River, with annex. Signed at
Washington Apr. 2, 1984.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Agreement regarding mutual assistance and
cooperation between customs administrations.
Signed at Quebec June 20, 1984. Enters into
force upon exchange of diplomatic notes in
which the parties notify each other of the
completion of any procedures required by
their national law for giving effect to this
agreement.

Agreement relating to the operation of radio
phone stations. Signed at Ottawa Nov.
19, 1969. Entered into force July 24, 1970.
T.I.A.S. 6931.

Notification of termination: May 8, 1984;

effective Nov. 7, 1984.

Bombia

Memorandum of understanding for scientific
and technical cooperation in the Earth
sciences. Signed at Bogota June 22, 1984.
Entered into force June 22, 1984.

Burkina Faso

Agreement relating to radio communications
between amateur stations on behalf of third
countries. Effected by exchange of telexes at
Nigermet and Roseau Dec. 8, 1983 and
Jan. 9, 1984. Entered into force Mar. 10,
1984.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec.
28, 1977 (T.I.A.S. 8973), relating to trade
in textiles and textile products. Effected by
exchange of notes at Cairo June 21 and 25,
1984. Entered into force June 25, 1984.

Equatorial Guinea

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Malabo Mar. 9 and 30, 1983.
Entered into force Mar. 30, 1983.

France

Protocol to the convention with respect to
taxes on income and property of July 28,
1957 (T.I.A.S. 6518), as amended by the Pro-
tocols of Oct. 12, 1970 (T.I.A.S. 7270), and Nov.
19, 1978 (T.I.A.S. 9500). Signed at Paris Jan.
19, 1984.

Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: July 16, 1984.

Convention on the transfer of sentenced per-
sons. Signed at Washington Jan. 25, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:

June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: July 17, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding on the par-
ticipation of France in the ocean drilling pro-
gram. Signed at Washington and Paris May
17 and June 13, 1984. Entered into force
June 13, 1984.

Memorandum of understanding on en-
vironmental cooperation. Signed at Paris
June 21, 1984. Entered into force June 21,
1984.

Gabon

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at Libreville Mar. 21, 1983 and July 5,
1984. Entered into force July 5, 1984.

Grenada

Agreement concerning the provision of train-
ing related to defense articles under the U.S.
IMET program. Effected by exchange of
notes at St. George's May 18 and 24, 1984.
Entered into force May 24, 1984.

Guinea

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities, related to the agreement of Apr.
21, 1976 (T.I.A.S. 8378). Signed at Conakry
June 11, 1984. Entered into force June 11,
1984.

Honduras

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 16,
1983, as amended, for the sale of agricultural
commodities. Signed at Tegucigalpa June 19,
1984. Entered into force June 19, 1984.

India

Agreement extending and amending the
memorandum of understanding of July 18,
1978 (T.I.A.S. 9285) concerning furnishing of
launching and associated services for Indian
national satellite system (INSAT)-1
spacecraft. Signed at Washington and
Bangalore Apr. 10 and 25, 1984. Enters into
force upon exchange of diplomatic notes.

Indonesia

Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of Dec. 11, 1978 (T.I.A.S. 9609), for
cooperation in scientific research and
technological development. Signed at
Washington July 9, 1984. Entered into force
July 9, 1984.

Italy

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal mat-
ters, with memorandum of understanding.
Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.

Jamaica

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com-
modities relating to the agreement of
Apr. 30, 1982 (T.I.A.S. 10495). Signed at
Kingston May 30, 1984. Entered into force
May 30, 1984.

Madagascar

Agreement concerning the provisions of
training related to defense articles under the
U.S. IMET program. Effected by exchange

of notes at Antananarivo Feb. 25, 1983 and
May 3, 1984. Entered into force May 3, 1984.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of
June 2, 1977 (T.I.A.S. 8952), relating to addi-
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex-
change of letters at Mexico May 29, 1984.
Entered into force May 29, 1984.

Morocco

Convention on mutual assistance in criminal
matters. Signed at Rabat Oct. 17, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: July 13, 1984.

Norway

Revised agreement for cooperation concern-
ing peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with an-
nexes and agreed minute. Signed at Oslo
Jan. 12, 1984.
Entered into force: July 2, 1984.

Supersedes agreement of May 4, 1967, as
amended (T.I.A.S. 6260, 6849).

Poland

Agreement extending the agreement of
Aug. 2, 1976, concerning fisheries off the
coasts of the U.S. (T.I.A.S. 8524, 10533, 10697).
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
and Warsaw Mar. 7 and 30, 1984.
Entered into force: July 27, 1984.

Romania

Agreement amending the agreement of
Sept. 3 and Nov. 3, 1980, as amended (T.I.A.S.
9911, 10639), relating to trade in wool, man-
made fiber textiles, and textile products. Ef-
fected by exchange of letters at Washington
and New York June 12 and 22, 1984.
Entered into force: June 22, 1984.

Sri Lanka

Agreement on cooperation in science and
technology. Signed at Washington June 18,
1984. Entered into force June 18, 1984.

Sweden

Supplementary convention to the extradition
convention of Oct. 24, 1961 (T.I.A.S. 5496).
Signed at Stockholm Mar. 14, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: July 13, 1984.

Convention for the avoidance of double tax-
ation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with
respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and
gifts. Signed at Stockholm June 13, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: July 13, 1984.

Thailand

Treaty relating to extradition. Signed at
Washington Dec. 14, 1983.
Senate advice and consent to ratification:
June 28, 1984.
Ratified by the President: July 18, 1984.

CHRONOLOGY

U.S.S.R.

Agreement relating to the memorandum of understanding of June 20, 1963 (TIAS 5362), and the agreement of Sept. 30, 1971 as amended (TIAS 7187, 8059), concerning the direct communications link. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 1984. Entered into force July 17, 1984.

Yemen (Sanaa)

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities, with related letter. Signed at Sanaa June 19, 1984. Entered into force June 19, 1984.

Zaire

Agreement concerning provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. IMET program. Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa Dec. 22, 1983, and June 18, 1984. Entered into force June 18, 1984.

¹Not in force.

²Not in force for the U.S. ■

July 1984

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments on the value of the *Bulletin's* monthly chronologies. Unless a positive response is received, the chronologies will be discontinued.

July 1-12

ACDA Director Adelman, visits Japan, China, and Thailand to discuss arms control and disarmament issues, as well as chemical weapons use in Southeast Asia.

July 1

TASS reports that the Soviet Union's offer for talks on banning weapons in outer space remains open, but the Soviets reject an U.S. attempt to discuss other arms issues.

Guatemalans hold elections for an 88-member Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution. An 11-member U.S. delegation observes the election process.

Senator Charles Mathias heads the U.S. delegation at the inauguration of Richard von Weizsaecker as Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

July 2

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko says the U.S. is avoiding talks on banning weapons in space and imposing unacceptable conditions on talks proposed for the fall.

White House spokesman Speakes says the U.S. agrees to outer space weapons talks in September, but also plans to discuss arrangements for nuclear arms talks.

U.S. Postmaster General Bolger, attending the UPU conference in Hamburg, says the Soviet Union's unethical postal practices threaten the integrity of the international system. He also affirms U.S. support to investigate Soviet violations.

The World Bank lowers interest rates to 9.89% on conventional loans to developing countries for the next 6 months.

July 3

During a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Shultz reaffirms U.S. commitment to hold space weapons talks in September and repeats that the U.S. also intends to discuss "offensive missiles that go through space."

British Foreign Secretary Howe, meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Chernenko, assures the Soviets that the U.S. has set no preconditions for proposed outer space arms talks.

Soviet authorities refuse to allow U.S. Ambassador Hartman to deliver a Fourth of July television address, claiming it is part of President Reagan's reelection campaign.

July 4-7

CARICOM's 13 members meet in Nassau to discuss the future of the organization. They agree to eliminate trade barriers and to grant observer status to Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Suriname.

July 4

Soviet authorities detain for 2 hours two U.S. diplomats, accusing them of activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. They were meeting in public with a Soviet citizen when they were picked up.

The Lebanese Government begins implementation of its security plan for the Beirut area. The Lebanese Army redeployes throughout Beirut and armed militias leave the streets.

July 5-17

Secretary Shultz visits Hong Kong (July 7-8), Malaysia (July 9-10), Singapore (July 10-11), Indonesia (July 11-14), Australia (July 14-15), and New Zealand (July 15-17).

On July 12-13 Secretary Shultz attends the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Jakarta.

The ANZUS council holds its 33d meeting (July 16-17) in Wellington. The Foreign Ministers of ANZUS issue a joint communique (July 17) reaffirming their commitment to the Pacific pact.

July 6

State Department acting spokesman Romberg reiterates U.S. protests on the detention of two U.S. diplomats by the Soviet Union.

In response to a TASS report that the Soviet Union's offer for September outer space weapons talks in Vienna remains open, State Department acting spokesman Romberg repeats the U.S. acceptance saying there are no preconditions on having such talks.

Senators East (North Carolina) and Symms (Idaho) urge President Reagan to repudiate the SALT II treaty, terming it as "dangerous to American security" and "unconstitutional."

The Lebanese Army assumes authority of Beirut from militia forces.

July 7

Secretary Shultz says U.S. is willing to negotiate some aspects of space weaponry with the Soviet Union if a plan for talks in September can be worked out.

July 9-11

Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa is held in Geneva. Attorney General Smith heads the U.S. delegation.

July 9

Greece tells the U.S. it will reassess the treaty permitting American military bases there for 5 years and the Voice of America facilities unless the U.S. stops interfering in its domestic affairs.

The U.S. Consulate in Belfast denies an entry visa to Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Féin, the Irish Republican Army's political wing.

President Reagan signs a proclamation designating today as African Refugees Relief Day.

Beirut airport opens for the first time in 5 months.

July 10-14

Assistant Secretary Abrams visits Turkey to assess human rights conditions.

July 10

While in Malaysia, Secretary Shultz says the death threat letters received in Malaysia, South Korea, Zimbabwe, and other Third World countries may be a "disinformation campaign" used to embarrass the U.S. The letters are allegedly from the Ku Klux Klan and have postmarks from the Virginia and Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C.

In Singapore, Secretary Shultz says Vietnam is blocking efforts to improve relations with the U.S. by not providing information on 2,500 missing Americans from the Vietnam war and by its continued aggression in Kampuchea.

President Reagan signs a proclamation designating July 10 as "Food for Peace Day" marking the 30th anniversary of the Food for Peace program. He also announces a proposed five-point food aid initiative.

Bolivia reverses an earlier decision and says it will send six athletes to compete in the Summer Olympic Games.

World Bank's World Development Report predicts the Earth's population will reach 6 billion by the year 2050; the biggest increase will be in poor countries where economic growth will be stunted by a large population.

July 11-15

West German Defense Minister Werner in Washington, D.C. On July 12 he meets with Secretary Weinberger to sign an agreement for deploying air defense missiles in Germany. He meets with President Reagan, President Bush, and Acting Secretary of State Dam on July 13.

July 11

State Department acting spokesman Romberg says the theme of recent threats sent to Third World countries in the

pics is "dovetailed" with the Soviet justification for its boycott and "bears all the marks of a disinformation campaign." Greek Prime Minister Papandreu and Ambassador Stearns meet to discuss re-U.S.-Greece disagreements. The International Trade Commission recommends that President Reagan impose quotas and tariffs on 70% of steel imports for the next 5 years in order to protect American steel producers and workers. Governing Board of the International Energy Agency meeting in Paris reaches agreement on a coordinated policy for draw-down contingency oil stocks of member nations in the event of a major supply disruption.

13 State Department report on the situation in El Salvador. Acting Secretary Dam El Salvador's armed forces have improved in professionalism as well as in performance. Other areas of progress in El Salvador include land reform, free elections, establishment of an effective judicial system, the elimination of death squad activity. The U.S. announces it will no longer provide bilateral family planning assistance to countries that use any method of force to reduce population reduction objectives.

14 Letter to Soviet President Chernenko, President Reagan says he is willing to delay proposed Vienna talks on space weapons until November to eliminate any Soviet combat about the presidential elections. New Zealand holds its general elections. Labor Party, led by David Lange, wins 55 seats in Parliament. The National Party takes 38 seats and the Social Credit Party takes 2 seats.

16 State Department acting spokesman Romberg confirms reports that 13 Western members of the London Suppliers Club met in Luxembourg (July 11-13) to discuss methods of strengthening controls on nuclear exports. Ambassador Kennedy headed the delegation. Other participating countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K. Ambassador Shlandeman meets with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Atlanta. President Reagan signs a proclamation during the third week of July (July 15-21) designating it as "Captive Nations Week."

17 U.S. and Soviet Union initial an agreement to trade the 21-year-old "Hot Line" for crisis communications. The new system will increase word transmission threefold from its present 64 words a minute and can also transmit graphics. President Reagan expresses disappointment over the Soviet Union's failure to join majority of the 35 nations that wish to begin "concrete" negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Vietnam returns the remains believed to be eight U.S. servicemen.

Department of State acting spokesman Romberg says the U.S. and 14 other COCOM members reached agreement on a new computer definition. This is part of a review to define products and technologies to be controlled to the East bloc.

The Guatemalan Supreme Electoral Tribunal reports that the coalition of the National Liberation Movement and the Nationalist Authentic Central received the most seats (23) in the new 88-member Constituent Assembly, despite finishing third in the July 1 voting. The Union of the National Center and the Christian Democratic Party each took 21 seats.

July 18

In a speech to the Honolulu Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Shultz says Vietnam has agreed to meet next month to discuss the Americans missing-in-action from the Vietnam war.

The Drug Enforcement Administration reports that two Nicaraguan Government officials are directly involved with cocaine trafficking between South America and the U.S.

Departments of State and Defense release a report titled *Nicaragua's Military Buildup and Support for Central American Subversion*.

The Lebanese Government announces its decision to restore diplomatic relations with Iran.

Lebanese Defense Minister Osseiran orders Israel to close its liaison office in Dubayyah.

July 19

President Reagan attends a conference of Caribbean heads of government in Columbia, South Carolina.

Communist Party members leave the French Government over economic policy disputes.

State Department acting spokesman Romberg says the U.S. regrets any move by Lebanon to close Israel's liaison office.

July 20

At a White House ceremony marking today as National POW/MIA Recognition Day, President Reagan announces that Laos will allow the U.S. to search for the remains of 13 U.S. servicemen at the site where an Air Force gunship exploded in midair on December 21, 1972.

On the 10th anniversary of the coup on Cyprus, Department of State acting spokesman Romberg reaffirms U.S. hope for a reunited Cyprus.

July 21

Poland approves an amnesty bill to release 652 political prisoners within 30 days. The Administration indicates that President Reagan may ease some sanctions as a result of the amnesty.

July 23

The Soviets suggest that the U.S. and Soviet Union issue a joint statement to show a willingness for serious talks on banning space weapons.

El Salvador's President Duarte meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, and congressional leaders to appeal for increased U.S. economic and security assistance.

July 24

Senate votes 93 to 0 to urge the Soviet Union to deliver information on the Sakharovs to all signatory nations of the Helsinki Final Act.

The Department of State presents the Soviet Union with a counterproposal for an agenda statement for the Vienna space weapons talks projected to begin on September 18. The latest proposal would allow the U.S. and Soviets to discuss a broad range of weapons issues, including strategic and medium-range nuclear arms.

Speaking at a televised news conference, President Reagan charges Nicaragua's Sandinista regime with trying to destroy El Salvador.

A U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration report says that Bulgaria uses illegal narcotics trafficking to support terrorism and as a "political weapon to destabilize Western societies."

July 25-26

South Africa's Administrator General to Namibia Willie von Niekerk and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma meet to discuss ending armed activities in Namibia.

July 25

President Reagan ends a ban on Soviet commercial fishing in U.S. Pacific waters. The Soviet allocation will be about 50,000 metric tons.

U.S. F-14 fighters fly exercises over the Gulf of Sidra which Libya considers to be its territorial waters. No incidents are reported.

West Germany approves a \$333 million private bank loan to East Germany which has promised to ease restrictions on contacts between East and West German citizens.

Israel closes its liaison office in Dubayyah, Lebanon, after weeks of pressure from the Lebanese Government.

Poland agrees to allow the Primate of Poland and Catholic Church appointed officials to supervise a fund to assist private farmers in an effort to relax U.S. imposed economic sanctions and improve relations.

July 26

State Department acting spokesman Romberg says three Libyan journalists were denied visas, for security reasons, to cover the Olympic Games.

State Department acting spokesman Romberg says the election of Rabbi Kahane to the Israeli Parliament could result in Kahane losing his U.S. citizenship.

July 27

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov says the latest U.S. response to a proposal to begin talks in Vienna on outer space weapons makes it impossible to conduct the kind of negotiations the Soviets are interested in.

White House spokesman Speakes says the U.S. accepted the proposed talks without preconditions and that such talks are not impossible.

In response to a speech made on July 26 by Fidel Castro, State Department acting spokesman Romberg says Cuba will have to demonstrate some fundamental changes in its foreign policy before the U.S. will agree to comprehensive talks with Cuba.

Panama President-elect Nicolas Ardito Barletta meets with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and Secretary Shultz at the White House.

July 28

In a letter to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, Libya protests the presence of the U.S. F-14 fighters over the Gulf of Sidra on July 25, citing it is a violation of Libyan territorial waters.

Burundi President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza is reelected as president of the Uprona Party for a second 5-year term.

In Honduras, six U.S. citizens affiliated with the AFL-CIO are arrested and deported to Nicaragua for participating in a political rally in Tegucigalpa on July 27.

July 29

Competition in the Summer Games of the XXIII Olympiad begins in Los Angeles. A record 140 countries send athletes.

A Venezuelan DC-9 jet, carrying 87 people, is hijacked to Curacao. Four U.S. citizens are among the passengers.

July 30

Six hostages from the hijacked Venezuelan jet are freed.

The last of the Marine combat troops at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut return to Navy ships.

July 31

Venezuelan commandos storm the hijacked DC-9 jet killing the two hijackers and rescuing all remaining passengers. State Department acting spokesman Romberg says U.S. antiterrorism experts flew to the scene to offer advice to local authorities.

U.S. and Cuba resume talks on migration, including the Mariel issue. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*157	7/5	Appointment of Dean Burch as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Space Services World Administrative Radio Conference (biographic data).

*158	7/10	Owen W. Roberts sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Togo, July 9 (biographic data).
*159	7/10	John W. Shirley sworn in as Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania, July 9 (biographic data).
*160	7/10	Weston Adams sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Malawi, July 9 (biographic data).
*161	7/11	U.S. and Indonesia renew Agreement for Cooperation in Scientific Research and Technological Development, July 9.
162	7/12	Shultz: news conference, Singapore, July 10.
*163	7/13	Shultz: remarks at banquet hosted by Acting Foreign Minister Datuk Abdullah HJ. Ahmad Badawi, Kuala Lumpur, July 9.
164	7/13	Shultz: remarks to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Jakarta.
*165	7/17	Shultz: statement at the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington, July 16.
166	7/18	Shultz: news conference at the American Embassy, Kuala Lumpur, July 10.
*167	7/18	Shultz: remarks at closing of the bilateral meeting with Indonesian President Soeharto, Jakarta, July 13.
*168	7/19	Shultz: remarks at ANZUS Council dinner, Wellington, July 16.
169	7/19	Shultz: remarks at luncheon for ANZUS Council, Wellington, July 16.
170	7/19	Shultz: address before the Honolulu Council on Foreign Relations, Honolulu, July 18.
171	7/20	Shultz: news conference at the Parliament House, Canberra, July 15.
*172	7/23	Shultz: interview on "The Today Show" by Bernard Kalb.
*173	7/23	Shultz: arrival statement, Jakarta, July 11.
174	7/23	Shultz, Hayden, Cooper: news conference at closing of ANZUS Council Meeting, Wellington, July 17.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

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Free multiple copies may be obtained writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Shultz

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Challenges Facing the U.S. and ASEAN, Foreign Ministers of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Jakarta, Indonesia, July 13, 1984 (Current Policy #597).

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Preserving Freedom and Security, Deputy Secretary Dam, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 13, 1984 (Current Policy #590).

East Asia

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Europe

Soviet Active Measures, Deputy Assistant Secretary Knepper, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, May 30, 1984 (Current Policy #595).

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International Narcotics Control (GIST, July 1984).

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Atlas of the Caribbean Basin, Harry F. Young, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, July 1984. ■

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
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Latin America and the Caribbean



Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean

by Langhorne A. Motley

based on oral and written testimony of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 31, 1984. Ambassador Motley is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.¹

Support for democracy is one of the cardinal points of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and in Latin America as a whole. Ambassador Motley's testimony discusses the status of democratic politics in the region. It concludes that democracy is proving to be a practical path to stability as well as to freedom. This conclusion, with the data that support it, parallels the finding of the National

Bipartisan Commission on Central America that recent events have "destroyed the argument of the old dictators that a strong hand is essential to avoid anarchy and communism, and that order and progress can only be achieved through authoritarianism."

Selected Latin American Elections in a 20-Year Perspective

Country	Year	Type*	Total Vote (thousands)	Adult Population Voting** (%)
Argentina	1983	P, L	15,180	89
	1963	P, L	9,326	71
Brazil	1982	L	48,440	81
	1962	L	14,747	45
Colombia	1982	P	6,816	68
	1962	P	2,634	35
Costa Rica	1982	P, L	992	87
	1962	P, L	391	76
Ecuador	1984	L	2,024	53
	1962	L	709	34
El Salvador	1984	P	1,524	69
	1962	P, L	400	35
Guatemala	1984	CA	1,856	57
	1964	CA	337	18
Honduras	1981	P, L	1,171	79
	1965	L	551	70
Mexico	1982	P, L	22,523	75
	1964	P, L	9,422	59
Peru	1980	P	4,030	49
	1962	P	1,693	42
Venezuela	1983	P, L	6,741	90
	1963	P, L	3,126	91

*P= Presidential, L= Legislative, CA= Constituent Assembly.

**Estimates based on votes cast as a percentage of total population age 20 or over as reported in the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* for the year in question.

THE BEST MEASURE OF FREEDOM

Since November 1980, when the United States last went to the polls to elect a president, our southern neighbors have cast some 150 million votes in 33 elections in 24 countries. That is more votes in more elections in more countries than in any previous 4 years in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean.

In Latin America, voter participation has increased, sometimes dramatically. In fact, recent turnouts, in some cases, have doubled those of 20 years ago in relative as well as absolute terms.

- More than 15 million Argentine voters went to the polls last fall. In the hotly contested election that ended nearly a decade of military rule, 9 out of every 10 adults voted. Raul Alfonsin became president with the largest vote in Argentine history, exceeding even Juan Peron's highest tally.

- In Brazil's 1982 congressional and municipal elections, 48.4 million Brazilians voted. This was more than three times the 14.8 million who voted in the 1962 legislative elections; the percentage of adults voting rose from 45% in 1962 to 81% in 1982.


- In May of this year, an absolute majority of all adult Salvadorans, some 1.5 million men and women, defied guerrilla violence to choose between Napoleon Duarte and Roberto D'Aubuisson. In the 1962 presidential elections, only 400,000 voters, roughly one-third of adult Salvadorans, had participated in an election dominated by an official military candidate.

- Two Constituent Assembly elections in Guatemala 20 years apart reveal a similar evolution: in May 1964, 337,000 votes were cast, 40% of those registered; in July 1984, the voters numbered 1,856,000, or 73% of those registered.

What lies behind this region-wide upsurge in democratic politics? Long-term development—including the revolutions in communications and expectations—is clearly, if slowly, making itself felt. A more immediate factor—one that has impressed many observers at recent elections—is voter desire to repudiate both dictators and guerrillas. To most Latin Americans, the uncertainties of democracy are preferable to the violence and abuse of leftist and rightist extremes.

Growth of Voter Participation in Selected Countries

(Estimate of Percent of Total Adult Population Voting)



The Military and Democracy

The force of the democratic tide and rejection of extremism can also be seen in what has *not* happened. Not a country that was democratic 40 years ago has lost its freedom. The military coups predicted for El Salvador and Honduras did not take place. Bolivian democracy has not fallen. Not one militia movement has taken power since 1979, when the Sandinistas ended Somoza and abandoned their claims to hold free elections. And to the surprise and surprise, Cuba's Marxist-Leninist dictators did not prove immune to their own abuses of power and were replaced by constitutional authorities committed to holding free elections by the end of 1984. Elections by themselves cannot make society or solve every problem. Competitive elections are, as Secretary Shultz has noted, "a practical test of democracy. They are an invaluable test of public accountability." Therefore, U.S. policy to support free elections without reservation, see-king them assurances that human rights will be protected, that reconciliation will reflect the work of people and not guns, and that U.S. aid and cooperation will have firm local founda-

tion in the English-speaking Caribbean, Central America, and Venezuela. Solidly based democracies of long standing. Over the last 5 years, elected presidents have replaced military rule in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru. National countries as different as Argentina and Uruguay, and Guatemala and Cuba are now also moving toward free democracy. The result is that more than 90% of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean are now living in countries with governments that are either democratic or heading there. For a part of the world often identified with dictatorship, this is something to cheer about. As recently as 1979, two-thirds of the neighbors lived under military or army-dominated governments of both the left and right. Any shift so striking inspires skepticism. But measured in voter participation and in competition at the polling booth, today's democratic regime is astonishingly deep. Our neighbors deserve the credit for progress they are making. We can, then, be proud that we are cooperating with them. Freedom is not a zero-sum game. Everyone wins when democracy is strengthened.

Essential to the survival of democracy is an apolitical military establishment—one which seeks not to defend one partisan interest or another but rather one committed to institutional democratic government. Significantly, the recent history of hemispheric democratic advance has been that of a transformation in which the military itself has taken an active part.

An example of this difficult process is today's El Salvador, which owes its agrarian reform to military support. After decades as defenders of the status quo, since 1979 El Salvador's security forces have made considerable progress toward improved field performance, greater respect for human rights, and an apolitical role in society.

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY

Despite this extraordinary pattern of progress, democracy in Latin America still faces many problems.

Competitive elections can help measure success or failure in dealing with particular problems; the problems themselves do not automatically disappear at the ballot box, regardless of who wins. Democracy requires elections; but elections alone are not enough.

Democracies must establish a track record as problem-solving mechanisms. If democratic institutions cannot solve problems, they cannot survive. If we are interested in the survival of democracy, we must help democratic governments deal with their problems—even though it is they, not we, who must solve them.

Internal problems include unequal access to education, justice, and employment; the clash of indigenous and immigrant cultures; great disparities in wealth; government inefficiency and corruption; civilian *caudillismo* and military intervention. These problems do not, of course, all exist in every country. But they do persist in varying degrees in the region as a whole.

External problems include increased costs for imported oil; the decline in the global economy accompanied by reductions in export earnings and forced reliance on increasingly expensive borrowed capital; and active efforts by

Training and organizational changes are largely responsible. Merit promotion has been implemented. President Duarte has appointed a Vice Minister of Defense responsible for the three police forces, as well as new, able commanders to head each. Officers associated with human rights abuses have been removed and a unit suspected of human rights abuse disbanded.

This increased professionalism was reflected in the performance of the armed forces during this year's presidential elections and inauguration. The Salvadoran military, once considered an impediment to the establishment of political democracy, is today defending the future rather than the past.

hostile powers outside the hemisphere to exploit local grievances and economic hardship. Again, the mix can vary greatly from country to country, but these external pressures are felt throughout the hemisphere.

These problems combine to create two immediate threats to democracy in Latin America today: political extremism and economic recession. To them must be added the growing international trade in illicit drugs, which degrades the rule of law as well as human dignity.

Political Extremism. The enemies of democracy often point to underdevelopment and economic hardship to justify violence and dictatorship. The problem with their argument is that neither left nor right extremes are stable or productive.

Marxist-Leninist regimes have tended to perpetuate both the political and the economic backwardness out of which they grew. When feuding Marxist-Leninists plunged Grenada into murderous disorder, the United States, Barbados, Jamaica, and Grenada's eastern Caribbean neighbors came to the rescue. The result was restoration of legal order. This was a major defeat for the extremists and their Cuban and Soviet supporters, who nonetheless still support totalitarianism in Nicaragua and oppose the consolidation of democracy in El Salvador.

Like leftwing extremism, extremism of the right is weakened by economic development. Unlike leftwing extremism, it has few reliable external sources of support. But the consolidation of democratic politics and reform has, nonetheless, been hindered by such phenomena as death squads and denials of elemental equity.

A Precedent for 1984?

In 1972-74, Anastasio Somoza stepped aside from the presidency of Nicaragua, continuing as commander of the National Guard, and, after the 1972 earthquake, as President of the National Emergency Committee.

In 1974, disregarding the advice of friends who thought the time had come for the family to withdraw from active politics, Somoza decided to become president again. To do so, he had the Constitution amended and barred 9 out of 10 opposition parties from the presidential election. Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops warned in a pastoral letter that these electoral manipulations amounted to "legal war."

Under those conditions, Somoza received a smashing 95% of the vote: 216,158 votes to 11,997 for Edmundo Paguaga Irias of the Conservative Party. But the victory was Pyrrhic. Many Nicaraguans, including former close associates of Somoza, became convinced a democratic end to the Somoza dynasty had become impossible.

Economic Recession. During the last 8-10 years, economic mismanagement and pressures for reform contributed to the decline of several unrepresentative regimes. Yet if democratic governments cannot produce economic recovery, then they, too, can lose their mandate. Today, many democracies need to restructure their economies at a time when living standards have already declined.

The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean constitute the developing world's most indebted region. External debt exceeded \$330 billion at the end of 1983. In 1982 and 1983, interest payments alone added up to more than \$40 billion per year. These payments were equivalent to more than 35% of the value of the region's exports of goods

and services—the world's highest debt service ratio. In some individual countries the ratio exceeded 100% before debt rescheduling.

The region's real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has dropped by over 10% from its 1980 level (by far more in some countries), and there is little doubt that per capita real economic growth will again be negative in 1984. In nearly all countries, unemployment and underemployment are at levels not seen since the Great Depression.

It hardly needs to be pointed out how dangerous such conditions are to any government that has to face elections.

The Drug Trade. Illicit narcotics trafficking and consumption also threaten democratic development by fostering disregard for the law and corrupting institutions as well as individuals. In some remote valleys, the lure of extraordinary profits and the absence of productive alternatives have broken down social and political order; lawlessness prevails and drug kings hold sway, sometimes in symbiosis with guerrillas.

In the past, many Latin Americans considered illicit drugs a "U.S. problem." Some even welcomed the increased employment and foreign exchange earnings brought by the drug trade. Today, they are increasingly aware of the enormous threat narcotics pose to the moral fiber of their own societies and to the legitimacy of their own political institutions. Democracy requires a collective victory over the traffickers and their allies.

U.S. POLICY IS TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY

It is U.S. Government policy to support democracy and democratic institutions. This approach is neither interventionist nor a mindless export of ideology. It is legitimate, it is in our enlightened self-interest, and it works—not overnight or in 6-month increments but over time.

- Democracy is the best guarantor of human rights. A government responsible to its people cannot abuse them with impunity.

- Democracy is also the best long-term guarantor of stability. Democratic governments do not drive their people into armed opposition nor do they threaten or attack their neighbors.

American officials from the President on down have made clear our unequivocal support for democratic processes. During his trip to Latin America in 1982, President Reagan insisted that

The future challenges our imagination but the roots of law and democracy and the inter-American system provide the answers. . . . Together, we will work toward the economic growth and opportunity that can only be achieved by free men and women. We will promote the democracy is the foundation of our freedom and stand together to assure the security of our peoples, their governments, and our way of life.

Support for democracy can mean everything from a public embrace for a new president of Argentina to sending qualified election observers requested by a government in Central America. It means encouragement of political dialogue and communication, technical exchange programs, specialized conferences, and even analytical publications. It can mean support for a strengthened administration of justice.

Rule of Law is Key

A judicial system that is independent and fair, accessible and effective is essential to democracy.

Working with the UN-affiliated Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, the U.S. Government is developing a program to assist efforts by governments and private groups in Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen legal institutions and improve the administration of justice.

During the last 4 years, it has all of these things—and more. We encouraged the open and competitive elections that took place in Honduras, Salvador, and Guatemala. We urged Sandinistas to honor the democratic promises they have abandoned and betrayed. We welcomed the return of democratic rule in Argentina. We declared that we would favor a restoration of democracy in Chile and Uruguay showed our support for democratic legitimacy when President Siles was ousted in Bolivia. We let the Government of Paraguay know we were unhappy with the closing of the independent newspaper *ABC Color*. We let the Government of Haiti know of our

at the arrest and mistreatment of opposition leaders.

In country after country in Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Embassies are today correctly perceived as supporting democracy. Local officials and citizens recognize in growing numbers that our representatives are actively fostering democratic dialogue, constitutional procedures, and respect for political diversity.

We also have recognized that government officials are not alone in playing a role to play in promoting democratic values and traditions. Private citizens are ultimately the backbone of democracy, and we have attempted to catalyze broader private cooperation. The West German political foundations, the political internationals, the American Institute for Free and Fair Trade, the National Endowment for Democracy, and many individual leaders have long proven that political cooperation among like-minded people and groups gets results.

The democratic tide has made it easier to build on these experiences. We have strengthened the ability of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to sponsor private exchanges. The National Endowment for Democracy and its constituent institutes are strengthening our national capacity to develop mutual support networks among democratic leaders and ties throughout the world.

Citizens: the Backbone of Democracy

Government contributions to the National Endowment for Democracy support private sector initiatives to encourage free and democratic institutions throughout the world. These initiatives involve U.S. business and labor as well as political parties. They include cooperation and organizational activities that promote pluralism, individual freedoms, internationally recognized human rights essential to the functioning of democratic institutions.

The new Center for Electoral Advice and Promotion in San Jose, Costa Rica, is an example of how a regional institution can help nations translate democratic theory into the nuts, bolts, and hot boxes of an open political system. Democratic countries have a particular obligation to reach out and assist

Costa Rica's Constitution

After the short 1948 civil war, a coalition of Costa Ricans looked at their own and their neighbors' political experiences and set out to create a legal framework to prevent abuses and assure a democratic future for the country. The document they wrote has been religiously followed since. Among other things, the Constitution of 1949:

- Permanently eliminated the army (*not* as an expression of "neutrality"—the civil war resulted partly in the explicit choice of democracy over communism—but to end any institutionalized military threat to elected civilian government);

- Created an independent "Supreme Electoral Tribunal," a fourth branch of government co-equal with the traditional three and with remarkably independent powers designed to assure scrupulously clean elections;

- Elaborated a complex system of checks, balances, and independent financing aimed at preventing undue concentration of power anywhere in the government; and

- Prohibited presidential reelection (not only of the incumbent, but of anyone in his/her cabinet or immediate family).

each other and those on the path to democracy. If they do not, they leave the field to those who are opposed to democracy. As President Eisenhower said on return from his 1960 South American trip:

... all nations—large or small, powerful or weak—should assume some responsibility for the advancement of humankind. . . . Cooperation among free nations is the key to common progress.

Economic Growth and Adjustment

With economic recession challenging social and political stability in several hemisphere countries, economic adjustment is not a matter of choice but of necessity. If economies are to grow, they must do so in accordance with market forces, not in opposition to them. Stable and equitable growth in the future requires economic adjustment now.

We in the United States have learned that lesson ourselves. The decisions we took to foster the resurgence of the American economy were not easy. Costs were incurred. At the height of the adjustment process, unemployment reached painfully high levels and industrial production declined markedly. But we are now reaping the benefits of the hard decisions we made earlier. Industrial production is expanding. Inflation is down and personal income is up. And in the past two quarters, our gross national product (GNP) grew much faster than anticipated.

Direct parallels cannot be drawn between the situation in the heavily indebted developing countries of Latin America and in the United States. But there is a lesson to be learned from our experience. It is clear that to achieve sustained noninflationary growth countries need policies that reflect economic realities and release the productive forces of their people.

Governments often face agonizing choices in the political management of adjustment. They must distribute the burdens of that adjustment. And they often must decide between taking hard measures at once or trying to postpone economic shocks—with the risk that those shocks will be more severe and violent later on. These are real dilemmas for which there is no simple or universal answer.

Democratic governments, with broad popular participation and support, are especially well positioned to deal with these tough decisions. As Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge told the International Labor Organization in Geneva on June 12, 1984:

We have drawn back from the gulf [by adopting] some very bitter and harsh decisions in order to improve a sick economy. . . . Democracy works as a means of settling the problems of production and to win battles in the struggle against under-development and poverty.

We are acutely aware of the scope and seriousness of the economic problems confronting the hemisphere. We are concerned, and we are helping.

The United States and the other industrialized countries will continue to respond constructively to external debt and other economic problems. It would be a disservice to all nations to weaken the very international instruments that can help troubled economies adapt to new economic realities. But it would be an equal disservice not to recognize the need for flexibility and understanding.

The June economic summit in London carefully considered debt-related issues. The summit leaders confirmed a basic strategy centered on adjustment, growth, and support and agreed to develop it flexibly, case by case. They also agreed on measures to strengthen and broaden that strategy over time.

The summit leaders also pledged to maintain and, where possible, increase bilateral and multilateral assistance, particularly to the poorest countries. They encouraged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to continue its key role of helping debtor countries make necessary policy changes. And they asked the World Bank to strengthen its role in fostering economic development, urging closer cooperation between the IMF and the Bank.

This approach has been successful in avoiding systematic crisis. Indeed, we have come a long way since August 1982, when Mexico's acute lack of liquidity raised fears that the international financial system might suddenly topple.

We and other creditor governments quickly provided temporary bridge financing to deal with immediate liquidity problems and began developing continuing measures to support Mexico's economic adjustment program. We have since collaborated on the official credits involved in financial support packages for a variety of debtor countries.

The responses of the United States, other creditor governments, commercial banks, the IMF, and other institutions reflect a more activist and creative approach to the hemisphere's economic problems.

Some countries, notably Mexico and Brazil, have made significant progress in adjusting their economies. Almost no country—from Jamaica to Peru, from the Dominican Republic to Costa Rica—has escaped the crisis or has failed to act to meet it. It is important that they be able to service their debt and bring about a resumption of sustainable, non-inflationary growth.

Opinion Polling in Latin America

Thomas Jefferson wrote that "it is rare that the public sentiment decides immorally or unwisely, and the individual who differs from it ought to distrust and examine well his own opinion." Scientific polling is a modern reflection of that sentiment—a common practice in democratic states, including in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Several dozen respected public opinion firms, from Mexico to Argentina, engage in a wide range of political polling, from in-depth inquiries into citizen concerns to candidate popularity polls. Some are associated with well-known companies like Gallup, and internationally accepted survey methods are the rule.

Individual companies have demonstrated the validity and usefulness of polling even in disturbed areas. In Central America, for example, pollsters have elicited public attitudes on such diverse themes as regional peace talks, the impact of U.S. policies, and the effects of economic adjustment.

To help make that possible, and to support democratic processes throughout the hemisphere, U.S. policy has sought to provide assistance to help governments implement adjustment measures conducive to long-term political and economic stability.

- The United States has made unprecedented use of Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees and special Export-Import Bank guarantee and insurance programs as specific debt management tools. We and our Paris Club colleagues have been flexible in rescheduling debt on a case-by-case basis. The debts of more countries are being rescheduled, including principal and interest, with longer repayment terms and grace periods.

- Our approach includes encouraging commercial bankers to maintain prudent involvement in lending and rescheduling. Commercial bank rescheduling and lending terms have improved over the past 18 months for countries which have successful adjustment programs—lower rescheduling and other fees, a drop in "spreads," lengthening repayment periods, and the rescheduling of maturities over multiyear periods.

- Adequate funding for the international financial institutions is an integral part of the solution. We have encouraged the evolution of the role of the IMF and other international financial institutions over the past 18 months. Working with the Congress last year we secured a major increase in IMF resources. The IMF is increasingly sensitive to political and social strains accompanying painful economic adjustment programs. The Fund, for example, has been innovative in defining the public sector deficit targets for Peru, Brazil and has negotiated more liberal targets for Mexico and Chile.

- We have worked for the favorable evolution of World Bank operations, encouraging such innovations as structural adjustment loans, which offer financial support over the medium term to countries undertaking economic reforms. And we are examining development bottlenecks resulting from inadequate counterpart or local currency funds under World Bank lending.

- An important part of our strategy, and one that depends heavily on Congress for support, is to prevent protectionist measures from inhibiting American access to the U.S. market. The hemisphere's share of U.S. imports has grown from 13% (\$23 billion) in 1978 to 16% in 1983 (\$41.7 billion)—withstanding recessions, debt crises, competition from other regions. The outlook for hemisphere exports to the United States is positive. U.S. imports from Latin America and the Caribbean in 1983 were up by 11% over 1982. Preliminary data for 1984—first quarter figures—show an increase of 31% over the first quarter of 1983.

- The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is a milestone. The CBI opens new opportunities for trade, investment, employment, and broad-based growth in the region. Its 12-year life represents long-term U.S. political commitment with incentives beyond its immediate trade objectives. Countries with the policy framework to promote investment and innovation will best be able to seize trade opportunities, increasing very significantly the payoff for appropriate economic policies.

- Another significant step is the trade credit guarantee program recommended for Central America by the bipartisan Bipartisan Commission on Central America, included in the foreign aid authorization bill, which passed the House in May.

In all these efforts, we are keenly aware that our programs and policies, however supportive, cannot be decisive. The main responsibility for economic development lies with the developing countries themselves. The flow of new capital from the industrialized countries is likely to remain below recent levels for an extended period of time. Yet developing countries continue to need more capital for development than they can generate internally.

Foreign direct investment is, therefore, likely to grow in importance as an engine of development in Latin America. Direct investment, particularly new equipment, offers the recipient country many advantages over external debt.

Equity investment is cheaper to obtain, especially in hard times. Although interest must be paid regardless, payments are remitted only when they are earned.

Equity brings with it technology, know-how, and management skills that are difficult to acquire in other ways.

Direct investment encourages integration into the world system, and, by creating a more open trading system, reduces the protectionist pressures that can be met more readily.

The United States is the source of nearly 60% of all foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Investment flows respond to economic conditions and to fiscal, trade, and exchange-rate policies in the recipient countries. Nations that choose to create an attractive climate for foreign investors can expect to attract an increased portion of the available funds. They will thus reduce their dependence on external debt for growth. We encourage this. But we recognize that the debtor countries alone, even with wise policies, cannot surmount the current crisis. Our assistance is necessary—and we will continue to provide it. The cooperation of lending countries is vital—and it has been forthcoming. The international financial institutions have an essential role to play—and they are playing it. With this support, we believe the responsible and democratic governments of the hemisphere can meet the economic challenges that confront them.

Security

The export of violence by Cuba and Nicaragua with Soviet backing is the principal external security threat to democracy in the hemisphere. U.S. security assistance and training are essential to help our neighbors defend themselves against this threat. As a demonstration of our resolve and to improve the capability of our own and regional forces, we continue to conduct joint exercises and maneuvers in the area.

At the same time, our diplomats are working actively to contain the threat posed by Nicaragua's military ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc, its subversive activities, militarization, and internal repression. We believe the Contadora process provides the means to negotiate a comprehensive, verifiable, and durable regional solution.

The leaders of the Caribbean understand well the vital importance of collective effort. Pioneers of economic and political cooperation in CARICOM, they helped inspire the Caribbean Basin Initiative to broaden that cooperation to include both Central America and the industrialized world. Similarly, faced with what one Caribbean leader called "an

ideology of violence whose aim is to undo democracy," the democracies of the eastern Caribbean, in particular, and the Caribbean as a whole did not vacillate in cooperating to restore order in Grenada in 1983.

Defense against the illicit narcotics trade entails cooperation of a similar kind among those in the region who recognize the threat and seek our active help—primarily in helping to fund what is, after all, a war against a well-armed and ruthless enemy.

AN END TO INDIFFERENCE?

Although its mandate was confined to Central America, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America could not avoid a broader conclusion in its report to the President:

Powerful forces are on the march in nearly every country of the hemisphere, testing how nations shall be organized and by what process authority shall be established and legitimized. Who shall govern and under what forms are the central issues in the process of change now under way in country after country throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

The United States is powerful enough to make a difference in favor of democracy. But successive U.S. Administrations and Congresses, Republicans and Democrats, have learned that our own democratic example and national power are not enough to make a decisive difference in the face of indifference abroad.

The important thing—the key to understanding how the United States should be conducting itself in this hemisphere—is that today indifference toward democracy is disappearing in Latin America and the Caribbean. Recent experience demonstrates this remarkable truth—in Central America, in the Andean countries, in Brazil, in the Caribbean, and in the Southern Cone. The voting statistics, the personal testimony of election observers, the palpable solidarity felt by anyone who has attended a Latin or Caribbean inauguration over the last 5 years—all evidence the growing sense of participation in national political life.

In international political cooperation today, the Contadora process is a critical experiment. It says a great deal about the invigorated power of the democratic idea that this group of countries has reached the "revolutionary" conclusion

Democracy in the Caribbean

The constitutions of the English-speaking nations of the Caribbean build on the British or "Westminster" model which has been followed in the region for over 300 years. Generally speaking, each nation elects a lower house or assembly roughly equivalent to the House of Commons, based on single member constituencies for a term of no more than 5 years. The leader of the majority party or coalition becomes Prime Minister, names a cabinet, and is responsible for governing during the term. An appointed Senate with minority representation sits for the duration of the term of the lower house. In those states whose constitution provides for it, a Governor-General represents the Queen. But this connection is *only* with the monarch, not at all with the Government or Prime Minister of Great Britain. The tradition of career, nonpartisan public service also runs deep in the Caribbean.

Contadora on Democracy in Central America

On September 9, 1983, all nine participants in the Contadora peace process* agreed on a 21-point "Document of Objectives"—a framework for addressing obstacles to peace in the region. Two of those objectives dealt specifically with internal democracy:

To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;

To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic processes in accordance with the law. . . .

*Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.

that democracy is absolutely essential for peace and development in Central America (see above).

Are these—and the more specific benchmarks elaborated within the process since then—not standards which we can all support? Don't they reveal both an understanding of democracy and a rejection of indifference?

Can there be any question of the results of any comparative application of these same benchmarks to the two Central American countries most often in the news: El Salvador and Nicaragua? Whose election experience or plans meet the standard? In which country is there "free access"? In which country are there "fair and regular elections"? Which country is promoting "national reconciliation efforts" on the basis of "fostering participation in democratic processes"? The answer in each case is El Salvador.

Those inclined to answer differently might ponder what Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa wrote in 1983:

When an American or European intellectual—or liberal newspaper or institution—advocates for Latin American countries political options and methods he would never countenance in his own society, he is betraying a fundamental doubt about the capacity of the Latin American countries to achieve the liberty and the respect for the rights of others that prevail in the Western democracies. In most cases, the problem is an unconscious prejudice, an inchoate sentiment, a sort of visceral racism, which these persons—who generally have unimpeachable liberal and democratic credentials—would sharply disavow if they were suddenly made aware of it.

Vargas Llosa is right. Too many of us have not looked at what is happening in Latin America closely enough to get beyond the stereotypes.

It is time to bury the canard that Latin Americans are "incapable of

democracy." The United States cannot afford ignorance, indifference, or inaction.

Our policy must be a program of understanding, of action, and of democratic solidarity. Recent history proclaims the strength of Latin America's drive for democracy. By encouraging it and supporting it, we are not "exporting" our own ideology or posing something "made only in US." We are helping our neighbors fulfill their own aspirations. And in doing so we are confirming our own deepest and most hopeful convictions.

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

The "Coordinadora" Nine Points

Following, in translation, is a summary of the nine points first made in December 1983 by the opposition Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Board (made up of three political parties, two labor unions, and the umbrella private sector organization) as a basis for free elections in Nicaragua.

1. Separation of State and Party. The army, the militia, the police, the Sandinista Television Service, and others must be part of the state and not of the FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front].

2. Repeal of Laws That Violate Human Rights. The code that restricts freedom of expression in the press, radio, and television must be abrogated. The laws that violate private ownership and others must be abolished.

3. Suspension of the State of Emergency. Suspension of the state of emergency and full exercise of freedom of expression and information.

4. Amnesty Law. A general amnesty law that will permit the par-

ticipation of all Nicaraguan citizens in the electoral process.

5. Respect for Freedom of Worship. Freedom for priests, pastors, and the faithful to perform their religious ceremonies.

6. Union Freedom. The full exercise of workers' rights, including the right to strike, to organize, and to bargain collectively.

7. Autonomy of the Judicial Branch. The judicial branch to have true independence from the government party and from the legislative and executive branches.

8. Protective Law With Recourse to Unconstitutionality. Recognition of the Fundamental Statute and the Statute of Rights and Guarantees as the Supreme Law until a new constitution is enacted, so that these will not be changed at the will of the government.

9. National Dialogue To Hold Elections in the Presence of the Contadora Group or the OAS. All political parties and movements, including those in arms, should negotiate on the elections.

Country Summaries

Type of
Election(s)Date of Most
Recent Election(s)Date of
Next Election(s)

Guyana and Barbuda

General Elections	Apr. 1984	1989
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Guyana and Barbuda gained its independence from the United Kingdom in August 1981. Prime Minister Vere C. Weir, Sr., leads the Antigua Labour Party (ALP). The Progressive Labour Movement (PLM) is the major opposition party but lost its representation in Parliament when the ALP swept open elections in 1984. A third party, the Guyana Caribbean Liberation Movement, has little support.

Argentina

Congress	Oct. 1983	1985
President	Oct. 1983	1989

On October 30, 1983, Radical Civic Union Party leader Raul Alfonsín was elected president after a hotly contested free campaign against the candidate of the Justicialist (Peronist) Party. A record-breaking turnout of more than 15 million gave Alfonsín an absolute majority in the presidential vote. The Radicals won control of the Chamber of Deputies, but no party obtained a majority in the Senate. One-third of the Senate and one-half of the House will be renewed in both 1985 and 1987.

Argentina's return to democracy after almost a decade of internal conflict and military rule was one of the most significant political events in 1983. The inauguration of President Alfonsín in December was a powerful and emotional occasion. Vice President Bush headed a U.S. delegation. Representatives of countries that have become democratic in the past decade—including Spain, Portugal, Peru, and Ecuador—were prominent. The United States shares with other democracies a vocation to defend and promote the democratic process.

The Bahamas

Parliament	June 1982	By 1987
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The 1982 elections gave Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling's Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) its fifth straight victory. Four other parties contested the elections, but only the Free National Movement received sufficient support to be represented in the Parliament. All parties had free and equal access to the media.

Barbados

Parliament	June 1981	By 1986
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One of the most stable and prosperous countries in the Caribbean, Barbados is an open parliamentary democracy in the British tradition. J.M.G. "Tom" Adams, leader of the Barbados Labour Party (BLP), is Prime Minister. The main opposition is provided by the Democratic Labour Party (DLP).

Belize

National Assembly	Nov. 1979	1985
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Belize, which achieved independence in 1981 after an extended period of internal self-government, has a democratic and parliamentary form of government. By law, general elections must be held by February 1985. In the 1979 election, the People's United Party, led by George C. Price, won 52% of the vote and the United Democratic Party 47%. The upcoming election also will be contested by the Christian Democratic Party.

Bolivia

Municipal	1949	Dec. 1984
President, Congress	June 1980	1986

After 18 years of military rule, Bolivian democracy was restored on October 10, 1982, when former President Hernán Siles Zuazo was elected president in a second-round vote by Congress and installed as constitutional president. Siles had obtained a plurality of the 1.4 million votes cast in June 1980 but had been prevented from assuming office by a July 1980 coup that led to three military regimes. Congress is responsible for setting election dates and seems likely to return to the traditional timetable by which a new president would be inaugurated on August 6, 1986.

U.S. support for the constitutional order has been a significant factor in buttressing Bolivian democracy, which faces difficult political, narcotics, and economic problems. President Siles publicly thanked the United States for its role in helping to frustrate the June 30, 1984, coup attempt in which he was kidnapped.

Brazil

President (indirect)	Oct. 1978	1985
Congress, State, Municipal	Nov. 1982	1986

Brazil has taken significant strides toward a fully representative government. Its opening to democracy, or *abertura*, was amply demonstrated in the November 1982 congressional, state, and municipal elections in which over 48 million voters chose some 40,000 officials. The opposition parties won 10 of the 22 contested governorships, including all but one of the important industrial states in populous southern Brazil. In the 69-member Senate, the governing Democratic Social Party (PDS) won 15 of the contested seats for a total of 46,

☐ Type of Election(s)

☐ Date of Most Recent Election(s)

☐ Date of Next Election

or a two-thirds majority. The major opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), won 9 seats for a total of 21. Of the 479 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, all of which were at stake, the PDS won 235 and the PMDB 200, so that neither of the major parties commands a majority.

The 1982 elections also determined the composition of the electoral college which will select the successor to President Joao Figueiredo on January 15, 1985. The 686-member college will consist of all Federal Senators and Deputies and six members of the majority party of each state legislative assembly. Only the two major parties are presenting candidates. The PDS has nominated Sao Paulo Federal Deputy Paulo Maluf; the PMDB has chosen Minas Gerais Governor Tancredo Neves. The election, which is expected to be hotly contested, will produce Brazil's first civilian president in over 20 years. Both candidates are campaigning on platforms calling for direct presidential elections in 1988. As elsewhere, U.S. policy is wholeheartedly in support of the democratic process, but neutral about who wins.

Chile

Plebiscite	Sept. 1980	1989
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Chile came under military rule in September 1973. A constitution ratified by plebiscite in September 1980 took effect in March 1981. Though its provisions and the conditions under which it was ratified were criticized by opposition groups, this constitution confirmed Augusto Pinochet as president until 1989, at which time another plebiscite is scheduled to vote on the junta's nominee to succeed him. If the nominee wins, he would be inaugurated on September 18, 1989. If the nominee is rejected in the vote, Pinochet would remain in office, and open presidential elections would be held on March 18, 1990, concurrent with elections for Congress. Opposition groups have proposed several changes to this election timetable process.

Some political liberalization occurred during 1983. The government is now considering a law which would legalize

some political parties. There is no formal dialogue between the government and the opposition but informal contacts have taken place. The U.S. strongly supports the return to elected, democratic, civilian government in Chile. We hope the process of communication between the government and the opposition will produce a consensus on a return to democracy.

Colombia

Parliament, State, Local	Mar. 1982	Mar. 1986
President	May 1982	May 1986
State, Municipal, Territorial	Mar. 1984	Mar. 1988

Colombia has been an active democracy for more than 25 years. Power has alternated between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Belisario Betancur of the Conservative Party was elected president in May 1982, winning decisively over Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, a former president and Liberal Party candidate.

Colombian democracy confronts a low-level but persistent Cuban-backed insurgency, as well as the narcotics scourge. Colombia has begun to take extraordinary steps to stamp out narcotics trafficking and President Betancur has negotiated a cease-fire with the largest guerrilla group, offering them the opportunity to lay down their arms and join the country's free political life.

Costa Rica

President, Legislative Assembly	Feb. 1982	Feb. 1986
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The elections of 1899 began a trend of free and honest elections that have enabled Costa Rica to evolve into a democratic republic with a strong system of checks and balances.

The electoral process is supervised by the powerful Supreme Electoral Tribunal, selected by Costa Rica's

Supreme Court of Justice. The purpose of this unique fourth branch of government is to guarantee free and fair elections.

President Luis Alberto Monge is a member of the leading political party, the National Liberation Party (PLN). The PLN is social-democratic in philosophy. With but one exception, the PLN and various non-PLN coalitions have alternated in the presidency in every election since 1953.

Cuba

Cuba is a communist one-party state, and the key exception to the prevailing democratic environment in the Caribbean. Although a self-professed champion of "national liberation" where other countries are concerned, Cuba itself is one of the least democratic, least independent countries in the world.

Candidates for "election" are determined by the Communist Party. There is no concept of legal organized opposition. Suffrage, limited to voting for local assemblies, is universal for citizens age 16 and over except for those who have applied for permanent emigration. Only sitting members of the local assembly may vote to choose members of regional assemblies and of the National People's Assembly. Membership in a local assembly is not, however, a requirement for candidacy to the National Assembly. This assures seats to all Politburo members and other high-ranking government and party officials. The National People's Assembly selects a council of ministers, again under the direction of the Communist Party.

Twenty-five years after coming to power, Fidel Castro rules through classic Marxist-Leninist methods, including direct repression. Behind the ideological smokescreen he has established, Castro's government is the despotism of the traditional *caudillo* aggravated by unprecedented subservience to foreign interests. Cuba adheres closely to Soviet political and military guidance. Only a massive Soviet subsidy of \$12-\$13 million per day keeps the Cuban people from even greater privation.

Type of Election(s)

Date of Most Recent Election(s)

Date of Next Election(s)

Dominica

House of Assembly	July 1980	June 1985
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The Minister Mary Eugenia Charles of the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) led control of the House of Assembly in a fair and open election. The DFP presently holds 17 of 21 seats. Opposing parties are the Dominica Labour Party, the Democratic Labour Party of Dominica, and a leftist grouping called the Dominica Liberation Movement Alliance.

Dominican Republic

President, Congress	May 1982	May 1986
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The Dominican Republic turned to democratic institutions after a long period of dictatorship and social and political upheaval. In spite of destabilizing economic problems, democracy continues to gain strength there, as evidenced by strongly contested elections in 1978 and 1982. Suffrage is universal and compulsory for those over 18 and married.

Three major parties contested the presidential elections in which 1.7 million citizens elected Salvador Jorge Blanco of the Dominican Revolutionary Party as president. The opposition parties—the Reformist Party and the Dominican Liberation Party, have representation at all levels of the government—federal, state, and local.

El Salvador

Legislative, Municipal	Jan. 1984	July 1986
President	May 1984 (2d round)	Jan. 1989

President Leon Febres-Cordero was inaugurated on August 10, 1984, marking the first transition in 24 years from one elected democratic government to another. President Febres-Cordero, a businessman, is a member of the Social

Christian Party (PSC), which allied itself with several other parties in a coalition called the National Reconstruction Front to oppose Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, the candidate of the Democratic Left (ID), also supported by a coalition of political parties, some of which supported the outgoing government of President Osvaldo Hurtado.

El Salvador

Legislative Assembly, Municipal	Mar. 1982	1985
President	May 1984 (2d round)	1989

El Salvador's political structure is established by a constitution that entered into force in December 1983. The Constitution was written by a constituent assembly elected in a direct popular vote in 1982. The 1982 elections for the assembly were part of a program of democratization agreed to among the military officers responsible for the coup in 1979 and the Christian Democratic Party. Automatic registration for the elections was offered to the political parties allied with the guerrilla umbrella organization, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), but rejected by them.

Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected president on May 6, 1984. International observers attested to the fairness of the 1984 presidential elections. Eight candidates representing a broad political spectrum competed in the first round. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a founder of the Christian Democratic Party, won 54% of the votes in a run-off against ARENA [National Republican Alliance] candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson. Over 80% of the electorate went to the polls.

Despite communist subversion, rightwing terrorism, crushing economic difficulties, and a history of repression, the people of El Salvador have persevered in constructing democratic institutions. The legislative and municipal elections to be held in the spring of 1985 will provide a further op-

portunity for political parties associated with the guerrillas to compete democratically for power. The United States strongly supports President Duarte's efforts to bring about such a national reconciliation through democratic procedures.

Grenada

Parliament	Dec. 1976	By the end of 1984
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The erratic rule of Sir Eric Gairy was forcibly ended on March 13, 1979, by Maurice Bishop and the New JEWEL [Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation] Movement. The Constitution was suspended, elections postponed indefinitely, and an extraordinary military buildup begun under Cuban and Soviet advisers.

In October 1983, Grenada's eastern Caribbean neighbors proved their democratic mettle when they acted—without hesitation and with the support of other democratic nations, including the United States—to restore order in Grenada after the country had fallen prey to a bloody power struggle among its Marxist-Leninist leaders. Their collective action made it possible for Grenadians to resume their democratic heritage. An interim government was appointed by Governor-General Paul Scoon in November 1983. Parliamentary elections are expected to take place before the end of 1984.

Guatemala

President	Mar. 1982	1985
Constituent Assembly	July 1984	Not applicable

On March 23, 1982, Efraim Rios Montt was named president after Gen. Lucas Garcia was ousted in a bloodless coup. On August 8, 1983, Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores seized power from Rios Montt and pledged a prompt return to democracy. International observers invited to witness the Constituent Assembly elections, held July 1, 1984, were favorably impressed by their

Type of
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fairness; 73% of registered voters participated. The assembly, inaugurated on August 1, 1984, will write a new constitution and electoral law. The expectation is widespread that presidential elections will facilitate a return to civilian control in 1985.

Guatemala faces formidable social, cultural, human rights, and economic problems, but the 1984 election, which was conducted openly and fairly, has encouraged democrats everywhere. We support continued progress toward democratization.

Guyana

National Assembly	Dec. 1980	None scheduled
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While Guyana maintains the structure of a multiparty parliamentary republic within the Commonwealth, its 1980 Constitution defines the country as a "democratic sovereign state in the course of transition from capitalism to socialism." The ruling party and its leader, Forbes Burnham, have imposed a minority government on the nation, resulting in an erosion of democratic practices.

Haiti

National Assembly	Feb. 1984	1990
Municipal	Apr. 1983	None scheduled

Impoverished and lacking democratic traditions, Haiti follows a constitution which, as amended in 1983, provides for lifetime President Jean-Claude Duvalier to designate his successor and legislative elections to be held every 6 years.

Although violence has been reduced, major human rights problems exist, including abuse of due process and a lack of freedom of speech, press, and association. For the first time, however, the government has announced plans for

legislation governing political party activities; recognized a labor federation; and called for judicial reform, strict observance of legality, and an end to interference in the judicial process. Press controls have been theoretically relaxed, but the recent temporary detention of several journalists raises serious questions about this process.

Honduras

President, Congress	Nov. 1981	Nov. 1985
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The April 1980 Constituent Assembly elections began a process that ended nearly 18 years of military rule. In January 1982 full democratic civilian government was restored to Honduras.

Roberto Suazo Cordova, of the Liberal Party, was elected president with about 54% of the votes. The Liberal Party won 44 of 82 congressional seats. The major opposition party, the National Party, won 34 seats.

Despite severe economic problems, the upheavals of the region, and the need to safeguard itself against Nicaragua, Honduras continues along the democratic path under able civilian leadership.

Jamaica

Parliament	Dec. 1983	By 1988
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Jamaica has been a stable functioning democracy since obtaining independence in 1962. Elections are held at the discretion of the Governor-General upon advice of the Prime Minister, but not less than every 5 years.

Prime Minister Edward Seaga's Labour Party (JPL) won the December 1983 elections. The chief opposition party, the People's National Party (PNP) led by Michael Manley, boycotted the elections and did not post any candidates. JPL candidates won all but 6 (contested by small minority parties) of 60 Parliament seats. Thus, although the JPL and the PNP have regularly alternated in power, the JPL now heads a single-party government. Many

observers anticipate that with the clarification of the voter registration issue that resulted in the PNP boycott PNP participation in the electoral process will resume.

Mexico

Deputies, Certain State Governors, Municipal	1984	1988
President, Senators, Deputies	July 1982	July 1986

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado was elected president on July 4, 1982. President and senators are elected for coinciding 6-year terms; governors at staggered intervals for 6-year terms; deputies and municipal officials for 3-year terms.

Mexico has had an evolving democratic system for more than 50 years. Recent constitutional amendments have expanded representation of opposition parties, including the National Action Party (PAN) and the Mexican Unified Socialist Party (PSUM), which in 1982-83 carried some important municipal elections traditionally won by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). President de la Madrid's key advisers are deeply engaged in efforts to resolve Mexico's most serious economic and financial problems since the Great Depression; his administration's programs include broadening popular participation in government.

Nicaragua

President, Council of State	Sept. 1974	Nov. 1984
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Sandinista Nicaragua contrasts sharply with progress toward more open and tolerant societies elsewhere in Central America. Despite promises of free elections and nonalignment, the Sandinistas in the 5 years since taking power in

Type of
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developed a militarized Marxist-Leninist state with close ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Widespread internal pressures and disillusionment abroad led the Sandinistas to announce elections for September 4, 1984. A genuine political opening in Nicaragua would be welcomed by the United States and others in Latin America and Western Europe. Pervasive FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front] presence and control throughout Nicaraguan society and its close identification with the government and armed forces provide it with enormous leverage in an electoral contest. The coordinating body of the opposition has called on the government of Nicaragua several times, beginning in December 1983, to take specific steps to create an environment conducive to genuine electoral competition (see p. 9). To date, the government has refused to significantly alter the rules of the game which greatly favor the governing FSLN party. Thus the opposition parties have declined to register for the elections in November. As of August 1984, it appeared that the 1984 Nicaraguan elections could resemble the 1974 Nicaraguan elections, in which the government candidate obtained an overwhelming percentage of the vote after ensuring the disqualification of all potentially serious opposition.

Nicaragua

President, National Assembly	May 1984	May 1989
Municipal	June 1984	June 1989

Alfonso Ardito Barletta was elected president in May 1984 in Panama's first presidential election in 16 years. More than three-quarters of Panama's 1.5 million voters, 717,000 voters, participated in a very tight race. The opposition Democratic Opposition Alliance (DCA), its candidate Arnulfo Arias, and the government party challenged votes in several districts.

Paraguay

President, Congress	Feb. 1983	Feb. 1988
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President and Congress serve concurrent 5-year terms. President Alfredo Stroessner was reelected in 1983 to a seventh term that ends in February 1988. The elections resulted in his Colorado Party receiving over 90% of the votes cast in a process flawed by campaign and media restrictions. Only two of the legally recognized opposition parties participated, the Liberal and the Radical Liberal parties.

There has been little change in Paraguay's political system in recent years. A state of siege is continuously renewed, and human rights problems persist. At the same time, the government has taken some positive steps, such as releasing almost all political prisoners, allowing some political activists to return to Paraguay after many years of exile, and arresting some police officials for abuse of authority.

Peru

President, Congress	May 1980	1985
Municipal	Nov. 1983	1986

Fernando Belaunde Terry, founder of the Popular Action (AP) party, was elected president for the second time in 1980. Reelected 12 years after he was deposed by a military coup, President Belaunde heads a democratic government that faces severe economic strains and terrorism from the indigenous Maoist guerrilla group, Sendero Luminoso. Nevertheless, Peru remains firmly on its democratic course. National elections planned for April 1985 will pave the way for the first constitutional turnover of power in 40 years.

Belaunde's coalition partner, the Popular Christian Party (PPC), withdrew from the government in May 1984 in anticipation of the 1985 elec-

tions. Candidates from the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and from the United Left (IU) did well in the 1983 municipal elections.

St. Christopher-Nevis

House of Assembly	June 1984	By June 1989
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St. Christopher-Nevis, which achieved independence from the United Kingdom on September 19, 1983, is a parliamentary democracy with a strong tradition of peaceful electoral change of government.

Prime Minister Kennedy A. Simmonds, leader of the People's Action Movement rules in coalition with the Nevis Reformation Party led by Simeon Daniel. This coalition government was recently returned to power in peaceful democratic elections. The leader of the opposing St. Christopher-Nevis Labour Party, Lee Moore, lost his seat, thus limiting his ability to challenge the present government.

St. Lucia

Parliament	May 1982	By Aug. 1987
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The St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) won the first postindependence elections in 1979, winning 12 of the 17 House of Assembly seats. By 1982 the political tide had turned, and Prime Minister John Compton's United Worker's Party defeated both the SLP and the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), winning 14 of the 17 seats. The PLP has been largely discredited since trying to send 14 students to Libya for military training.



Type of Election(s)



Date of Most Recent Election(s)



Date of Next Election(s)

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

House of Assembly	July 1984	By 1989
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Milton Cato's St. Vincent and the Grenadines Labour Party won the elections held in 1979 and until 1984 held 12 of 13 seats in the House of Assembly. The 1984 elections produced a peaceful upset, as James "Son" Mitchell and his New Democratic Party won 9 of the 13 seats and took control of Parliament.

Suriname

Until a violent military coup in February 1980, Suriname was a functioning democracy with a history largely free of violence. The military government headed by Lt. Col. Desire Bouterse has suspended the constitution and has not announced any plans for elections. In December 1982, 15 national leaders were killed while in government custody. There has been some dialogue among various political and social groups, but power remains in the hands of the army.

Trinidad and Tobago

Parliament	Nov. 1981	By Mar. 1987
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Trinidad and Tobago has been a functioning and stable democracy since it achieved independence in 1962.

Prime Minister George Chamber's People's National Movement (PNM) won the 1981 elections. Of the eight political

parties contesting the elections, the PNM, the United Labour Front (ULF), the Democratic Action Congress (DAC), and the Tapia House Movement (THM) won seats in the assembly. The elections were hotly contested with all parties actively campaigning for popular support.

Uruguay

President, Congress	1971	Nov. 1984
Plebiscite	1980	Not applicable

Uruguay has been under military rule since 1973. In 1980 a constitution drafted by the military and widely criticized as undemocratic was rejected in a plebiscite. In September 1981, the military selected a retired general, Gregorio Alvarez, as president.

Since 1981, Uruguay has proceeded on an accelerated course toward a democratic transition. The military recently deproscribed the Blanco and Colorado parties and most of the constituent member parties of the Broad Front. An agreement has been concluded between the Colorados, the Broad Front, and the military governing the modalities of the transition to civilian rule. Elections are scheduled for November 1984. Although the Blanco Party did not participate in the agreement because of the detention of its leader, Wilson Ferreira, it does plan to take part in the election. The United States firmly supports the return of democracy to Uruguay.

Venezuela

President, Congress	Dec. 1983	Dec. 1988
Municipal	May 1984	1989

Venezuela has had a democratic government for over 25 years. Although smaller parties represent a full spectrum of political tendencies, Venezuelan politics have evolved into a two-party system made up of COPEI and Democratic Action (AD), typifying respectively the classic international competition between Christian Democratic and Social Democratic currents. Continuing a tradition of alternation of power with COPEI, the AD's Jaime Lusinchi was elected president in December 1983—the first president to be elected by an absolute majority since the restoration of democracy in 1958.

After the ouster of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958, the country successfully fought both Cuban-backed insurgents and rightwing extremists in the early 1960s—but without sacrificing respect for human rights and the rule of law. Few Venezuelans have forgotten how close their country came to losing its liberty, and 90% of Venezuela's population typically turns out for presidential elections.

Dependent Territories

Type of Election(s)

Date of Most Recent Election(s)

Date of Next Election(s)

Anguilla

Legislative Assembly	Mar. 1984	1989
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Separated from St. Christopher-Nevis in December 1980, Anguilla remains a British dependent territory.

British Virgin Islands

General Elections	Nov. 1983	Nov. 1988
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The British Virgin Islands is a British Crown Colony with a parliamentary form of government. The most recent elections brought the United People's Party, under the leadership of Cyril Ommanney, to power. The Virgin Islands Labour Party forms the opposition.

Cayman Islands

Legislative Assembly	Nov. 1980	Nov. 1984
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The Cayman Islands is a British dependency with a parliamentary form of government. The legislature is comprised of 12 elected members and 3 members appointed by the Governor.

Governor. Although there are no highly structured political parties, there are loosely structured political organizations or "teams." The Unity Team and the Progress with Dignity Team are represented in the Legislative Assembly.

Montserrat

National Parliament, Chief Minister	Mar. 1983	Mar. 1988
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Montserrat is a British Crown Colony. Elections are held every 5 years. In March 1983, Chief Minister John Osborne was reelected, but his People's Liberation Movement lost two of its seven seats in Parliament to the opposition People's Democratic Party.

Netherlands Antilles

Federal Parliament	June 1982	1986
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The Netherlands Antilles has been a stable parliamentary democracy since the beginning of autonomy in 1954 as a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Federal Parliamentary elections

are mandatorily held every 4 years but may be called sooner should the party or coalition in power lose its majority. None of the 12 parties participating in the Federal Parliament election in 1982 received a majority of the vote, and a coalition government was formed.

Each of the islands has its own representative body, the Island Council, which enacts laws regarding local island affairs.

Turks and Caicos Islands

Legislative Council	May 1984	1990
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The Turks and Caicos Islands is a British Crown colony. The most recent Legislative Council elections returned the People's National Party (PNP), headed by Norman Saunders, to power. The PNP won 8 of the 11 Legislative Council seats with the opposition People's Democratic Movement winning three.

French Overseas Departments

French Guiana

General Council	Mar. 1983	1988
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French Guiana normally holds elections every 5 years. It elects one Senator and one Deputy to the French Senate and National Assembly.

Guadeloupe

General Council, Municipal	Mar. 1983	Mar. 1988
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General Council elections normally are held every 5 years. Guadeloupe elects two Senators and three Deputies to the French Senate and National Assembly.

Martinique

General Council	Mar. 1983	Mar. 1988
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General Council elections are usually held every 5 years. Martinique elects two Senators to the French Senate and three Deputies to the National Assembly.

40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising

President Reagan's remarks to guests at a White House luncheon marking the anniversary on August 17, 1984.¹

It's always an honor for me to be with individuals like yourselves who understand the value of freedom. I'm reminded of a story about a conversation between one of our citizens and a Soviet citizen. The American described the freedom of speech that we have here in the United States, and the citizen of the Soviet Union said, "Well, we're free to speak in the Soviet Union just like you are in the United States." He said, "The only difference is you're free after you speak." [Laughter]

But today we pay tribute to a nation which for two centuries has struggled for freedom and independence. From the uprisings in 1794, the November uprising in 1830, and then again in 1863, the people of Poland demonstrated courage and a commitment to human liberty that inspired free men and women everywhere.

And this 200-year record of perseverance and bravery coincided with the development of our own precious liberty here in the United States, and that is no mere coincidence. Our two peoples drank from the same well of freedom, held dear the same Judeo-Christian values, respected the simple virtues of honesty and hard work. And even today, it's often noted that unlike many others, our two peoples take their religious convictions seriously. These heartfelt convictions have kept the spirit of freedom burning in our hearts, especially during times of great adversity.

Pope John Paul II has said, "Freedom is given to man by God as a measure of his dignity. . . ." And "as children of God," he said, "we cannot be slaves." I know that you feel as I do, we're truly blessed in this time of great need to have a spiritual leader like Pope John Paul II.

The continuing suppression of the Polish national identity brought wave after wave of Polish immigrants to the United States. And for that, we can be grateful. We all know the list of contributions and the names of those who rose to great prominence. But just as

important are the millions who came here and, with their hard work and with their moral strength, helped shape the American character.

During this century, Americans and Poles have stood side by side in those two conflagrations that swept the world. The First World War, unfortunately, did not end all wars, but it did result in the reestablishment of the Polish state.

This month, we commemorate a desperate battle of the Second World War, an heroic attempt by free Poles to liberate their country from the heel of Nazi occupation and to protect it from postwar, foreign domination. For years, they covertly resisted the occupation forces. And then in 1944, for 63 brutal and agonizing days, ill-equipped and overwhelmingly outnumbered they—and I could say, many of you—held off the Nazi war machine. And it's fitting that we and all free people take special care to remember this occasion.

Of those who fought for freedom, and those who put their lives on the line for human liberty, I can think of none who should be prouder than those who can say, "I fought in the Polish Home Army."

And today, we honor three individuals, heroes of the Polish Home Army, never given their due after the Allied victory. And it's my great honor to now present the Legion of Merit to the families or representatives of these men.

Let us salute Stefan Rowecki, who led the Resistance until he was captured and executed by the Gestapo.

[The President presented the award to Jan Morelewski, president of the Polish Home Army Veterans Association.]

Next, his son will arise, the son of Bor-Komorowski, leader of the Warsaw uprising, who later died in near poverty in exile in London.

[The President presented the award to Adam Komorowski.]

And finally, General Leopold Okulicki, who was lured into a trap and died under suspicious circumstances in Moscow.

[The President presented the award to Zdzislaw Dziekonski, chairman of the Warsaw Uprising Commemorative Executive Committee and director of the Polish American Congress.]

These brave men and the courageous individuals who fought with their command represent the best of human spirit. They risked all for the ideals, for their God and country, at a time when the odds were so much against them. They're now part of the inspiring legacy of the Polish people.

If there's a lesson to be learned from the history books, it is that Poland may be beaten down, but it is never defeated. It may be forced into submission, but it will never give up. It may be pressured to acquiesce, but it will never accept foreign domination and the suppression of God-given freedom. After two decades of brutal foreign domination, we witnessed, just a short time ago, a resurrection of the indomitable spirit of the Polish people. And I assure you we have not forgotten and will never forget Solidarity and the freedom of the Polish people.

There are some, of course, who seem all too willing to turn a blind eye to Soviet transgressions, ostensibly to improve the dialogue between East and West. But those who condemn firm support for freedom and democracy—in order to prove their sincerity, we project weakness—are no friends of peace, human liberty, or meaningful dialogue.

Our policies toward Poland and other captive nations are based upon a set of well-established principles.

First, let me state emphatically we reject any interpretation of the agreement that suggests American consent for the division of Europe into spheres of influence. On the contrary, we see that agreement as a pledge to the three great powers to restore freedom and to allow free and democratic elections in all countries liberated from the Nazis after World War II, and there is no reason to allow the Soviet Union or ourselves to evade this commitment. We shall continue to press for full compliance with it, along with the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, and other international agreements guaranteeing fundamental human rights.

Passively accepting the permanent degradation of the people of Eastern Europe is not an acceptable alternative. In 1981, when it appeared that Poland would suffer a similar fate to that of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, we raised our voices in support of the Polish people. And we did not remain passive when, under intense Soviet pressure, martial law was imposed on Poland.

Many credit, trade, and fishing privileges extended to Poland, due to its somewhat broader degree of freedom than other Eastern European countries, have been suspended. At the same time, we have assisted voluntary organizations to provide humanitarian aid through the Polish church to avoid hurting the very people we want to help.

I would especially like to commend the work of Al Mazewski and the Polish American Congress. In cooperation with the church, they've provided over \$40 million worth of food, clothing, and medical supplies to the people of Poland. I know that I speak for Nancy—my wife is thrilled to have been selected honorary chairman for the Polish American Congress' Infant Charity Drive. We both wish you the best on this worthwhile project.

I've pledged that our sanctions can be lifted, one by one, in response to meaningful improvement of the human rights situation in Poland. For example, complete and reasonable implementation of the Polish Government's amnesty law would create a positive atmosphere that would allow reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund.

In the meantime, we've agreed, along with our allies and private organizations, to help fund a Polish church program to assist individual farmers. I am pleased to announce today that I am seeking support for a \$10 million American contribution to the pilot phase of the church's program. And we will follow the progress of this program carefully to determine whether additional support should be forthcoming.

Perhaps the most significant thing that we can do is let the Polish people and all the people of Eastern Europe know that they're not forgotten. And that's why we're modernizing Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America. Our radio programming is becoming the mighty force for good that it was intended to be. As the Scriptures say, "Know the truth and the truth will make you free." Our broadcast will carry the truth to captive people throughout the world.

The free peoples of the world are in ideological competition with the followers of a doctrine that rejects the basic tenets of freedom and declares the worship of God to be a social evil. As important as this competition is, until recently, the democracies, including the United States, seemed paralyzed by uncertainty and lacking the will to compete.

In the last 3½ years, we've quit apologizing, and at long last, we're standing up and being counted. As our UN Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, said, we've taken off our "Kick me" sign.

We're proud of our way of life, we're confident that freedom will prevail, because it works and because it is right. We believe the free peoples of the world should support all those who share our democratic values.

The National Endowment for Democracy, which I first proposed in a speech before the Parliament in London 2 years ago, has been established to encourage the democratic forces and the development of free institutions throughout the world. Its concerns include nonviolent, democratic movements like that of Solidarity in Poland.

And the rise of Solidarity is a matter of historic significance. It continues to be an inspiration of all free people that the Marxist-Leninist myth of inevitability is crumbling. Communism has brought with it only deprivation and tyranny. What happened in Poland is one sign that the tide is turning. The Polish people, with their courage and perseverance, will lead the way to freedom and independence, not only for themselves but for all those who yearn to breathe free.

The battle cry of the Polish Home Army still rings true: "Poland is fighting. Poland will live. Poland will overcome."

¹President's introductory remarks omitted here, as is the response by Stefan Korbonski, honorary chairman of the Warsaw Uprising Commemorative Executive Committee and president of the Polish Council of Unity in the United States (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 20, 1984). ■

Diplomacy and Strength

Secretary Shultz's address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago on August 20, 1984.¹

Patriotism in our country has been re-awakened during these last few years. Pride in America is greater than at any time in recent generations. So it is a particular honor and privilege to be here today among this distinguished group. For you are patriots who have never wavered in your devotion to our nation. The service you have given the United States in times of peril and your unflagging dedication—in good times and in bad—to the principles for which America stands have earned the admiration and appreciation of your fellow citizens.

And we are grateful not just for your service in war but for your contribution in times of peace as well. For you have been steadfast and vigorous supporters of a strong defense for America. You know, better than anyone, that a strong defense is essential for ensuring security and freedom. Your President is profoundly grateful for the support you have given to his efforts to restore America's strength these past 4 years.

And I am here to tell you that I am grateful, too. For if history has taught

come a better world in which peace and prosperity would reign and war would be a thing of the past. But we learned soon after the war that there are no final victories: the struggle between freedom and tyranny goes on; the United States, as the leader of the democracies, cannot evade its continuing responsibility to promote freedom and prosperity and to defend what we hold dear.

The Purpose of Negotiation

Dwight Eisenhower, as a great military leader and a great president, knew that America's strength was moral as well as military and economic. Our power was the servant of our positive goals, our values, and ideals. We Americans have always deeply believed in a world in which disputes were settled peacefully—a world of law, international harmony, and human rights. But we have learned through hard experience, in World War II and after, that such a world cannot be created by good will and idealism alone. Since 1945, every president, Democratic or Republican, has understood that to maintain the peace we had to be strong, and, more than that, we had to be willing to use

doubts in the minds of some that peace and military strength were compatible. The lessons so clearly understood by President Eisenhower, it seemed, were being forgotten. And today, even though we have overcome the trauma of Vietnam, one gets the sense that some still believe that power and diplomacy are alternatives. From one side, we hear that negotiations alone are the answer. If we will only talk (the argument runs) we can have peace. If we will only talk our differences will easily be resolved as if negotiations were an end in themselves, as if the goal of American foreign policy were not primarily to protect the peace, or defend our values, our people, or our allies, but to negotiate for its own sake. From another side, though the chorus is considerably smaller, we hear that we should never negotiate, never compromise with our adversaries, because the risks are too great and the differences irreconcilable.

Both views are as wrong today as they would have been four decades ago. Negotiations are not the goal of American foreign policy, they are a means of attaining that goal. In fact they are an essential means. But we know, as surely as we know anything, that negotiations and diplomacy not backed by strength are ineffectual at best, dangerous at worst.

As your Secretary of State I can tell you from experience that no diplomacy can succeed in an environment of fear from a position of weakness. No negotiation can succeed when one side believes that it pays no price for intransigence and the other side believes that it has to make dangerous concessions to reach agreement. This is true whether we are talking about Vietnam or Lebanon, Central America; it is true in arms control and in our relations with the Soviet Union. Americans have only to remember what we understood so well four decades ago: neither strength nor negotiations are ends in themselves. They must go hand in hand.

And I can also tell you that any strategy, to be effective, must be sustainable over the long haul. It cannot be sustained if our policies vacillate in response to events beyond our control. Americans are by nature a people of action, and we are sometimes impatient with a world that progresses slowly. When Americans act, we want to

No negotiation can succeed when one side believes that it pays no price for intransigence and the other side believes that it has to make dangerous concessions to reach agreement.

us anything, it is that effective diplomacy depends on strength. Dwight Eisenhower—in whose name you are honoring me tonight—understood it well. "Military power," he once told the Congress, "... serves the cause of peace by holding up a shield behind which the patient, constructive work of peace can go on."

It has been almost 40 years since the end of the Second World War, a war in which many of you fought. You fought—and many Americans died—not only to defend our nation but to free the world from a brutal tyranny. The American people hoped that with victory would

our strength. We would not seek confrontation, but we would never appease or shrink from the challenge posed by threats of aggression. And this determination was always accompanied by an active and creative diplomacy and a willingness to solve problems peacefully.

President Kennedy defined the two goals of this solidly bipartisan approach in his inaugural address: "Let us never negotiate out of fear," he said, "but let us never fear to negotiate."

In the years that followed, however, the consensus behind this balanced approach began to show signs of strain. For whatever reason, Vietnam created

and quick results. And the pattern of the recent past has been one of excessive expectations that, when unfulfilled, have led to equally excessive reversals in policy. This inconsistency hindered the achievement of American goals.

We do not negotiate with our adversaries because we think they are perfect. Nor do we negotiate just to please or that domestic constituency. We negotiate because it is in our country's interest to do so, and we reach agreements when we perceive that both we and our adversaries can gain from a negotiated solution. To negotiate on these terms is to deal with the world as it is, without illusions.

We know that negotiations with the Soviet Union, for instance, are not a panacea. Yet we know that equitable and verifiable agreements can make a significant contribution to stability in the near age or to the resolution of conflicts that might otherwise escalate and threaten to overwhelm us. To negotiate these ends is the only prudent and sensible course. It serves American interests.

If our proposals are rejected and reciprocated—as they have been of late—we must show staying power. Sometimes, it seems as if the Soviets won't take yes for an answer. At the same time, we should not seek agreement for the sake of agreement or allow occasional successes to give rise to unwanted euphoria. Our interests require that we stay on course despite the periodic disappointments and setbacks. We are bound to encounter in dealing with such a ruthless competitor. Unfortunately, outrageous incidents, such as the Korean airliner attack or the execution of Andrei Sakharov, are not what we must expect. However shocking they do not come as surprises that require us to reassess and change our strategy, including our strategy of openness to negotiate.

Patience is a virtue in foreign affairs as much as in our personal lives. If we keep our eye on our strategic objectives, we negotiate without illusions, if we use our strength effectively, we will see progress. The truth is, we advance our interests less by the big, obvious successes, by summits, by decisive battles, by glamorous international agreements, than we do by our permanent engagement and by the steady application of our policies.

The Tide of Freedom

Let's look at Central America. It is no coincidence that when America has shown consistency and commitment in Central America, progress in that region has been equally consistent. We all know what the problem is in Central America: Nicaragua's push toward militarism and totalitarianism. We have seen increased

solution is to be found that ends the fear and agony in Central America and opens a promising future of peace, freedom, and prosperity.

Our policies are working. Gradually, but inevitably, communist aggression is losing the contest. Hope is being created for the people of Central America. Success will not come overnight; and we cannot let our policies vacillate in

Despite grave economic problems and communist efforts to exploit them, almost every nation [in Latin America] is either democratic or on the path toward democracy . . . This gradual movement does not receive the attention of the media as much as the sporadic guerrilla offensive. . . .

repressions, persecution of the church, a massive influx of Soviet arms, and continued aggression against Nicaragua's neighbors. Today we hear of Nicaraguan elections promised for November. The notion of democracy is so powerful that even dedicated Marxist-Leninists feel they have to show that they are holding elections. Feeling the pull of the tide of true democracy that is running now in Central and South America, they seek to represent their elections as meaningful. But they are not succeeding. The failures of the Nicaraguan regime have generated a determined internal opposition—the true Sandinistas. Because of the regime's efforts to suppress that internal opposition, the elections promised for November now look more and more like sham elections on the Soviet model.

America has responded with patience and consistent policies based on strength and diplomacy. We have sought a dialogue with the Nicaraguan leadership. We have given our full support to the Contadora peace efforts. But we have also maintained an American military presence in the region to serve as the shield, in President Eisenhower's words, behind which effective diplomacy can go forward. We have provided economic, political, and military support for the free elected Government of El Salvador.

And we admire the dedication of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, who want only to bring democracy to their people. All these forces help provide the strength and the purpose essential if a

response to emotions or political passions at home. Only a steady, purposeful application of our diplomatic and military strength offers real hope for peace in Central America and security for the hemisphere.

We can see similar signs of progress throughout the world. While there are always obstacles and occasional setbacks, the broader picture is a hopeful one. The day-to-day events of foreign policy are like waves rolling up against the shore. Some break in one direction; some break in the other. But what is more important than the path of a single wave is the flow of the tide beneath it. Is the tide rising or is it falling? Is the course of history on the side of peace, freedom, and democracy? Or is America standing on weak ground against inevitable and ineluctable forces?

The tide of history is with us. The values that Americans cherish—democratic freedom, peace, and the hope of prosperity—are taking root all around the world. Look again at Latin America. Despite grave economic problems and communist efforts to exploit them, almost every nation in that region is either democratic or on the path toward democracy. Never before have more people in our hemisphere had such hope of tasting the fruits of true freedom. This gradual movement does not receive the attention of the media as much as the sporadic guerrilla offensive, but it is there. It is undeniable. The tide in Latin America is the tide of freedom.

Restoration of Confidence

A month ago, I visited our friends and allies in Southeast Asia. Our relations with those nations have never been stronger, in large part because the values we Americans cherish are flourishing in those faraway lands, as well. Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand are valued allies and vibrant societies; the free Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], are embarked on the same journey toward freedom and democracy; their economic success symbolizes how far they have come. The U.S.-China relationship is maturing and broadening as we identify and develop common interests. Our deepening friendship with these nations gets few headlines, but it marks the fact that in the decade since Vietnam, the United States has restored its position and its relations in Asia. And, increasingly, the real lesson of Vietnam is clear. The world

The yearning for democracy and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe is a powerful and growing force. . . . someday it will happen.

now condemns Vietnam's aggression in Kampuchea. The steady outflow of refugees from areas dominated by Hanoi are showing the Vietnamese communists for what some of us always knew they were.

In Europe, we have faced periodic crises, moments of apparent disunity, and times when Soviet intimidation has jostled relations with our oldest and closest friends. The Soviets once thought they could split the NATO alliance by pointing SS-20 nuclear missiles at the free peoples of Western Europe. But these tests of the alliance's strength have served only to prove one thing: that the solidarity of democratic nations endures, that the transatlantic bonds are strong and secure. Our shared moral values and political principles have made

NATO the keeper of the peace for 35 years and will continue to do so into the next century and beyond.

Indeed, if there is weakness in Europe, it is within the Soviet empire. The yearning for democracy and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe is a powerful and growing force. We have seen it in recent years among the brave people of Poland, as we saw it in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Hungary in 1956, and East Germany in 1953. We will never accept the idea of a divided Europe. Time is not on the side of imperial domination. We may not see freedom in Eastern Europe in our lifetime. Our children may not see it in theirs. But someday it will happen. The world's future is a future of freedom.

Make no mistake. History will do us no special favors. A better future depends on our will, our leadership, our willingness to act decisively in moments of crisis, and on our ability to be constant and steadfast in moments of calm. We must be ready to engage ourselves where necessary throughout the world. We must be ready to use our diplomatic skills and our military strength in defense of our values and our interests.

There was a time, a decade or so ago, when some Americans may have doubted that their great nation could continue to be a force for good in the world. But today Americans no longer doubt America's ability to play its proper role. In the past 4 years, this nation has taken the essential steps to restore its leadership of the free world. We have restored the strategic balance. We have restored the strength and thrust of our dynamic economy. We have restored our will and self-confidence. We have restored national pride and respect for the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. And we have restored the confidence of our friends and allies around the world that America can be trusted to confront challenges, not wish them away.

I don't mean to suggest that the path ahead of us is easy. But in the face of the forces of tyranny, we draw inspiration from the basic goodness of America, and our pride in our country gives us strength to lead abroad.

No one understands or feels that pride more deeply than you, who have defended this great nation in times of national peril. You knew what you were fighting against and what you were fighting for. And you knew what kind of

people you were defending—a people devoted to freedom and justice, a brave people willing to sacrifice for what they believe. And it was your sacrifices that have made peace possible. You laid the foundation for the kind of world we seek. Let us never forget that as we look toward the future.

Americans must never be timid, ashamed, or guilt-ridden, or weak. We are proud and strong—and confident. We will use our power and our diplomacy in the service of peace and our ideals. We have our work cut out for us. But we feel truly that the future is bright.

¹Press release 191. ■

Security for Europe

James E. Goodby

The following is an article reprinted in the June 1984 issue of NATO Review. Ambassador Goodby is head of U.S. delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (E).

In the past 10 years, the United States and its NATO allies have sought to ease the division of Europe through the process of dialogue, cooperation, and critique created by the Helsinki accords of 1975. In the Helsinki process has now emerged a new negotiating forum which has the potential to create a system of security based on carefully defined cooperation in military affairs "from the Atlantic to the Urals." This is the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which opened in Stockholm last January.

The Stockholm conference is different from "classical" arms control negotiations in that it addresses not the abilities for war—the number of weapons and troops—but rather the most likely causes of war: flawed judgments or miscalculations stemming from fears of sudden attack and uncertainty about the military intentions of an adversary. It is highly unlikely that any war at all will commence in Europe. But if war should ever come, it probably would not be in the form of a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack by one side against the other. The most probable cause of the outbreak of war would be some small incident, perhaps connected with a military maneuver, which would not be fully understood, leading to confrontation and armed conflict. This nightmare is an improbable scenario but the stakes are so high that some reassurance against such a contingency would be in everyone's interest. If it is successful, the Stockholm conference will negotiate and put into place certain procedures which could stop a fatal progression and catastrophe.

Procedures which would make military activities in Europe more predictable would reassure governments that those activities were normal, routine, and nonthreatening. Procedures for questioning and verifying the essential character of specific military activities would provide more certain

knowledge of the intentions of the parties to this agreement. Such reassurance would lead to increased confidence and security among all participating states. It could also, in time, lead to a habit of cooperation among participants on activities affecting their most vital national security interests, thus acting to dissolve distrust. From this, a new system of international security might emerge in Europe, which could soften some of the rougher edges of the adversarial relationship and provide a mechanism for preventing escalation toward crisis and war.

Proposals have been advanced by the 16 members of the Atlantic alliance which represent initial steps toward this ambitious goal. These proposals do not call for large changes in the military postures of the countries involved in the Stockholm conference. That objective is for other negotiations. But if a first, substantial agreement can be achieved in Stockholm, the consequences can be of historic importance.

The Stockholm conference will remain an integral part of the Helsinki process, and its achievements will be evaluated in a CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] followup meeting scheduled for Vienna in 1986, which will also review progress in the other dimensions of the process, including human rights. As U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said when he addressed the opening of the Stockholm conference last January:

... true peace and security in Europe depend on a foundation of basic freedoms—not the least of which is the right of peoples to determine their own future. ... Confidence-building in the larger sense means pursuing the work of Helsinki—through practical steps to break down barriers, expand human contact and intellectual interchange, increase openness, and stretch the boundaries of the human spirit.

Origins of the Stockholm Conference

Although the Stockholm conference is the child of the Helsinki process, it has even more remote ancestors. When Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954 called for an all-European security treaty, he was giving expression to a key objective of Soviet policy, then and now: a security arrangement for Europe which would ratify postwar borders and, if possible, isolate the United States from European security affairs. With Western

Europe thus isolated, the Soviet Union would be left in the position of supreme arbiter on the continent.

What the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and its allies eventually settled for was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But the conference was far from what the East had originally envisaged. In fact, it was much closer to Western concepts.

Before the negotiations which led to the Helsinki Final Act could even begin, some longstanding issues dividing Europe had to be resolved or accommodated. An example was the signing of the 1972 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. And although Soviet accommodations to Western interests were probably regarded as tactical concessions necessary for a longer range strategy, the agreements which preceded or came from the Helsinki meeting created political dynamics which significantly altered the role of the CSCE as conceived by Moscow.

The Helsinki conference and the process that flowed from it, in fact, came to support a grand strategy pursued by the United States and its allies which, in the broadest terms, sought to ameliorate the harsher results of the division of Europe; far more than a European security conference in the Eastern sense, it also encompassed human rights, human contacts, economic issues, and cultural and educational exchanges. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 accepted the Western concept that security embodies political, social, and economic concerns as well as strictly military concerns. The CSCE gave a particular impetus to the promotion of human rights, and it remains today a major forum for pursuing enhancement of fundamental principles of Western democracies.

Furthermore by including both the United States and Canada as full partners in the process, the Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed the necessity for permanent American involvement in European security matters.

Shortfalls and Shared Interests

Far from fulfilling a Soviet conception, the Stockholm conference, mandated in the Madrid CSCE review meeting in September 1983, emerged from a French idea for a multistage "Conference on Disarmament in Europe," which looked to a high-level forum on

security and disarmament issues, linked to the CSCE process. The French called for a first stage devoted to making significant improvements in those provisions of the Helsinki Final Act which called for notification and observation of military maneuvers. A second stage would discuss broad disarmament issues.

The Helsinki process has shown that the West can pursue and achieve some limited objectives in negotiations with the East. Thus there already has been experience with the kinds of cooperative security arrangements (which are referred to as confidence- and security-building measures) which the West seeks to enact in Stockholm. Those measures

agreed in the Helsinki Final Act are modest in scope; they need to be expanded in Stockholm. Implementation of them has been imperfect; implementation needs to be strengthened in Stockholm. Nevertheless, experience with them and their implementation up to now has been instructive. It is possible even now to see how cooperation in security affairs can work, as well as how this cooperation needs to be improved.

The central features of the Helsinki security provisions were a measure calling for prenotification 21 days in advance of certain military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops and a measure calling for invitation of

observers to those maneuvers. There was also a measure calling for notification of some smaller-scale exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops. The zone of application extended only 250 kilometers into the Western part of the Soviet Union.

In the 8½ years since adoption of the Final Act, there have been nearly 100 notifications of military activities in Europe involving well over 2 million men. Although the system has worked well on the whole, notable exceptions exist, and precisely in the case of the largest military maneuver conducted by a CSCE state since 1975—the U.S.S.R.'s Zapad 81, which took place in 1981 in the Soviet Union near the Polish border and which was not properly notified.

In accordance with the Helsinki agreements, observers have been invited to approximately 50 exercises. The Warsaw Pact has extended more than 30 invitations; the United States alone has invited 10. The Eastern record is less impressive. The Warsaw Pact has announced more than 20 maneuvers but has invited Western observers to less than half of these. Among the Western observers, American observers have been invited to Warsaw Pact maneuvers only twice and not since 1979.

In the area of smaller-scale exercises, the West has notified 29 maneuvers. The Warsaw Pact has notified four.

On the basis of this record, clearly the 35 CSCE participants have not met the aspirations of the Final Act. In particular, they have not succeeded in dealing with the problem of misunderstanding or miscalculation concerning military activities where, in words of the Final Act, "... participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities." In spite of partial implementation of the Helsinki agreement, therefore, significant uncertainties still exist among the participating states about the military activities taking place in Europe and about the intentions which lie behind them. Such uncertainties can be destabilizing, and this circumstance points the way to an international system in which East, West, and neutrals should hold in common.

Head of U.S. CDE Delegation

James E. Goodby was born December 29, 1929, in Providence, Rhode Island. He graduated from Harvard in 1951 and attended graduate school at the University of Michigan. He served in the U.S. Air Force (1952-53) and then continued graduate studies at Harvard.

Ambassador Goodby entered the Foreign Service in 1952 and transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954. While there he took part in several international negotiations relating to nuclear arms control and cooperation in the civil uses of nuclear energy.

In 1960 he moved to the office of the special assistant to the Secretary of State for atomic energy, specializing in nuclear arms control matters. With the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), he became officer in charge of the nuclear test ban negotiations. Those negotiations resulted in the first major arms control treaty since World War II.

Following service as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, he was assigned in 1967 to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities in Brussels, where his major concern was the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under negotiation at that time, and U.S. relations with EURATOM, the atomic energy component of the European Communities.

From 1969 to 1971, Ambassador Goodby was officer in charge of defense policy affairs at the State Department's office for NATO affairs. He then served for 3 years as Counselor of Political Affairs at the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. In that role he negotiated common positions with the allies, including those involving the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), and the 1974 Ottawa declaration of Atlantic relations. From 1974 to 1977, he was Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, with responsibilities for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), other arms control negotiations, and various defense policy issues.



(Department of State photo)

He was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in 1977, handling U.S. relations with the countries of northern and central Europe and European regional political and security affairs, in which capacity he was responsible for the followup to the Helsinki accords (the CSCE). In 1980-81 he served as U.S. Ambassador to Finland.

In 1982-83 he was deputy chairman of the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva. Ambassador Goodby has been head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) since September 1983. ■

Western Proposals

January 24, 1984, the 16 members of the Atlantic alliance tabled a formal six-point proposal, the first of the Stockholm conference, the thrust of which was to make the military environment in Europe more understandable, predictable, and stable. That the 16 were able to table a comprehensive document at the outset of the conference is indicative of the unity and seriousness of purpose with which the alliance has approached this negotiation. In brief the six Western measures are:

Measure 1, the exchange of military information, which provides that, on a yearly basis, participants will inform each other about the structure of their ground and air forces in all of Europe, giving unit designation, normal headquarters location, and composition of the forces.

Measure 2, exchange of forecasts of activities notifiable in advance, calls for an exchange of forecasts, again on a yearly basis, of military activities. The forecasts would furnish the name of the exercises, the countries participating, the size and type of forces involved, and the place and time it would occur. The forecasts would also list the purpose of the exercise.

Measure 3, notification of military activities, calls for notification, 45 days in advance, of activities involving fielding of units at division level or above and notification of certain mobilization and amphibious exercises.

Measure 4, observation of certain military activities, requires states to invite observers from all other states to all notified activities and to certain alert activities.

Measure 5, compliance and verification, has two parts. States agree not to interfere with the "national technical means"¹ of other states; secondly, participating states may send observers, on a limited basis, to observe activities which seem not to be in compliance with negotiated agreements.

Measure 6, development of means of communication, asks that the participating states develop better means and procedures for urgent communications.

These measures are mutually reinforcing. Their objective is to reduce tensions, to promote common understanding among all participants, and to diminish the danger of armed conflict arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation. They focus on preventing a sequence of events which has all too

often led to war on the Continent of Europe: the incident, military movement, or political event which is misunderstood, with misunderstanding leading to suspicion, reaction, escalation, and perhaps confrontation and conflict.

... And How They Work

The six points of the Western proposal can be implemented easily with a minimum of intrusion into or alteration of normal, nonthreatening military activity. The process would work something like this.

A context of basic information is established through measure 1, near the end of each year. Much of the information which would be exchanged is already available to the CSCE states through other means. At the same time, under measure 2, a state would advise the other participants of its planned military activities during the next calendar year. Incidentally, because modern training and rotational activities are complex and are planned a year or more in advance, military forces routinely develop this kind of information.

Measure 3, on prenotification, then provides more detail and also a cross-check on the forecast. If a state should notify under measure 3 an activity not previously forecast, other countries could demand an explanation of the apparent anomaly. A nation with aggressive intent would be raising an alarm against itself if it announced an exercise which it had not forecast, and, of course, this alarm would sound even louder if a country failed either to forecast or to notify 45 days in advance of the event. The measures are thus self-enforcing.

The observers called for in measure 4 serve to verify that activities are as they have been advertised. But there may be occasions where one state sees, or thinks it sees, an activity that has not been notified but should have been. In such a case, under measure 5, suspicions can be alleviated or confirmed by asking for verification, either by direct observation, if necessary, or by some other appropriate means. The communications network of measure 6 could be utilized to seek further information on a potentially destabilizing event.

These measures would not, in themselves, prevent war. They could not absolutely prevent one state from using force for political intimidation. But they could make unwanted confrontation less likely, and they could raise the political cost of using force to intimidate. By establishing a pattern of routine ac-

tivities, anomalies would stand out clearly. Governments would know with reasonable certainty what was supposed to happen. If a departure from the routine pattern occurred, they would have some time to clarify the situation before political tensions escalated or in time to take counteraction against a real threat. The result, over time, should be an increase in confidence and stability among the participating countries.

The six points of the Western package are, as required by the mandate for the Stockholm conference, militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe. The Helsinki measures were less meaningful in military terms. They applied only to part of Europe, most of the European Soviet Union being excluded. Exercises to be notified were larger. The notification period was only 21 days, as opposed to 45. There was no exchange of information to establish a base of knowledge. There was no annual forecast. And the Helsinki measures were largely voluntary. The measures proposed by the West in Stockholm are meant to be mandatory.

Hoary Ideas

All 35 states, to one degree or another, have supported an expansion of the measures of the Helsinki Final Act. But, of course, differences exist. The Soviet Union chose for Stockholm a collection of rather hoary ideas, which are hardly the grist for a serious security negotiation. This incongruous approach, drawing on a stock of old proposals, would be compatible with the thesis that Moscow has still not fully assessed the potential of the Stockholm conference.

At the outset, however, Soviet behavior in Stockholm has been consistent with at least one of the goals they have pursued throughout the Helsinki process: the Soviet Union has tried to use the conference for image-building, attempting to portray Moscow as the defender of peace and the United States and some of its allies as aggressive, militaristic adventurers. The Soviet Union has also sought to find and exploit differences between the United States and Europe. This self-serving approach has not caught on either among other delegations or with the European or American publics, but it has prevented the conference from getting quickly down to business.

The Soviet Union has raised two objectives to the Western proposals. It claims that they amount to "legalized espionage" and that they are technical and

too trivial to affect the security situations that exist today in Europe.

While it is true that the Soviet Union is a closed society in which routine information is much harder to obtain than in the West, it is not true that the Western measures seek to expose important secrets of the Soviet military establishment. The information exchange and forecast measures ask for facts which frequently are already available in the public domain. The notification measure involves only field exercises, not other sensitive areas. Nor would observers prowl at will all over Soviet or any other territory. They would visit the area where field training exercises were taking place. Even the most superficial examination of the Western measures deflates the contention that they aim at any kind of espionage.

The second Soviet charge is that the Western proposals involve trivial technical matters which would do little or nothing to enhance security in Europe. For its part, the Warsaw Pact has offered six alternative proposals: agreements on the non-use of force, the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons-free zones, reduction of military budgets, a chemical weapons ban in Europe, and expansion of the confidence-building measures of the Helsinki accords.

Many of these ideas have been around for a long time, some for a quarter of a century or more, and they have failed in all that time to gain consensus among the states now participating in the Stockholm conference. Furthermore, the chemical weapons ban is currently being negotiated in Geneva. The United Nations annually tries to carry on a study of military budgets, where the Soviets and their allies have been entirely uncooperative.

The non-use of force proposal, usually combined with a proposal not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, has emerged as the flagship of the Warsaw Pact's entries. The Western countries have never questioned the principle of non-use of force; we all subscribe to it in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and, most recently, in the concluding document of the Madrid CSCE review meeting last year. The point that we have made in Stockholm is that the principle must now be given effect and expression through an agreement on practical measures which will affect the everyday behavior of the 35 participating countries and their military establishments. In order to make clear the American view on this issue, Presi-

dent Reagan, in a major policy statement on June 4, announced explicitly that "if discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete, new meaning to that principle, we will gladly enter into such discussions."

In expressing Western willingness to meet the Soviet concerns and to explore every reasonable avenue for progress to serious negotiations, the President clearly and specifically identified the context in which the non-use of force principle must be approached. "Mere restatement of a principle all nations have agreed to in the UN charter and elsewhere," he said, "would be an inadequate conclusion to a conference whose mandate calls for much more. We must translate the idea into actions which build effective barriers against the use of force in Europe." The United States is prepared to discuss reaffirmation of the principle of non-use of force; the discussion must be in the context of negotiations on measures that will have a real impact on military activities in Europe.

Proposals made in the Stockholm conference by the Soviet Union, in fact, recognize such a context. The Soviet Union, supported by other Warsaw treaty organization countries, has proposed an expansion of the Helsinki confidence-building measures in ways that could prove to be similar in kind to proposals offered by NATO countries and by the neutral and nonaligned countries in the conference. These proposals remain on the periphery of the Eastern presentations; the West hopes they will move closer to the center of understanding shared by nearly all the other participants in the conference. In keeping with President Reagan's June 4 initiative, the West is seeking to encourage the East to recognize the possibilities for progress and move to join the developing consensus.

A Time for Choice

Some observers, especially in the East, like to characterize the current international situation as a time of deep crisis between East and West, a time of tension so great that normal discourse between East and West is all but impossible. The necessity for choice remains, however, no matter how one characterizes the current European scene, reacts to it, or allocates the credit for it. The 35 nations of the Stockholm conference are beginning the process of

deciding, incrementally, what to make this new forum. This includes the Soviet Union, of course, and the evidence suggests that Moscow, even though its grand strategy and ultimate objective remain unchanged, is now far from certain how it should proceed with its original idea of a European security conference under present-day circumstances.

For the Atlantic alliance, the process of inventing and agreeing on the six confidence- and security-building measures tabled by the alliance on January 24 required an effort which testifies to the alliance's intentions in Stockholm. The neutral or nonaligned group of nations also accepts the proposition that the Stockholm conference can be a path to genuine improvement in security. Thus the majority of participants already agree that the potential of Stockholm should be seriously explored.

The Soviet Union now faces a choice of whether to exaggerate differences in its relations with the West or to try, in Stockholm, the path of greater cooperation, looking not for unilateral gain but for mutual advantage. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are not destined to be trouble-free. There will always be competitive elements in relations between systems with such different social, political, and economic values. But limited cooperation is possible in security affairs as in other areas.

If the Soviet Union decides that its interests lie in following a cooperative rather than an adversarial course, the Stockholm conference can make a start toward improving the stability of the current system of international security. In so doing, it can lay the foundation of confidence and experience essential for more ambitious and complex negotiations in the future.

In itself, the Stockholm conference can be a forum of cooperative action offering an opportunity to restart the international dialogue and improve the climate of relations among states. What is needed now is a commitment from the 35 participating states, including the Soviet Union, to seize that opportunity.

¹National technical means (NTM) refers to assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provision of an agreement. NTM includes photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radar and optical systems as well as sea- and ground-based systems (such as radars and antenna for collecting telemetry). ■

U.S. Activities on POW-MIA Issue

Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 8, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee and the POW-MIA Task Force to discuss U.S. government efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting for Americans still missing in Southeast Asia as a result of Indochina war.

Administration Commitment

As I last spoke before this committee, President Reagan has reemphasized his personal concern about this issue on numerous occasions and reaffirmed his administration's commitment to make progress in resolving the POW-MIA situation.

In his May 28 remarks at the Memorial Day ceremony honoring the Unknown Soldier of the Vietnam war, President said, "We write no last chapters. We close no books. We put away no final memories. An end to America's involvement in Vietnam can come before we've achieved the best possible accounting of those missing in action." And in his remarks at the White House on the occasion of National POW-MIA Recognition Day [July 20, 1984], the President told the families of the still missing in Indochina. "I'm confident that you gave your sons and husbands and fathers into the care of our government when they left to fight for our nation. You knew they might die in battle. But you had, and will always have, every right to expect that your government will not abandon those who went to return."

Despite our many actions to resolve this issue, the ultimate key to resolution of this tragedy must necessarily be a decision to cooperate by the Governments of Vietnam and Laos. It is only through their cooperation that real progress can be made. We are pressing those governments for full cooperation as a matter of highest national priority, and we will continue to do so as long as necessary to achieve the fullest possible accounting for those missing from the conflict in Indochina.

Slow Progress From Vietnam

Progress with Vietnam on resolving this issue has been disappointingly slow, but developments in recent weeks offer room for some hope.

Hanoi returned the remains of nine persons following the last POW-MIA technical meeting in Hanoi in June 1983. Then, as you recall, despite their agreement to treat the POW-MIA issue as a humanitarian one, separate from other issues, the Vietnamese suspended our regular quarterly technical meetings. They cited what they characterized as "hostile" American statements as the reason.

Shortly thereafter, discussions began which resulted in Vietnam's agreement to receive the highest level executive branch delegation to visit Vietnam since the end of the war. This delegation, which was led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Armitage, included a member of the National Security Council staff, the executive director of the National League of Families, and two Department of State officials.

As a result of these February 1984 discussions in Hanoi, both sides agreed that cooperation in resolving the POW-MIA problem would be pursued as a separate humanitarian issue, not linked to other matters which divide our two countries. Our delegation impressed on the Vietnamese the U.S. Government's desire to move beyond the unacceptably low level of past cooperation and, instead, to work together seriously to remove what is the primary bilateral obstacle to improvement of the atmosphere between the two countries. The Vietnamese stated their intention to accelerate efforts to resolve the POW-MIA issue and to concentrate initially on the cases involving the more accessible sites. The Vietnamese offered to resume regularly scheduled technical meetings in the near future. During the same discussions, they agreed to turn over five sets of remains and indicated a willingness to turn over three others that had been previously promised to a private group of Americans.

The Vietnamese have fulfilled two of their promises since the February discussions. On July 17 they handed over the remains of eight persons to an American military team. We welcome the return of these remains, but we must recognize that the pace is painfully

slow. One thousand eight hundred twenty-six Americans are still missing in Vietnam alone; government-to-government negotiations have thus far resulted in only 95 remains repatriated by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and subsequently identified as Americans. (The Chinese turned over two additional remains and the Lao one which have been identified as Americans and were the result of negotiated efforts.)

On resumption of technical meetings, Hanoi first agreed to, and then abruptly cancelled, a mid-April session. They expressed an unwillingness to schedule another technical meeting until just a few weeks ago. They again claimed that a "hostile" American attitude was the reason for this delay. We are pleased to report, however, that the first in a resumed series of technical meetings has now been set for next week.

We hope the Vietnamese will fulfill all of the commitments they made during the visit of the Armitage delegation, including their longstanding agreement that resolution of the POW-MIA issue is a humanitarian matter to be dealt with separately from other issues dividing Vietnam and the United States. We have told the Vietnamese that we are prepared to recognize publicly any significant steps they take toward resolution of this issue, as the President did in his July 20 statement.

At the same time, we will continue to speak out frankly about this issue and to express fully justified concern about the inadequate pace of cooperation. Secretary of State Shultz underlined the importance of the POW-MIA issue and its relevance for our relations with Vietnam, when he said to the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] meeting in Jakarta: "The United States has both a legal and moral responsibility to obtain the fullest possible accounting of almost 2,500 of our men still missing. The American people rightfully expect no less. We deeply appreciate the support you have given us with Vietnam on this problem. It is a problem which demands meaningful cooperation and progress before the American people will permit discussion of normalization with the Vietnamese, even in the context of a Kampuchea settlement."

We believe that we have the support of the Congress and American people in urging Vietnam to honor its pledge to resolve this issue. As the President stated on Memorial Day, "Today, a united people call upon Hanoi with one

voice: Heal the sorest wound of this conflict. Return our sons to America. End the grief of those who are innocent and undeserving of any retribution."

Signs of Progress With Laos

Following the President's statement to the League of Families in January 1983 that we are prepared to improve relations between Laos and the United States, with progress on the POW-MIA issue as the principal measure of Lao sincerity, we have closely pursued the POW-MIA issue with the Lao Government and can report modest progress.

In October 1983, I met with the Lao Foreign Minister during the UN General Assembly to stress our interest in the POW-MIA issue. I reaffirmed that the United States would cooperate in our mutual effort to improve bilateral relations and informed him that we would henceforth vote in favor of loans for Laos by multilateral lending institutions which otherwise meet our criteria. Shortly thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Monjo and National Security Council staff member Richard Childress met with a Lao Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials in Vientiane to propose joint Lao-American searches of crash sites of American aircraft downed during the war.

In December 1983, at the invitation of the Lao Government, a team of U.S. POW-MIA experts conducted a preliminary survey of the crash site of an American aircraft downed during the war near Pakse, Laos. In January we proposed to the Lao a joint excavation of that site to search for remains. Excavation of the crash site will not be possible until the dry season at the end of this year, but we and the Lao have been discussing details of this joint operation. Last month, as the President announced in his July 20 address to the League of Families, the Lao Government agreed in principle to the excavation.

I am encouraged by this sign of progress and cooperation from the Lao and hope that we can soon reach agreement on the specific details of the excavation. We look forward to the prospect of excavating other crash sites in Laos.

As I noted earlier, we and the Lao Government have agreed that each of us will try to take concrete steps to improve relations. Although there is no direct link between what we do and what they do, an honest effort by both

sides will further the POW-MIA accounting process. I should mention in this regard that we have recently taken the opportunity to demonstrate our desire for better relations with Laos by responding to an emergency food shortage caused by irregular monsoon rains. The United States has joined other nations—particularly Sweden, Japan, and Australia—in providing Laos with emergency food aid. Laos accepted our offer of some 5,000 tons of California glutinous rice under the PL 480 (Food for Peace) Title II program. We are working with the World Food Program to arrange distribution of this rice to those areas most severely affected.

The foreign assistance legislation now, of course, prohibits development assistance to Laos. We have told Lao officials that action to lift this congressional ban would be possible only after a pattern of sustained cooperation has been established toward resolving the fate of Americans missing in Laos from the war in Indochina. If future progress develops into a pattern of sustained cooperation, we would consult with Members of Congress on the question of lifting the ban.

Kampuchea

Our policy of firm support for the approach of ASEAN to the Kampuchean problem is well known and was recently reaffirmed by Secretary of State Shultz in his meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the six ASEAN countries in Jakarta.

The Heng Samrin regime, which was installed in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese, joined the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam and Laos last January in a communique which stated that the three countries would share POW-MIA information. They indicated a readiness to cooperate with the United States on the POW-MIA issue due to the increased interest of the American people, if we would "change our attitude." A senior Heng Samrin regime official made a similar offer to cooperate with the United States in a meeting with a delegation from a private American relief organization.

The Heng Samrin regime does not have control over the entire country, and there is reason to question whether it could carry out the kind of careful investigation required to account for missing Americans. Any available information on Americans missing in Kampuchea would almost certainly be known to the Vietnamese, who exercise *de facto* control there as they did in many areas

of Kampuchea during the Vietnam war. If Hanoi does have such information, finds it in the future, we will look to them to cooperate with us in the same way that they are pledged to do in the case of Americans missing in Vietnam. At the same time, we have asked an international humanitarian organization (which has asked not to be identified) to contact the Phnom Penh authorities to transmit to us any information they might be willing to provide on Americans missing in Kampuchea. So far no such information has been forthcoming.

Efforts With Other Governments

We actively seek the cooperation of other governments in making known the Vietnamese and Lao Governments our concern about the POW-MIA issue. In June of last year Secretary Shultz raised the POW-MIA issue with the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in Bangkok. They said they would do what they could to help, and several useful contacts were made as a result. Our allies and a number of other countries both Europe and Asia are sympathetic and constructive concerning this humanitarian issue. Such approaches bring home to the two governments the importance attached to this problem and international opinion and make clear that the POW-MIA issue can have an effect on broader Vietnamese and Lao foreign policy interests.

During the past year we made an across-the-board effort to advise all friendly countries with missions in Hanoi of our interest in the POW-MIA issue.

I wish I could express publicly our appreciation for the efforts of all the countries that have helped, but their preference—and the need to give quiet diplomacy a chance to work—require that I not do so.

American allies have cooperated with our efforts to contact Indochinese refugees resettled in their countries information about POW-MIAs. Our efforts have also been directed toward refugees resettled in other countries who have been reported to have relevant information.

Southeast Asian governments have expressed understanding of and sympathy for our POW-MIA efforts and have assisted our attempts to screen refugees from Indochina for POW-MIA information. The Royal Thai and Hong Kong Governments have been most helpful in granting special access for American POW-MIA specialists to camps housing refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea which are nor

Continuation of MFN Status for China

by William A. Brown

Statement before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee on August 8, 1984. Mr. Brown is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I welcome this opportunity to testify before this subcommittee as part of an Administrative panel concerning the extension of the President's general waiver authority under Section 402(c) of the Trade Act and the continuation of the specific waivers permitting most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for China, Hungary, and Romania. My testimony will address the waiver for China.

Development of strong, stable, and enduring relations with China has been a foreign policy objective of four consecutive Administrations. President Reagan has reiterated that "such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. Economic development has become China's top priority, and China has opened the door to foreign trade and investment. Accordingly, our bilateral economic relationship has moved to the forefront of our developing ties with China. As this relationship has grown, disagreements have naturally arisen in some areas. We can expect that other problems will come up in a trading relationship which is dynamic and which involves two very different trade and legal systems. Nevertheless, we believe the prospects are good for further growth of our economic ties.

Trade and Investment

Bilateral trade has increased dramatically in recent years. Overall, China ranks 22d among our world trading partners, while we are China's third largest trading partner, after Japan and Hong Kong. Last year, two-way trade totaled \$4.4 billion, a four-fold increase over 1978 but 20% less than 1981's \$5.5 billion. In most years, the United States has maintained a trade surplus. Sales of U.S. agricultural products declined last year, and we are concerned about the slow pace of Chinese grain purchases under the U.S.-China grain agreement so far this year. At the same time,

however, the volume of high-technology manufactured products exported to China has grown steadily, reflecting China's development needs and our own liberalized export guidelines. Last year, the dollar value of export licenses approved for high-technology shipments to China was about \$1 billion and will probably exceed \$1.5 billion in 1984.

American business has not hesitated to take advantage of the opportunities for investment in China. The United States stands as China's number one source of foreign investment in equity joint ventures and commitments to explore for offshore oil and gas. Twenty U.S. firms account for 25% of China's total direct foreign investment (\$85 million out of \$340 million). Twelve U.S. oil companies have made commitments to spend \$500-600 million in exploring for oil off China's coast. U.S. firms are also expected to participate in a major coal mining project in China's Shanxi Province, which could involve U.S. equipment exports amounting to over \$300 million. The prospects are excellent that investment and trade opportunities for U.S. firms will continue to expand as China seeks foreign help in modernizing existing industries and in developing new ones, in fields such as telecommunications, electronics, instrumentation, and electrical power generation.

The opportunities for U.S. trade and investment with China are enhanced by the series of government-to-government economic agreements that we have concluded and will conclude with China. Agreements on trade, civil aviation, grain, textiles, and claims and assets, among others, now form the basis for the expansion of economic relations. Work programs under our science and technology agreement and our industrial and technological cooperation accord contribute to China's development and create opportunities for American business. During President Reagan's visit to China in April, a new tax agreement was signed which will promote further commercial relationships with China. We will hold further discussions on an investment agreement with the Chinese.

As the economic relationship has grown, so have official and unofficial exchanges which promote longer bilateral relations. For example, there are 21 U.S. media organizations with offices in Beijing, nearly 200 U.S. firms with offices in China, more than 80 U.S.

closed to outsiders. The refugee opening program, however, requires constant monitoring because of changing conditions, among them changing volunteer agencies and host-country officials. This year my Department and the Department of Defense again reviewed programs to ensure, as much as possible, that refugees know of our interest.

Interagency Effort

The Department of State chairs the interagency POW-MIA group and participates fully in the planning of U.S. actions aimed at making progress on the POW-MIA issue. We have taken the lead in efforts to improve our overall relations with Laos, in developing a strategy to deal with the Vietnamese on this issue, and in approaches to other concerns.

The POW-MIA policy is formulated by participating interagency members: the Department of State, the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Executive Director of the League of Families, whose long experience on this issue and depth of knowledge of family concerns has been invaluable. Staff members of the House and Senate also participate in the interagency group.

We strongly encourage support from private Americans for our POW-MIA efforts. Public support is the backbone of our policy. At the same time, we neither support nor condone forays by private Americans in search of remains or prisoners. Such actions jeopardize the government-to-government efforts which are the only viable channel for resolution of the POW-MIA issue. In addition, it has been our experience that they often operate on fabricated or faulty information and thus only add to the misunderstandings and misperceptions involved in this issue.

Making progress on the POW-MIA issue clearly requires a long-term effort. The U.S. Government, supported by the American people, can be successful in persuading Hanoi to cooperate on the POW-MIA issue. We believe that we have such support and join with the President in saying that, "Today, a united people call on Hanoi with one voice."

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

universities that maintain affiliations with about 120 Chinese schools, and more than 20 American States and cities that have sister relationships with their Chinese counterparts. At the same time, over 200 Chinese delegations visit the United States each month, and American tourists to China numbered more than 168,000 last year.

Travel and Emigration

China's decision to speed up the pace of developments by greater reliance on foreign goods and technology has been accompanied by some liberalization in the area of emigration. Travel restrictions have been relaxed and simplified for both immigrants and short-term travelers. There are currently more than 10,000 Chinese students and scholars in this country. In addition, last year some 11,000 business visas were issued to Chinese citizens. At the same time, our China posts issued nearly 10,000 immigrant visas. There are over 60,000 Chinese with approved visa petitions waiting for their turn to immigrate to the United States, most of whom have close family members already living here.

China's commitment to more liberal emigration practices is reflected in the bilateral U.S.-China consular convention, which has been in effect for 2 years. In diplomatic notes accompanying the convention, both sides agreed to facilitate travel for the purpose of family reunification and also to facilitate travel between the two countries of persons with simultaneous claims to the nationality of the United States and of China.

This is not to say that Chinese emigration is problem free. China, like many developing countries, is concerned about potential brain drain. Current Chinese regulations restrict foreign study by Chinese university students until they complete their Chinese education and work for 2 years. In addition, local work units may be slow to approve departure, and officials are sometimes reluctant to issue passports and exit permits to persons whose emigration might create gaps in modernization efforts. There is no evidence, however, of any policy aimed at inhibiting the emigration of those with legitimate family ties abroad, although many encounter bureaucratic delays in obtaining passports and exit permits.

The principal obstacle to emigration from China remains the limited ability or willingness of other countries to receive the large numbers of people able and willing to immigrate. In the case of the United States, our numerical limitation on immigrants from each country cannot keep up with the Chinese demand. For example, applications for fifth preference immigration (siblings of U.S. citizens) stretch back to 1979, implying at least a 5-year wait for applicants in this category.

Trade is a fundamental component of China's modernization effort and an

avenue for China's further integration into the community of nations. China's advancement toward greater modernization and integration is clearly in the American interest, and MFN treatment contributes to this. The Administration strongly believes that the continuation of MFN status for China is vital to our foreign policy interests.

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S.-Bulgaria Relations

by Richard R. Burt

Statement before the Subcommittee on European and Middle East Affairs and the Task Force on International Narcotics Control of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 24, 1984. Mr. Burt is Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs.¹

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss our policy toward Bulgaria.

As the most loyal member of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria evidences the least amount of differentiation from the Soviet Union in its political, ideological, and economic policies. For years the Bulgarian leadership evoked an almost symbiotic relationship with the Soviet Union. They seemed to fall over themselves to defer to the Soviets, to echo their propaganda, and to support them in every single issue of international importance. Bulgarian devotion to the Moscow line seemed to go far beyond their obligation under existing political realities, surpassing that of their partners in the Warsaw Pact. One looked hard for even small signs of diversity. Under those conditions, there were few grounds for dialogue. In fact, during the decade of the 1950s, we did not even maintain diplomatic relations.

Relations were reestablished in 1960, but little has happened. Our relations with Bulgaria remain at a low level. Unlike some of the other countries in Eastern Europe with which our relations began to expand in keeping with our policy of differentiation, we have not exchanged high-level political visits nor

do we have official bilateral commission on economic and trade development. A Bulgaria has not fulfilled the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974, we do not extend most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to Bulgaria. Nor is Bulgaria eligible for U.S. Government trade credits or guarantees.

By the end of the 1970s, Bulgaria began paying greater attention to developing its economic and commercial ties to Western Europe and the United States. In order to do so, its leaders accepted a broadened political and cultural dialogue with us on matters of importance to us. In this dialogue, we pressed for improved Bulgarian adherence to the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] principles—greater contacts, reunification of divided families, and human rights generally. We pressed the Bulgarians to stop jamming our Bulgarian-language Voice of America broadcasts. We pressed them on persistent allegations and reports of official Bulgarian involvement in the illegal drug trade and in illegal arms sales to terrorist groups in the Third World and the Middle East.

The results of our efforts have been on balance, disappointing. In the area the Helsinki principles and human rights, they have resolved nearly all of the longstanding family reunification cases for which we had been seeking solutions, in some cases, as much as 1 years. They have also taken steps to facilitate the operation of our Embassy in Sofia and improve their access to Bulgarian officials. Last fall, they received at the very highest level—

ident Zhivkov—an important
legation from this House led by Con-
gressman Gibbons [Sam M. Gibbons,
Fla.].

Narcotics Trafficking and Arms Trade

On the very serious issues of
Bulgarian involvement in the illegal nar-
cotics and illicit arms trade, our
representations have produced few
results. Our drug enforcement coopera-
tion efforts with Bulgaria have been
used into propaganda exercises to
constrate apparent rather than real
cooperation in eliminating drug traffick-
ing from Bulgaria. Repeated requests by
key for extradition of known Turkish
narcotics smugglers have been refused.
Information passed by our Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) people
that known narcotics smugglers in
Bulgaria has been largely ignored, and,
instead, we have been given statistics
on the number of seizures at the
border. Little has been done to crack
down on those within the country who
are moving drugs and illicit arms in in-
ternational trade.

After several years of frustrating
operation that produced few real im-
provements in drug enforcement, we
suspended customs cooperation with
Bulgaria in 1981. We reluctantly came
to the conclusion that the relationship
was largely fruitless and was being
used for propaganda purposes.
Last February I visited Bulgaria,
along with two other countries in
Eastern Europe, to provide that close
all of the Soviet Union our position on
arms control and, in particular, INF
[intermediate-range nuclear forces], in
the context of Soviet counter-
measures in Eastern Europe. I also
saw that opportunity to make un-
mistakably clear our continuing interest
in a concern over Bulgaria's official deal-
ing in or toleration of the international
narcotics trade, their involvement in the
illicit arms trade, and over allegations of
support for terrorist groups. I stressed
that there could be no marked improve-
ment in our relations until these con-
cerns could be satisfied. In addition to
my trip, I note that representatives of
the CIA also have been in Sofia recently to
discuss the Bulgarians and will be continu-
ing such contacts.

I understand that there are recent
reports of improved Bulgarian enforce-
ment action along their borders, and
significant drug seizures have been an-
nounced. I hope these reports are cor-
rect. However, there has been insuffi-

Bulgaria—A Profile

People

Noun and adjective: Bulgarian(s). **Popula-
tion** (Dec. 1980): 8,876,652. **Annual growth
rate:** 3.6/1,000. **Birth rate:** 14.3/1,000. **Den-
sity:** 80/sq. km. (207/sq. mi.). **Ethnic groups:**
85.3% Bulgarian, 8.5% Turk, 6.2% others
(Gypsies, Greeks, Armenians, and Russians).
Language: Bulgarian. **Religions:** Bulgarian
Orthodox; Muslim minority. **Education:**
Years compulsory—8. Attendance—
1,457,848. **Literacy—95% (est.). Health: In-
fant mortality rate—20.2/1,000. Life expec-
tancy—men 69 yrs., women 74 yrs. Work
force** (3,997,615): **Agriculture—23.2%. In-
dustry and commerce—42.6%. Government—**
1.5%. **Other—32.7%.**

Geography

Area: 110,912 sq. km. (44,365 sq. mi.); about
the size of Ohio. **Cities:** *Capital—Sofia* (pop.
1,056,945). *Other cities—Plovdiv* (350,438),
Varna (291,224), Ruse (172,782), Burgas
(168,412). **Terrain:** Mountainous. **Climate:**
Similar to US Midwest (dry, hot summers
and damp, cold winters), but with strong
regional variations.



Government

Type: Communist people's republic. **Constitu-
tion:** May 1971.

Branches: *Executive—chief of state*
(chairman of State Council), head of govern-
ment (chairman of Council of Ministers).

Legislative—unicameral National Assembly;
Council of State (chairman, 1 first deputy
chairman, 5 deputy chairmen, 1 secretary,
and 21 members). **Judicial—**Supreme Court,
28 provincial courts, 103 people's courts.

Political parties: Bulgarian Communist
Party, Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.

Administrative subdivisions: 27 prov-
inces, 1 city.

Defense: 5.9% of government budget
(est.).

National holiday: September 9.

Flag: White, green, and red horizontal
stripes with a lion framed by wheat stalks on
white stripe.

Economy

National income (1981): \$23.31 billion. **An-
nual growth rate:** 4%. **Per capita income**
(1980): \$2,625.

Natural resources: Bauxite, copper, lead,
zinc, coal, lignite, lumber.

Agricultural products: Grain, tobacco,
fruits, vegetables, sheep, hogs, poultry,
cheese, sunflower seeds.

Industrial products: Processed agricul-
tural products, machinery, chemicals,
metallurgical products.

Trade (1982): *Exports—\$11.2 billion* (US
share, \$25.6 million). *Imports—\$11.32 billion*
(US share, \$106.45 million). *Major trade
partners—*USSR 54%, other CEMA coun-
tries 19%, developing countries 11.4%.

Official exchange rate (April 1982): 0.96
leva = US\$1.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and many of its specialized agencies,
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA), Warsaw Pact.

Taken from the *Background Notes* of April
1983, published by the Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, Department of State. Editor: Juanita
Adams. ■

cient movement on elimination of the drug rings that operate out of Bulgaria, moving drugs and guns between the Middle East and Europe. Those are the operators that we have to get at. Those are the connections that must be broken. We must and will continue to press the Bulgarians on these concerns. We have also discussed our concerns with key West European governments, urging them to approach the Bulgarians directly on the subject. We will continue to work to enlist the support of other governments.

Assassination Attempt Against the Pope

With regard to the two resolutions concerning Bulgaria that are currently before this subcommittee, let me say that there should be no mistake as to the gravity with which we view the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. We regard the cowardly attack on the Pope as one of the most terrible and despicable of all possible crimes.

As you know, the crime occurred on Vatican soil, and it is the Italian judicial system which has the jurisdiction to investigate the charges. All along, we have been extremely impressed with the thorough and dispassionate manner in which the Italian authorities have pursued their investigation. Their courageous, painstaking, exhaustive, and impartial approach has been most laudatory. We continue to have complete faith in the integrity of the Italian investigation. And we have offered the fullest possible assistance to the Italian investigation, and we will continue to do so.

Since the Italian judicial process has not yet been completed, we must maintain both the appearance and the reality of nonintervention in this case. This is the position that the Secretary of State stressed in his testimony on June 13 before the full Foreign Affairs Committee.

In considering these pieces of legislation (H.R. 5980 and H. Con. Res. 337), let me assure you that we share the concerns of members of this subcommittee about the very grave charges of Bulgarian complicity in the attempted assassination of the Pope. We support the conduct of a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria to examine all facets of our relationship. I would strongly recommend, however, that the study be delayed until such time as the Italians have completed their in-

vestigation and the outcome of an eventual trial is known. By awaiting those results, we will not have interfered in the Italian judicial process. We will also avoid playing into Soviet and Bulgarian hands by introducing the appearance of external pressure that could discredit the impartiality of the investigation and an eventual trial.

In conclusion, let me assure you once again of the seriousness with which the Department of State regards the

charges and evidence of Bulgarian involvement and toleration of illicit narcotics and arms trafficking and support to terrorist groups. We will continue to devote close attention to the concerns raised by you and members of your committees.

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Polish Government's Release of Political Prisoners

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUG. 3, 1984¹

The President has taken note of the release of political prisoners announced by the Polish Government on July 21. He believes that it represents a significant move in the direction of national reconciliation in Poland. Therefore, in accordance with his step-by-step approach for dealing with the Polish situation, he has decided to take two steps.

First, the President has authorized the lifting of the ban on landing rights for regularly scheduled flights by the Polish state airline, LOT, subject to the regularization of our civil aviation relationship and the full reestablishment of scientific exchanges between the United States and Poland.

Second, the President has indicated that complete and reasonable implementation of the amnesty decision will create a positive atmosphere that would allow the reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States would, of course, consider any final application on its merits, including Poland's willingness to fulfill the obligations of IMF membership.

The purpose of our sanctions, from the very beginning, has been to encourage movement away from confrontation toward reconciliation in Poland. While the United States remains concerned with the situation in Poland, we view the Polish Government's amnesty declaration as a potentially positive development.

The United States is prepared to take further positive steps in response to further significant movement toward national reconciliation in Poland. In meantime, we will be consulting with our NATO allies and others on the situation in Poland and a Western response to it.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Aug. 6, 1984.

Food and Population Planning Assistance

I. Peter McPherson

*Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 2, 1984. McPherson is Administrator of the Agency for International Development (AID).*¹

Chairman [Dante Fascell], it is a pleasure to be here to discuss with your committee two areas of vital importance to the developing countries, food and population. I would like to express my appreciation to the committee for its support for foreign assistance, and look forward to continued cooperation for your leadership. I would also like to thank Under Secretary Amstutz for a thorough briefing on the 10th ministerial session of the World Food Council. The Department of Agriculture and AID have long had a productive relationship working together on food aid and the world hunger problem.

Last week I returned from Africa where I saw the tragic effect of the drought and social disruption on the situation. As I have previously stated, the long-term solution rests primarily with the African governments themselves which must reassess their economic and agricultural policies. At the same time, needed policy reforms are being instituted in many countries giving farmers a fair price for their production and encouraging the private sector to become involved in providing agricultural inputs, food processing, storage, and marketing. If the necessary policy reforms are instituted, then, over the long term Africa will be less likely to be brought to its knees by drought. While the United States bases its support on the less developed countries under long-term solutions, we continue to undertake actions to relieve the short-term food needs of these populations.

The United States has learned some lessons from the present African food situation. We are using these lessons to provide food assistance more efficiently in future emergencies. These lessons are reflected in the recent presidential food initiative which I will discuss briefly.

Presidential Food Aid Initiative

The President announced on July 10 a new initiative to allow the United States to respond more quickly and ef-

fectively to the hungry and malnourished of Africa and the rest of the world. This initiative includes a five-point plan to increase effectiveness:

- 1. Prepositioning of Grain in Selected Areas.** Prepositioning grains in or near areas especially vulnerable to acute food shortages will help save lives by shortening U.S. response time from the present 3-6 months to as little as 2 weeks. A number of possible sites in Africa are being investigated.

- 2. Special \$50-Million Presidential Fund.** The creation of this special fund will provide the President the ability to accelerate emergency food relief efforts, saving lives by responding more quickly to emergency requests for food aid. The President will shortly propose legislation to set aside foreign aid resources within current and planned levels to meet emergency food aid needs. Replenishment of the fund will be through transfers of unobligated foreign assistance and PL 480 funds or appropriations.

- 3. Financing or Payment of Transportation Costs of Food.** Unfortunately, many of the countries most severely affected by hunger and malnutrition are unable to or find it very difficult to finance ocean transportation costs under the concessional sales program or inland transportation and distribution costs under the grant program. Assistance under the current Food for Peace Title II legislation is limited to providing only the ocean freight transportation costs to a recipient's port or border. The President, therefore, proposes to amend PL 480 Title II to allow, in limited cases, payment of internal transportation costs as a way of ensuring that U.S. food aid reaches the people most in need of our assistance. We will also consider a change in policy to finance, on a limited basis, the ocean freight costs associated with the concessional sales program (PL 480 Title I).

This action will increase the flexibility of the PL 480 Title I and II programs in helping to meet emergency food situations.

- 4. Creation of a Government Task Force to Better Forecast Food Shortages and Needs.** The best response to an emergency food crisis is an early and smooth delivery of food aid. To meet this goal, an interagency task force will be created to bring together all available

information and resources to prepare an early warning system to forecast possible famine situations.

- 5. Establishment of an Advisory Group of Business Leaders.** The perspective and expertise of U.S. business leaders represents an untapped resource in dealing with Third World food problems. U.S. agricultural exports to the Third World represent over one-third of total U.S. agricultural exports. The Business Advisory Committee of the Department of State will be expanded to include a senior-level working group on Third World food problems.

These five steps respond to the President's request in December 1983 for a high-level interagency study of the worldwide hunger situation. This study group was chaired by Ambassador Robert Keating, the President's envoy to Madagascar and the Comoros. We believe these measures will significantly improve our ability to respond rapidly and effectively when emergency food needs arise.

Population

Before the advent of government population programs, several factors combined to create an unprecedented surge in population. In developing nations, the tremendous expansion of health services—from simple medication to elimination of major diseases—saved millions of lives every year. Emergency relief, facilitated by modern transport, helped millions to survive flood, famine, and drought. The sharing of technology, agricultural improvements, improvements in educational standards generally all helped to reduce mortality rates, especially infant mortality and to lengthen life spans. The paradox is that these beneficial and desirable actions have upset the preexisting equilibrium and created challenges in some places of excessive population pressures. Other necessary actions have not occurred to restore the equilibrium required between population growth and economic growth.

Statist government policies have disrupted economic incentives, awards, and opportunities for advancement, especially in agriculture. Natural disasters have made the provision of adequate supplies of food even more difficult.

It is clear that the current exponential growth of population cannot continue indefinitely and that there is a need to reach an equilibrium between population and economic growth. The Administration's position is that both economic and social conditions and

access to a broad range of voluntary family planning services are important components of fertility declines and sustained economic growth.

The United States has prepared a policy paper for the International Conference on Population which will begin in Mexico City on August 6. The policy paper has two basic thrusts—first, a strong statement of this Administration's continued support for voluntary family planning; and, second, additional policy guidance to ensure that no U.S. Government funds support abortion-related activities.

Rapid population growth compounds the already serious problems faced by both public and private sectors in LDCs in meeting the needs and demands of their citizens for food, shelter, education, and health care. It diverts scarce economic resources from investments which will produce rapid economic progress.

AID attempts, through its programs and policy dialogues with host governments, to ensure that family planning programs and economic development policies and programs in other sectors are mutually reinforcing. Under this Administration, we have used these complementary approaches to resolving the problems of the imbalance between population growth and economic growth. I believe that this follows very well the congressional mandate outlined in Section 104(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which is based on recognition of the reciprocal links between fertility and other aspects of development. We also believe that the International Conference on Population offers the United States an opportunity to strengthen the international consensus on the interrelationships between economic development and population growth which has solidified since the World Population Conference in 1974.

The population problem is not just numbers and national statistics, and it dehumanizes the problem to speak only in broad statistical terms. We must recognize that population pressures result from individuals and families who make life and death decisions. It is essentially a family crisis. One of the most poignant consequences of rapid population growth is its effect on the health of mothers and children. Especially in poor countries, the health and nutrition status of women and children is linked to family size. Maternal and infant mortality and morbidity rise with the number of births and with births too closely spaced. Complications of pregnancy are more frequent among

women who are very young or near the end of their reproductive years. In societies with widespread malnutrition and inadequate health conditions, these problems are reinforced; numerous and closely spaced births lead to even greater malnutrition of mothers and infants. Unfortunately, in many countries abortion is seen as an answer. But abortion is not family planning; it is family planning failed. Voluntary family planning programs provide a humane and workable alternative to abortion. Widespread resort to abortion is evidence of the need for safe and acceptable methods of family planning.

For all these reasons, the United States will maintain its strong support for voluntary family planning programs. As President Reagan stated in his message to the Mexico City conference, where population programs are "... truly voluntary, cognizant of the rights and responsibilities of individuals and families, and respectful of religious and cultural values. . . . such programs can make an important contribution to economic and social development, to the health of mothers and children and to the stability of the family and of society." This has been the consistent thrust of AID's population assistance while I have been administrator.

The new U.S. policy articulates the Administration's concern about abortion. Abortion is not an acceptable method of family planning, and it must not be part of our program in any way. The policy tightens our controls and provides a more effective means of assuring that U.S. funds are not used for abortion. It states that "when dealing with nations which support abortion with funds not provided by the United States Government, the United States will contribute to such nations" only "through segregated accounts which cannot be used for abortion." Moreover, the United States will no longer contribute to separate nongovernmental organizations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations.

This policy, which has now been developed as the Administration position for the conference in Mexico, represents a tighter policy and is consistent with the Administration's overall position concerning abortion. I believe that it provides a more effective means of assuring that U.S. funds are not used for abortion. We will now ensure that any U.S. Government funds to nations which support abortion with other monies will be given through segregated accounts for purposes which are allowed under

legislation. As a practical matter, this has generally been the case; now it will be universal. And, we will no longer fund separate nongovernmental organizations which perform or actively promote abortions in other countries.

Draft recommendations for the Mexico meeting include one which states that countries "[t]o take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortions and, whenever possible, to provide for the humane treatment and counseling of women who have had recourse to illegal abortion." We will support this recommendation as it is fully consistent with our policy.

Our policy includes the need for broader access to family planning education and services, especially in the context of maternal/child health programs. National maternal/child health programs, however, are only one channel for distributing family planning services. As the recent "World Development Report" makes clear, one of the principal constraints on the practice of family planning is access to contraceptive knowledge and materials. Here the private sector can play a critical and cost-effective role. Thus, we have expanded our support for the marketing of contraceptives which can provide family planning at low cost through existing commercial channels. These channels can reach out beyond cities and to remote rural villages not easily served by centralized government programs and can provide assistance to families who may not have access to service from other sources. Provision of services which are acceptable within the cultural and religious context of each country is critical, and we believe that we have enhanced our programs in accordance with congressional mandates by including natural family planning methods where these are appropriate to the beliefs of the individuals and nations which we support.

In summary, we have a policy which emphasizes the need for voluntary family planning services, while ensuring that these do not include abortion as a method of family planning. Our policy also makes clear the importance of the links between economic development and effective family planning.

We will continue to carry out our population assistance programs with the cultural, economic, and political context of the countries we are assisting and in keeping with our own values

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy Zero-Sum Game?

Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the American Bar Association in Chicago on August 6, 1983. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State.

often said that where you sit influences how you think. For two centuries, the east coast dominated U.S. foreign policy. Not surprisingly, Europe was at the core of our international relations.

But today some well-known and influential thinkers believe that is changing. They say that America is reorienting itself from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Europe to Asia. This reorientation, they claim, is exacerbating growing policy divergence—indeed, divergence—between the United States and Europe. In some cases it is not clear whether these commentators favor such reorientation or simply believe that reorienting it will have a salutary effect on European thinking.

Lawyers bring special skills to world affairs, and the American Bar Association as an institution has played an innovative role in the development of U.S. foreign policy. Perhaps today, with members from Maine to California gathered here in America's heartland, we can cast a critical eye on the "Europe vs. Asia" debate.

Alleged Shift From Europe to Asia

As I first consider this notion that America is "tilting" toward Asia. Certainly the center of gravity of U.S. trade is to be shifting westward. Since the 1960s more U.S. trade has crossed the Pacific than the Atlantic—and the gap is widening. In 1983 our two-way trade with the Pacific totaled \$137 billion, up from some \$30 billion more than our two-way trade across the Atlantic. The "Pacific Rim" is now America's "Near East."

In addition, the Asian economies have surged while those of Europe have stagnated. Growth in Europe over the past decade has averaged about 2% annually. In contrast, the newly industrialized countries of Asia have grown at a 7% annual rate. And their manufacturing exports have grown at an annual clip.

These changes in the world have been paralleled by changes in the United States. Economic power and influence—as well as people—have migrated south and west. U.S. exports reflect that shift. The latest statistics (1981) show that California and Texas are the company's top two exporters of manufactured goods.

Perceived Divergence Between U.S. and Europe

This alleged shift from Europe to Asia has been exacerbated, in the eyes of some commentators, by a perceived divergence in security and economic policies between the United States and Europe. Whether this divergence is a cause or a consequence of the alleged shift in interest from Europe to Asia is unclear.

On the security front the most serious problem, in the opinion of these commentators, is that the United States bears a disproportionate burden of the cost of the common defense of Europe. They note that we spend about 1.7 times as much of our GNP [gross national product] on defense as does Western

Europe, and our allies strongly opposed this measure, but it still came within 14 votes of passage. A strong sentiment obviously exists in Congress that Europe is not carrying its share of the defense burden.

In the economic field, this decade has witnessed a major divergence in U.S. and European economic policies—and performance. Over the past 10 years, the big difference between the U.S. and European economies has not been in growth or inflation but in job creation. Between 1973 and 1983, 15 million new jobs were created in the United States. The West Europeans netted no new jobs in the same period. The ratio of employment to working-age population is higher in the United States (66%) than all of Western Europe except for Sweden. And the ratio is rising in the United States and falling in Europe, as more women participate in the U.S. labor force.

But why the higher rate of job formation in the United States, whether for men or women? Part of the answer is that in America we have dismantled burdensome regulations and lowered taxes so that market forces can work. In

... a major foreign policy accomplishment of this Administration is its success in encouraging the industrialized democracies—in Europe, Asia, and North America—to cooperate in developing global, not parochial, solutions to our common economic and security problems.

Europe. But this is a complex issue; no single measure can stand as an adequate indicator of relative burdensharing. The point is that more must be done by the Europeans, as well as ourselves and our Asian friends, to offset the relentless Soviet military buildup.

Yet, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia recently proposed in Congress that American forces in Europe be frozen now and reduced in future years if the European defense effort does not grow to meet specific target levels. The Ad-

ministration and our allies strongly opposed this measure, but it still came within 14 votes of passage. A strong sentiment obviously exists in Congress that Europe is not carrying its share of the defense burden.

Europe, fragmented markets (particularly in the service sector), a tradition of government intervention, and immobile, high-cost labor impede economic growth. Instead of the tonic of the marketplace, Europeans have too often chosen the dulling narcotic of subsidies and protectionism. Thus, Europe is struggling to match the vitality of Japan and of our own silicon valley. As one European statesman recently lamented: "The Japanese have a strategy. The Americans have a dream. But where do we fit in?"

The Questions Raised

The thesis that the United States is turning away from Europe in favor of Asia raises some fundamental questions.

First, is such a shift from Europe to Asia in fact taking place?

Second, if so, does it have either as a cause or a consequence increasing policy differences between the United States and Europe?

... the United States is a global power with global interests. We do not have the luxury of choosing to care about one region more than another.

Third, in the face of these developments, how can the industrialized democracies of Europe, North America, and Asia continue to meet the common challenges to their prosperity and peace?

Today, I should like to examine these questions. My own view is that international affairs is not a zero-sum game. There are, indeed, changes underway in both Europe and Asia—and in U.S. relations with both—but our policy is balanced, not tilted in one direction or the other. Yet, Asia is growing in importance in political, security, and especially economic terms; but no, our strengthened relations with Asia need not diminish our traditional ties to Europe. And those ties remain close despite—or, in some cases, because of—our differences and debates. Indeed, a major foreign policy accomplishment of this Administration is its success in encouraging the industrialized democracies—in Europe, Asia, and North America—to cooperate in developing global, not parochial, solutions to our common economic and security problems.

The Shift Toward Asia Reconsidered

Let's look again at the so-called "tilt" toward Asia. Increased U.S. interest in the Pacific Basin over the next decade seems likely to me. But this increased interest does not mean that Americans have just "discovered" Asia. Rather, it merely represents a return to a historical association.

Let us recall that America has been involved in Asia from the first days of

this nation. When George Washington was inaugurated, Yankee clippers already were in the port of Canton. Since 1945 we have fought two wars, both in Asia. The 7th (or Far East) Fleet has always been bigger than the 6th (or Mediterranean). Asian issues have played a role in at least five of the nine postwar presidential campaigns: remember 1948 (who lost China?); 1952 (Ike: I will go to Korea); 1960 (Quemoy

and Matsu); 1968 (Romney: I was brainwashed; Nixon: I have a plan); and 1972 (Kissinger: peace is at hand).

In short, a strong American interest in Asia has been the norm. What has been abnormal has been the low level of public interest in the aftermath of Vietnam. This Administration, however, has given a great deal of emphasis to our relations with Asia, and we have achieved results. U.S.-China relations, as exemplified by the President's recent visit, have been put on a sound, businesslike footing. U.S.-Japanese security relations are better than they have ever been, and we have succeeded in further opening up many Japanese markets for American products and capital. Finally, our relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are so good that during Secretary Shultz's trip last month to that region, no television network bothered to air a single report on his activities. As they say, no news is good news.

The Policy Divergence Reconsidered

Just as America's interest in Asia is not new, neither is dissent, division, and debate in the Atlantic alliance. How could it be otherwise in an organization composed of 16 vigorous democracies? Debate within each country, and between countries, is expected. And it beats the alternative.

So, before anyone proclaims the demise of NATO, let us put today's security and economic disagreements with Europe in perspective. Do you remember the 1949 debate over whether the United States should even commit

itself to a permanent, peacetime alliance? Or 1956 and our falling out with Britain and France over Suez? Remember the 1960s with the multilateral force and DeGaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's military structure? Remember the 1970s and the debates with Europe over Vietnam and the Middle East? And the 1970s and the criticism of America's "zig-zag" foreign policy?

History has its uses. One is to remind us that the present is less unique—and in this case less dire—we imagine. Our problems in the all today are real but not nearly of the magnitude of the ones I have just cited.

It is true, for example, that in the security sphere Western Europe is too parochial. But let's remember that Americans and Europeans have always had different perspectives on security. The Europeans sit next door to the Soviet Union. Former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt often pointed out that his home in Hamburg is on kilometers from the East German border. For a Chicagoan, that is as the Iron Curtain fell straight down middle of Lake Michigan.

And yet, Western Europe still demonstrates genuine concern for international security issues. U.S. and European forces serve together not only Berlin but also in the Sinai. France, for example, has forces defending Western interests not only in the Mediterranean but also in Africa; and the United Kingdom has forces on station in the Central American country of Belize well as on the Rhine.

It is also true that our NATO alliance could do more with respect to the conventional defense of Europe. And in 1983—the Year of the Missile—the alliance rebuffed a determined Soviet attempt to divide it. Instead, we and allies united in support of the 1979 NATO "dual-track" decision to seek negotiate limits on intermediate-range nuclear missiles and, if necessary, deploy such missiles ourselves. After arms control negotiations failed to remove the threat posed by well over 200 Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe, NATO began to deploy counterbalancing forces.

The willingness of European governments to deploy these missiles is another demonstration of their political courage and their commitment to the alliance. That courage and commitment are not limited to governments alone. Recent elections in Europe demonstrate that the people support the alliance.

ss. In elections last year, supporters alliance and of the 1979 NATO on won clear mandates in all three major countries that are deploy-intermediate-range missiles to er the Soviet monopoly. s for those economic differences I earlier, it is true that Europe imes succumbs to protectionism. Despite European protectionism, our ce on current account with the ean Community switched from a lllion deficit in 1980 to a \$3-billion as in 1983. And the volume of our ay trade with Europe is quite —over \$100 billion annually. As tary Shultz has said in discussing European trade: "We must be something right."

Tasks Ahead

e compared our relations with Asia Europe. It should be clear that gthening our ties with Asia, while taneously encouraging debate and oy consensus within the Atlantic ce, are not only compatible but, in mutually reinforcing activities. reflect a simple geopolitical fact: nited States is a global power with l interests. We do not have the lux-f choosing to care about one region than another. We should not write e Atlantic alliance or prescribe (like the Nunn amendment's troop tions) far worse than the ailment. er should we ignore the burgeoning Asian economies. Rather, the ean-U.S.-Asian relationship should ewed in complementary, not com-e, terms. Europe gains, not loses, strengthened U.S.-Asian ties. And gains, not loses, from strengthened European ties.

n short, we must close ranks and ogether, not apart. This is par-rly true if we are to meet the two important tasks of the 1980s: ng protectionism—which threatens l prosperity; and meeting the t challenge—which threatens the

ighting Protectionism. The U.S. ation has shifted to the south and as the smokestack industries in orth and east have declined. Some we should protect those declining tries from import competition. You ow the arguments against protec-sm. You know about the importance mparative advantage and consumer e. I shall not dwell on those notions v, for we in the United States have ally avoided protectionism. Instead,

we have used deregulation and tax changes to create a climate in which new technologies—and new jobs—flourish. There have been exceptions and qualifications to this policy, but on the whole we have held to it.

The decline of our old industries has led us to import more basic goods from abroad. This contributes to our trade deficit. Until last year the biggest current account deficit ever experienced by a country in a single year was \$15 billion. Arthur Burns recently noted that the current account shortfall we are headed for this year, now estimated to be \$80-\$100 billion, is "awesomely different from anything experienced in the past." This deficit makes the need to fight protectionism in common with Europe and Asia both more imperative and more difficult than ever before.

Europe's old industries, like ours, are also in decline. The steel mills of Lorraine and the Ruhr are in trouble. The shipyards on the Clyde in Scotland are laid low. But, unlike the United States, Europe has failed over the past decade to create new jobs and develop new technologies. Efforts to protect dying industries through subsidies and trade barriers have stifled the technological innovation the European economies need. Lagging economic performance in turn complicates the effort to increase the strength of Europe's defenses. It is thus imperative that Europe be encouraged to resist protectionism.

satellites, and—something important to me and all of you as well—legal services. We must continue to build upon the progress that has been made. The United States, Europe, and Asia must all remember that erecting trade barriers invites retaliation. And retaliation is a threat to the one out of every eight American jobs dependent on exports.

Meeting the Soviet Challenge. The second task that demands the combined efforts of North America, Europe, and Asia is meeting the Soviet challenge. To be successful, countries on all three continents need to adopt a global, not a regional, outlook. For example, Europe initially viewed the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) as a purely European problem. However, more than one-third of all Soviet SS-20s are in Asia. For that reason, the United States saw INF as a global problem and proposed global limits. During the negotiations, the Europeans and the Japanese also came to appreciate that SS-20s pose a worldwide problem. Faced with this common front, the Soviets eventually accepted the need for a global solution to INF. Unfortunately, no agreement has been reached because the Soviets continue to demand a monopoly on such weapons and have refused to negotiate further.

Another aspect of meeting the Soviet challenge is strengthening our collective defenses. The United States is

... more than one-third of all Soviet SS-20s are in Asia. For that reason the United States saw INF as a global problem and proposed global limits.

Fortunately, the Europeans have always understood that market access must be reciprocal—at least in areas other than agriculture. The Japanese, however, have been slower to endorse reciprocity. U.S. trade policy is aimed at achieving the same access to Japan's markets that Japanese goods have to ours. The trade package announced in April by Prime Minister Nakasone is the latest of several encouraging steps in that direction. Progress has been made on beef, citrus, tobacco, telecommunications, semiconductors, and capital market liberalization. But more needs to be done on tariffs on forest products,

increasing its effort, as we believe it must. But Europe must also do its full share. Only in this way can we expect to maintain a cohesive alliance and a credible deterrent.

The level of spending is not the only issue. Last year the debate in NATO was over nuclear missiles. In the coming years, the focus will be on conventional defense. In the past there has been a difference of perspective on this issue, with the United States favoring strong conventional defenses to keep the nuclear threshold high; and many Euro-

peans tending to favor reliance on nuclear forces as the only guarantee against conventional war fought on their territory. Now there is a ferment of new ideas on conventional defense: new technologies, new tactics, and new resources. If we approach this opportunity with skill and ingenuity, the alliance can emerge militarily stronger and politically more cohesive, just as was the case with INF deployments.

In Asia, Japan, too, needs to do more. We support Japan's commitment to protect its air- and sealanes out to 1,000 miles. In recent years, Japan's defense spending has increased by nearly 5% per year in real terms. But we believe that the pace of Japan's efforts must be stepped up even more in the face of the Soviet threat to Asian stability.

Finally, Japan and Europe must be more concerned about threats to our common security arising in distant regions. Europeans often argue that detente has been largely successful in Europe. But Europe, like the United States, has vital interests at stake in areas, such as the Persian Gulf, far from its own borders. That is why the United States, Europe, Japan, and our other Asian friends must work in concert to oppose Soviet adventurism and to promote stability throughout the world.

Conclusion

We have made great progress toward the development of concerted policies. This Administration has sought not merely to strengthen our bilateral ties with Asia and Europe but to encourage greater interaction among all members of the community of advanced industrialized democracies. This new and more cohesive allied consensus, spanning three continents, was in evidence at last year's economic summit meeting in Williamsburg. With President Reagan as host, the leaders of the seven largest industrialized democracies of North America, Europe, and Asia took a historic step. Up to that time the annual summit meetings, which began in 1975, had dealt only with economic matters. But at Williamsburg, in addition to the traditional economic business of the summit, the seven leaders issued a statement explicitly recognizing that the security of each nation was indivisible from that of the others; the statement also supported the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet threat.

This year's summit meeting in London, under Prime Minister Thatcher's leadership, built on the success of Williamsburg. And again, the heads of government of the seven summit countries demonstrated the growing political consensus that binds us together as a community of democratic states with shared values and common interests. The seven leaders discussed an unprecedented range of political and security problems. They issued a series of declarations on democratic values, East-West relations, and terrorism. The range of their discussions demonstrated that the economic and security concerns

of the industrialized democracies are common and truly global.

In economics it is generally recognized that trade is not a zero-sum game. Growth in our trade with Europe or Asia creates greater opportunities—and wealth—for all.

International relations, like trade, need not be a zero-sum game. Every benefits, if each takes a global rather than a parochial view of the problem that face us all. In short, there will be no losers if we resist—as we must—temptation to permit where we sit to determine how we think. ■

Ninth Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act

Nine years ago, in Helsinki, Finland, the United States and Canada joined 33 Eastern and Western European governments in signing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Helsinki accords, which committed the signing nations to abide by a set of universal standards of international conduct and fundamental human rights, hold out a beacon of hope for human dignity and freedom.

The United States remains firmly committed to the full implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki accords. During the past year, there have been a number of significant developments in the CSCE. Last September, the 3-year-long Madrid followup meeting was successfully concluded, with the adoption of important new provisions intended to advance the cause of human rights, including trade union and religious freedom. The Stockholm conference on European security was opened, where we have proposed measures to lessen the risk of surprise attack in Europe. Just as the United States and its allies played an essential role in achieving a positive outcome at Madrid, we have advanced concrete proposals at Stockholm to enhance East-West security.

Unfortunately, the promises of the Helsinki Final Act have all too frequently gone unfulfilled. The Helsinki accords pledge the signatory states "to respect human rights and fundamental

freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." There are also commitments to advance trade union freedoms, to combat terrorism, reunify families, to encourage the free flow of information, and more.

Over the years, there have been some gradual, hard-won gains. But often in Eastern Europe, and particularly in the Soviet Union, we find a different story—repression of dissent, restraints on religious freedoms, refusal to permit citizens to emigrate, jamming of Western radio broadcasts, support of terrorism, and disbanding of free trade unions. The plight of Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Elena Bonner is one very important example among many where the denial of basic human rights impedes the development of more constructive East-West relationships we seek.

The challenge is a formidable one to give real meaning, through deeds, to the promise of the Helsinki process. We have realistic expectations, a patient approach, and are prepared for serious dialogue. We call upon all CSCE states to foster human rights and freedom through the promise and commitment of the Helsinki Final Act.

Press release 175 of Aug. 2, 1984. ■

Current Developments in the Middle East

Richard W. Murphy

Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Foreign Affairs Committee on May 5, 1984. Ambassador Murphy is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.¹

This is a time of steady, sustained action on our part to maintain stability in the region and to deal with persistent conflicts. The gulf war seems to be on its own momentum in a twilight beyond any reason or logic for either Iran or Iraq. Lebanon is beginning the slow and painful process of healing from 9 years of bitter war. Israel has just held its national elections and will now proceed to form a new government. When that government has been established, it can turn its attention to addressing the urgent problems of Lebanon, the peace process, and the Israeli economy. We will be engaged in pursuing the long process of achieving a durable peace between Israel and the Arab states.

Iran Conflict

The war in the gulf has evolved into a waiting game, with a quarter of a million Iranian troops massed in the northern sector for a major offensive that may come tomorrow—or never. Meanwhile, preparations for the attack continue, as do efforts to strengthen defensive positions. In the gulf, the war continues at an uneven but furious pace. The Iraqis are continuing their sporadic attacks against shipping serving Iranian ports in an attempt to force Iran to negotiate, and the Iraqis are retaliating against ships serving neutral ports. For the moment, the situation is not getting any better—nor is it getting any worse—but this is a stalemate duel. The danger is real that it at any moment ignite a wider con-

front. The single bright spot is the cease-fire against attacks on civilian populations which was proposed by the Secretary General and agreed to by Iran and Iraq June 12. That cease-fire is still holding, despite some claims of violations by both sides. We would support any efforts to broaden the agreement, but we have no evidence

that Iran is yet willing to accept either a wider cease-fire or one limited to gulf shipping and ports.

The gulf states, meanwhile, are strengthening their own defenses, while continuing to emphasize that a diplomatic solution to the war deserves the highest priority. In the first instance, they will rely on their own resources to deter or prevent aggression against their own territories and shipping in their waters. Their capabilities to defend themselves have grown steadily over the last decade—to a large extent due to the sustained assistance we and Western Europe have provided through our military supply and training relationships. Our objective has been to strengthen their security by developing a credible defense capability. In the case of Saudi Arabia our policy has been especially effective. We believe our prompt support for Saudi self-defense, in combination with Saudi determination to defend itself without being provocative, has played an important role in checking escalation in the northern gulf. We are now engaged in discussions with several of the other states, including Kuwait and Bahrain, to assess ways in which we could further strengthen their individual and collective defense capabilities on a near-term basis.

Our one overriding objective in the gulf war is to bring it to an end. We have consistently supported the pursuit of every avenue to a negotiated settlement which would leave neither party dominant and which would preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both. Those efforts have thus far not borne fruit, nor will they until both sides agree that it is time to stop the bloodletting. But it is important that the efforts continue.

It is also our objective to avoid direct U.S. military involvement in the fighting. Thus far we have been successful. We trust that our success will continue, but we must continue intensive planning for contingencies which might be beyond the capabilities of the Arab states of the gulf to meet, even while we help them develop the capability to provide for their own self-defense.

Retaining Access to Oil Supplies

It is in our vital interest that the world retain access to the oil supplies of the gulf. We are not seeking military in-

volvement in the war, but neither do our interests permit us to ignore it or to allow the gulf to be closed to our ships or those of our allies and friends. Our strategy, therefore, has been one of pursuing diplomacy while cooperating with the gulf states and our allies to prevent or to be prepared to deal with a military crisis if regional capabilities prove inadequate.

Our consultations with our allies have included energy preparedness. We have worked with the International Energy Agency (IEA) for some months to lay out a broad approach to dealing with a major supply disruption. We are pleased with the July 11 decision of the IEA's governing board that early drawdown of emergency oil stocks, and other mutually supportive actions to restore supply-demand balance, are vital elements in minimizing the economic effects of a disruption.

Despite the protracted nature of the war and the continued shipping losses, there has been no appreciable drop in oil exports from the gulf, and prices on the spot market have fallen. While the price weakness is primarily due to the continued glut of oil on the market, it may also in part reflect world confidence that the United States and its allies will ensure that the energy supplies continue.

I would note in this context, and in a larger context as well, that our military supply relationship with many countries in the Middle East not only allows them to provide for their own security—a burden we are not called upon to bear—but it also provides a concrete means of maintaining American influence in the region. The states of the Middle East are going to seek arms to defend themselves. The only question is, who will supply those arms. To the extent that our longstanding military supply relationships are supplanted by arms purchases from elsewhere—the Soviet Union or even Western Europe—our own influence is diminished. This has implications for our ability to move the peace process forward or to aid in resolving crises within the region, wherever they may develop.

Israel

Let me turn for a moment to Israel. Although you are all aware of the results thus far of the Israeli elections, I thought it might be useful to go over them with you. With over 98% of the vote in, projections for the 120 seats in Israel's 11th *Knesset* indicate no clear victory for either the Labor Alignment (45 seats) or the Likud (41). As the smaller parties are doing well, it appears that the coalition-forming process may be prolonged.

The projections thus far are not definitive. The final breakdown for party representation in the 11th *Knesset* will not be determined for a day or two. In the face of this uncertainty, it would be inappropriate to make any predictions about what party will lead the next government or what that government's policies will be.

After the election results are published early next week, President Herzog will begin to consult with the parties prior to giving one party the first opportunity to form a government. There is no time limit within which President Herzog must make his choice, although it usually takes only a few days.

Whatever the outcome of the election, we do expect and intend to continue our close cooperative relationship with the next Israeli Government.

Lebanon

Concerning Lebanon, since my appearance before this subcommittee in June, the national unity government of Prime Minister Karami has begun to im-

plement a security plan for the greater Beirut area. The "green line" has been reopened between east and west Beirut, and the airport and main seaport are also open. These are welcome signs that the Lebanese Government is having some success in addressing the many problems before it and that the various political factions are beginning to come together. The United States has strongly backed efforts to form a more broadly based government and to undertake the internal reforms needed for reconciliation between Lebanon's warring factions. We hope the government will make further progress toward restoring stability and security.

We believe that Syria has been one of the helpful players in these recent developments. We also believe that Lebanon needs peaceful, cooperative relations with both Syria and Israel. No lasting solution is possible which fails to take into account the interests of both of these important neighbors. We will continue to encourage Lebanon to deal directly with Israel on the issue of Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and security arrangements along their border.

But there is a long and difficult road ahead for the Lebanese people and for their government. We will be supportive of every effort which advances the goals of restoring unity and national reconciliation and the withdrawal of foreign forces. In the final analysis, however, both we and the Lebanese realize that they themselves must take the prime responsibility in dealing with their own problems. We can help; other friends can help; but the basic solution is in their own hands.

Jordan

With Jordan, we continue to enjoy productive relations on many levels. As befits friends, we have maintained a ongoing dialogue on many issues—Jordanian security and economic development, the Iran-Iraq war and stability in the gulf, and prospects for broader peace in the area. Jordan has maintained its continuing interest in seeking a political solution to the conflict with Israel.

Finally, I would like to touch on the peace process. We are committed to seeking progress toward a just and lasting peace wherever progress is possible. We also remain committed to the positions in the President's initiative of September 1, 1982. The United States has a consistent record, which has extended over succeeding Administrations, of seeking to promote progress toward peace whenever the opportunities for progress have arisen. We will work to ensure that no opportunity is lost.

¹The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

International Narcotics Control

Ground

use of heroin, cocaine, marijuana, other dangerous drugs causes health and social problems in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and other countries, including nations in which these drugs are produced and/or transshipped. The United States consumes annually 4.1 metric tons of imported heroin, 50–61 metric tons of imported marijuana, and 13,600–14,000 metric tons of marijuana, much of it imported. Production of these drugs far exceeds estimated demand. For example, if all illicit coca leaf currently produced were converted to cocaine, it would yield about 227 metric tons of cocaine; worldwide demand is about 80 metric tons a year. Worldwide illicit opium production exceeds 1,700 metric tons, compared to 41 metric tons needed to supply the United States addicts.

Sources

Heroin, for conversion to heroin and in world markets, is grown primarily in three areas—Mexico; the “Golden Triangle” of Burma, Thailand, and Laos; the “Golden Crescent” of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Most of the heroin and, recently, much of the heroin used in Southeast and Southwest Asia are consumed by increasingly addict populations in those areas.

Cocaine is derived primarily from leaves grown in Bolivia and Peru trafficked through Colombia, which has become a coca producer.

Marijuana, too, comes from many areas. Although Colombia still produces more than half of the U.S. marijuana supply, U.S. domestic production imports from Mexico and Jamaica supply about 41% of the total.

Methaqualone, a tranquilizer widely used in the United States and other areas, has been shipped in bulk from Europe and Asia to clandestine labs in Colombia and elsewhere for processing and rerouting to the United States. But availability has dropped sharply thanks to effective control at the source.

Department of State Role

The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), directed by an assistant secretary, is charged with coordinating the U.S. Government's international drug control activities. INM aims to strengthen U.S. diplomatic and program efforts to reduce the supply of dangerous drugs entering the United States. The bureau receives about \$41 million annually for bilateral and multilateral narcotics control programs. These funds are used for:

- Crop eradication and control programs;
- Law enforcement assistance;
- Equipment and materials;
- Training of foreign law enforcement personnel;
- Development assistance to provide economic alternatives for illicit narcotics crops; and
- Technical assistance for demand reduction programs.

INM works with narcotics coordinators in the Department's regional bureaus and U.S. Embassies and collaborates with the Agency for International Development (AID) on new projects linking narcotics control with development assistance in Bolivia, Peru, and Pakistan. INM participates in multilateral control efforts with UN agencies and cooperates with the White House, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and other concerned U.S. agencies on domestic and international activities.

Narcotics control, a matter of government responsibility under treaties, should be dealt with as an international obligation. Producer and transit countries have the primary responsibility under treaties for controlling the cultivation, reproduction, and distribution of illicit narcotics. In assisting these countries, INM places highest priority on programs to control production and prohibit trafficking at the source.

Programs

The worldwide supply of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs is so great, and trafficking channels to the United States so diverse, that major interdictions and even crop eradications cause only temporary declines in

availability when achieved in just one or two producing areas. INM's strategy is based on the ultimate objective of simultaneously controlling production in all key geographic sectors so that significant and lasting reductions are achieved.

INM has drug control projects in key opium producing nations (Burma, Thailand, Mexico, and Pakistan) and in transit countries through which opium is refined into heroin or transshipped. INM supports coca control and cocaine interdiction projects in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia and projects to control marijuana production and trafficking in Mexico and Colombia. It also supports interdiction and enforcement efforts in other producer and transit nations in the three target regions—Latin America and Southeast and Southwest Asia—and assists dozens of countries through INM-funded law enforcement and customs training programs.

Multilateral Efforts

Drug abuse is not just an American problem; it affects all nations from the poorest to the wealthiest, countries that produce and traffic in drugs, and those that are consumers.

Historically the U.S. Government has borne much of the cost of international control programs; now it is urging other nations to assist through their own bilateral programs, through direct economic assistance to producer countries, and through multilateral activities. The U.S. Government has urged international financial institutions to target development programs in narcotics-producing areas whenever feasible.

The U.S. Government also pursues international narcotics control objectives in the UN General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and other UN agencies that coordinate multilateral efforts to control production, trafficking, and abuse. These latter efforts are directed by the UN Commission on Narcotics Drugs, its Division for Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board, and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, which supports key drug control projects throughout the world. The U.S. Government helped create the fund and, to date, has contributed the largest single amount of the fund's resources.

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Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual Obligations

by Richard T. Kennedy

Address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., on June 28, 1984. Ambassador Kennedy is special adviser to the Secretary on nonproliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs.

It is a great pleasure and honor for me to have the opportunity to speak to this very distinguished audience. I particularly enjoy an opportunity to step back from the trees in order to take a look at the forest—to take a look at the bigger picture. In dealing with nonproliferation problems on a day-to-day basis, one must not lose sight of the basic objectives and policies which guide us, and it is helpful to reexamine them periodically.

What I would like to discuss with you is both the fundamental importance and the implications of being a reliable nuclear supplier. At the outset, let me assert that the nonproliferation regime in place today could not have been achieved and cannot be maintained for the future without widespread confidence in the reliability of supply and cooperative undertakings in the nuclear arena. But it is equally true that reliability of supply implies obligations not only on the part of suppliers but on the part of recipients as well.

Over 30 years ago, President Eisenhower took a historic step which, in a sense, created the worldwide civilian nuclear industry: he inaugurated the Atoms for Peace program in 1953. The United States volunteered to share the nuclear technologies it had developed so that they could benefit all mankind. In the intervening years, American policy has sought to assure that nations could benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear technology under a system which prevented the misuse of that technology. Atoms for peace, not war, has been our objective. Our basic approach today is one of continuity with the principles of the past—to assure the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to prevent its misuse. All of our efforts have been bent to the task of ensuring that these principles are not only honored in the abstract but are given concrete expression in practice.

There is now in place an international nuclear regime which, while clearly not perfect, is functioning effectively. We want to make that regime and the institutions, norms, and practices which comprise it, stronger, more complete, and more effective. This Administration, like its predecessors, has fully embraced nonproliferation as a high priority and has taken numerous steps to further the objective of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Let me cite a few specifics.

- We have actively encouraged additional adherence to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].
- We have provided strong financial and technical support to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards.
- We have implemented the voluntary offer to accept IAEA safeguards.
- We ratified the physical security convention and have strongly urged others to do so.
- We ratified Protocol I of the treaty of Tlatelolco and have urged others to ratify the treaty to bring it fully into force.
- We have made considerable progress in addressing the problem of safeguards on large reprocessing plants.
- We have pursued an initiative aimed at the adoption by all major suppliers of comprehensive safeguards as a condition for future nuclear supply commitments.
- We have buttressed U.S. alliances and security ties that reduce incentives to acquire nuclear explosives.

In addition, there has been a number of other developments which have strengthened the nonproliferation regime, for example:

- China has taken steps to participate in international nonproliferation efforts and has joined the IAEA.
- South Africa announced earlier this year that it would require IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear exports and is also discussing with the IAEA the application of safeguards to its new semicommercial enrichment plant.
- The trigger lists have been further clarified and refined.

We also can and should take considerable satisfaction from the progress we have made in strengthening those internationally agreed rules of nuclear trade without which peaceful nuclear commerce would not be possible.

In the United States, we have laid policies, and procedures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Every other major nuclear exporting country has adopted its own although obviously not wholly identical restrictions. We can and should take considerable comfort from these facts.

The Need To Strengthen Rules of Nuclear Trade

But let us be completely candid: there are strains on the existing norms, and there is need for still further efforts to broaden and strengthen these rules of nuclear trade.

In many countries, there are large nuclear industries created at a time when projected energy demand was much greater and when it seemed that the future for nuclear power was unbounded. But times have changed, and we are all faced with the problem of how to preserve those nuclear industries for the future when demand for nuclear power will again grow—as I believe will. In this situation, it is only natural that competitive pressures are intense. And those pressures are focused increasingly on the effort to find new markets abroad.

But it is in the interest of every nation—supplier and purchaser alike—competition for those markets becaut out in terms of such factors, for example, as the quality and capacity of equipment, know-how, and expertise and delivery schedules. These are the traditional and understood grounds for competition in the marketplace.

Competition must not be conducted in a way that it will hinge on the readiness of a supplier to shade safeguards or other nonproliferation conditions, to look for possible technology sweeteners that will make purchasing from it seem more attractive than from another country that honors existing sound norms. For, once the process of shading our shared nonproliferation standards begins, we will

with the lowest common denominator of what can be agreed to by nations. Each will be motivated by its or the world's long-term interests but by short-term gain and fear of its neighbors might do. Under these conditions, the nonproliferation regime will gradually unravel, and we find ourselves unable to realize the promise for the health and well-being of all.

Let me emphasize that, for our part, the United States has never sacrificed, and will never sacrifice, its nonproliferation principles for commercial gain or economic advantage. We have set this standard for our own conduct. We believe it should be the universal norm. The prospective emergence of new players on the scene adds even greater urgency to efforts to preserve and strengthen the agreed rules of nuclear commerce. If there is disharmony and inconsistency among the major nuclear supplier conditions for nuclear export, new suppliers inevitably will be tempted to use nonproliferation conditions as a bargaining factor in their purchases. If they see existing suppliers performing in this way, what else can they reasonably expect? By contrast, the agreement now among the existing suppliers on sound guidelines and a commitment to honor those guidelines will make it easier to urge new suppliers to live up to those agreed and sensible export practices in the future.

Let me say further word about such common export policies and guidelines: it is not that no list of sensitive materials can ever be immutable. The items on such a list must change over time as technologies change and as our understanding of technologies becomes deeper and deeper. But there are other items whose inclusion on the sensitive activities list is more permanent. What should we do, for example, if a nation seeks to buy a computer that could be useful in the operation of a safeguarded reprocessing plant? Where do we get to the heart of the dual-use question: the same computer that could help in the operation of a reprocessing plant could also be used quite properly and harmlessly in a large industrial facility. How should the nations of the world decide which request to grant and which to reject? The nuclear-exporting states, after all, are those most likely to be in a position to export a computer in question. Should there be a policy aimed at foreclosing the export of any item which has a dual use?

Should any item be barred which could conceivably find its way into a facility which could be used in developing nuclear explosives?

These are not simple questions, and there are no simple answers. Clearly, for example, a blanket export prohibition might prevent the construction of a perfectly respectable—indeed, vitally necessary—chemical plant in a developing country. But by the same token, the potential dangers cannot be ignored.

If we can have confidence that the intended use of that mythical computer is not related to the manufacture of nuclear explosives, the question is clearly much easier to answer. But how can the requesting nation generate that confidence? One clear answer would be by adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or, in the case of Latin American countries, by accepting and agreeing to be bound by the treaty of Tlatelolco. The voluntary acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all of a country's nuclear facilities and activities is yet another way to generate that needed confidence.

Let me elaborate. In order to manufacture nuclear explosives, a nation needs two things.

First is the know-how and technical backup—the scientists and the necessary materials and equipment. This is the technical side of the equation and, though the barriers are considerable and must remain so, more and more nations are coming to possess the technical wherewithal to cross those barriers.

Second is the political decision to “go nuclear.” A nation must consciously make this hard decision. Presumably, it would make that decision because it sees some benefit to itself in doing so. This is the political ingredient. After all is said and done, the political ingredient is by far the more important. All the export controls that suppliers can devise or safeguards that the IAEA can implement cannot forever bar a country from acquiring nuclear explosives. A nation, however, can rule out “going nuclear” by an act of political will. It can turn its back on the development of nuclear weapons by adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting safeguards on all its nuclear activities. Over 120 non-nuclear-weapons states so far have done just that. Adherence to a regional treaty such as the treaty of Tlatelolco can serve the same purpose.

But there is more to it than a simple signature on a treaty. The best way for a nation to demonstrate its bona fides—the most graphic way—is to accept safeguards in spirit as well as in the letter. It is unseemly for nations with facilities subject to safeguards to haggle about the niceties of safeguards—whether a given action or a particular technical change is within the writ of a particular IAEA safeguards agreement. Instead of a preoccupation with preventing the agency from going beyond the precise legal letter of safeguards—a preoccupation with form over substance—such nations—indeed, all nations—should work to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and help it to perform its vital task.

Only such a cooperative attitude can provide the proper basis for nuclear commerce. Without it, that mutual trust and confidence, which is essential to continued use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, will be lacking. For after we strip away all the verbiage, it comes down to this: trust must be the predicate for all nuclear commerce. The exporting nation must have confidence that the materials it exports will not be turned into devices of war and destruction; the recipient nation must have confidence that, having demonstrated by word and deed its own bona fides, it can get the help it needs to realize the atom's peaceful promise.

A Positive Approach to Nuclear Power

While there has been a broad continuity with past administrations on nonproliferation policy goals, the Reagan Administration has placed more emphasis on the need for mutual confidence among exporting and recipient countries. There are several aspects of present policy which impact on this.

The Administration, for instance, has taken a very positive approach to nuclear power. It considers nuclear power to be a clean, efficient, and safe way to generate electricity. It is not considered a choice of last resort. Instead, it is seen to be a key element in our domestic energy future. And nuclear-generated energy is recognized as important for the economic development and energy security of many nations. The Administration stands by the idea that where the necessary nonproliferation conditions are met, nations can and should have access to the benefits of nuclear energy.

Next, the Administration firmly believes that the United States must be—and must be seen to be—a predictable and reliable supplier of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. For only in that event can the United States reasonably expect to exert the influence which its technological experience and competence could rightly be presumed to yield. In his key nonproliferation policy statement of July 1981, President Reagan noted that many friends of the United States had lost confidence in our ability to recognize their needs. Therefore, he called for the reestablishment of this nation as a “predictable and reliable partner under adequate safeguards.”

Another important aspect of this Administration's policies involves its attitude toward reprocessing and the use of plutonium. There is no question that plutonium is an inherently dangerous substance. How to control it has always been a very real and substantial challenge for the nonproliferation regime. U.S. policy seeks to inhibit the spread of sensitive technology, equipment, and material which could lead to production of weapons-useable material, particularly where there is a risk of proliferation. We want to restrict the number of reprocessing plants around the world and to limit other sensitive fuel cycle activities. These are not and should not be items of general commerce.

The approach to these concerns and objectives, however, has not been to seek the abandonment of reprocessing in any of the industrialized countries or the reversal of plans to enlarge existing capabilities. Instead of a universal approach aimed at foreclosing reprocessing and plutonium use everywhere, a coherent, realistic, yet prudent plutonium use policy is being pursued which differentiates among countries on the basis of their needs and their nonproliferation credentials. Specifically, President Reagan decided that the United States should not attempt to inhibit or set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs and where it did not constitute a proliferation risk. An important aspect of this approach is a willingness under the proper circumstances to grant programmatic approvals for the reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel—approvals which we believe are essential to the maintenance and improvement of close relationships with our industrialized nuclear partners.

The effort to pursue a more positive approach to nuclear cooperation—to be perceived as a reliable nuclear partner and to be a reliable supplier as contemplated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act—is a key element of the Administration's policy. The United States realizes that it cannot take a unilateral approach to nuclear supplier policy if it is to continue to play a meaningful role with respect to nuclear commerce and the nonproliferation regime. We no longer possess the degree of influence in the nuclear field—scientific or commercial—that we once enjoyed. Indeed, none of today's suppliers does. As mastery of the technology has become more widespread, the ability of any one nation to influence others through a nuclear supply relationship, let alone dictate their nuclear energy choices, has diminished. This trend can only continue over the long term, particularly as new suppliers enter the scene.

But what does being a reliable supplier mean in terms of specifics? It is essential that nuclear trading partners have confidence that if they adopt and apply the strong nonproliferation stance of which I have spoken, the suppliers, including the United States, will be responsible to the needs of their nuclear programs. Needlessly long delays in responding to specific requests must be avoided. And requests must be responded to in a consistent manner. If such confidence is not maintained, these partners will inevitably seek to disengage themselves from dependence on the otherwise responsible suppliers and look elsewhere.

Nuclear trading partners also must believe that they can conduct commercial nuclear relations with each other without running the risk that new legal requirements of one side will change the name of the game without the other's consent. They must not be led to think that, at any time, they may be forced to choose between breaking off a relationship which is crucial to their own economy or accepting intrusions by others into matters they believe are within the scope of their sovereignty. Such unpredictability and change does not serve nonproliferation interests.

As an example—and only that—consider one side effect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. That act provided a positive benefit by establishing a new legislative underpinning for U.S. nuclear exports. But, unfortunately, the perception of some of our closest allies was that it called into question existing

agreements. At least in the initial stages of the implementation of the law, many nations perceived it as an attempt to substitute unilaterally U.S. desires for international consensus in the nuclear field. It appeared to them that we were using domestic legislative and administrative processes to adopt rules for the conduct of nuclear commerce—which affected their own nuclear programs—thereby imposing those rules on our trading partners by fiat. We were perceived to be ignoring the traditional forms of agreement, accommodation, negotiation, and mutual adjustment of interests which characterize international diplomacy. Consequently, we were less able to win their support on pricing supply, safeguards, and other nonproliferation matters.

With time we believe we are regaining the confidence and trust of our nuclear partner; but one lesson is clear—in the future we should seek to avoid major sudden changes in nuclear export policy. As I noted, I cite this experience only as an example—an example which could be repeated by a supplier if it acts unilaterally and without developing the climate of a ment and support which a successful nonproliferation regime requires. But that is not to say that we would shirk from pursuing a course that we consider the proper one—that we would sacrifice principle on the altar of harmony.

But what about recipient countries which for one reason or another have not demonstrated their own bona fides through adherence to the NPT or, at least, acceptance of full-scope safeguards. Certainly, such countries must not have the degree of access to nuclear goods that countries which have taken these actions enjoy. However, it is self-defeating to preclude maintaining dialogue with countries which pursue nuclear policies different from our own. We must allow ourselves some maneuvering room to influence the nuclear policies of such countries to move them to accept international nonproliferation norms.

Let me return to the point I made at the beginning. I have tried to illustrate that reliability of supply implies obligations not only on the part of suppliers but on the part of recipients as well. Suppliers can only be seen as capricious if they are or are perceived to be attempting to dictate unilaterally and in an absolutist fashion the scope and terms of international commerce. In the same token, only if they are seen to be reliable, reasonable, and predictable

Competitive Challenges of Global Telecommunications

by William Schneider, Jr.

Statement before the Subcommittee of Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on July 25, 1984. Mr. Schneider is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.¹

I would like to preface my remarks by commenting that the global system of international communications satellites is a magnificent achievement of U.S. policy based on the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. While the telecommunications revolution founded on satellite technology seems almost a routine achievement these days, this was not the case 20 years ago when the INTELSAT [International Telecommunications Satellite Organization] system was conceived.

We know by experience that even great successes give rise to new questions, to new issues, even to new problems. It is appropriate that we should from time to time review our international communications satellite policies and their instruments to see if they best meet the changing requirements and opportunities that the continuing developments of telecommunications technology provide. I am not here to criticize INTELSAT, INMARSAT [International Maritime Satellite Organization], or COMSAT [Communications Satellite Corporation]; they have performed beyond the expectations of their founders, including the Congress, and deserve praise for their achievements. I am here to comment on proposals to amend the rules of COMSAT's participation in the international satellite organizations in light of changing times and to discuss the Department of State perspectives and responsibilities in the instructional process and related matters.

COMSAT Instruction Process

The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, as amended, provides the framework for U.S. international satellite policies. The act sets out the

basis for U.S. participation in the international satellite organizations, INTELSAT and INMARSAT, and created a private sector corporation, COMSAT, to own and represent the U.S. shares in those organizations.

The development of policies toward the international satellite organizations is complex since we are dealing with continuously operating international commercial organizations and with a private sector public corporation, COMSAT, as signatory to agreements establishing INTELSAT and INMARSAT. COMSAT sits on the executive board of both organizations which hold formal sessions quarterly. As in any business, there are a host of internal management functions which require directions from a board representing shareholders. There are also issues which affect international telecommunications policies. As an example, there are INTELSAT's objectives as a user of orbit locations and radio frequencies which do not necessarily coincide with those of the United States or other members.

Congress foresaw the need for governmental oversight and included provisions for Presidential instructions to COMSAT in the 1962 act. The President has delegated that responsibility to the Secretary of State. The instruction procedure was set out in a letter from the Department of State to COMSAT on August 18, 1966, resulting from an agreement between the Department, FCC [Federal Communications Commission], and the then Office of Telecommunications Management in the Executive Office of the President.

The procedures are that COMSAT provides the agenda and documentation for each meeting to the Department of State, FCC, and NTIA [National Telecommunications Information Agency]. COMSAT then meets with representatives of these agencies in advance of the meeting and submits in writing its proposed position on the agenda items. These positions are discussed and pertinent questions are raised. Following this briefing, the Department of State consults with the other agencies and after considering their views, issues instructions to COMSAT on those agenda items which are deemed to require such in-

structions. Following the meeting, COMSAT again meets with representatives of the three agencies to report on what transpired. Again, questions are asked and explanations given for any actions taken by the executive board.

Proposals before Congress would require that all instructions issued to COMSAT be made public. While we favor making as many INTELSAT and INMARSAT documents as possible available to the public, there may be instances where the instructions affect U.S. Government concerns as the party to both INTELSAT and INMARSAT and raise issues involving foreign relations. While foreign signatories would have access to U.S. positions and negotiating strategies, we would not have access to theirs which would place U.S. interests at a disadvantage. We would prefer to have public dissemination of U.S. Government instructions judged by the normal criteria for public release of government documents found in the Freedom of Information Act. We are working closely with COMSAT to provide substantial additional information to the public and we applaud their cooperation.

We do not agree with the proposal that the Federal Communications Commission issue separate instructions to COMSAT with respect to regulatory matters within its jurisdiction. Although the International Maritime Satellite Communications Act provides for separate FCC instructions to COMSAT for INMARSAT meetings, this has not been used. The FCC has been an active participant in the instruction process and we are concerned that separate instructions might unnecessarily raise conflicts over the primacy of "public interest" and "national interest." The Communications Satellite Act clearly gives the President primary authority in the instruction process and we believe it would be a mistake to infringe on this authority by separate FCC instructions.

How Binding are Instructions to COMSAT?

The Communications Satellite Act directed executive branch supervision over COMSAT to ensure its relations with foreign governments or entities or international bodies are consistent with the U.S. national interest and foreign policy. While instructions on these matters are binding, the act does not provide for direct enforcement procedures or sanctions beyond judicial relief contained in Section 403 should COMSAT refuse to follow government instruc-

tions. Nevertheless we find it difficult to perceive a situation where COMSAT would reject instructions based on U.S. Government considerations. Any substantive departure from instructions could lead to an Administrative request for legislative remedy. COMSAT is also subject to regulatory supervision of the FCC.

The instruction process has worked well over the years as evidenced by the lack of serious disagreements between COMSAT and the government. This, I believe, is due to government appreciation of the commercial nature of the international satellite systems and the responsibility of COMSAT to its shareholders as well as its customers and the general public. At the same time, COMSAT has accepted that the government is required to exercise supervision over COMSAT in matters of national interest.

Determination of Policy

While the instruction process has worked well, it is a vehicle for applying existing policy rather than the determination of policy in response to new challenges or a perceived need for change. Such a challenge occurred with the applications now before the FCC for non-INTELSAT international communications satellite systems. This has posed an extremely difficult policy decision involving the importance of protecting the integrity of INTELSAT and the value to the consumer of competition in the provision of new international communication services. The Senior Interagency Group [SIG] on International Communication and Information Policy, consisting of representatives of 15 government agencies, undertook a detailed examination of the applications and forwarded its recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and State to assist them in their advice to the President on what decisions he should make on this matter. While much of the internal debate on the most appropriate position to take has been aired in the trade press, I would not wish to comment further until the decision has been reached other than to say any controversy is a reflection of the importance and complexity of the issue.

The transborder use of domestic satellites is another issue of importance in international satellite policy. After a lengthy interagency consideration, Under Secretary of State James Buckley set forth the foreign policy requirements for approval of the use of U.S. domestic

satellites for transmissions to neighboring countries. This was by letter to the FCC Commissioner on July 23, 1981 and the requirements included agreement of the other government and coordination with INTELSAT under Art 14(d) of its agreement, which included submission on the economic effect of service on the INTELSAT global system.

In the past year, concerns of the nation picture and program supplier industry that copyrights may be inadequately protected in transborder satellite transmissions were studied by a working group and a policy decision taken that appropriate assurances of copyright protection would be required before TV transmissions would be approved to the individual country.

The ITU [International Telecommunications Union] forum includes consideration of international communication satellite issues and the United States is in the midst of preparations for a World Administration Radio Conference [WARC] on the use of geostationary satellite orbit and space services to begin in July 1985 with a second session in 1988. Preparations for this conference began several years ago and include the FCC Notice of Inquiry Process and Public Advisory Commission on Space WARC, and technical contributions from an NTIA-chaired ad hoc group under its Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee. A SIG steering committee under the chairmanship of the Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy provides a forum to incorporate the contributions of various working group individual agencies. The office of the coordinator also provides an executive director and support staff for conference preparations and works with the department and appropriate agencies.

I hope that I have presented the case that international communication satellite policy is not determined in an arbitrary way but is a result of coordination within the government involving many technical experts and foreign policy talents in close coordination with the private sector.

Private Sector Participation

While the private sector does not participate directly in the COMSAT instruction process, in formulating the instructions government agencies have a good deal of relevant information and knowledge obtained through structured and regular meetings with the private sector on international telecommunications issues.

The United States is unique in world communications in relying fully on the private sector for providing the service. In the extent to which competition is encouraged in those services, there is no way the U.S. Government can adequately understand and promote telecommunications interest in international negotiations without the active participation of the carriers, service providers, equipment suppliers, users, and the general public.

In addition to the direct participation of the private sector in the ITU conference committees and study groups, the advisory committees organized for the WARC preparations, there are other groups that deal with specific issues such as the Working Group on Border Data Flows, and the facilities planning committees of the FCC in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean regions.

The facilities planning process is also the development of overseas communications facilities and services, offering an opportunity to carriers, service providers, users, and the general public to submit views on the design and structure of the future telecommunications structure linking the United States with the rest of the world. Through this process, U.S. positions on international satellites, cables, and terrestrial systems developed from among competing interests.

Outside these formal structures, the Government officials welcome informal meetings with interested firms and individuals who have a specific international telecommunications problem. They do not simply want to present their views on any issue of importance to the Government. In addition, testimony taken by professional committees such as this provides important information and the opinions expressed in the journals are given close attention. It is unlikely that any significant private position or opinion is overlooked. Continuous intensive and extensive process of private sector consultation in international telecommunications is essential. If this occurs, it is because the carrier or individual has failed to make use of the many channels of communications available to the government which are available.

INTELSAT and INMARSAT Procurement

A primary interest of the U.S. space industry is selling products and services to the international satellite organizations.

Article XIII of the INTELSAT agreement provides that procurement of goods or services shall be "effected by the award of contracts, based on responses to open international invitations to tender, to bidders offering the best combination of quality, price and the most favorable delivery time." The responsibility for carrying out this provision is borne by the INTELSAT Secretariat, under the direction of the Board of Governors. Equivalent provisions are contained in the INMARSAT convention.

U.S. industry has done well in competition for INTELSAT procurement. In October 1983, the director general designate of INTELSAT informed the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that since 1964 over 2,500 contracts had been awarded some 600 U.S. firms with a total value of \$3.365 billion. This is not surprising given the lead of U.S. space and launch technologies. American spacecraft manufacturers and launch service providers are actively participating in bids for the second generation INMARSAT system. The U.S. Government has been assisting U.S. industry in this effort.

The FCC did examine whether COMSAT would have advantages over other U.S. firms in INTELSAT procurement as part of its 1980 study. It found several examples because of its activities as technical adviser to INTELSAT and its knowledge of specific development. This was an element in the decision to split COMSAT into monopoly and competitive components.

It is a responsibility of the U.S. Government to ensure that all American firms are offered equal opportunities to compete for INTELSAT and INMARSAT procurement. We take this responsibility seriously and will continue to offer U.S. industry assistance to this end.

COMSAT's Representation of U.S. Policy

Can there be conflicts between COMSAT's corporate interests and U.S. national or public interest, and what would happen if this occurs?

We are actually progressing through such a potential situation. INTELSAT has energetically campaigned against

U.S. approval of non-INTELSAT international satellite systems. COMSAT shares with INTELSAT an interest in maintaining a monopoly on transoceanic international communication satellite services. While expressing its own view as a signatory, COMSAT has carried out instructions to inform the INTELSAT Board and Meeting of Signatories that the U.S. Government viewed INTELSAT's intervention in the domestic consideration of applications before the FCC as premature and inappropriate and the publication of leaked U.S. policy papers as improper.

COMSAT has a variety of obligations to its stockholders, its customers, and to the public by virtue of its role as signatory to the satellite organization agreements. By providing for U.S. Government oversight and instructions, Congress was aware that these obligations could be in conflict. In the exercise of oversight, we do not rely on COMSAT to define what is the U.S. national interest and public interest; we make that determination and instruct accordingly. We believe this is the prudent thing to do.

In regard to the proposal that the President appoint a government representative to participate in all of COMSAT's activities with respect to INTELSAT and INMARSAT, we believe "activities" is too broad a term that seems to include every COMSAT contact with the organizations. While such an expansive provision in our view is unnecessary, more narrowly drawn provisions may be useful.

Competition With INTELSAT

Technological developments in the past several years have opened the doors to more competition in telecommunications services in our domestic market. It was inevitable that these same forces would press upon the international provision of these services.

The applicants to the FCC for non-INTELSAT systems have made many arguments why their projects would not significantly damage the INTELSAT global systems. Some assert that their designs for innovative new services would benefit INTELSAT by developing new markets which INTELSAT can also serve in the future without risking capital needed for the expansion of global basic telecommunications services. These arguments merit consideration by ourselves and the world community.

In our deliberations of proposals for non-INTELSAT international communication satellite systems, we should

be aware that a number of regional non-INTELSAT satellite systems are being implemented by INTELSAT members. The policy question we face is not whether regional systems are incompatible with INTELSAT obligations but whether U.S. participation in such systems, particularly across the North Atlantic, would undermine the viability of the global system. It is this search for a possible accommodation between competition with all of its potential benefits and the preservation of a viable global system, with its known benefits, that has preoccupied executive branch policymakers. We hope and believe such an accommodation can be achieved.

Transatlantic Fiber Optic Cable

Officials of INTELSAT for good reasons regard fiber optic cables as a major competitive threat. The decision to build a U.S.-Europe fiber optic submarine cable has acknowledged the potential of this new cable technology. The international impact of the eighth transatlantic telephone cable (TAT-8) has become evident long before its planned entry into service in 1988. For the first time since the launch of "Early Bird" in 1965—the inauguration of commercial satellite communications across the Atlantic—the cable will become competitive with satellites for certain transoceanic services.

Contract awards in mid-November 1983 for TAT-8 reflected the U.S. lead in fiber optic communications technology. The 29-nation consortium of telecommunications administrations (including AT&T [American Telephone and Telegraph Company] and other U.S. companies for the United States) that will own the cable awarded the major portion of the contract—\$250 million—to AT&T communications. The remainder of the \$335 million total investment will be split between the United Kingdom's Standard Telephone and Cables Limited and France's SUB-MARCOM. The link will span some 6,500 kilometers (3,900 miles) between Tuckerton, New Jersey, and Widenmouth, United Kingdom, and Penmarch, France, with the cable branching at the edge of Europe's continental shelf.

TAT-8 will represent state-of-the-art technology, which is considerably more advanced than the long distance fiber optic networks AT&T installed along the Northeast corridor of the United States and in California last year. It will differ from its predecessor cables in several critical respects.

- TAT-8 will be the first transatlantic digital—as opposed to analog—undersea link. Voice sounds are not sent as direct electrical signals (analog), but instead are converted by computers into bits (binary digits) representing zeros and ones, transformed into pulses of laser light, transmitted through the special glass optical fibers in discrete bunches, and reconstructed by computers into a conventional analog signal at the other end.

- The cable, made up of only three pairs of optical fibers, will be able to handle up to 40,000 conversations simultaneously—about four times the volume of either TAT-6 or TAT-7, which entered service in 1976 and 1983, respectively. The large capacity will make TAT-8 competitive with the most advanced communications satellite, INTELSAT VI, which is scheduled for launch in 1986.

- Light beam repeater/regenerators will be spaced at 20-mile intervals along the cable, compared with 5 miles for the older systems, and be able to process the data flow more than 3 times faster.

- The cable will be able to stretch by up to 2% without breaking (3 to 4 times more than terrestrial cable), increasing its survivability in case of submarine landslides like those that severed three cables across the North Atlantic in 1929.

- The light-beam-generating laser-diode transmitters are expected to be trouble-free for 25 years, 15 years longer than the projected life span of the new communications satellites.

Transmission lines and switching equipment in the United States, Japan, and most of Europe are being changed to accommodate digital transmission in a sweeping transformation of the developed world's telecommunications system. TAT-8 could become, along with satellites, a key link in the planned global integrated services digital network.

The fact that TAT-8 can make multiple landing points raises the economic stakes. Cable landings are an important source of revenue for nations involved, since they:

- Allow significant potential reductions in telecommunications operational costs,

- Allow the sales of services to other countries through routing of traffic and cable maintenance, and

- Make economically feasible links to route traffic to third countries, an option which might not have been viable with local traffic alone.

Although the "bident" landing approach has been taken, the addition of a third link to TAT-8 has been left open. The extra cost of a southern landing and the supporting revenue remain the determining factors. The Department is continuing to monitor this consideration.

Although opinions differ, many experts regard optical fibers as intrinsically superior to satellite radio communications for point-to-point voice transmissions over busy routes, and for security and privacy as well.

Satellites are likely to remain more competitive in applications that require wide-band communications channels, such as business data transmissions, distribution of television programs, videoconferencing, and in the ability of satellites to provide direct services to consumer premises. Satellites also have the edge for point-to-point transmissions over thin routes, such as links to and within developing countries. But for the present bread-and-butter business of international communications satellite, the introduction of fiber optic cables poses a significant economic and technological challenge.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I can assure you that the Department of State is very much aware of the challenges in the field of international telecommunications policy. We, the U.S. Government and industry, can be justly proud of their past contributions, we must continuously seek in national agreement to permit the international system to benefit from rapid advancements in equipment and services. The participation of our private sector is essential to this process. We cannot unilaterally change international policies, but our leadership in telecommunications technology is universal, recognized and the world is closely watching our response to the changing technological environment. We have already witnessed in some countries moves to open the telecommunications sector to more competition. As the benefits of these policies spread, we should experience a more ready acceptance of less regulation and more competitive policies in international telecommunications. We will continue to work toward this goal.

The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Afghanistan

Background

In September 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, executed Marxist Minister Hafizullah Amin, and installed the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal to head the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The DRA was established following the "Great Saur Revolution," the 1978 Marxist revolution that overthrew President Mohammad Daoud and named Noor Mohammad Taraki as President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister. Taraki was ousted by Amin in a *coup d'etat* in November 1979.

In opposition to the Marxist government, the resistance developed almost immediately after the April 1978 coup and subsequently spread throughout Afghanistan. The resistance continues today in the form of a countrywide insurgency against the Soviets and the DRA by the majority of Afghan people. The Soviets, with 110,000-115,000 troops, have not succeeded in their attempts to crush the Afghan resistance or to establish an effective Afghan Army and consolidate the authority of the Karmal government.

Afghan Resistance Groups

Against Afghan resistance, or *mujahidin* ("warriors"), groups maintain their main headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. United in their desire to rid the country of the Soviets, they are divided by ideologies and personalities into major and minor factions, loosely organized into two alliances—the "moderates" and the "fundamentalists." The morale of the Afghan freedom fighters remains high, with their resistance against the Soviets increasing. They control 75% of the countryside and are better armed and trained than the DRA. The resistance has become particularly effective against Soviet/DRA convoys, and Soviet helicopter and aircraft losses have risen significantly unless the Soviets substantially increase the size of their army in Afghanistan, the military stalemate will continue, and the Soviets will be unable to defeat this determined and resilient resistance. Faced with growing opposition, the Soviets have turned to increasingly brutal tactics, including reprisals against noncombatants, as a means of wearing down civilian support for the resistance.

Afghan Refugees

The 2-3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, located in some 348 camps in the border areas of the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces, constitute the world's largest refugee population.

Since the international relief effort began in 1980, the U.S. Government has contributed more than \$350 million for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These funds are channeled primarily through the world food program and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has overall responsibility for coordinating international contributions. Other contributions are made to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and U.S. voluntary agencies working among the refugees.

With the roughly 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, about half of them refugees, the estimated number of Afghans in exile is now well over 3.5 million, more than 20% of the entire prewar Afghan population. Many refugees continue to leave Afghanistan and will do so as long as the Soviet occupation continues. The rate has slowed somewhat due to the large numbers that already have fled abroad, but each major Soviet operation brings a new influx of refugees into Pakistan.

UN Efforts

Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has approved overwhelmingly five resolutions calling for a settlement in Afghanistan based on the removal of Soviet forces, the independent and nonaligned status for Afghanistan, self-determination for the Afghan people, and the return of the refugees with safety and honor.

To achieve these goals, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has appointed Diego Cordovez, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, as his personal representative in an indirect negotiating process that seeks a political settlement. This process of consultations in the region and indirect talks in Geneva includes the DRA regime and the Pakistan Government with the Soviets unofficially involved. Although all parties want the UN process to continue, their positions remain far apart, and prospects for a political settlement are not promising.

Soviet Position

The Soviets justify their continuing presence in Afghanistan with the claim that a limited contingent of Soviet troops was invited into Afghanistan by a friendly government. This assertion ignores the fact that the head of this government, Hafizullah Amin, was executed by the Soviets and Babrak Kar-

Afghan Attacks on Pakistan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUG. 23, 1984¹

On a number of occasions over the course of the past week, aircraft, artillery, and rocket launchers based in Afghanistan carried out a series of brutal violations of Pakistan's territorial sovereignty which cost the lives of nearly 50 innocent persons, injured a large number, and destroyed property.

The United States deplores these attacks on Pakistan, a nation whose independence and territorial integrity we have long supported. We call upon the Soviet Union and its Kabul clients to put an end to these actions.

These attacks once again highlight the tragedy and suffering caused by the Soviet Union's effort to subjugate the Afghan nation and people and to in-

timidate Afghanistan's neighbors. These actions have brought death, misery, and exile to millions of innocent Afghan men, women, and children. We believe it is vital that an orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces be achieved, thereby ending the repression in Afghanistan.

We call upon the Soviet Union to permit genuine progress in the talks about to resume in Geneva so that Soviet forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan and Afghans may be permitted to establish their own government. This would create the conditions in Afghanistan for the citizens of that country, including the millions who are now refugees elsewhere, to return to live in peace in their own land.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

mal installed in his place, and ignores the right of the Afghan people to self-determination.

The Soviets insist that the withdrawal of their forces is a bilateral matter between them and the Kabul regime, to take place only with Kabul's "agreement"—an unlikely eventuality since the regime could not survive without the Soviet military presence. The central element of the Soviet/DRA conditions for a political settlement is the cessation of outside interference, for which the Soviets name the United States as the major source. The Soviets stress the need for international guarantees to accompany the required pledges of non-interference—but not withdrawal of their forces—in effect asking the outside world to secure the end of Afghan resistance as a precondition to Soviet withdrawal.

U.S. Position

President Reagan has said: "We seek the removal of Soviet military forces so that the Afghan people can live freely in their own country and are able to choose their own way of life and government." The United States strongly opposes the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the issue remains significant in East-West relations.

Although in our view Soviet withdrawal is the key, we believe that a resettlement also must provide for the other three requirements spelled out in the UN General Assembly Afghanistan resolutions. Such an agreement could also include appropriate international guarantees of the settlement's stability. The United States supports the UN negotiating effort of indirect talks to achieve these goals.

Taken from the GIST series of August 1984, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Harriet Culley. ■

International Terrorism: A Long Twilight Struggle

by Robert M. Sayre

Address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on August 15, 1984. Ambassador Sayre is Director of the Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning.

Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, although arms we need; not as a call to battle; though embattled we are; but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation," a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

These words expressed by an American president more than two decades ago are a very appropriate introduction to a discussion of political violence and terrorism because we are asked "to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation.'"

The problem is real enough, especially for those engaged in the diplomatic profession. The problem has been growing since 1968. Although the total number of incidents has been almost the same for the past 5 years, 1983 stood out from the rest because of sheer violence. In 1983 there were more victims (some 1,925) and more U.S. casualties (387) from international terrorist acts than ever before. The Middle East dominated the global terrorism scene although the region ranked third after Western Europe and Latin America in the number of incidents. The United States was the target in 40% of the cases and diplomats in general in 52% of the cases. The figures so far in 1984 suggest a significant increase—incidents in the first 6 months are running 25% ahead of 1983.

These incidents of international terrorism are only the tip of the iceberg of worldwide political violence and probably represent no more than 1% of the total.

Beyond the statistics, there are other reasons why recent events are disturbing. The accent is on killing people. Such imprecise weapons as vehicle bombs have been used to produce mass casualties. So were the bombs placed aboard commercial aircraft. Terrorists have become less discriminating and are

more willing to target low-level victims when the high-level victims prove to be well protected.

What has become particularly disturbing to us and our allies in the year is the extent to which states themselves have increasingly used intelligence services and other agencies of government to engage directly in terrorist activity. This concern prompted the issuance of the London declaration on terrorism at the recent meeting of the summit seven. The weight of the evidence is that Syria and Iran were directly involved in the three major bombing incidents in the Middle East in 1983—the destruction of the American Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait on April 18 and December 12 and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23. Members of North Korean military carried out bombing in Rangoon that killed members of the South Korean Cabinet. Members of the Libyan "Embassy" in London opened fire on a peaceful demonstration and killed a British policewoman.

As tragic as specific events are in human terms, the end objective of events was to force governments to change their policies and to destabilize governments. If states practicing terrorism are successful in that objective we can expect more such efforts. We must demonstrate to them that this is not an effective way to conduct diplomacy. Giving in to such activity also sends signals to others who are tempted to be venturesome and aggressive. So we must be mindful not only of the immediate effects of terrorism but its longer range and broader consequences.

Any event in isolation may not threaten our security. But it must become a priority policy concern when states actively engage in terrorist acts against us; when states like the Soviet Union provide training, arms, and other direct and indirect support to nations and groups that engage in terrorism; when the pattern of terrorism against the United States and its allies is concentrated in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Caribbean area of course, are areas of strategic importance to the United States and essential to NATO defense.

I would not want to suggest by highlighting the events of the past year those of particular concern to the United States that these are the only causes for terrorism. Some engage in terrorist activity for irredentist reasons like the Basques in Spain, the Armenians against the Turks, and others. Religious differences are a key factor in the strife in northern Ireland, in the Iran-Iraq war, and the civil war in Lebanon. These events disturb our relations with other countries and in total create an atmosphere of instability and insecurity in the world.

Response

On the outlines, we have a significant amount of political violence that is directed primarily against the Western democracies and our interests. The primary target is the United States, and it has been for some years. States have become more actively involved in promoting and supporting this violence as a means of influencing our policy. What can we do about it?

Our first response is, of course, to defend ourselves. We are in the process of improving security at our diplomatic posts around the world, first at the highest risk posts. We have made a major effort to improve emergency planning at our Embassies, to work more closely with the American community in the country, and to train our personnel on how to handle such problems. We have made a good beginning, but we have made a considerable distance to go.

We have sought to expand cooperation with other countries both on a common approach to the problem as well as on tactical measures to deal with it. The United Nations has developed conventions to deal with specific types of terrorist activity. Thus there are conventions on aircraft hijacking and sabotage, on terrorist acts against protected persons and on the taking of hostages. The United States is seeking legislation from the Congress to implement fully all of our commitments under these conventions as well as fill other gaps in existing legislation. Efforts in the United Nations to have a general convention on suppression of terrorism have faltered on the definition of terrorism. At the summit seven countries have concentrated considerably on developing a common consensus on dealing with terrorism through their declarations on the hijacking of commercial aircraft, the protection of diplomats, and more recently the London declaration on dealing with state-supported terrorism.

We have strengthened greatly the collection of intelligence on terrorist activities and the exchange of information with our friends and allies.

The Congress approved last year and we are now implementing a training program for foreign law enforcement officers to deal with all types of terrorist activity. This program will promote a stronger international consensus on the threat terrorism poses and how we and our friends and allies can deal with it. It will also improve communications and strengthen ties among law enforcement officials generally.

We believe that we have made substantial progress within the U.S. Government on an effective response to terrorist attacks and have also developed a good working relationship with our allies. Much more can and should be done on defensive measures.

Events of 1983, however, persuaded us that a good defense posture was not adequate. We need to improve our capabilities, especially intelligence, to prevent terrorist states and groups from undertaking attacks. Within the United States we have, with effective police work, been rather successful in preempting terrorist activity. Other countries, such as Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, have also had considerable success in identifying terrorist groups and preventing terrorist acts. Without in anyway minimizing the difficulties, we believe with greater effort and resources that it should be possible to prevent many of the terrorist attacks against us in other countries.

Conclusions

Having lived with the issues for almost 3 years, reading daily intelligence reports, studying intelligence on the subject, responding to dozens of incidents and helping to resolve them, considering various policy options, and working within the U.S. Government and with our allies on ways to deal with the problem, I have naturally come to a few conclusions.

- Terrorism is politically motivated and is planned and organized. It is a mixed picture as to the states and groups that engage in it. Most of it is carried out by states and groups of Marxist-Leninist persuasion, and the Soviet Union and its Eastern-bloc partners lend support and comfort to them. The Soviet Union continues to do this because it considers it in its interest to do so. If the Soviet Union would stop

providing military training, equipment, and other support, there would be a significant drop in terrorist activity. There are other major actors such as Islamic fundamentalist groups supported by Iran. A considerable amount of the terrorism even in Western Europe stems from the turmoil in the Middle East, and if there were a peaceful settlement there, it would contribute to a drop in terrorist activity.

- Given the nature and motivation of most of the groups and states engaging in terrorism, it is not surprising that the Western democracies, and especially the United States, are the primary targets.

- Given these conclusions, it is not likely that there will be any general agreement within the United Nations on the suppression of terrorist activity.

- Rather, the United States and its friends and allies will be most effective with good intelligence and the sharing of that information, improved defense measures, more effective police work, and preemption of terrorist acts whenever and wherever possible. Sharing of technical knowledge on dealing with terrorism through the training of foreign law enforcement officers is an essential element in any effective program. Combatting terrorism is essentially a police and not a military matter.

- Stronger international cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally is essential. The international community has to recognize the problem first before we can deal with it effectively. The London declaration that identifies state actions as a major cause of terrorist activity is a major step forward.

- We will have to learn to use effectively both diplomacy and force and in ways that reinforce each other. We will not have the luxury of clear-cut situations. In dealing with terrorism on a global basis, we will have to be very discriminating and know when our interests are being threatened and when they are not. Our opponents in seeking to achieve their objectives will deliberately confuse the issues and try to keep the threshold below what they believe we conceive to be our vital interests.

- It is possible to deal with terrorism on a legal basis. There is no need to resort to extralegal measures. Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and we have all been very successful with aggressive law enforcement. Any attempt to deal with it outside the law

helps the terrorists achieve their objectives and leads to very disastrous results as we have seen in Argentina and Uruguay.

- An effective program against terrorism requires the employment of substantial resources. We have to accept that fact and provide the resources. The Federal Government alone, for example, spent some \$65 million on security at the Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Local jurisdictions spent substantial additional sums. The games were not only a major success as an international sports event but they were very peaceful and demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Soviet assertions about poor security were phony.

- Most of the terrorism against the United States occurs overseas. We need to strengthen our efforts to deal with it there, including the root causes, or we run the substantial risk that it will grow and spread into the United States.

- We have been reluctant to apply sufficient resources to deal with terrorism, possibly because we hoped that the problem was temporary. While we have prepared for the larger challenges of conventional or nuclear war, our opponents have nibbled at us in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America with low-level warfare. The events of 1983 brought home to us very clearly that we will have to cope with terrorism for some time to come and we need to make certain that we are organized and apply the resources needed to do that. The facts suggest that the problem will continue to grow. We are, indeed, engaged in a long twilight struggle. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

Accession deposited: Cuba, Aug. 16, 1984.

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Canberra Sept. 27, 1983 at the 12th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Enters into force when approved by all contracting parties whose representatives were entitled to participate.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1983, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. Ratifications deposited: Angola, June 20, 1984; Federal Republic of Germany, July 12, 1984; Paraguay, June 15, 1984.

Commodities—Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.² Ratifications deposited: Cape Verde, July 30, 1984; Greece, Aug. 10, 1984.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Done at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance deposited: St. Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Done at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. Signature and acceptance deposited: St. Christopher & Nevis, Aug. 15, 1984.

Jute

International agreement on jute and jute products, 1982, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 9, 1984. Accession deposited: Switzerland, June 19, 1984.

Patents—Plant Varieties

International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants, of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1981. TIAS 10199. Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Aug. 2, 1984.³

Pollution

Convention for the protection and development of the marine environment of the wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 1983.² Senate advice and consent to ratification: Aug. 9, 1984.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 1984.

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for Art. V which entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 1984.

Second additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 1984. Ratification deposited: Sri Lanka, July 2, 1984.

General regulations of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol and annex, and universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981; except for Art. 124 of the general regulations which became effective Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 9972.

Accession deposited: Kiribati, Aug. 14, 1984. Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, 1984. Ratifications deposited: Bahamas, July 1984; Lebanon, July 18, 1984; Philippines, June 28, 1984; Sri Lanka July 20, 1984; Uruguay, June 21, 1984.

Money orders and postal traveler's check agreement, with detailed regulations with final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981. TIAS 9973.

Approval deposited: Thailand, July 3, 1984. Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, July 1984; Sri Lanka, July 20, 1984; Uruguay, June 21, 1984.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1974. TIAS 6932.

Accession deposited: Cyprus, July 26, 1984.

Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, annexes, as extended (TIAS 9664, 104). Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980.

Ratification deposited: Venezuela, Aug. 1984.

Telecommunications

Radio regulations, with appendices and protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982; definitively for the U.S. Oct. 27, 1983.

Approvals deposited: Jamaica, June 1, 1984. Republic of Korea, May 11, 1984.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international textiles. Done at Geneva Dec. 20, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1974. TIAS

extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1982. TIAS 7840, 8939. Done at Buenos Aires Dec. 22, 1981. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1982. TIAS 10323.

Instruments deposited: Norway, July 1,

Agreements to the schedule to the international convention for the regulation of whaling, 1956 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at Buenos Aires Dec. 22, 1984. Enters into force Oct. 8, 1985. Unless any contracting party lodges an objection.

Protocol for the further extension of the Geneva Convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). Signed at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1983.⁶

Protocol for the further extension of the Geneva Convention, 1980 (TIAS 10015). Signed at Washington Apr. 4, 1983. Entered into force July 1, 1983.⁶

Instruments deposited: France, Aug. 13, 1984.

Health Organization

Convention of the World Health Organization at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the U.S., Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1808.

Instruments deposited: Kiribati, July 26, 1984.

GENERAL

Agreement for the conduct of a balloon expedition in Australia for scientific purposes. Signed at Washington and Canberra June 27, 1984. Entered into force upon exchange of notes.

Agreement on air transport services, Memorandum of consultation [dated June 14, 1984]. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia July 11, 1984. Entered into force July 11, 1984.

Agreement relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Klamath River, with annex. Signed at Washington Apr. 2, 1984.²

Entered into force by the President: Aug. 27, 1984.

Agreement on the elimination of discrimination in trade, with exchange of notes. Signed at San Jose Dec. 4, 1982.²

Entered into force by the President: Aug. 17, 1984.

Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and certain other transfers. Signed at Washington Apr. 27, 1983.²

Entered into force by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.⁷

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, for the sale of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Aug. 2, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1984.

European Economic Community

Agreement extending the agreement of Feb. 15, 1977, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8598). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 27, 1984. Entered into force July 30, 1984; effective July 1, 1984.

Gabon

Agreement relating to jurisdiction over vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at Libreville July 25 and Aug. 2, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 2, 1984.

Grenada

General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed at Grenada May 7, 1984. Entered into force May 7, 1984.

Guatemala

Agreement for the sales of agricultural commodities, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Guatemala Aug. 1, 1984. Enters into force upon exchange of notes confirming that the internal procedures of the importing country have been met.

Guinea

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. IMET program. Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry Mar. 29, 1983, and Feb. 13, 1984. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1984.

Haiti

Agreement for the interdiction of narcotics trafficking. Signed at Port-au-Prince Aug. 22, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 22, 1984; effective Oct. 1, 1983.

India

Agreement amending and extending memorandum of understanding of July 18, 1978 (TIAS 9285), concerning furnishing of launching and associated services for Indian national satellite system (INSAT)-1 spacecraft. Signed at Washington and Bangalore Apr. 10 and 25, 1984. Entered into force: July 31, 1984; effective Jan. 1, 1984.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the arrangement of Oct. 1 and 15, 1979 (TIAS 9667), relating to a visa system for exports of cotton, wool, and manmade fiber apparel manufactured in Indonesia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta June 1 and 14, 1984. Entered into force June 14, 1984.

Ireland

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington July 13, 1983.²

Entered into force by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.

Senate advice and consent to ratification: June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.

Italy

Extradition treaty. Signed at Rome Oct. 13, 1983.²

Entered into force by the President: June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 10, 1984.

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982.²

Entered into force by the President: June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 16, 1984.

Jamaica

Extradition treaty. Signed at Kingston June 14, 1983.²

Entered into force by the President: June 28, 1984.

Ratified by the President: Aug. 17, 1984.

Agreement for the furnishing of commodities and services in connection with the peace-keeping force for Grenada. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Nov. 29 and Dec. 6, 1983. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1983.

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Oct. 2, 1969, as amended (TIAS 6770, 9613). Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston July 17 and 23, 1984. Entered into force July 23, 1984.

Japan

Agreement concerning Japan's financial contribution for U.S. administrative and related expenses for 1984 (JFY) pursuant to the mutual defense assistance agreement of Mar. 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 20, 1984. Entered into force July 20, 1984.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 1, 1982 (TIAS 10611), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 26 and 27, 1984. Entered into force July 27, 1984.

Liberia

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to or guaranteed by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes and implementing agreement regarding payments due under PL 480 agricultural commodity agreements, with annexes. Signed at Monrovia June 22, 1984. Entered into force July 27, 1984.

Mauritius

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1982, for the sale of agricultural commodities (TIAS 10628). Effected by exchange of letters at Port Louis Mar. 29 and July 4, 1984. Entered into force July 4, 1984.

Morocco

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 2, 1984, for the sale of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of letters at Rabat July 5, 1984. Entered into force July 5, 1984.

Mozambique

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Maputo July 28, 1984. Enters into force on date Mozambique communicates by note to U.S. Government that exchange of notes has been approved pursuant to its constitutional procedures.

Niger

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Niamey June 11, 1984. Entered into force July 24, 1984.

Panama

Agreement relating to wool textiles and textile products manufactured in Panama, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Aug. 7 and 21, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1984; effective Dec. 1, 1983.

Thailand

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct. 29, 1982.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification:
Aug. 9, 1984.

Tunisia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities relating to the agreement of June 7, 1976 (TIAS 8506). Signed at Tunis June 13, 1984. Entered into force June 13, 1984.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, as amended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528, 10531). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Feb. 28 and Apr. 11, 1984. Entered into force: July 31, 1984.

Agreement extending the long-term agreement of June 29, 1974 (TIAS 7910), to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 15 and 27, 1984. Entered into force June 27, 1984.

Zaire

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa May 3, 1984. Entered into force June 11, 1984.

Treaty concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment. Signed at Washington Aug. 3, 1984. Enters into force 30 days after date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

¹Applicable to Berlin (West).

²Not in force.

³For the Kingdom in Europe.

⁴With declaration.

⁵With statement.

⁶In force provisionally for the U.S.

⁷With reservation. ■

August 1984

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments on the value of the *Bulletin's* monthly chronologies. Unless a positive response is received, the chronologies will be discontinued.

August 1

Representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Consular Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs exchange diplomatic notes concluding the latest round of U.S.-Soviet consular review talks.

National security adviser McFarlane, in a public statement, reaffirms that the U.S. has accepted the Soviet Union's June 29 proposal to meet in Vienna and is prepared for serious talks on outer space, including antisatellite weapons. He also says the Soviet Union has repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position on such talks suggesting that the Soviets were not serious about the proposed talks.

At his ranch in Santa Barbara, President Reagan meets with the Vatican's Archbishop Pio Laghi to discuss the situation in Poland, East-West issues, and Central America.

House rejects an Administration request for \$117 million in supplementary military aid to El Salvador for this fiscal year.

U.S. sends a team of Navy mine-warfare experts to investigate shipping explosions in the Red Sea.

August 2-20

Delegates from 135 countries meet in Vienna for the fourth general conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Ambassador Richard S. Williamson leads the U.S. delegation.

August 2

A U.S. Marine guard at the Consulate building in Leningrad is beaten by Soviet police and jailed for 2 hours. The Marine was off duty but investigating a suspicious vehicle that had been circling the Consulate. State Department acting spokesman Romberg says the U.S. strongly protested this serious incident but that the Soviet Union has not given a satisfactory response.

In New York City, U.S. and Cuban representatives end a second round of talks on immigration issues, including the return of persons from the 1980 Mariel boatlift. Michael G. Kozak headed the U.S. delegation.

In Tehran, hijackers of an Air France Boeing 737 released all passengers and crew, set off an explosion in the cockpit, and then surrendered to authorities ending a 2-day siege. It is discovered that three passengers aboard are Americans.

USIA Director Wick greets 47 Japanese exchange students at welcoming ceremonies at the Department of State.

August 3

U.S. signs a deep seabed mining agreement with Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.K. The agreement is aimed at avoiding conflicts over deep seabed mine sites and providing for regular consultations.

In response to Poland's announcement to release 652 political prisoners, President Reagan lifts the ban on the Polish state airline LOT and reestablishes full scientific exchanges between the U.S. and Poland.

Upper Volta officially changes its name to Burkina Faso which means "land of honest men" in the Mossi tribe language. Its new flag is red and green with a gold star. The people of this West African country will be called Burkinabes.

August 6-14

The second International Conference on Population is held in Mexico City. Ambassador James L. Buckley heads the U.S. delegation.

The conference adopts (August 10) a recommendation that abortion should not be promoted as a family planning method.

On August 11, Ambassador Buckley says the U.S. will continue its support for the United Nations Fund for Population Activities having received the necessary "concrete assurances" that the organization does not engage in or provide funding for abortion or coercive family planning programs.

The conference adopts (August 14) the text of the Mexico City Declaration on Population and Development, as well as 8 recommendations to further implement the World Population Plan of Action approved at Bucharest in 1974.

August 6

Department of State issues warning to travelers to Leningrad that their rights as foreign tourists and the protections afforded them under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention are not being respected by Soviet authorities.

August 7

At the request of Egyptian President Mubarek, the U.S. Navy sends mine-sweeping helicopters and about 200 servicemen to search the Gulf of Suez area for explosives that have damaged commercial shipping.

Uganda suspends its international military education and training (IMET) program with the U.S. and bars a U.S. military attaché from visiting the country to help administer the program in response to recent U.S. criticism of human rights abuses in Uganda.

At an African-Arab solidarity conference in Tunisia, PLO leader Arafat urges Arab states to adopt "rigorous positions" against the U.S.

August 8

Iran accuses U.S. and Israel of placing mines in the Red Sea in a "conspiracy" to discredit Teheran's Islamic government.

In a letter to Congress, President Reagan reports that U.S. nonproliferation initiatives in 1983 had a positive contribution to the goal of preventing "the further spread of nuclear explosives."

Seven Afghans, wounded in fighting caused by the Soviet Union's occupation of their country, arrive in the U.S. for treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. The mission is sponsored by the private Americas Foundation.

ad the U.K. announce they will join
for explosives in the Red Sea and
Suez at the request of Egypt.
S. agrees to help Belgium purchase a
made high technology lathe for the
army to avoid its sale to the Soviet

approves an extra \$70 million in
aid to El Salvador for the remaining
the.
Soviet Union travel agency, In-
alls the State Department's
travel advisory about Leningrad
will be intended."

1
ad Cuba agree to improve trade,
and technological relations despite
tensions in international matters.

2
Los Angeles Summer Olympics conclude.
222 gold medals were awarded
in this 16-day event. U.S. athletes win a
74 medals, of which 83 are gold.

3
Reagan and Secretary Shultz meet
Iran Foreign Minister Andreotti while
in Los Angeles.
Iran holds swearing in ceremony of its
new president.

4
State Department acting spokesman
says the review process has begun
to determine whether Rabbi Kahane should
lose U.S. citizenship after being sworn in
as a member of the Israeli Parliament.

5-16
S. Shlaudeman meets with Nicaraguan
Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco
Cardenas in Mexico, for the fourth round of

6
Reagan says the U.S. will consider
its participation in the United Na-
tions Conference on Women at Nairobi,
Kenya, if the conference adopts a measure
on Zionism with racism.
U.S. notifies the U.S. of its willingness
to talk on the lifting of some U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions.

7
Ceremony commemorating August 1,
the 40th anniversary of the Warsaw
Ghetto Uprising against Nazi occupation, President
Reagan says the U.S. rejects "the interpreta-
tion of the Yalta agreement that suggests
Soviet consent for the division of Europe
on the basis of influence." He expresses his
commitment to "press for full compliance"
with the agreement, especially free elections.
The Yalta agreement was signed in February
1945 by President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin,
and British Minister Churchill.

The UN Security Council approves, by a
vote of 13 in favor and 2 abstentions (U.S.
and the U.K.), a resolution that rejects and
declares "null and void" the constitutional
changes made by South Africa.

August 18
In response to President Reagan's statement
of August 17 regarding the Yalta agreement,
the Soviet Union accuses President Reagan
of distorting history and defaming the Soviet
Union and Poland.

August 19
Uganda says that about 15,000 people have
been killed in political and tribal violence
since 1981, disputing Assistant Secretary
Abrams testimony of August 9 that 100,000
people have been killed by the military.

August 20
Greece cancels a joint military exercise with
the U.S. in northern Greece saying it
perceives no threats from its Warsaw Pact
neighbors.

August 21-22
At the CDE session in Stockholm, U.S. and
Soviet Union conduct talks on ways to
enhance security, build confidence, and pre-
vent surprise attack in Europe. Ambassador
James E. Goodby heads the U.S. delegation.

August 21
State Department acting spokesman
Romberg expresses U.S. regret of Greece's
decision to cancel a joint military exercise in
the Aegean Sea. He adds that the U.S. does
not agree with the Greek reasons for justify-
ing the cancellation.

August 22
President Reagan signs a bill that includes
\$503 million in economic and military aid to
Central America; \$70 million of the aid will
go to El Salvador.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg says the U.S. deplores recent at-
tacks on Pakistan made from Afghanistan
and calls upon the Soviet Union and the
Kabul regime to end these actions.

State Department acting spokesman
Romberg reaffirms U.S. relations with
Australia and support of ANZUS after
reports of concern regarding the Administra-
tion's current views on these issues.

For the first time in 28 years, South
Africa holds its first round of elections to
choose representatives for people of mixed
race. In South Africa's new, three-chamber
Parliament, whites will be represented in a
160-seat house, people of mixed race will
have an 80-seat house, and Indians will be
represented in a 40-seat house. The black ma-
jority will not be represented.

August 23
State Department receives a report that
Yelena Bonner was convicted of slandering
the Soviet Union and sentenced to 5 years of
internal exile on August 17.

Romania celebrates the 40th anniversary
of the overthrow of the Fascist government.

Auburn University announces the estab-
lishment of the International Aquacultural
Network that will link scientists in 70 nations
by satellite to each other for obtaining the
latest research information to help developing
nations and U.S. producers grow fish more
efficiently.

The Department of Defense makes public
its recommendation to provide coverage of
military operations by news organizations.

August 24
U.S. announces it will send additional grain
shipments to Ethiopia and Kenya to ease con-
ditions caused by drought.

August 25
TASS reports that the Soviet Union has suc-
cessfully tested a long-range ground-launched
cruise missile allegedly in response to the
U.S. deployment of such weapons.

August 24-30
A third round of indirect talks between
Pakistan and Afghanistan are held in Geneva
in an attempt to arrive at a political settle-
ment for Afghanistan. Issues discussed in-
clude a timetable for Soviet withdrawal,
pledges of noninterference and noninterven-
tion, international guarantees of an agree-
ment, and a mechanism for consulting the
refugees on the condition of their return. UN
envoy Diego Cordovez mediates the discus-
sions.

August 27
State Department spokesman Hughes says
the Soviet Union's testing of a long-range
ground-launched missile "comes as no sur-
prise." He adds that the Soviet's cruise
missile program had been active long before
U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise
missile deployments began.

U.S. and China sign an agreement under
which the Department of the Interior will
help China design the world's largest hydro-
electric dam.

The Department of State rejects as
"totally false" recent allegations by Radio
Moscow that Korean Air Lines Flight 007
was blown up by a U.S. bomb to prevent evi-
dence that it was a spy plane from falling in-
to Soviet hands. The plane was shot down by
a Soviet military aircraft on September 1,
1983.

The U.S. Immigration Service reports
that an estimated 7,000 Nicaraguans, be-
tween the ages of 15 and 22, are in Miami,
Florida, to escape their homeland's com-
pulsory military draft.

August 28
South Africa holds its second round of elec-
tions to choose representatives for the
40-seat Indian house of the new Parliament.

August 29

A U.S. Court of Appeals overturned President Reagan's "pocket" veto of a military aid bill that required him to certify improvements in El Salvador's human rights situation. The bill was vetoed while Congress was in its Thanksgiving holiday recess last year.

The following newly appointed ambassadors present their credentials to President Reagan: Falilou Kane (Republic of Senegal), Guenther van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Joseph Edsel Edmunds (Saint Lucia), Donald Aloysius McLeod (Republic of Suriname), Ignatius Chukuemeka Oisemekwa (Federal Republic of Nigeria), and Maati Jorio (Kingdom of Morocco).

August 30

President Reagan establishes a new Commission on Agricultural Trade and Export Policy.

U.S. Trade Representative Brock says the Soviet Union has contracted to purchase 7.9 million tons of grain—1.3 million tons of wheat and 6.6 million tons of corn—in the 1984-85 agreement year of the current U.S.-U.S.S.R. long-term grain agreement.

Greece protests the U.S. military's refusal to reinstate 16 striking workers at the Hellenikon air base in Athens, despite an understanding that no striking workers would be dismissed.

August 31

U.S. restricts Libya's UN diplomats from traveling outside New York City without special permission.

South Africa lifts ban on *The Windhoek Observer*, a weekly newspaper known for its reports against the government's policies on Namibia. ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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175	8/2	Statement on the 9th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act.
*176	8/3	Diana Lady Dougan confirmed rank of Ambassador (biographic data).
*177	8/7	Signature of seabed mining agreement, Aug. 3.
*178	8/7	Committee of the U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee meeting, Sept. 6.
*179	8/9	Leonardo Neher sworn in as Ambassador to Burkina Faso, July 17 (biographic data).
*180	8/14	Samuel F. Hart, Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador, Dec. 14, 1982 (biographic data).

*181	8/13	Everett E. Briggs, Ambassador to the Republic of Panama, Oct. 6, 1982 (biographic data).
*182	8/13	Lewis A. Tambs, Ambassador to the Republic of Colombia, Mar. 24, 1983 (biographic data).
*183	8/14	Malcolm R. Barnebey, Ambassador to Belize, May 25, 1983 (biographic data).
*184	8/14	Curtin Winsor, Jr., Ambassador to the Republic of Costa Rica, June 9, 1983 (biographic data).
*185	8/17	Paul F. Gardner sworn in as Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands (biographic data).
*186	8/17	Alan W. Lukens sworn in as Ambassador to the People's Republic of the Congo, Aug. 14 (biographic data).
*187	8/20	David C. Jordan, Ambassador to the Republic of Peru, Mar. 8, 1984 (biographic data).
*188	8/20	Richard W. Boehm sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus, Aug. 15 (biographic data).
*189	8/20	Diego C. Asencio, Ambassador to the Federative Republic of Brazil, Nov. 22, 1983 (biographic data).
*190	8/20	Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., Ambassador to the Argentine Republic, Nov. 21, 1983 (biographic data).
*191	8/20	Shultz: address before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Chicago.
*192	8/23	Shultz: interview by Daniel Schorr of "Cable News Network," Aug. 22.
*193	8/28	Clayton E. McManaway, Jr., Ambassador to the Republic of Haiti, Dec. 6, 1983 (biographic data).

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

Department of State

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Free **multiple** copies may be obtained by writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Secretary Shultz

Power and Diplomacy, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Chicago, Aug. 20, 1984 (Current Policy #606).

Africa

U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs (Current Policy #599), Aug. 1984.

East Asia

U.S.-China Agricultural Relations (GIST, Aug. 1984).

Economics

World Economic Prospects, Under Secretary Wallis, American Chamber of Commerce, Santiago, July 27, 1984 (Current Policy #599).

Europe

U.S. Policy: The Baltic Republics (GIST, Aug. 1984).

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges (GIST, Aug. 1984).

General

Europe v. Asia: Is Diplomacy a Zero-Sum Game?, Deputy Secretary Dam, American Bar Association, Chicago, Aug. 6, 1984 (Current Policy #603).

Middle East

U.S.-Egyptian Relations (GIST, Aug. 1984).

Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Trade: Reliable Supply and Mutual Obligations, Ambassador Kennedy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, July 1984 (Current Policy #607).

Population

U.S. Commitment to International Population Planning, Ambassador Buckley, International Conference on Population, Mexico City, Aug. 8, 1984 (Current Policy #608).

Food and Population Planning Assistant AID Administrator McPherson, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Aug. 2, 1984 (Current Policy #602).

South Asia

Afghanistan (GIST, Aug. 1984).

Indian Ocean Region (GIST, Aug. 1984).

Terrorism

International Terrorism: A Long Twisted Struggle, Ambassador Sayre, Foreign Policy Association, New York, Aug. 1984 (Current Policy #608).

Western Hemisphere

Grenada Occasional Paper No. 1: Maur Bishop's "Line of March" Speech, September 13, 1982; Department of State 1984.

Cuba as a Model and a Challenge, Cuban Affairs Director Skoug, Americas Society, New York, July 25, 1984 (Current Policy #600).

Review of Nicaragua's Commitments to OAS, Ambassador Mitterdorf, OAS Permanent Council, July 18, 1984 (Current Policy #601). ■

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bulletin

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UN General Assembly/1
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Cover:

The United Nations flag—a symbol of peace, progress, and justice.

(United Nations photo by T. Chen)

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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
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(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

President Reagan addresses the 39th session of the UN General Assembly.



FEATURE
UN General Assembly

Reducing World Tensions

by President Reagan

*Address before the 39th session
of the UN General Assembly
in New York on September 24, 1984.¹*

First of all, I wish to congratulate President Lusaka [Paul Lasaka of Zambia] on his election as President of the General Assembly. I wish you every success, Mr. President, in carrying out the responsibilities of this high international office.

It is an honor to be here, and I thank you for your gracious invitation. I would speak in support of the two great goals that led to the formation of this organization—the cause of peace and the cause of human dignity.

The responsibility of this Assembly—the peaceful resolution of disputes between peoples and nations—can be discharged successfully only if we recognize the great common ground upon which we all stand: our fellowship as members of the human race, our oneness as inhabitants of this planet, our place as representatives of billions of our countrymen whose fondest hope remains the end to war and to the repression of the human spirit. These are the important, central realities that bind us, that permit us to dream of a future without the antagonisms of the past. And just as shadows can be seen only where there is light, so, too, can we overcome what is wrong only if we remember how much is right; and we will resolve what divides us only if we remember how much more unites us.

This chamber has heard enough about the problems and dangers ahead; today, let us dare to speak of a future that is bright and hopeful and can be

ours only if we seek it. I believe that future is far nearer than most of us would dare to hope.

At the start of this decade, one scholar at the Hudson Institute noted that mankind also had undergone enormous changes for the better in the past two centuries, changes which aren't always readily noticed or written about.

"Up until 200 years ago, there were relatively few people in the world," he wrote. "All human societies were poor. Disease and early death dominated most people's lives. People were ignorant and largely at the mercy of the forces of nature."

"Now," he said, "we are somewhere near the middle of a process of economic development . . . at the end of that process, almost no one will live in a country as poor as the richest country of the past. There will be many more people living long healthy lives with immense knowledge and more to learn than anybody has time for. It will be able to cope with the forces of nature and almost indifferent to distance."

We do live today, as the scholar suggested, in the middle of one of the most important and dramatic periods in human history—one in which all of us can serve as catalysts for an era of world peace and unimagined human freedom and dignity.

And today, I would like to report to you, as distinguished and influential

The starting point and cornerstone of our foreign policy is our alliance and partnership with our fellow democracies.

members of the world community, on what the United States has been attempting to do to help move the world closer to this era. On many fronts enormous progress has been made, and I think our efforts are complemented by the trend of history.

If we look closely enough, I believe we can see all the world moving toward a deeper appreciation of the value of human freedom in both its political and economic manifestations. This is partially motivated by a worldwide desire for economic growth and higher standards of living. And there's an increasing realization that economic freedom is a prelude to economic progress and growth—and is intricately and inseparably linked to political freedom.

Everywhere, people and governments are beginning to recognize that the secret of a progressive new world is to take advantage of the creativity of the human spirit; to encourage innovation and individual enterprise; to reward hard work; and to reduce barriers to the free flow of trade and information.

Our opposition to economic restrictions and trade barriers is consistent with our view of economic freedom and human progress. We believe such barriers pose a particularly dangerous threat to the developing nations and their chance to share in world prosperity through expanded export markets. Tomorrow at the International Monetary Fund, I will address this question more fully, including America's desire for more open trading markets throughout the world.

This desire to cut down trade barriers and our open advocacy of freedom as the engine of human progress are two of the most important ways the United States and the American people hope to assist in bringing about a world where prosperity is commonplace, conflict an aberration, and human dignity and freedom a way of life.

Let me place these steps more in context by briefly outlining the major goals of American foreign policy and then exploring with you the practical ways we're attempting to further freedom and prevent war. By that I mean, first, how we have moved to strengthen ties with old allies and new friends; second, what we are doing to help avoid the regional conflicts that could contain the seeds of world conflagration; and third, the status of our efforts with the Soviet Union to reduce the levels of arms.

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

Let me begin with a word about the objectives of American foreign policy, which have been consistent since the postwar era and which fueled the formation of the United Nations and were incorporated into the UN Charter itself.

The UN Charter states two overriding goals: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind," and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."

The founders of the United Nations understood full well the relationship between these two goals, and I want you to know that the Government of the United States will continue to view this concern for human rights as the moral center of our foreign policy. We can never look at anyone's freedom as a bargaining chip in world politics. Our hope is for a time when all the people of the world can enjoy the blessings of personal liberty.

But I would like also to emphasize that our concern for protecting human rights is part of our concern for protecting the peace. The answer is for all nations to fulfill the obligations they freely assumed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will



White House photo by Michael Evans

President Reagan and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar.



FEATURE UN General Assembly

expressed in periodic and generations." The declaration also includes these rights: "to form and to join unions"; "to own property alone as well as in association with others"; "to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country"; and to enjoy freedom of opinion and expression." This is the most graphic example of the relationship between human rights and peace is the right of peace groups to stand to promote their views. In the treatment of peace groups may be the best test of government's true interest for peace.

Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships

In addition to emphasizing this tie between the advocacy of human rights and the prevention of war, the United States has taken important steps, as I mentioned earlier, to prevent world conflict. A starting point and cornerstone of our foreign policy is our alliance and partnership with our fellow democracies. For 40 years, the North Atlantic alliance has guaranteed the peace in Europe. In Europe and Asia, our alliances have been the vehicle for a great reconciliation among nations that had fought wars in decades and centuries. And here in the Western Hemisphere, north and south are being won on the tide of freedom and are engaged in a common effort to foster peaceful economic development. We're proud of our association with these countries that share our commitment to freedom, human rights, the rule of law—and international peace. In the bulwark of security that the Atlantic alliance provides is essential—and remains essential—to the maintenance of world peace. Every peace involves burdens and obligations, but these are far less than the sacrifices that would result if peace-loving nations were divided and neglectful of their common security. The people of the United States will remain faithful to their commitments. And the United States is also faithful to its alliances and friendships with scores of nations in the developed and

... the United States is also faithful to its alliances and friendships with scores of nations in the developed and developing worlds. . . .

developing worlds with differing political systems, cultures, and traditions. The development of ties between the United States and China—a significant global event of the last dozen years—shows our willingness to improve relations with countries ideologically very different from ours.

We're ready to be the friend of any country that is a friend to us and a friend of peace. And we respect genuine nonalignment. Our own nation was born in revolution; we helped promote the process of decolonization that brought about the independence of so many members of this body, and we're proud of that history.

We're proud, too, of our role in the formation of the United Nations and our support of this body over the years. And let me again emphasize our unwavering commitment to a central principle of the UN system, the principle of universality, both here and in the UN technical agencies around the world. If universality is ignored, if nations are expelled illegally, then the United Nations itself cannot be expected to succeed.

The United States welcomes diversity and peaceful competition; we do not fear the trends of history. We are not ideologically rigid; we do have principles and we will stand by them, but we will also seek the friendship and good will of all, both old friends and new.

We've always sought to lend a hand to help others—from our relief efforts in Europe after World War I to the Marshall Plan and massive foreign assistance programs after World War II. Since 1946, the United States has provided over \$115 billion in economic aid to developing countries and today provides about one-third of the nearly \$90 billion in financial resources, public and private, that flow to the developing world. And the United States imports about one-third of the manufactured exports of the developing world.

Negotiations To Resolve Regional Conflicts

But any economic progress, as well as any movement in the direction of greater understanding between the nations of the world, are, of course, endangered by the prospect of conflict at both the global and regional levels. In a few minutes, I will turn to the menace of conflict on a worldwide scale and discuss the status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But permit me first to address the critical problem of regional conflicts—for history displays tragic evidence that it is these conflicts which can set off the sparks leading to worldwide conflagration.

In a glass display case across the hall from the Oval Office at the White House, there is a gold medal—the Nobel Peace Prize won by Theodore Roosevelt for his contribution in mediating the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. It was the first such prize won by an American, and it is part of a tradition of which the American people are very proud—a tradition that is being continued today in many regions of the globe.

We're engaged, for example, in diplomacy to resolve conflicts in southern Africa, working with the frontline states and our partners in the contact group. Mozambique and South Africa have reached a historic accord on nonaggression and cooperation; South Africa and Angola have agreed on a disengagement of forces from Angola, and the groundwork has been laid for the independence of Namibia, with virtually all aspects of Security Council Resolution 435 agreed upon.

Let me add that the United States considers it a moral imperative that South Africa's racial policies evolve peacefully but decisively toward a system compatible with basic norms of justice, liberty, and human dignity. I'm

We recognize that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control. . . .

pleased that American companies in South Africa, by providing equal employment opportunities, are contributing to the economic advancement of the black population. But clearly, much more must be done.

In Central America, the United States has lent support to a diplomatic process to restore regional peace and security. We have committed substantial resources to promote economic development and social progress.

The growing success of democracy in El Salvador is the best proof that the key to peace lies in a political solution. Free elections brought into office a government dedicated to democracy, reform, economic progress, and regional peace. Regrettably, there are forces in the region eager to thwart democratic change, but these forces are now on the defensive. The tide is turning in the direction of freedom. We call upon Nicaragua, in particular, to abandon its policies of subversion and militarism and to carry out the promises it made to the Organization of American States to establish democracy at home.

The Middle East has known more than its share of tragedy and conflict for decades, and the United States has been actively involved in peace diplomacy for just as long. We consider ourselves a full partner in the quest for peace. The record of the 11 years since the October war shows that much can be achieved through negotiations. It also shows that the road is long and hard.

• Two years ago, I proposed a fresh start toward a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. My initiative of September 1, 1982, contains a set of positions that can serve as a basis for a just and lasting peace. That initiative remains a realistic and workable approach, and I am committed to it as firmly as on the day I announced it. And the foundation stone of this effort remains Security Council Resolution 242, which in turn was incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David accords.

• The tragedy of Lebanon has not ended. Only last week, a despicable act of barbarism by some who are unfit to associate with humankind reminded us once again that Lebanon continues to suffer. In 1983, we helped Lebanon and Israel reach an agreement that, if implemented, could have led to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces in the context of the withdrawal of all foreign forces. This agreement was blocked, and the long agony of the Lebanese continues. Thousands of people are still kept from their homes by continued violence and are refugees in their own country. The once flourishing economy of Lebanon is near collapse. All of Lebanon's friends should work together to help end this nightmare.

• In the gulf, the United States has supported a series of Security Council resolutions that call for an end to the war between Iran and Iraq that has meant so much death and destruction and put the world's economic well-being at risk. Our hope is that hostilities will soon end, leaving each side with its political and territorial integrity intact, so that both may devote their energies to addressing the needs of their people and a return to relationships with other states.

• The lesson of experience is that negotiation works. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt brought about the peaceful return of the Sinai, clearly showing that the negotiating process brings results when the parties commit themselves to it. The time is bound to come when the same wisdom and courage will be applied, with success, to reach peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors in a manner that assures security for all in the region, the recognition of Israel, and a solution to the Palestinian problem.

In every part of the world, the United States is similarly engaged in peace diplomacy as an active player or a strong supporter.

• In Southeast Asia, we have backed the efforts of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] to mobilize international support for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian problem, which must include the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the election of a representative government. ASEAN's success in promoting economic and political development has made a major contribution to the peace and stability of the region.

• In Afghanistan, the dedicated efforts of the Secretary General and his representatives to find a diplomatic settlement have our strong support. I assure you that the United States will continue to do everything possible to find a negotiated outcome which provides the Afghan people with the right to determine their own destiny; allows the Afghan refugees to return to their own country in dignity; and protects legitimate security interests of all neighboring countries.

• On the divided and tense Korean Peninsula, we have strongly backed confidence-building measures proposed by the Republic of Korea and by the Command at Panmunjon. These are

U.S. Delegation to the 39th UN General Assembly

Representatives

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Jose S. Sorzano
Robert D. Ray
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., U.S. Senator
from the State of Maryland
John H. Glenn, Jr., U.S. Senator from
the State of Ohio

Alternate Representatives

Richard Schifter
Alan Lee Keyes
Harvey J. Feldman
Preston H. Long
Guadalupe Quintanilla

USUN press release 75 of Sept. 27, 1982



FEATURE UN General Assembly

ant first step toward peaceful
tation in the long term.
Ve take heart from progress by
in lessening tensions, notably the
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barriers between the two Ger-
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And the United States strongly
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st the Cypriot parties in achieving
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United States has been, and
will be, a friend of peaceful
ns.

S.S.R. Relations

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noted that we cannot count on
tinct for survival alone to protect
nst war. Deterrence is necessary
sufficient. America has repaired
ngth; we have invigorated our
es and friendships. We're ready
estructive negotiations with the
Union.

recognize that there is no sane
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ad other issues between our two
s, which have the capacity to
civilization as we know it. I
this is a view shared by virtually
country in the world, and by the
Union itself.

d I want to speak to you today on
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can accomplish together in the
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o take.

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from the Soviet Union. And not
m that seat, just over to the side,
seat of the representative from
ited States.

this historic assembly hall, it's
here is not a great distance be-
us. Outside this room, while there
ill be clear differences, there is
reason why we should do all that
sible to shorten that distance. And
why we're here. Isn't that what
ganization is all about?

... any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition on offensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Last January 16, I set out three objectives for U.S.-Soviet relations that can provide an agenda for our work over the months ahead. First, I said, we need to find ways to reduce—and eventually to eliminate—the threat and use of force in solving international disputes. Our concern over the potential for nuclear war cannot deflect us from the terrible human tragedies occurring every day in the regional conflicts I just discussed. Together, we have a particular responsibility to contribute to political solutions to these problems, rather than to exacerbate them through the provision of even more weapons.

I propose that our two countries agree to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional problems. We will be prepared, if the Soviets agree, to make senior experts available at regular intervals for in-depth exchanges of views. I have asked Secretary Shultz to explore this with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Spheres of influence are a thing of the past. Differences between American and Soviet interests are not. The objectives of this political dialogue will be to help avoid miscalculation, reduce the potential risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, and help the people in areas of conflict to find peaceful solutions.

The United States and the Soviet Union have achieved agreements of historic importance on some regional issues. The Austrian State Treaty and the Berlin accords are notable and lasting examples. Let us resolve to achieve similar agreements in the future.

Our second task must be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world. I am committed to redoubling our negotiating efforts to achieve real results: in Geneva, a complete ban on chemical weapons; in Vienna, real reductions—to lower and equal

levels—in Soviet and American, Warsaw Pact and NATO, conventional forces; in Stockholm, concrete practical measures to enhance mutual confidence, to reduce the risk of war, and to reaffirm commitments concerning non-use of force; in the field of nuclear testing, improvements in verification essential to ensure compliance with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions agreements; and in the field of nonproliferation, close cooperation to strengthen the international institutions and practices aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons, together with redoubled efforts to meet the legitimate expectations of all nations that the Soviet Union and the United States will substantially reduce their own nuclear arsenals. We and the Soviets have agreed to upgrade our "hot line" communications facility, and our discussions of nuclear nonproliferation in recent years have been useful to both sides. We think there are other possibilities for improving communications in this area that deserve serious exploration.

I believe the proposal of the Soviet Union for opening U.S.-Soviet talks in Vienna provided an important opportunity to advance these objectives. We've been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues and concerns of both sides, such as the relationship between defensive and offensive forces and what has been called the militarization of space. During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both sides might take while negotiations proceed. However, any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition in offensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Our approach in all these areas will be designed to take into account concerns the Soviet Union has voiced. It

... I will suggest to the Soviet Union that we institutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet-level meetings between our two countries on the whole agenda of issues before us. ... I believe such talks could work rapidly toward developing a new climate of policy understanding. ...

will attempt to provide a basis for a historic breakthrough in arms control. I'm disappointed that we were not able to open our meeting in Vienna earlier this month, on the date originally proposed by the Soviet Union. I hope we can begin these talks by the end of the year or shortly thereafter.

The third task I set in January was to establish a better working relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

We've made some modest progress. We have reached agreements to improve our "hot line," extend our 10-year economic agreement, enhance consular cooperation, and explore coordination of search and rescue efforts at sea.

We've also offered to increase significantly the amount of U.S. grain for purchase by the Soviets and to provide the Soviets a direct fishing allocation off U.S. coasts. But there is much more we could do together. I feel particularly strongly about breaking down the barriers between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and among our political, military, and other leaders. All of these steps that I have mentioned, and especially the arms control negotiations, are extremely important to a step-by-step process toward peace. But let me also say that we need to extend the arms control process, to build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate—a roadmap, if you will, showing where, during the next 20 years or so, these individual efforts can lead.

This can greatly assist step-by-step negotiations and enable us to avoid having all our hopes or expectations ride on any single set or series of negotiations. If progress is temporarily halted

at one set of talks, this newly established framework for arms control could help us take up the slack at other negotiations.

A New Beginning

Today, to the great end of lifting the dread of nuclear war from the peoples of the earth, I invite the leaders of the world to join in a new beginning. We need a fresh approach to reducing international tensions. History demonstrates beyond controversy that, just as the arms competition has its roots in political suspicions and anxieties, so it can be channeled in more stabilizing directions and eventually be eliminated, if those political suspicions and anxieties are addressed as well.

Toward this end, I will suggest to the Soviet Union that we institutionalize regular ministerial or cabinet-level meetings between our two countries on the whole agenda of issues before us, including the problem of needless obstacles to understanding. To take but one idea for discussion: in such talks we could consider the exchange of outlines of 5-year military plans for weapons development and our schedules of intended procurement. We would also welcome the exchange of observers at military exercises and locations. And I propose that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the U.S. nuclear test site, and for ours to go to theirs, to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. We should work toward having such arrangements in place by next spring.

I hope that the Soviet Union will cooperate in this undertaking and reciprocate in a manner that will enable

the two countries to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

I believe such talks could work rapidly toward developing a new climate of policy understanding, one that is essential if crises are to be avoided. Real arms control is to be negotiated. Of course, summit meetings have a useful role to play, but they need to be carefully prepared, and the benefit here is that meetings at the ministerial level would provide the kind of progress that is the best preparation for higher level talks between ourselves and the Soviet leaders.

How much progress we will make and at what pace, I cannot say. But I have a moral obligation to try and do again.

Some may dismiss such proposals as my own optimism as simplistic American idealism. And they will point to the burdens of the modern world and to history. Well, yes, if we sit down and catalogue, year by year, generation by generation, the famines, the plague, the wars, the invasions mankind has endured, the list will grow so long, and the assault on humanity so terrific, that it seems too much for the human spirit to bear.

But isn't this narrow and short sighted and not at all how we think of history? Yes, the deeds of infamy and justice are all recorded, but what is lost from the pages of history is the vision of the dreamers and the deeds of the builders and the doers.

These things make up the story that we tell and pass on to our children. They comprise the most enduring and significant fact about human history: that through the heartbreak and tragedy man has always dared to perceive the outline of human progress, the steady growth of not just the material well-being but the spiritual insight of mankind.

"There have been tyrants and murderers, and for a time they have seemed invincible. But in the end, they always fall. Think on it . . . always. All through history, the way of truth and love has always won." That was the belief of



FEATURE UN General Assembly

The United Nations

Background

The immediate antecedent of the United Nations was the League of Nations, created under U.S. leadership (although the United States never became a member) following World War I. The League existed from 1919 until its reduced organization and functions were replaced by the United Nations in 1945.

The roots of the United Nations organization go back more than 100 years. Since the early 19th century, national governments have discussed and acted on common issues and problems through intergovernmental parliamentary bodies. This process led to conferences such as The Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, which pointed the way to developing legal and arbitral alternatives to war.

The idea for the United Nations found expression in declarations signed at conferences in Moscow and Tehran in October and December 1943. In the summer of 1944, informal conversations were held by representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, a mansion in Washington, D.C. Later, discussions among the United Kingdom, the United States, and China resulted in proposals concerning the purposes and principles of an international organization, its membership and principal organs, arrangements to maintain international peace and security, and arrangements for international economic and social cooperation. These proposals were discussed and debated by governments and private citizens all over the world.

On March 5, 1945, invitations to a conference to be held in San Francisco in April were issued by the United States on behalf of itself, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China to 42 other governments that had signed the January 1, 1942 "Declaration by United Nations" and that had declared war on Germany or Japan no later than March 1, 1945. The conference added

Argentina, Denmark, and the two Russian republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, bringing the total to 50.

The 50 nations represented at San Francisco signed the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945.¹ Poland, which was not represented at the conference but for which a place among the original signatories had been reserved, added its name later, bringing the original signatories to a total of 51. The United Nations came into existence 4 months later, on October 24, 1945, when the Charter had been ratified by the five permanent members of the Security Council—China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and by a majority of the other signatories.

Membership. UN membership is open to all "peace-loving states" that accept the obligations of the UN Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to fulfill these obligations. As of October 1984, there were 159 members. Admission to membership is determined by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

New York Headquarters. The headquarters site in New York is owned by the United Nations and is international territory. Under special agreement with the United States, certain privileges and immunities have been granted, but generally the laws of New York City, New York State, and the United States apply.

The presence of the United Nations in New York indirectly contributes an estimated \$692.2 million per year to the economy of New York, as estimated in 1980 by the New York City Commission for the United Nations. It greatly offsets the estimated \$15 million annual cost to the city. More than 4,000 Americans are employed in New York in UN-related jobs. The commission concluded that the United Nations is a "year-round convention, aiding hotels, restaurants, taxi

of Mahatma Gandhi. He said that, and it remains today a gift that is good and true. This gift," is said to have been the expression of another great gift, a Spanish soldier who gave days of war for that of love and and if we're to make realities of great goals of the UN—the dreams of peace and dignity—we must take to heart words of Ignatius Loyola; we must long enough to contemplate the gift of life, the gift of this world, the gift of each other.

the gift of the present. It is this time, that now we must leave you with a reflection from a Gandhi, spoken with those in who said that the disputes and of the modern world are too overcome. It was spoken short-Gandhi's quest for [Indian] independence took him to Britain.

in not conscious of a single experience throughout my three months' England and Europe," he said, made me feel that after all east is west is west. On the contrary, I am convinced more than ever human nature is much the same no matter under what clime it flourishes, if you approached people with affection, you would have tenfold and thousand-fold affection and to you."

the sake of a peaceful world, a where human dignity and freedom protected and enshrined, let us approach each other with tenfold trust and hundredfold affection. A new future is. The time is here, the moment

of the Founding Fathers of our Thomas Paine, spoke words that to all of us gathered here today. apply directly to all sitting here in m. He said: "We have it in our to begin the world over again.

from Weekly Compilation of
Statistical Documents of Oct. 1, 1984. ■

drivers and a myriad of other local enterprises."

About 5,000 meetings are held in the headquarters each year. UN radio programs are broadcast in some 24 languages and reach all continents. Sales of UN postage stamps—usable only for letters and articles mailed at the headquarters—total about \$7.8 million annually. About 300 correspondents and 110 photographers are permanently accredited to the United Nations, and an additional 750 hold temporary accreditation at any given time. The United Na-

tions answers about 47,000 public requests for information each year. Estimates show that some 2.7 million visitors have taken guided tours of the headquarters since it opened.

The Security Council

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," and all UN members "agree to accept and carry out the deci-

sions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

Other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member governments. The Security Council, however, has the power to make decisions, which member governments are obligated to carry out under the Charter. A representative of each Security Council member must always be present at UN headquarters so the Council can meet at any time.

Decisions in the Security Council on all substantive matters—for exam-

United Nations—A Profile



Established: By charter signed in San Francisco, Calif., on June 26, 1945; effective October 24, 1945.

Purposes: To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to achieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common ends.

Members: 159.

Official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish.

Principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, Secretariat.

Budget: UN assessment budget (calendar year 1983)—\$685.3 million. US share—\$171.3 million. The total UN system budget (including the UN and specialized agencies and programs, but not the World

Bank) was about \$4.5 billion in calendar year 1981. The US share was \$1 billion.

Secretariat

Chief administrative officer: Secretary General of the United Nations, appointed to a 5-year term by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. Secretary General 1982-present: Javier Perez de Cuellar (Peru).

Staff: A worldwide staff of 22,000 from some 150 countries, including more than 2,900 US citizens. The staff is appointed by the Secretary General according to UN regulations.

General Assembly

Membership: All UN members. President: Elected at the beginning of each General Assembly session.

Main committees: *First*—Political and Security; Special Political Committee. *Second*—Economic and Financial. *Third*—Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural. *Fourth*—Trusteeship. *Fifth*—Administrative and Budgetary. *Sixth*—Legal. Many other committees address specific issues, including peacekeeping, crime prevention, status of women, and UN Charter reform.

Security Council

Membership: 5 permanent members (China, France, USSR, UK, US), each with the right to veto, and 10 nonpermanent members

elected by the General Assembly for 3-year terms. Five nonpermanent members are elected from Africa and Asia; one from Eastern Europe; two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other areas. Nonpermanent members are eligible for immediate reelection. The 1982 nonpermanent members are Egypt, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian SSR, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Zimbabwe. President rotates monthly in English alphabetical order of members.

Economic and Social Council

Membership: 54; 18 elected each year by the General Assembly for 3-year terms. President: Elected each year.

Trusteeship Council

Membership: US, China, France, USSR. President: Elected each year.

International Court of Justice

Membership: 15, elected for 9-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council from nominees of national groups. Provisions of the International Court of Justice Statute.

Taken from the *Background Notes of 1984*, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: J. Adams. ■

FEATURE UN General Assembly

calling for direct measures to the settlement of a dispute require the affirmative votes of permanent members. A negative vote—by a permanent member adoption of a proposal that has the required number of affirmatives. It was agreed early in UN that abstention is not regarded as a permanent member usually when it does not wish to vote in a decision or to block it with a

ough July 1984, a total of 194 had been cast: 116 by the Soviet Union, 15 by China, 22 by the United Kingdom, and 38 by the United States. Of the 3 vetoes by China, 2 by the People's Republic of China and 1 by the Republic of China. Of the 87 vetoes, 87 (80%) were cast in 1958. All 38 of the U.S. vetoes were cast since 1969—32 since 1975, and 15 since January 1981. On questions of procedure, the agenda, require the affirmative votes of any nine members not subject to a veto.

that is a member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate in Security Council discussions in which the Council is directly affected. In recent years, the Council has interpreted this criterion enabling many countries to take part in discussions. Nonmembers are invited to take part, under conditions decided by the Council, when they are parties to disputes being considered by the Council.

ough the UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for international peace and security, it provides that parties attempt to settle their disputes peacefully, either directly or through regional organiza-

Under Chapter VI of the Charter, "Settlement of Disputes," the Security Council "may investigate any dispute or any situation which might

lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute." The Council may "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the situation might endanger international peace and security.

Under Chapter VII, the Council has broader power to decide upon measures to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression." In such situations, the Council is not limited to recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force, "to maintain or restore international peace and security." The 1977 application of an embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa was the first use of this power against a member nation.

Under Article 43, the signatories undertook to make armed forces available to the Council "on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements" between the Council and UN member states. Because of disagreements among the permanent members of the Council, however, efforts to implement such arrangements were dropped early in UN history. Never-

theless, military forces have been made available to the United Nations by its members on an ad hoc basis when specifically authorized by the Security Council, e.g., in Cyprus, the Sinai, and Lebanon.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly is made up of all 159 UN members. Each member may designate five representatives. Member countries are seated in English alphabetical order. Each year, seating begins at a different point in the alphabet, determined through a drawing.

The Assembly meets in regular session once a year under a president elected from among the representatives. The regular session usually begins on the third Tuesday in September and ends in mid-December. Special sessions can be convened at the request of the Security Council, of a majority of UN members, or, if the majority concurs, of a single member.

There have been 12 special sessions of the General Assembly. In 1978, the Assembly held its eighth special session



(UN photo by Milton Grant)

UN Security Council

(on financing of a new peacekeeping force in Lebanon) and its ninth (on Namibia). The 10th special session, in May and June 1978, constituted the largest intergovernmental conference on disarmament in history. A followup session on disarmament, the 12th special session, took place in June and July 1982. A special session, the 11th, on North-South economic issues, occurred 2 years earlier in August and September 1980.

Voting in the General Assembly on important questions—recommendations on peace and security; election of members to organs; admission, suspension, and expulsion of members; trusteeship questions; budgetary matters—is by


a two-thirds majority of those present and voting “yes” or “no.” Abstentions are not counted. Other questions are decided by a simple majority vote. Each member country has one vote.

Apart from approval of budgetary matters, including adoption of a scale of assessment, Assembly resolutions are only recommendatory and are not binding on the members. The General Assembly may make recommendations on any questions or matters within the scope of the United Nations except matters of peace and security under Security Council consideration.

As the only organ of the United Nations in which all members are repre-

sented, the Assembly has been the forum in which members have launched major initiatives on international relations of peace, economic progress, human rights. It may initiate studies, make recommendations to promote international political cooperation; and codify international law; realize human rights and fundamental freedoms; and further international economic, social, cultural, education, health programs.

The Assembly may take action if the Security Council is unable—usually to disagreement among the five permanent members—to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace in a case involv-





FEATURE UN General Assembly

threat to the peace, breach of the act of aggression. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution, adopted in 1950, empowers the Assembly, if not in session, to convene an emergency special session on 24-hour notice and to recommend collective action—including the use of armed force—in the case of a breach of the act of aggression. Two-thirds of the members must approve any such recommendation. Emergency special sessions under this procedure have been held on nine occasions. The eighth emergency special session, in September 1948, considered the situation in Palestine. The situation in the occupied territories, following Israel's unilateral extension of its laws, jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights, was the subject of the ninth emergency session in January and February 1982.

In recent years, the Assembly has become a forum for the North-South dialogue—the discussion of issues between industrialized nations and developing countries. In large part, this is due to the phenomenal growth and changing makeup of the UN membership. The fact that the Assembly is the only body comprising all members of the United Nations—countries that achieved independence after the United Nations' creation—caused a massive shift in its character. In 1945, the United Nations had 51 members, most of them Western. Of its present 159 members, more than two-thirds of them are developing countries.

There are many differences in size, and outlook among the developing countries. Nevertheless, this group (some 120 countries in the Assembly), known as "the Third World," the "nonaligned," and the "Group of 77," usually votes and acts in unison. Because of their numbers they, in effect, determine the agenda of the Assembly, the character of its debates, and the nature of its decisions. For developing countries, the United Nations is particularly important. It is the primary source of much of their political influence and the basic outlet for their foreign relations initiatives. In-

creasingly, they seek inclusion in the councils of power, and the United Nations provides such a policy forum.

The United Nations has devoted significant attention to the problems of the developing countries, in response to their growing political importance in multilateral arenas. The General Assembly has guided, and in many cases created, special programs to help developing nations acquire the skills, knowledge, and organization they need for more productive economies. These programs complement the work of the various specialized agencies in the UN system. Through its economic committee, the Assembly remains concerned with the question of economic development.

The Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) assists the General Assembly in promoting international economic and social cooperation. ECOSOC has 54 members, 18 of which are selected each year by the General Assembly for a 3-year term. A retiring member is eligible for immediate reelection—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have been

members since the United Nations was founded. ECOSOC holds two major sessions each year: a spring meeting, usually in New York, and a summer meeting, usually in Geneva. The president is elected for a 1-year term. Voting is by simple majority.

ECOSOC undertakes studies and makes recommendations on development, world trade, industrialization, natural resources, human rights, the status of women, population, narcotics, social welfare, science and technology, crime prevention, and other issues.

A number of standing committees and functional commissions assist ECOSOC. It also has regional economic commissions that seek to strengthen economic development of countries within their regions. These are:

- The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa;
- The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Bangkok;
- The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Geneva;
- The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Santiago; and
- The Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA), Baghdad.

U.S. Representatives to the United Nations*

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
Hershel V. Johnson (acting)
Warren R. Austin
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
James J. Wadsworth
Adlai E. Stevenson
Arthur J. Goldberg
George W. Ball
James Russell Wiggins
Charles W. Yost
George Bush
John A. Scali
Daniel P. Moynihan
William W. Scranton
Andrew Young
Donald McHenry
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

March 1946–June 1946
June 1946–January 1947
January 1947–January 1953
January 1953–September 1960
September 1960–January 1961
January 1961–July 1965
July 1965–June 1968
June 1968–September 1968
October 1968–January 1969
January 1969–February 1971
February 1971–January 1973
February 1973–June 1975
June 1975–February 1976
March 1976–January 1977
January 1977–April 1979
April 1979–January 1981
January 1981–present

*The U.S. Representative to the United Nations is the Chief of the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York and holds the rank and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. ■

ECOSOC also provides consultative status to nongovernmental organizations active within its fields of competence. These organizations may send observers to public meetings of the council and its subsidiary bodies and submit statements related to the council's work.

Trusteeship Council

The UN trusteeship system was established to help ensure that territories were administered in the best interests both of the inhabitants and of international peace and security. The Trusteeship Council operates under the authority of the General Assembly, or, in the case of strategic trusts, the Security Council. It assists those bodies in carrying out their responsibilities under the UN Charter.

A UN member administering a trust territory is pledged to promote the political, economic, and educational advancement of the territory's people. It is also to promote "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."


As recently as 1957, 11 territories—most of them former mandates of the League of Nations or territories taken from enemy states at the end of World War II—were part of the UN

trusteeship system. All but one have attained self-government or independence, either as separate nations or by joining neighboring independent countries.

The only remaining is the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), designated as a strategic area and administered by the United States under a 1947 agreement with the Security Council. Following negotiations which began in 1969, an agreement was reached in 1975 with one part of the territory, the Northern Mariana Islands, which will become a commonwealth of the United States upon termination of the trusteeship. In 1983, UN-observed plebiscites were held in the remaining three jurisdictions—the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. All resulted in voter approval of an agreement providing for a "free association" relationship with the United States. While the governments of two of these areas subsequently approved a Compact of Free Association, Palau's formal approval has been held up by constitutional difficulties. The United States is working with the Palau Government to resolve this problem. The United States continues to strive toward termination of the trusteeship for all four components of the trust territory as soon as possible, under terms acceptable to all parties.

Membership of the Trusteeship Council consists of the United

UN headquarters in New York covers an 18-acre area on Manhattan Island. The buildings include the 39-story Secretariat, the General Assembly, council chambers and conference rooms, and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library.





FEATURE UN General Assembly

The 159 Members of the United Nations¹

tan (1946)	The Gambia (1965)	Pakistan (1947)
(1955)	German Democratic Republic (1973)	Panama
(1962)	Germany, Federal Republic of (1973)	Papua New Guinea (1975)
(1976)	Ghana (1957)	Paraguay
and Barbuda (1981)	Greece	Peru
a	Grenada (1974)	Philippines
(1955)	Guatemala	Poland
(1973)	Guinea (1958)	Portugal (1955)
(1971)	Guinea-Bissau (1974)	Qatar (1971)
sh (1974)	Guyana (1966)	Romania (1955)
s (1966)	Haiti	Rwanda (1962)
(1981)	Honduras	St. Christopher-Nevis (1983)
(1960)	Hungary (1955)	St. Lucia (1979)
(1971)	Iceland (1946)	St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1980)
a (1966)	India	Samoa (1976)
arussalam (1984)	Indonesia (1950)	Sao Tome and Principe (1975)
(1955)	Iran	Saudi Arabia
Faso—formerly Upper Volta (1960)	Iraq	Senegal (1960)
(1948)	Ireland (1955)	Seychelles (1976)
(1962)	Israel (1949)	Sierra Leone (1961)
sian SSR	Italy (1955)	Singapore (1965)
de (1975)	Ivory Coast (1960)	Solomon Islands (1978)
African Republic (1960)	Jamaica (1962)	Somalia (1960)
60)	Japan (1956)	South Africa
(1975)	Jordan (1955)	Spain (1955)
960)	Kenya (1963)	Sri Lanka (1955)
a	Kuwait (1963)	Sudan (1956)
(1960)	Lao People's Democratic Republic (1955)	Suriname (1975)
(1975)	Lebanon	Swaziland (1968)
960)	Lesotho (1966)	Sweden (1946)
a	Liberia	Syria
(1960)	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1955)	Thailand (1946)
(1975)	Luxembourg	Togo (1960)
960)	Madagascar (1960)	Trinidad and Tobago (1962)
a	Malawi (1964)	Tunisia (1956)
(1960)	Malaysia (1957)	Turkey
ovakia	Maldives (1965)	Uganda (1962)
ctic Kampuchea—	Mali (1960)	Ukrainian SSR
ly Cambodia (1955)	Malta (1964)	USSR
tic Yemen (1967)	Mauritania (1961)	United Arab Emirates (1971)
(1977)	Mauritius (1968)	United Kingdom
(1978)	Mexico	United Republic of Cameroon (1960)
un Republic	Mongolia (1961)	United Republic of Tanzania (1961)
dor	Morocco (1956)	United States of America
al Guinea (1968)	Mozambique (1975)	Uruguay
)	Nepal (1955)	Vanuatu (1981)
(1955)	Netherlands	Venezuela
960)	New Zealand	Vietnam (1977)
	Nicaragua	Yemen (1947)
	Niger (1960)	Yugoslavia
	Nigeria (1960)	Zaire (1960)
	Norway	Zambia (1964)
	Oman (1971)	Zimbabwe (1980)

¹ Countries are listed with names as registered by the United Nations. Year in parentheses indicates date of admission; countries with no year listed were original members in 1945.

Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of Oct. 25, 1971, the General Assembly decided "to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the representative of its Government as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations." ■

States—the only country now administering a trust territory—and the other permanent members of the Security Council: China (which does not participate), France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. The Court was established under the Charter in 1945 as the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court's main functions are to decide contentious cases submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions submitted to it by the General Assembly or Security Council, or by such specialized agencies as may be authorized to do so by the General Assembly in accordance with the UN Charter.

The seat of the Court is at The Hague, Netherlands. It is composed of 15 judges elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council from a list of persons nominated by the national groups in the

Permanent Court of Arbitration. Electors are mandated to bear in mind the qualifications of the candidates and the need for the Court as a whole to represent the main cultural groups and principal legal systems. No two judges may be nationals of the same country. Judges serve for 9 years and may be reelected. One-third of the Court (five judges) is elected every 3 years.

Questions before the Court are decided by a majority of judges present. Nine judges constitute a quorum. In case of a tie, the president of the Court casts the deciding vote. In certain circumstances, parties may be entitled to choose a judge for a specific case.

Only states may be parties in cases before the International Court of Justice. This does not preclude private interests from being the subject of proceedings if one state brings the case against another. Jurisdiction of the Court is based on the consent of the parties. Consent may be given in several ways. States may specify, generally in a treaty, that any dispute concerning the meaning of the treaty may be referred to the Court; or, after a specific dispute arises, they may agree to take it before the Court for resolution. In addition, a state may, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in certain categories of disputes, such as those concerning the interpretation of a treaty or a question of international law. In the event of a dispute concerning the Court's jurisdiction, the matter will be settled by the Court. Judgments in contentious cases are binding upon the parties. The Security Council can be called upon by a party to determine measures to be taken to give effect to a judgment if the other party fails to perform its obligations under that judgment.

The United States is one of the 47 countries that had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by 1983. In accepting that jurisdiction in 1946, the United States specifically excluded disputes regarding matters essentially within the U.S. domestic jurisdiction, "as determined by the United States of America." The last phrase, known as the Connally reservation, permits the United States rather

than the Court to determine whether certain disputes should come before the Court.

On a number of occasions since the 1950s, the Court has dealt with issues regarding control by South Africa of Namibia (South-West Africa). In the most recent advisory opinion (1971) the Court advised that since the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal, South Africa is obliged to withdraw its administration and end its occupation of the territory.

Other recent cases include:

- A complaint by Pakistan in 1971 that India was planning to turn over Bangladesh for trial 195 Pakistani prisoners of war;
- Challenges by Australia and New Zealand in 1973 to further French atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific Ocean;
- Complaints by the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany about the decision of Iceland to extend its exclusive fisheries zone from 19 kilometers (12 mi.) to 80 kilometers (50 mi.) around its coast;
- Questions raised by the General Assembly about the status of the Spanish Sahara (now Western Sahara);
- A dispute between Greece and Turkey over the boundary of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea;
- A complaint by the United States in 1980 that Iran was detaining American diplomats in Tehran in violation of international law; and
- A dispute between Tunisia and Libya over the delimitation of the continental shelf between them.

A chamber of the Court currently has before it a question as to the extent of the maritime boundary dividing the Continental Shelf and fisheries zone between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine area.

International Court of Justice Officials

Nine-year terms expire on February 5 of the year shown in parentheses. The President is elected by the Court for a 3-year term.

President of the Court—Taslim Olawale Elias, Nigeria (1985)

Vice President—Jose Sette-Camara, Brazil (1988)

Other Members of the Court

Manfred Lachs, Poland (1985)
 Platon Dmitrievich Morozov, USSR (1988)
 Nagendra Singh, India (1991)
 Jose Maria Ruda, Argentina (1991)
 Hermann Mosler, F.R.G. (1985)
 Shigeru Oda, Japan (1985)
 Roberto Ago, Italy (1988)
 Abdallah Fikri El-Khani, Syria (1985)
 Stephen M. Schwebel, US (1988)
 Robert Y. Jennings, UK (1991)
 Guy Ladréit de Lacharrière, France (1991)
 Keba Mbaye, Senegal (1991)
 Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria (1988) ■



FEATURE UN General Assembly

Secretariat

The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General, assisted by a staff of more than 16,000 international civil servants worldwide. It provides studies, information, and facilities needed by UN organs for their meetings. It also carries out tasks as directed by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and other principal UN bodies. The Charter provides that the staff be chosen by application of the "highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity," with due regard for the importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

The Charter also provides that the Secretary General and staff shall not receive instructions from any government or authority other than the United Nations. Each UN member is entitled to respect the international character of the Secretariat and not to influence its staff. The Secretary General alone is responsible for the staff selection.

The Secretary General's duties include using his good offices in resolving international disputes, administering peacekeeping operations, organizing international conferences, gathering information on the implementation of Security Council decisions, and consulting with other governments regarding various international relations initiatives. The Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any mat-

ter that in his or her opinion may threaten international peace and security.

In 1977, the General Assembly created a new position in the Secretariat—a director general for development and economic cooperation. The incumbent, second only to the Secretary General, works to obtain better efficiency and coordination of the many economic and developmental programs operating in the UN system. Jean Ripert of France currently occupies this post.

The UN Family

In addition to the six principal UN organs, the UN family includes nearly 30 major programs or agencies. Some were in existence before the creation of the United Nations and are related to it by agreement. Others were established by the General Assembly. Each specialized agency provides expertise in a specific area.



The World Health Organization (WHO) has eradicated smallpox and is working toward the goal of the "health for all by the year 2000." It has established a worldwide network to warn against the outbreak of other contagious diseases and is promoting a global campaign to make available immunizations against the six major childhood diseases by 1990.



The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) gathers, analyzes, and publishes information for the benefit of the world's food producers and consumers; provides technical assistance to developing countries to improve agricultural production and stimulate economic development; provides systematic early warnings on impending food and crop shortages; and carries out programs to control plant and animal diseases.



The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has established a World Weather Watch to increase the collection and dissemination of data necessary for more accurate weather prediction. It promotes standardization of meteorological observations and provides information about long-term climate changes that can affect agriculture and other economic activity.



The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) develops the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure the safe and orderly growth of civil aviation. Practices and recommended standards developed by ICAO directly affect U.S. commercial air travel and the sale of U.S. aircraft and equipment abroad. ICAO also promotes standards for the control of noise and pollution from aircraft.

UN Secretaries General

Trygve Lie	Norway	February 1, 1946–April 10, 1953
Dag Hammarskjöld	Sweden	April 10, 1953–September 18, 1961
U Thant	Burma	November 3, 1961–December 31, 1971
Initially appointed acting Secretary General; formally elected Secretary General November 30, 1962.)		
Kurt Waldheim	Austria	January 1, 1972–December 31, 1981
Javier Pérez de Cuellar	Peru	January 1, 1982–present ■



The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a specialized agency primarily devoted to lending to low-income farmers in poor food-deficit countries. It is a cooperative effort of industrialized, oil-exporting, and developing nations. Most of IFAD's loans involve cofinancing with other international financial institutions.

Other prominent specialized agencies are the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Labor Organization (ILO).

Programs created by the United Nations also work to fill many important economic and social needs.

The UN Development Program (UNDP) is the largest multilateral source of grant technical assistance in the world. Voluntarily funded, it maintains 116 field offices to fulfill its role as the central funding and coordinating mechanism for technical assistance within the UN system. Its country and intercountry programs in some 150 nations and territories focus on training, institution building, and preinvestment activity, with the greater proportion of resources going to the least developed countries. Total expenditures for 1982 exceeded \$850 million.

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), originally created to assist homeless and destitute children in Europe and China after World War II, now provides humanitarian and developmental assistance to children and mothers in developing countries. UNICEF concentrates on long-term programs that maximize local community participation and stimulate self-reliance in efforts to improve maternal and child health, nutrition, and education as well as to increase the availability of clean water and sanitation. UNICEF was awarded the 1965 Nobel Peace Prize. In 1982, UNICEF urged broad collaboration among multilateral and bilateral aid

donors, private voluntary agencies, developing country governments, and local communities to take advantage of the opportunity created by recent developments in health science and social organization to achieve "a health revolution for children" in developing countries.

The UN Environmental Program (UNEP) is responsible for coordinating UN environmental activities, calling international attention to global and regional environmental problems, while stimulating programs to correct these problems. It assists developing countries in promoting environmentally sound development policies and has developed a worldwide environmental monitoring system to standardize international environmental data.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides refugees—people outside of country of nationality because of well-founded fear of persecution—with legal protection and material assistance at the request of a government or of the United Nations. UNHCR was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1954 and 1982.

International Conferences

Some conferences held in the UN system are regular annual meetings; others are convened specifically to address a single topic. Most of the specialized agencies hold periodic assemblies of the representatives of member governments for the agencies' regular business and attention to specific problems. Subgroups of these agencies often meet to discuss specific problems and to make recommendations to the larger representative body for action.



For example, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) focuses specific attention on efficient navigation, pollution control, and tanker safety. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommends uniform regulations and standard safety measures as well as simpler procedures at international



borders. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocates the radio frequency spectrum, registers radio frequency assignments, and works to reduce or eliminate interference between radio stations.

The United Nations organizes special worldwide conferences to concentrate on particular issues. The 1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy was held in Nairobi, Kenya, to encourage new and renewable sources of energy such as solar and geothermal power and oil shale. The conference dealt especially with the problem of developing countries' access to new sources of energy.

The World Assembly on Aging, held in Vienna in July and August 1981, emphasized the problems facing the aging and addressed their rights; role in society; and social, economic, and personal security.

UNISPACE '82, also held in Vienna in August 1982, addressed international cooperation in the peaceful application of space technology.

U.S. delegations often include not only executive branch officials but also Members of Congress, technical experts, and representatives of relevant segments of the U.S. private sector.

The United Nations also draws attention to specific issues by designating international "decades," "years," and "days." Some of these are:

- Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace (1976–85);
- Second Disarmament Decade (1980s);
- Third UN Development Decade (1981–90);
- International Youth Year (1985);
- International Year of Peace (1986);
- World Health Day (April 7);
- World Environment Day (June 5);
- United Nations Day (October 24, the date of entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945); and



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Human Rights Day, annually celebrated on December 10, the date of adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the General Assembly in 1948.

Financing the System

The UN system is financed in two ways: assessed contributions from member states in fulfillment of their treaty obligations, and voluntary contributions from member states.

The regular budgets of the United Nations and its specialized agencies are fixed by assessments. In the case of the United Nations, the General Assembly approves the regular budget and determines the assessment for each member. The assessment is broadly based on the relative capacity of each member to pay, as measured by national income statistics, although there are variations.

The Assembly has established the principle that no member should pay more than 25% of the regular budget. The United States is the only nation affected by this limitation. If the standard of "capacity to pay" were applied in the same manner to the United States as to other major industrial nations, the United States would be assessed at about 29%. The minimum assessment is 0.01%.

Under the scale of assessments adopted for the 3-year period 1983-85, the major contributors to the regular budget are the Soviet Union (22%), Japan (10.32%), the Federal Republic of Germany (8.54%), France (6%), and the United Kingdom (5%). The assessments against members for the regular budget amount to \$762 million for each year of the 1984-85 period; the U.S. share is \$190 million.

UN peacekeeping operations have been financed by a combination of assessments, voluntary contributions, and the sale of UN bonds. The UN Truce Supervision Agency in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been financed solely by voluntary contributions. Some member nations, in addition to providing monetary support, have provided troops, equipment, or services without subsequent reimbursement. The

United States has airlifted personnel from nations contributing troops to a number of peacekeeping operations.

Special UN programs not included in the regular budget—such as UNICEF and the UNDP—are financed by voluntary contributions from member governments. Some private sector funds are also provided. Some nations use the UN system extensively to contribute to developmental assistance programs in other nations.

In calendar year 1982, expenditures by the United Nations; the specialized agencies; the IAEA; and the special programs such as UNDP, UNICEF, the UNEP, WFP, and the UNHCR totaled about \$4.5 billion.

The United States contributes varying percentages of the costs of the different agencies and programs in the UN system. In FY 1982, its combined assessed and voluntary contributions amounted to \$702.6 million, or about 16% of the total.

Some nations have refused to pay all or part of their assessments for certain peacekeeping operations as a matter of principle and thereby have caused financing difficulties for the United Nations. These refusals and other factors, such as making some payments in non-convertible currency, have produced a deficit estimated at \$326 million in December 1983.

Maintaining the Peace

The UN Charter gives the Security Council the power to:

- Investigate any situation threatening international peace;
- Recommend procedures for peaceful solution of a dispute;
- Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations; and
- Enforce its decisions militarily, if necessary. The original assumption that the United Nations would have its own armed forces did not work out. However, through contributions of troops and equipment by various nations, UN peacekeeping forces have been

able to limit or prevent conflict in a number of situations. With steady experience in the operation of such forces over a number of years, this UN activity has become more readily acceptable, although disagreement among the permanent members has led to difficulties in some efforts to institute new peacekeeping forces.

The United Nations has also served to reduce the danger of wider conflict and to open the way to negotiated settlements through its services as a center of debate and negotiation, as well as through factfinding missions, mediators, and truce observers. On the other hand, there have been many violent international outbreaks since the United Nations was created. Some have not been discussed by the Security Council at all, and others proved to be beyond the capacity of the United Nations to affect. Continuing efforts by the United States and other nations have sought to enhance the effectiveness of the Security Council in dealing with international conflicts.

The most extensive use of UN troops was in Korea, where, in 1950, the Security Council mobilized forces under U.S. leadership for the defense of south Korea against an attack from the north. UN forces reached a peak strength of 500,000.

In the Congo (now Zaire), the UN peacekeeping operation in 1960-64 helped the Congolese Government restore order following its independence. At its peak, the UN force totaled more than 20,000 officers and troops.

In 1964, a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created to prevent the recurrence of fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since Turkish troops landed on Cyprus in 1974, UNFICYP also has helped to maintain the cease-fire between the Cyprus National Guard and the armed forces of Turkey. Other UN efforts have sought a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

In the search for a peaceful solution in the Middle East, the United Nations has been involved in various ways over the past 36 years. Its efforts have ranged from employment of the "good

offices" of UN officials in helping to resolve differences to the actual deployment of UN troops. The fighting that broke out when the State of Israel was established in 1948 was halted by a UN cease-fire. UN mediators helped bring about armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. These agreements provided for implementation by mixed armistice com-

missions and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) was established to assist refugees from the conflict.

In 1956, the Suez crisis was resolved by the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French forces from Egyptian territory in compliance with a UN resolution and by the establishment of the UN

Emergency Force (UNEF) to preserve the peace. A UN "presence" in Jordan and observer groups in Lebanon and Yemen also have helped to diminish potential threats to international peace and security in the area. UNEF policed the Gaza and Sinai lines between Israel and the United Arab Republic from 1956 to 1967, when it was withdrawn at Egyptian request. In June 1967 the Security Council achieved a cease-fire and installed UN observers on the cease-fire lines between Israel and Syria.

Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, a new UN Emergency Force was created to impose itself between the forces of Israel and Egypt. In 1974, meeting chaired by the UNEF commander, the two countries signed an agreement on disengagement, which UNEF then supervised. Under the agreement, as well as under a second disengagement agreement in 1976, UNEF manned the zones of disengagement and inspected the zones of lines and forces as agreed to by the parties. UNEF was dissolved in 1979 when the Egyptian-Israeli peace rendered the mandate no longer necessary.

After Israel and Syria reached an agreement on disengaging their forces on the Golan Heights in 1974, the Security Council established a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The mandate of UNDOF also has been extended periodically by the Council.

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created in early 1978 following an Israeli reprisal attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) bases in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was first with 4,000 troops and then with more, was established to permit an Israeli withdrawal and restore order under the control of Lebanese authorities. UNIFIL helped to preserve a fragile cease-fire along the Israel-Lebanese border until Israel's invasion of June 1982 drastically transformed conditions in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL still performs its duties to the extent possible in its anomalous situation behind Israeli lines. Its mandate has been extended periodically by the Security Council on an interim basis, with humanitarian and other temporary



(UN photo by J.K. Isaac)

The UN Charter gives the Security Council power to enforce decisions militarily. In a number of situations, UN peacekeeping forces have been able to limit or prevent conflict.



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to its functions. At the end of UNIFIL had a strength of some

UNTSO, originally created to help implement the armistice agreements following the first Arab-Israeli war, has performed a variety of chores in the East conflict zones. Its unarmed observers assist UNDOF and UNIFIL. The presence of UNTSO observers has been in place since 1982, monitoring the situation after the Israeli invasion. At the end of 1983, it had an authorized force of 9 observers throughout the Middle

The United Nations also has been active in establishing terms for the achievement of independence of Namibia (South-West Africa) from South African colonial rule. Numerous meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council—including a special session of the General Assembly on Namibia in November 1978—have focused on this issue. Since early 1977, a small “contact group” consisting of the then five permanent members of the Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany—has been active in facilitating negotiations on the Namibia dispute. In July 1978, initial agreement was reached, and the Security Council asked the Secretary General to draw up a plan to ensure the early achievement of Namibia through free elections under UN auspices. Although South Africa objected to portions of the Secretary General's plan, the Council, in November 1978, endorsed the plan as Security Council Resolution 435 and authorized creation of a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), with civilian and military components. This remains the internationally accepted basis for Namibian independence. Though implementation of the plan has been delayed, most differences among the parties have been overcome through extended negotiations. The Security Council remains seized of the issue.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Although the UN Charter adopted in 1945 gave no immediate priority to disarmament, it envisaged a system of regulation that would ensure “the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.”

The advent of nuclear weapons came only weeks after the signing of the UN Charter and provided immediate impetus to concepts of arms limitation and disarmament. In fact, the first resolution of the first meeting of the General Assembly (January 24, 1946) was entitled “The Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy,” and called upon the commission to make specific proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

Since the early years of the United Nations, great-power disagreement has severely hampered efforts to promote arms control and disarmament within the UN system. However, the United Nations has undertaken continuing efforts to develop organizational machinery that can effectively address disarmament issues. The early establishment of an atomic energy commission and a commission for conventional armaments met with difficulties; in 1952, these two commissions were merged by the General Assembly into the Disarmament Commission (UNDC). The UNDC was largely ineffective and stopped meeting in 1965, but was reestablished by the General Assembly in 1978 as a new committee composed of the entire UN membership. The UNDC served as a deliberative body, lacking authority to conduct negotiations or establish negotiating bodies. Today, these functions are centered in the Conference on Disarmament.

In 1957, the United Nations created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which administers nuclear materials safeguards and promotes peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In 1959, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union decided to create a 10-nation

disarmament committee outside—but linked to—the United Nations. This committee ceased meeting in 1960, but in 1962, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) was established. Later renamed the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), membership grew to 26 in 1969 and to 31 in 1974. The United States and the Soviet Union served as cochairs.

In 1978, agreement was reached to create a new body, the Committee on Disarmament (CD), to succeed the CCD. The CD, which met first in 1979, remains the principal multilateral negotiating forum for arms control. It is composed of the five nuclear-weapon states and 35 other states representing all areas of the world. The chairmanship rotates on a monthly basis among all members. Like its predecessors, the CD is not formally a UN body. However, it reports annually to the General Assembly, takes relevant Assembly resolutions into account as it conducts its work, and has a secretary appointed by the UN Secretary General.

The CD reconvened in February 1984 as the Conference on Disarmament and plans to expand its membership by four, which would raise total membership to 44. Issues on its agenda are discussed in plenary sessions and then referred to ad hoc working groups when the members consider them ripe for negotiation or more detailed examination. Also in February 1984, the position of the personal representative of the UN Secretary General to the CD was redesignated as Secretary General of the CD; the first incumbent was Rikhi Jaipal of India.

Since its creation, the CD has concentrated on the issues of banning chemical and radiological weapons, arms control in outer space, and nuclear arms control. Although some progress has been made in the chemical and radiological areas, the tense international climate, the inherent complexity of the issues, and the large membership of the new body have prevented rapid agreement on any of these issues. The CD has also devoted considerable time to attempting to elaborate a comprehensive program on disarmament.

Despite considerable progress in many areas of international concern, worldwide arms expenditures continue to grow, amounting in 1982 to more than \$800 billion per year in current (1982) dollars.

The United Nations has held two special sessions devoted entirely to disarmament. The first Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 was an initiative of the nonaligned nations to spur progress in all aspects of disarmament. The general atmosphere at the session was constructive. The extensive conference document—referred to as the final document, which included a declaration on disarmament and a program of action—was adopted by consensus. Among other things, the first special session:

- Declared that “effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority;”
- Urged the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude a new strategic arms limitation agreement at the earliest possible date and urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- Noted the importance of international action to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- Noted the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- Took note of the assurances given by nuclear-weapons states that such weapons would not be used against non-nuclear-weapons states;
- Urged efforts to limit various non-nuclear weapons that have the potential for mass destruction;
- Recognized the importance of conventional arms issues, particularly international transfers of these weapons;
- Urged the financial resources released as a result of disarmament efforts be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations, and called for an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development; and
- Endorsed changes in the machinery for multilateral disarmament talks.

At the second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II), held in 1982, the assembled members reaffirmed their commitment to the final document of SSOD I. The member states could not agree, however, on a substantive document going beyond SSOD I. SSOD II was highlighted by the participation of 18 heads of state or government, including President Reagan, who addressed the session on June 17, 1982. In the face of a strong Soviet campaign to promote proposals on the nonfirst use of nuclear weapons, Western leaders made clear their commitment to prevention of war of any sort—nuclear or conventional—and the value of deterrence.

In mid-October of each year, the First Committee of the General Assembly convenes to consider arms control and disarmament matters. The committee holds general debates, adopts resolutions regarding issues on its agenda, and forwards them to the General Assembly for further action.

Items on the First Committee agenda include but are not limited to: reduction of military budgets, conclusion of a nuclear test ban, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, efforts to ban chemical weapons, nuclear disarmament, and confidence-building measures.

At the September 26, 1983, meeting of the General Assembly, President Reagan, addressing the plenary session, called for a recommitment to the basic tenet of the United Nations Charter and reaffirmed the U.S. goal of taking new and bolder steps to calm an uneasy world. The President specifically reaffirmed the U.S. commitment “to reduce nuclear arms and to negotiate in good faith toward that end.”

In 1984, the United States remains hopeful for progress in multilateral arms control. On April 18, 1984, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft U.S. convention banning the development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons on a global basis. The U.S. Government also favors the convening of a meeting of the states parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to discuss ways to strengthen the compliance mechanism of

that convention. A General Assembly resolution adopted in 1982 called for such a meeting.

In 1985, the third review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will be held. Since its entry into force in March 1970, the NPT has been a cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation policy. About 120 states are party to the treaty. This is the largest number of states ever to adhere to an arms control agreement, indicating the breadth of international support for the objectives of the treaty.

Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states are obligated not to assist any non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear explosive devices (Article I). According to the treaty, non-nuclear-weapons states party to the treaty are obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire such devices (Article II). In order to monitor compliance with the treaty's provisions, the NPT provides for the application of international safeguards by the IAEA to all nuclear material in the peaceful programs of nonnuclear weapons states (Article III).

To balance the obligations assumed by non-nuclear-weapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons, the NPT provides that all parties will facilitate the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear cooperation (Article IV) and provides for access to any benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (Article V). It also enjoins all parties to pursue in good faith negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures (Article VI).

Human Rights

The pursuit of human rights was one of the central reasons for creation of the United Nations. World War II atrocities, including the execution of millions of Jews, led to a ready consensus that a new organization must work to prevent similar tragedies in the future.

An early objective was the creation of a framework of legal obligations on the basis for consideration of and action on complaints about human rights violations. The UN Charter obliges all member nations to promote “univer-



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for, and observance of, human and to take "joint and separate" to that end. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not legally binding, was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948 as an early indicator of the goals that should be assumed by the international community. Treaties and conventions followed, many of them drawing from the Universal Declaration. These included:

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights;

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Although each of these treaties has been signed by the United States, none of their ratification has not been approved by the Senate.

In addition to the preparation of documents, various organs of the system undertake consideration of human rights issues. The General Assembly regularly takes up human rights questions originating in the Security Council or referred to it by subsidiary bodies.

The UN Human Rights Commission, established in 1948 and replaced by ECOSOC, is charged specifically with promoting human rights. To carry out its mandate, the commission can recommend international instruments, conduct studies, or investigate situations in countries where human rights violations are believed to occur. Investigations can be proposed by any member state and are decided upon by a majority of the entire commission. The 43 members of the commission (including the United States) are elected by ECOSOC on the basis of equitable geographic distribution.

The commission has a Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, composed of experts serving as individuals rather than as government representatives.

Under procedures set up by ECOSOC, the subcommission may make a confidential review of private communications sent to the United Nations containing complaints about human rights. Situations that appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations may be referred to the commission in closed session. That body may then make a thorough study of the situation or may undertake an investigation with the consent of the accused government.

A Human Rights Committee was formed in 1977 under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in March 1976. Its 18 members, who serve in their personal capacities, are nationals of the countries that have ratified or acceded to the covenant. The committee receives reports on measures adopted and progress made in participating countries and may comment on those reports directly to those countries or to ECOSOC. The committee may also consider complaints from one country that another is not fulfilling the obligations of the covenant, provided that both nations have accepted the competence of the committee to perform this role. Further, under the optional protocol to this covenant, the committee may consider complaints submitted by private individuals against governments that are parties to the protocol.

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was established in 1969, the year of entry into force of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Like the Human Rights Committee, its 18 members are experts, serving in their personal capacities, elected by countries that are parties to the convention. The jurisdictional mandate is also similar.



Other UN agencies also act on human rights concerns. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was one of the first agencies to set high standards and reporting requirements on human rights situations in the labor

field. A special UNESCO committee examines human rights complaints from individuals; groups; and nongovernmental organizations within the fields of education, science, culture, and communication. This procedure permits initiation of a probe based on a single complaint rather than on the establishment of a "consistent pattern of gross violations," as required by the Human Rights Commission. The Organization of American States (OAS) has written an American Convention on Human Rights that gives jurisdiction to an Inter-American Human Rights Commission and creates a new court on human rights. The convention entered into force in July 1978. The United States has signed but not ratified the convention.

The United Nations also has been expanding its work on behalf of women, not only to ensure their rights as individuals but also to stress the need for them to use their talents and abilities for progress on social issues. These efforts are reflected in the agendas of the Commission on the Status of Women, ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Commission, the UNDP Governing Council, and in discussions of the rights and problems of elderly women at the World Assembly on Aging. UN efforts led to the celebration of International Women's Year in 1975 and to the declaration of a UN Decade for Women, 1976-85.

Although the UN system has created a legal framework for action on human rights, efforts to implement the established standards have been uneven. Some observers have suggested that UN forums have been characterized by "selective morality" as criticism has been focused primarily on the state of human rights in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, and the Israeli-occupied territories simply because such criticism was acceptable to the majority of UN members, while criticism of other nations' abuses was not. The 1982 and 1983 sessions of the Human Rights Commission marked a departure in this

regard, by taking public action on an East European country, Poland, for the first time in the commission's history.

Another reason for slow progress on human rights has been a debate about priorities—whether precedence should be given to violations of the integrity of the person—genocide, torture, illegal detention, or execution without trial; to civil or political liberties—freedom of speech, association, press, or movement within or outside one's country; or to economic problems—inadequate food, shelter, and health care. The Reagan Administration is on record as questioning the notion that economic, social, and cultural rights occupy a place in the constellation of human rights comparable to civil and political rights. The idea of economic and social rights is easily abused by repressive governments which claim that they promote human rights even though they deny their citizens the basic rights of the integrity of person, as well as civil and political rights. This justification for repression has, in fact, been extensively used. No category of rights should be allowed to become an excuse for the denial of other rights. For these reasons, the Administration does not use the term economic and social rights.

There exists, however, a profound and necessary connection between human rights and economic development. The engine of economic growth is personal liberty. Societies that protect civil and political rights are far more likely to experience economic development than societies that do not.

Despite this debate over categories of rights and despite the great national and regional sensitivities to human rights criticism, there have been strenuous efforts, led by Western countries, to broaden concern about human rights in the UN context. Recent Human Rights Commission sessions have, in fact, included an increasingly broad range of human rights issues, and it is hoped that this trend will expand.

Participation in the United Nations: Benefits

One of the chief benefits of the UN system is the opportunity it provides for government officials to meet, share ideas, and consult on international problems. This helps them solve problems while avoiding confrontations that might otherwise result from misunderstandings of national intentions and interests.

Each year in September, the General Assembly's annual regular session brings together not only the official representatives of all member countries but also, in many cases, the foreign ministers and chiefs of state. The U.S. Secretary of State traditionally spends 2 or 3 weeks at the General Assembly each year consulting with other governments on both bilateral questions and on issues coming before the United Nations. In September 1983 and 1984, President Reagan addressed the 38th and 39th sessions of the General Assembly and met with a number of world leaders in New York.

Similarly, at other conferences and meetings in the UN system, delegates of many nations—including people from the private sector—become more deeply acquainted with each other and with the perspectives of various countries on important issues. In this way stereotypes are removed and misunderstandings reduced. By bringing together educators, scientists, cultural leaders, development experts, economists, and government leaders of many nations, UN agencies build a growing global communications network of people who have learned to cooperate toward the achievement of shared objectives. Their respective governments may be unfriendly but, on an individual basis, participants in these meetings have the opportunity to strengthen ties between nations that over time can reduce the likelihood of conflict.

General Foreign Policy Benefits.

Participation in the United Nations and its affiliated programs and agencies helps the United States in at least two ways: it provides important mechanisms for the advancement of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and it gives concrete benefits to private and public sectors of this country.

In foreign policy, the United Nations clearly accomplishes tasks that neither the United States nor any nation could accomplish alone or in small coalition.

UN peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, for example, have been essential to the maintenance of a cease-fire thereby meeting U.S. objectives of establishing an atmosphere in which fruitful peace negotiations could take place. The United States and other Western nations have pursued initiatives for peaceful settlement in Namibia in the UN framework, not because of a doctrinaire belief in UN mechanisms but because the parties most directly concerned want the United Nations involved. The Middle East, Namibia, and other security issues have the potential for international conflict that could lead to great power confrontation. The United States hopes that involving the United Nations will reduce the danger inherent in such problems and promote more stable international order.

Achievement of U.S. international goals in human rights depends largely on the support by other nations and international organizations. If only one nation urges an end to genocide, torture, terrorism, illegal detention, or political or economic deprivations, the offending nation can procrastinate without penalty. If international forums such as the United Nations become involved, pressures for reform are more effective and the likelihood of corrective action correspondingly greater.

UN programs also serve U.S. objectives for the developing world by promoting development. Concerned about global poverty, the United States attempts through various means to help developing nations meet basic human needs—clean water, food, shelter, health care—and other development goals. This objective is pursued in various channels: on a bilateral basis through regional approaches, and by actively working in the UN system to persuade other countries to share the burden of global development. UN technical assistance and financing provide needed experience, skills, equipment, and resources. Several donor countries now use the UN system as a channel



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development aid, thus making the United Nations increasingly important in worldwide economic development. UN programs also meet humanitarian needs. They reflect the international community's collective concern for the welfare of groups—children in the developing world; refugees in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; and victims of natural disaster anywhere—disadvantaged by circumstances beyond their control. Education and training programs meet the general needs of specific groups lacking normal educational opportunities. Programs promoting international cooperation deal with major problems such as the weather, environment, and nuclear safety. All of these efforts are important to U.S. policy objectives. Encouraging and assisting dialogue between the industrialized countries and developing nations is another important role played by the United Nations. This is particularly appropriate because developing nations regard the UN as their chief vehicle for foreign relations.

Growing world economic interdependence enhances the importance of the United Nations in developing a consensus between industrialized countries and North and lesser-developed countries of the South. Both regions want to solve problems impeding economic growth. Developing countries constitute more than two-thirds of the UN membership and purchase over one-third of U.S. exports. In the specialized UN agencies dealing with trade, commodity, and investment, the United States works to expand the world economy in a way compatible with its own economic interests and values. In the Economic and Social Council, the regional commissions, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the United States has provided an open international trading and payment system. The United States continues to maintain a strong role for the private sector in meeting the development needs of all countries.

Direct Benefits. Beyond benefits provided for U.S. foreign policy interests, the United States also gains economic, political, and humanitarian benefits. Large amounts of U.S. financial assistance to the

United Nations and its related agencies are returned to U.S. companies through equipment and supply sales and consulting services. The UNDP, in particular, spends a major part of its resources in the United States for procurement, fellowships, and other training.

As the world's most advanced nation, the United States has extensive needs for immediate and reliable worldwide communication, and thus relies on the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to maintain and extend international cooperation between member states and to promote the development of efficient technical facilities with a view to improving international telecommunication services. The United States is the largest producer and supplier of telecommunications equipment, and therefore, benefits from the technical assistance extended to developing countries from agencies such as the ITU.

U.S. maritime interests benefit directly from the International Maritime Organization's work on standardization, safety of life at sea measures, and ocean antipollution programs. Other U.S. environmental interests are supported by the UN Environmental Program, which serves as a catalyst in bringing international attention to global and regional environmental problems and helping developing countries conceive sound environmental programs.

The World Meteorological Organization provides weather information to persons from all spheres of U.S. life: farmers, mariners, aviators, and travelers. Its work has significant economic and social impact on the United States.

Practices and recommended standards developed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) directly affect U.S. commercial air travel and favorably influence the U.S. economic community, which supplies the greatest share of aircraft and equipment to both developed and developing countries. ICAO develops the principles and techniques of international air navigation and fosters the planning and development of international air transport to ensure the

safe and orderly growth of civil aviation. It also promotes standards for the control of noise and pollution from aircraft.

The United States also benefits from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which facilitates the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes while utilizing important programs of non-proliferation and safeguards to protect against the use of atomic energy for military purposes. The IAEA fosters the exchange of scientific and technical information and assists in the training of scientists and experts.

U.S. Policy Toward the United Nations

Today . . . I solemnly pledge my nation to upholding the original ideals of the United Nations. Our goals are those that guide this very body. Our ends are the same as those of the United Nations' founders, who sought to replace a world at war with one where the rule of law would prevail, where human rights were honored, where development would blossom, where conflict would give way to freedom from violence.

President Reagan, in an address to the UN General Assembly, September 26, 1983

Even before he took office, President Reagan expressed his determination to reassert U.S. authority in the United Nations. Since January 1981, he has sought to make increased use of the diplomatic machinery available through the UN system and to strengthen U.S. support for a more effective and efficient UN system. The U.S. Government, in particular, has urged recognition of UN value to the conduct of U.S. foreign relations and in terms of direct benefits to this country and its people.

The U.S. Government, an essential force in the creation of the United Nations in 1945, joined the organization with great enthusiasm. The Senate, by a vote of 89-2, gave its consent to the ratification of the UN Charter on July 28, 1945. In December 1945, the Senate and the House of Representatives, by unanimous votes, requested that the United Nations make its headquarters in the United States. Since the founding days, the United States has

been a major participant; however, with the changing political makeup of the world following World War II, this has entailed changes in the United Nations as well as U.S. approaches to UN issues.

Since the early 1980s, the United States has sought to reassert its leadership in multilateral affairs, strengthen its influence in the United Nations and its related agencies, promote fiscal responsibility in the budgetary process, increase the number of U.S. nationals on staffs of international organizations, and augment private sector involvement in UN programs and activities. The United States has achieved results in several of these areas.

Efforts to reassert U.S. leadership were assisted by forceful action in New York and elsewhere in the UN system. A prominent example was U.S. Permanent Representative Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's October 1981 letter concerning the Nonaligned Movement communiqué at the 36th session of the General Assembly. That letter formally put nonaligned nations on notice that the United States was closely following their activities in the United Nations and expected them to act more responsibly. Moreover, the United States has made it a point, through speeches and frequent rights of reply, to spotlight unacceptable Soviet bloc behavior and to counter harmful Soviet positions. Vigorous and well-publicized U.S. efforts to prune swelling UN budgets have won serious attention and made some headway in curbing costs, thus laying the groundwork for future progress.

An active and systematic review of all major multilateral agencies in terms of their relationship to the above-cited policy goals led to the decision in late 1983 to notify UNESCO that the United States would withdraw at the end of 1984. The reasons for this decision were:

- Unacceptably high budget growth;
- Politicization of the UNESCO work program; and,
- A drift toward statist solutions—e.g., the call for a new world information and communication order—to complex social and political problems.

The United States said it would also remain watchful for any changes in UNESCO during 1984, and left open the possibility that, if these changes were significant, the decision to withdraw might be reconsidered. In a somewhat related case, the 1977 U.S. decision to withdraw from the International Labor Organization contributed to the progress in that body to reduce politicization, eventually enabling the United States to rejoin in 1980.

The United States has remained a firm and unwavering advocate of the universality principle with respect to UN membership. Secretary of State Shultz reiterated this position on October 16, 1982, stating that the United States would cease participation in and support for any UN body which excluded Israel or denied Israel the full privileges of membership.

The United States has continued to seek UN support for its ongoing efforts to help bring about peaceful settlements in the Middle East and southern Africa. In this regard, the United States supports UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon and the Golan Heights and stands ready to assist the transitional assistance group for Namibia envisioned in Security Council Resolution 435.

Concern that the United States can be outvoted in the General Assembly by the "automatic nonaligned majority" has led to various suggestions for reform. Rather than have one vote for each nation, it has been proposed that votes be weighted according to the wealth, UN contributions, population, or power of each country. Several studies have shown that in many cases results under a weighted voting system would be less favorable to U.S. interests than under the current one-country, one-vote system. Moreover, such changes could not be implemented unless the permanent members of the Security Council were willing to accept curbs on their veto power. For obvious reasons, the permanent members have not accepted such proposals.

Apart from approval of budgetary matters, Assembly resolutions are recommendatory and not binding on the members. Binding decisions concerning action with respect to threats to the

peace and acts of aggression can only be made by the Security Council. In this case, the UN Charter gives the United States and the four other permanent members the right of veto. The United States is thus the beneficiary of an important voting privilege.

The United States, over the years, has offered several proposals for enhancing UN effectiveness, which include:

- Strengthening the role of the Security Council in the settlement of disputes, particularly through more automatic referral to the Council or situations of international tension;
- Greater use of the International Court of Justice;
- More effective peacekeeping capability, including the designation of member nations of trained national troop contingents for quick deployment in international situations when authorized, and the establishment of a reserve fund to ensure the covering of initial costs of peacekeeping operations;
- Better means of addressing disarmament and arms control questions;
- More effective machinery to address human rights issues;
- Exploring ways to supplement financing of international programs from international commerce, services, or resources;
- Better coordination of the technical assistance programs in various UN agencies, including expanded evaluation, monitoring, and quality control;
- Improving the UN Secretariat's performance both in operations and quality of personnel; and
- Better coordination of the participation in the UN system of various branches of the U.S. Government.

U.S. Representation

The U.S. representative to the United Nations heads this country's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. The mission serves as the chief of communication for the U.S. Government with the UN organs, agencies, commissions at UN headquarters and with the other permanent missions credited to the United Nations and



FEATURE UN General Assembly

member observer missions. The mission is a professional staff made up of career Foreign Service officers, including specialists in political, economic, social, financial, legal, and public affairs. The United States also maintains missions in Geneva and Vienna and offices in other cities where various UN agencies are based. All of these units report to the State Department and receive guidance on all questions of international relations from the President through the Secretary of State. Relations with the

United Nations and its family of agencies are coordinated by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

U.S. delegations to the regular sessions of the General Assembly each year include two Members of the U.S. Congress—one Republican and one Democrat, selected in alternate years from the Senate and House. Delegations also include prominent Americans from various fields outside the government.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations is located at 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017 (tel. 212-826-4580).

¹The U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco conference to organize the United Nations was led by Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. It included former Secretary Cordell Hull, senators and congressmen, and representatives of cabinet-level departments and other government agencies. The delegation had a total of 200 U.S. citizens. Representatives of major U.S. nongovernmental organizations, including veteran's groups, labor unions, women's organizations, and civic organizations, were also present. ■



U.S. mission to the United Nations.

Promoting Global Economic Growth

President Reagan's address before annual meeting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on September 25, 1984.¹

I'm honored once again to address the leaders of your institutions. Your quest to improve the condition of humankind, to offer opportunities for fulfillment in our individual lives and the lives of our national and world communities, places you in a position of responsibility and leadership second to none. You are true missionaries for a more prosperous world and a more peaceful world.

And we who are public servants in this international economic community know well the daily problems and pitfalls that obstruct our path to progress. Sometimes the immensity of these challenges and the attention they receive seem all but overwhelming to us.

But in these moments, let us remember and draw strength from the most powerful, enduring truth in human history: free men and women are not destined to be powerless victims of some capricious historical tide; free men and women are themselves the driving force of history. And our future is never trapped in the hands of fate. Our future will depend on our own freedom, courage, vision, and faith.

When I first spoke to you 3 years ago, I asked that we examine the terrible shocks inflicted upon the world economy during the 1970s, that all of us face up to the origins of those problems and also recognize our ability to withstand and surmount them.

For our part, we said one conclusion seemed both undeniable and universally true. The societies whose economies had fared best during these tumultuous times were not the most tightly controlled, not necessarily the biggest in size, nor even the wealthiest in natural resources. What united the leaders for growth was a willingness to trust the people—to believe in rewarding hard work and legitimate risk.

So the United States made a new beginning—one based on our conviction that we could only meet the challenge of contributing to world economic growth and of assuring that all countries, especially the poorest, participate fully in that growth by renouncing past

policies of government—of government regimentation and overspending—and by taking decisive action to get our domestic house in order and restore incentives to liberate the genius and spirit of our free people.

And while we would not impose our ideas, our policies, on anyone, we felt obliged to point out that no nation can have prosperity and successful development without economic freedom. Nor can it preserve personal and political freedoms without economic freedom. Only when the human spirit can dream, create, and build, only when individuals are given a personal stake in deciding economic policies and benefiting from their own success—only then do societies become dynamic, prosperous, progressive, and free.

We invited all of you to join us and walk with us on this new path of hope and opportunity. And some of you have. We knew this endeavor would be neither short nor easy. We knew that it would require great effort and patience. But we were confident that once our people saw it through, the rewards would be far greater than anticipated.

I believe that confidence has been justified. As I said yesterday to the United Nations, we can speak again, and we should, of a future that is bright and hopeful—a future of prosperity that I believe is far nearer than most of us would ever dare to hope. By working together we can make it happen.

Strength of U.S. Economy

Our own economy is dramatically changed from only 3 years ago. Rewarding hard work and risk taking has given birth to an American renaissance. Born in the safe harbor of freedom, economic growth gathered force and rolled out in a rising tide that has reached distant shores.

We are heartened that the strength of the U.S. economy is helping lead the world from recession toward a new period of lasting economic expansion, with lower rates of inflation in many countries. And we're convinced we can continue to offer this leadership in the future.

Permit me to elaborate. The United States has enjoyed 21 straight months of economic growth—the strongest growth since 1950. We've witnessed the creation of 6 million jobs and seen our expansion sustained by exceptionally low inflation.

Consumer prices are rising by only around 4% now, compared with more than 12% in 1980.

And, let me emphasize that we're determined to make another change from past policies. We intend to bring inflation down even more, and we're determined to keep it down, by continuing to restrain the growth of our government spending. We have already cut the rate of that spending by more than half. And we're pushing hard for an amendment to our constitution, putting mandatory limits on government power to spend.

Fueling economic growth has been the record increase in venture capital and business investment, both resulting in new incentives in our tax structure. Innovation holds out the promise for continued strength in productivity, growth, and new breakthroughs in advanced technology.

We believe we have taken only the first small steps into the newest frontiers, the technological revolution. In reaching for great gains in productivity, we can create a bounty of new jobs and technologies in the quality of life surpassing anything that we have ever before dreamed or imagined. I tell you today from my heart: we in America want to share our knowledge and the blessings of progress with you and all citizens, because together, and only together, can we build a better world—a far better world.

So, just as we must do more to restrain public spending, we believe more can and must be done to increase personal incentives. We will not be satisfied until America challenges the limits of growth. We want to enact historic simplification of our tax system that will enable us to significantly increase incentives by bringing personal income tax rates further down, not up.

We have noted the increased recognition that's given to the central role of incentives in promoting economic growth. The *Wall Street Journal* recently cited surveys that were published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as indicating governments can best spark economic growth by spending less and cutting rates, not by planning an elaborate industrial policy. This is our strategy for growth, and it will allow us to keep America's deficit on its current downward path.

Economic Recovery Abroad

As we continue moving forward, we are heartened to see that recovery is gaining momentum. Growth of over 3% is being projected for other industrial countries in 1984 and 1985. We're seeing a rise in developing country growth rates, led by those aggressively pursuing outward-looking and market-oriented policies.

This broadening economic growth has had a significant impact on expanding world trade. Your 1984 IMF Annual Report pointed out that "with progress of economic recovery in the industrial countries, the volume of world trade began to expand quite strongly in 1983 and the prolonged deterioration in terms of trade of non-oil developing countries came to an end."

Expansion here in the world's single market has meant increased trading opportunities for other nations. Total U.S. imports rose 32% in the first half of this year. And for the year, our imports are expected to exceed 1983 imports by over 25%. U.S. imports from the non-oil developing countries rose about 14% in 1983. And they are up by nearly 30% for the first half of 1984.

We sometimes hear complaints about U.S. interest rates, particularly by nations which are legitimately concerned about the additional debt service costs that they must bear. But enough mention is made of trade to make the far greater benefits developing countries receive from renewed economic growth and open-market policies of the United States.

For the United States alone, imports from the non-OPEC LDCs [less developed countries] during the first 7 months of this year increased by more than \$12 billion over the same period last year. By comparison, a 1% increase in interest rates would increase net payments by the non-OPEC LDCs by about \$2.5 billion. But we're not seeing an increase in interest rates. There's been a slight drop in the last few days, and I believe there will be more of that ahead.

So we can be pleased at the improved outlook for the world's economy. But we can't be complacent. At the Williamsburg and London economic summits, my colleagues and I agreed that if we are to make the strength of the international economy stronger still, sound domestic policies underlying that progress must be preserved. I think we've all learned from bitter experience that quick fixes don't solve seated problems. The more difficult it is to resist the temptation of

politically expedient solutions, or the pressure of powerful interest groups, and to, instead, make the hard choices necessary to advance the long-term good of all the people. But we must persevere.

Once the corner has been turned, once economic growth and financial health are built on a foundation of granite rather than playing cards, we will have opened the door to a new future of opportunity for our children and our children's children.

The Need To Liberalize and Expand World Trade

For their sake as well as ours, we must not only go forward with domestic policies that encourage growth, we must staunchly resist policies that destroy it. Let me underscore the special importance which the United States attaches to resisting protectionist pressures.

All of us know how crucial world trade is to the health of our economies and how fiercely competitive trade is nowadays. Few of our industries are unaffected by the pressure on foreign goods and services, whether competing for sales at home or abroad. Our common challenge is to pursue policies permitting freer and fairer trade.

Now, I know there's been concern, especially among debtor countries, that pressures for trade protectionism in the United States could lead us to run up the flag, erecting new import barriers and harming prospects for their export growth.

Well, we believe our record should put those doubts to rest. Requests for protection on tuna, stainless steel flatware, shoes, and copper have all been turned down.

And only last week, I reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to an open world trading system by rejecting protectionist quota and tariff relief for the steel industry. I've decided, instead, to take vigorous action against unfair trade practices in steel that will prove to be in the best long-term interest of consuming and supplying nations alike.

But we're not just fighting protectionism; we want to go forward toward more open markets. At the London summit, we pressed for new efforts to liberalize and expand international trade. Consultations are continuing among the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] countries on the possible objectives, arrangements, and timing for a new negotiating round. For the millions around the globe who look to us for help and hope, I urge all of you

today: join us. Support with us a new, expanded round of trade liberalization, and, together, we can strengthen the global trading system and assure its benefits spread to people everywhere.

There is not just my challenge, this is our challenge. It can only happen if we make it happen. But if we do, if each of us is prepared to give a little, the people of the world will gain a lot.

International Financial Issues

Our sensible five-part debt strategy, endorsed at Williamsburg and strengthened in London, has shown itself to be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to meet the diverse needs of debtor nations. These nations, in partnership with the IMF, are charting a course of renewed prosperity and stability which can serve as a guidepost for others to follow. The international financial system is the ultimate beneficiary of these individual country success stories and is stronger today than when we met here last year.

Providing an environment to foster lasting, noninflationary growth requires financing from both internal and external sources. It has become clear that a variety of capital inflows in the developing countries will be necessary. Countries will have to rely less on external debt and more on direct private investment—both foreign and domestic.

Policies that attract foreign investors are identical with those policies that encourage domestic savings and investments and contribute to the efficient use of scarce capital resources; positive real interest rates; a realistic exchange rate; free convertibility of currency; and a respect for property rights—in short, an economic environment that allows investors to earn a fair deal and a fair, real after-tax rate of return.

At the last economic summit in London this June, we also urged our finance ministers to: "Consider the scope for intensified discussion of international financial issues of particular concern to developing countries in the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee, an appropriate and broadly representative forum for this purpose."

I welcome the decision by the members of the interim committee and the Development Committee to accept the U.S. proposal announced by [Treasury] Secretary Regan to sponsor an enhanced dialogue on ways that the industrialized countries can better pursue our common goal of achieving sustained noninflationary economic growth throughout the world. Your institutions

represent the best means of cooperatively addressing the obstacles to realizing that goal.

As we go forward, we will support our two great institutions, the IMF and World Bank, which have been the cornerstones of the international economic and monetary systems since World War II. The United States remains honored to be one of the "founding fathers" of both organizations. Besides their enormous contributions to individual freedom, prosperity, and initiative, these multilateral organizations are effectively handling even greater responsibilities as the technological revolution ushers in an increasing velocity of human transactions and greater global economic interdependence.

Last year the World Bank committed over \$15 billion to supplement the efforts of developing member countries to strengthen their economies. In addition to its proven expertise as an investment project lender, we value highly the Bank's ability to provide helpful policy guidance and technical assistance and to act as a catalyst in encouraging private enterprise and investment capital.

We are committed to providing the agreed-upon level of U.S. contributions to the IBRD selective capital increase, the seventh replenishment of IDA [International Development Association], and the capital increase of the IFC [International Finance Corporation].

The IMF has always had a central role in assisting members facing serious balance-of-payments problems, and it has assumed leadership in helping debtor countries design economic adjustments which seek to restore economic and financial balance and creditworthiness. For our part, considerable effort went into negotiating and obtaining the necessary legislative concurrence for U.S. participation in the quota increase which provided resources for the Fund to deal with this difficult problem.

We don't want a world in which some nations go forward while others are left behind. We want a world in which all go forward together. And we can go forward together if our countries give up spending what need not be spent and leave more in the hands of all the people who work and earn. Let them plant the seeds of wealth, and we'll see the smallest dreams awaken and grow into golden dreams for all mankind.

Economic Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa

Permit me to take a brief moment to speak about a subject of special interest and concern to our government—the particularly severe economic problems besetting sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank issued the third in a series of excellent reports on this subject, and we look forward to working with the Bank, the Fund, other donors, and African countries in developing a joint response.

Last January I submitted to the Congress legislation called the Economic Policy Initiative for Africa. And this initiative closely parallels the recommendations of the World Bank concentrating on flexible donor response to African economic policy reform initiatives. Our plans call for a U.S. contribution of \$500 million over 5 years. And this would be in addition to ongoing U.S. economic assistance programs which are expected to run roughly at the billion-dollar level—in the coming year, a 30% increase over such assistance levels a few years ago.

Conclusion

I look out at all of you this morning people from so many different cultures and countries, speaking so many different languages, and I think, of how our nations spring from separate pasts, how many of us live at opposite ends of the Earth. But all of us, I'm convinced, have been brought together to this place by aspirations that bind us to friends and family. I'm talking about determination to help people build a better life, to climb from the shadows and want into the sunlight of prosperity. That's what this job of ours is all about.

We're a little like climbers who start their ascent from opposite ends of a mountain. The harder we try, the higher we climb, and the closer we come together—until that moment we reach the peak, and we are as one.

What I'm describing actually does happen in real life. One American and two Japanese groups began climbing Mount Everest—the Japanese from the side of Nepal and the Americans from the top of Tibet. The conditions were so difficult and dangerous that before it ended the climbers tragically lost their lives. But before that tragedy, these brave climbers all met and shook hands just under the summit. And then they climbed to the top together for the magnificent moment of triumph.

Distinguished colleagues and good friends, we are not asked to face the kind of perils those climbers did. Yet we do share the risks affecting the future economic well-being of our nations and of the world. But if those mountaineers could join hands at the top of the world, imagine how high our people can climb if all of us work together as powerful partners for the cause of good. Together with faith in each other, with freedom as our guide, there is nothing that we cannot do.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1988.

The Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension

Secretary Shultz's address¹ before the Chamber of Commerce and on-and-answer session² with the press of the audience in Miami on November 14, 1984.

ask today about a problem that directly or indirectly affects the well-being of all Americans. That problem is drugs. And I would like to discuss, in particular, the large international dimension of the problem and what we are doing to confront it.

All of you know well what narcotics are doing to our cities and our society. Miami, in New York, in Chicago, in Detroit, Los Angeles, in Washington—and, in almost every American city—the drug problem in our streets earns about it daily in our media. We see it preying on our nation's youth. We see it eroding families and communities. We see the crime it brings—murders, the robberies, and the organized crime rings who have made it a lucrative business. We see it destroying lives indiscriminately—rich and poor, black and white, young and old. We can measure the costs of drug abuse in many ways—in lost productivity, escalating health and social costs, and most profoundly, in the senseless loss of life.

We see the drug problem in its enormity, and sometimes we wonder how it possibly be addressed. I will not tell you before you and say that there are no solutions. Nor, clearly, can solutions be found solely through governmental actions. Drug abuse is one of the glaring symptoms of a deeper social and cultural phenomenon: the weakening of the traditional values of family and community and religious faith that we have suffered for some time in Western society.

Our Founding Fathers created a system of government that could protect rights and freedoms of the individual. But they deeply believed that something more was needed to protect the spiritual health of the nation. The fully constructed edifice of a free society had to be buttressed by an enduring public and private morality. And our Founders also believed that upholding this morality was not primarily the responsibility of government but of our educational, religious, and social institutions, families and communities.

So when we look at the nation's drug problems, we must bear in mind that government does not have all the answers. Technical solutions devised by public officials cannot alone repair this loose strand in our society's moral fabric. In our public life we must restore the faith in family, church, and community that has kept democracy strong for over two centuries.

I believe such a restoration is occurring. Faith in these institutions is returning. And we can see this even in the nation's changing attitudes toward the drug problem. Today, there is a spreading consensus across America that drug abuse is not fashionable; it is immoral. We have rejected the fatalistic view that drug abuse as a national phenomenon is here to stay. Parents, community organizations, educational and religious institutions are heeding President Reagan's call "to join the battle against drug abuse."

The Federal Strategy

Government, of course, must do its part, with energy and determination. As you know, this Administration has made the reduction of national drug abuse one of its highest priorities. We have worked hard to devise new ways to attack the problem on all fronts. President Reagan has called drug abuse "one of the gravest problems facing us," and at his direction, this Administration has set forth a comprehensive Federal Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. This Federal strategy has five central components that attack the problem at every link of the chain that extends from the grower to the user of narcotics. We have devised extensive programs for:

First, prevention, which includes educating our youth about the dangers of drugs;

Second, detoxification and treatment for drug abusers;

Third, research aimed at understanding the causes and consequences of drug abuse;

Fourth, drug law enforcement to destroy drug networks and interdict drug supplies before they reach the consumers; and

Fifth, international cooperation to control the production and shipment of narcotics.

This five-point strategy adds up to an aggressive approach to this multifaceted problem. And we are pursuing each path with great vigor.

You are all aware of what this Administration has been doing to address the domestic aspects of our drug problem. The First Lady has made it her personal crusade to educate our youth on the dangers of drugs, and Nancy Reagan's valiant efforts have given great impetus to this dimension of national prevention. Vice President Bush has played the leading role in improving our domestic drug interdiction efforts. As you know, he is the head of the South Florida Task Force, and he is also the head of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. These and other efforts have shown encouraging results on the domestic side of the problem. It should be clear that demand helps create supply, and we cannot expect to meet the challenge of drug abuse without doing all we can to reduce the demand for drugs here at home.

The International Dimension

It is equally clear, however, that we cannot meet the challenge of drug abuse here at home without also attacking the worldwide network of narcotics production and trafficking. I want you to know that drug abuse is not only a top priority for this Administration's domestic policy, it is a top priority in our foreign policy as well.

Every year, drug traffickers smuggle into this country 4 metric tons of heroin; as much as 70 metric tons of cocaine; and as much as 15,000 metric tons of marijuana. These drugs come from all over the world: from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Belize, Jamaica, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Thailand, and Burma. Once the crops are produced in these countries, they are often shipped elsewhere for processing and then in their refined narcotic form are shipped again to local suppliers in Western Europe, the United States, and throughout the industrialized world. Drug money is laundered in international financial markets. Middlemen are hired to smuggle the drugs past customs officials and the Coast Guard. It is a smooth and ever more efficient operation that is truly an international effort.

Our concern about this growing narcotics network is twofold. I have already noted its severe impact on our own people. But it also represents a threat to American interests of a different sort. The fact is, it is an example of a larger and relatively new kind of foreign policy problem that confronts the civilized world today. It is part of a trend toward international lawlessness that has been increasing ominously over the past two decades.

Today, there is a spreading consensus across America that drug abuse is not fashionable; it is immoral.

This trend harkens back to the days when piracy on the seas was rampant, when the civilized nations of the world were unable or unwilling to combat it systematically. The modern versions of piracy are narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and similar kinds of outlaw behavior. Not surprisingly, there is ample evidence that shows that all these different types of lawlessness are linked. Money from drug smuggling supports terrorists. Terrorists provide assistance to drug traffickers. Organized crime works hand in hand with these other outlaws for their own profit. And what may be most disturbing is the mounting evidence that some governments are involved, too, for their own diverse reasons. There are demonstrable links between drug trafficking, terrorism, and some communist governments, which I will come back to in a moment.

The civilized world faces, therefore, not just separate and isolated incidents of violence and banditry but a systemic, global problem of growing proportions. And this global problem poses a unique—and deliberate—challenge to the world order that Americans and all civilized peoples seek: a world order based on justice and the rule of law.

Novel problems require fresh thinking, new tools, and new approaches. You have my personal pledge that the Department of State is committed to this effort. We have been working closely with Federal drug enforcement agencies on new ways of dealing with the growing narcotics problem on an international level. And we do so not only to fight the calamity of domestic drug abuse but to fight the growing threat of international lawlessness as well.

Meeting the Challenge

To meet the challenge of international narcotics trafficking requires, above all, international cooperation between those nations that share our concern about this growing threat to our societies.

During this Administration, we have gone beyond all previous efforts to promote international cooperation on narcotics control. In September 1981, President Reagan laid out our objectives. He

called for "a foreign policy that vigorously seeks to interdict and eradicate illicit drugs, wherever cultivated, processed, or transported." American officials at the highest levels—including President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and myself, our ambassadors and senior State Department officials—have continually emphasized to foreign leaders the importance we attach to their cooperation on the narcotics issue. We have placed our greatest emphasis on reaching bilateral agreements on crop control, eradication, and interdiction with nations where narcotics are produced, shipped, and consumed. We have also worked hard in the United Nations to support international efforts to stem the flow of drugs and reduce production.

Many nations, concerned as we are with the drug problem, have taken significant steps. In Colombia, an aerial herbicide eradication program that began July 5 has destroyed more than 4,200 acres of marijuana, a truly major breakthrough in the global control effort. This initial effort alone could keep nearly \$3-billion worth of marijuana off our streets—and the Colombian program has just started. In Peru, despite the threat of terrorism, authorities have eradicated nearly 5,000 acres of coca bushes used to produce cocaine; in fact, the government has recently sent its military forces into the coca-growing region. We are working with other South American governments to prevent the spread of drug production into new source areas.

In Asia, the Government of Pakistan continues to extend its ban on cultivation of opium poppy into additional areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, and it has reported sharply increased seizures of heroin in the first

quarter of 1984. And this month, Pakistani officials seized 163 kilograms of opium and 20 kilograms of heroin in a raid on a heroin laboratory. The Thai Government has increased its commitment to controlling opium cultivation villages that receive development assistance and moved aggressively against opium warlords. The Burmese Government is exploring with us more systematic methods of eradication.

All told, we will be spending over \$100 million on worldwide narcotics control programs in 1985.

We know the difficulties involved in reducing crop production. In many producer countries, narcotics production or has become an important fact of everyday life. There are parts of the world where opium and coca are use part of centuries-old traditions, and, course, many nations have growing interdiction problems of their own which courage narcotics production. Finally, many producer countries are just too poor to mount effective crop control eradication programs.

Our international narcotics policies are aimed at overcoming these obstacles. We are providing bilateral assistance in 1984 to 18 governments whose experience or resources are insufficient to meet the challenge of crop reduction. We have encouraged multilateral assistance through the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control and other international organizations. The Department of State has worked with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, and Coast Guard to provide training to foreign governments in narcotics control, enforcement, and interdiction. Since 1971, we have provided funds to train more than 25,000 foreign enforcement officers, and in 1985 we will provide more funds to train an additional 2,000 officers in 30 different countries. We have also tried to help foreign governments alert their publics to the threat that drug abuse poses to the societies.

But the toughest challenge we faced until recently was simply convincing other nations that narcotics trafficking is an international problem that requires international efforts. For a long time, foreign governments considered narcotics an exclusively American problem. Today, that is changing.

In Colombia, to take one example, the Minister of Health has declared drug addiction is the greatest health threat to Colombian youth, and Colombian law enforcement agencies have responded with commendable vigor. In March, the Colombian police discovered a vast, complex cocaine processing

cities hidden in the Amazon jungle. In one case, 10 tons of cocaine and cocaine base, with a street value of over \$100 million, were destroyed. Colombian public opinion was shocked at the discovery of these drug camps, some of which were operating side by side with guerrilla camps. They were outraged by the subsequent assassination of Colombia's Minister of Justice, apparently ordered by the drug traffickers. Colombia's President Betancur has ordered an all-out war on the narcotics traffic. Other nations have come painfully to realize that narcotics is their problem, and that only through international cooperation can the world community hope to combat the international narcotics network. The leaders of the Andean nations and Argentina, meeting in Lima last month, expressed to Vice President Bush their deep concern over the problems caused by narcotics production and trafficking in their region. Encouraged by the sense of urgency in our appeal and their willingness to work together, we are responding with specific proposals to strengthen regional cooperation on drug law enforcement, communications, and information sharing.

Several important and distressing developments have contributed to this growing international awareness. In Western Europe, and in the countries where narcotics are produced, drug addiction has begun to assume alarming proportions. The crime that inevitably accompanies increased drug abuse has begun to arouse popular anger even in countries traditionally tolerant of drug use. And, in some countries, the increased corruption that results from income peddling by organized crime and the major drug smugglers has become a national calamity threatening the stability and continued survival of the governments themselves.

Narcotics trafficking poses a special threat to democratic nations in the developing world. Where democratic institutions and legal systems are in their infancy, the corruption and crime brought on by narcotics trafficking can be too much for the government to handle. Their stark choice may be between resorting to undemocratic measures on the one hand or capitulating to criminals on the other. In either case, the result may be loss of public faith in democratic institutions. Elected leaders, such as those in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, recognize the dangers that narcotics trafficking poses to democracy itself.

Add to all this the fact that narcotics trafficking is undermining the integrity of international financial centers. According to some estimates, the drug trade may involve up to \$80 billion each year, and drug money is often laundered through otherwise respectable financial institutions, including the offshore banking centers of the Caribbean Basin and in Europe, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

And finally, as I mentioned, international concern has been reinforced by the realization that narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and communist revolutionaries increasingly make common cause in their separately destructive activities. I would like to take a few moments to elaborate on what we have learned about this disturbing interrelationship in recent years.

The Links With Terrorism and Communist Insurgencies

For years, the world had good reason to suspect that narcotics smugglers were being aided by some governments: that they were getting money and protection, that they were being provided safe havens and support in shipping drugs to the United States and elsewhere. One of the most prominent suspects was communist Cuba. Over the years, the case against Cuba mounted until, finally, in November 1982, four high-level Cuban officials were indicted by a Miami grand jury for helping a major Colombian narcotics trafficker. That case provided startling evidence of Cuban complicity in Latin American narcotics trafficking.

with his drug-smuggling racket, Guillot participated in a plan to provide weapons to the M-19, a terrorist group that operates in Colombia.

The pattern, long suspected, was finally and clearly established. Cuba was using drug smugglers to funnel arms to terrorists and communist insurgents. And Cuba's involvement is not unique. Later evidence has shown that the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has also been involved in drug-smuggling activities. To facilitate his safe travel through Central America, Guillot was granted a Nicaraguan visa by Nicaragua's Ambassador to Mexico, apparently on the request of an M-19 leader.

Recent investigations by the Drug Enforcement Administration have revealed the extent of continuing Sandinista involvement. On July 17, the U.S. Government filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in Miami charging two Colombians and a Nicaraguan official—Frederico Vaughan, an assistant to Interior Minister Tomas Borge—with possession, conspiracy to distribute, and importation of cocaine. Between March and July 1984, these men conspired to smuggle a shipment of about 1,500 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to the United States through Nicaragua. Interior Minister Borge's assistant helped load this cocaine shipment onto a U.S.-bound plane on June 4. The drug traffickers were allowed to park their aircraft in the military side of Managua airport, and we have photo-

... drug abuse is not only a top priority for this Administration's domestic policy, it is a top priority in our foreign policy as well.

According to evidence revealed in the course of that investigation, a Colombian drug smuggler, Guillot Lara, was recruited by Cuba's Ambassador to Colombia. The Ambassador offered Cuban Government help in smuggling drugs to the United States. Cuban waters were provided as a safe haven for the transfer of narcotics to boats bound for Miami. Certain Cuban authorities were instructed to leave Guillot and his men alone while they went about their business. In return, the Cuban Government received payments, in hard cash, of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

But there was another element in this elaborate deal. In return for help

graphs that show Sandinista troops helping the traffickers load the cocaine onto the plane. All these facts suggest that other Nicaraguan officials in addition to Vaughan participated in the drug-smuggling plot.

The complicity of communist governments in the drug trade is cause for grave concern among the nations of the free world. It is part of a larger pattern of international lawlessness by communist nations that, as we have seen, also includes support for international terrorism and other forms of organized violence against legitimate governments. Nor is the link between narcotics, terrorism, and communism confined to

Latin America. We have seen such networks in Italy and Turkey, though both governments have cracked down hard with remarkable success. A similar network currently operates in Burma. And we have evidence of Bulgarian complicity in the illicit arms and drug-smuggling business.

We can only speculate as to the motives for communist involvement in the drug trade. We know that, with their failing economies, Cuba and

Second, the international community must assist those nations that lack the resources to take the necessary steps.

Third, worldwide emphasis must be on crop control and eradication—we have seen that interdiction alone is not the answer.

Fourth, in producer nations that need our help, our narcotics-related economic assistance must be linked to agreements on reducing crop levels.

We have placed our greatest emphasis reaching bilateral agreements on crop control, eradication, and interdiction with nations where narcotics are produced, shipped, and consumed.

Nicaragua need hard cash to buy essential goods. We have seen how Cuba uses drug smugglers to funnel arms to communist insurgencies and terrorists. And it is not hard to imagine that smuggling massive amounts of drugs into Western nations may serve their broader goal of attempting to weaken the fabric of Western democratic society.

I am not suggesting that if we were able to end communist support for the international narcotics network, our drug problems would be over, or even that they would be substantially reduced. Clearly the problem is much bigger than that. But as we look toward solutions to the problem of drug abuse, the free world cannot ignore the role of communist governments. And I would suggest that the implications of their involvement in this form of international lawlessness go beyond the drug problem. Government support for outlaws cannot be tolerated by the civilized nations if we are to build a world order based on law and justice.

What the Reagan Administration Has Accomplished

The hurdles we face in confronting this problem are many, but we have made significant strides in recent years. Our international narcotics policy has rested on four basic principles:

First, countries where narcotics are produced or through which drugs are shipped must accept their responsibilities under international treaties to reduce crops and interdict drug smuggling.

Our goal must be to control narcotics production in all geographic areas simultaneously. We have learned the hard way that markets shift to meet demand; we cannot focus on only a few areas at a time. When we helped reduce heroin production in Turkey, for example, increased production in Mexico filled the gap. A truly international effort aimed at all producer nations is essential. And we are moving down that path.

In 1981, when this Administration took office, we had commitments to work on reducing narcotics crops from Burma, Turkey, and Mexico. Today, thanks to this Administration's efforts and to the growing concern of leaders in producer countries, we also have commitments from Pakistan, Colombia, Belize, Peru, and Bolivia. In Pakistan, the world's leading supplier of heroin, we have seen tremendous results. Thanks in part to the extraordinary efforts of the Pakistani Government and to U.S. assistance, raw opium production has been reduced from a massive 800 metric tons per year in 1979 to under 60 metric tons per year in 1983. Mexico's production of processed heroin, once as high as 7.5 metric tons per year, was reduced to 1.4 metric tons in 1983.

What Remains To Be Done

Much has been done, and we are only beginning the fight. Obviously, we still have a long way to go. Some countries have not done enough to reduce their crop levels. Others could do more to curb the flow of narcotics through their territory and airspace and end their use as a way station by drug traffickers. We must seek greater cooperation and increased effectiveness in reducing culti-

vation in all of the producer nations. Overall crop production still provides a surplus of narcotics that greatly exceeds not only American but worldwide demand.

And we know that the international narcotics network is larger, more efficient, and more sophisticated than ever before. The narcotics market is an evolving phenomenon that adapts to each new method we devise to confront it. Drug smugglers have managed to find new ways of smuggling to elude our stepped-up efforts. Finally, we have seen that some communist nations continue to use the drug trade for their purposes and, therefore, have an interest in its perpetuation. The international drug problem, therefore, presents an increasing challenge to our intelligence community to provide good estimates of narcotics production and to trace the links between drugs, terrorism, and communist insurgencies.

But we are making progress. We have a policy in place that addresses all aspects of the international problem—the cultivation, production, and distribution of drugs, the flow of profits, the impacts upon other countries as well as our own. And we have developed broad-based international support for controlling the narcotics trade.

I believe that our diplomatic and program efforts, together with the increasing awareness in producer countries of the disastrous effects on them of the drug trade, are improving the prospects of narcotics control. But these substantial successes can be severely damaged by perceptions overseas about what is happening in the United States. To a greater degree than many people realize, our success in international narcotics control is dependent on the success of our assault on drug abuse at home. It will be hard to convince other nations to put an end to drug cultivation if they believe we are not living up to our own responsibility to get a grip on the drug problem here. We cannot preach what we do not practice.

This is why what we do here and throughout our own country is so important to our overall efforts. The officials in every community across this nation must understand that effective foreign policies of narcotics control are clearly linked to an effective domestic program against drug abuse.

And we must recognize that our international campaign against drug abuse rests ultimately on our ability to reduce the demand for drugs here in the United States.

By redoubling our efforts throughout this country, we send a message

in other countries, and to their governments, that we in the United States intend to control our own drug problem.

President Reagan has designated the week of September as National Abuse Education and Prevention Week. The President is determined to make this effort, for the narcotics problem poses a direct threat to this nation's interests and goals, both domestic and international.

We are confronting that threat, and we are making significant progress. Success will take time and hard work. But we are building a foundation for the future—a future not only of reduced drug abuse in our country but of a world where there is no room and no tolerance for outlaws.

It is an effort that calls for broad national support from all Americans.

Q. The Soviet Union has provided 50 scholarships for Panamanian students, 50 of which will deal with drug-related studies. The U.S. has provided one. Are we planning to end the Latin American scholarship program in the very near future to counteract Soviet influence?

A. I think the promotion of scholarship programs and the coming to the United States for study from people all over the world is one of the best things we can do, whether it's related to the Canal or the Soviet Union or not—in terms of our own interests—and I am a strong supporter of programs of this kind.

Actually, we do a great deal, mostly through private organizations of one kind or another, so there's a big flow of students to the United States. But we could do more, and I think that we should examine—and we are examining—various government programs to be involved in this.

Q. What are your thoughts on whether or not an early solution to the debt crises of the less developed countries is possible?

A. We have seen a great deal of progress on this debt problem when the Reagan Administration came to office. When I arrived on the scene about 2 years or so ago, we found this problem at our doorstep, and it's been a great problem. But there is a clear strategy in place for dealing with it. I believe it has been very well administered by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the work of Jacques de Larosiere, the Frenchman, who is the chairman; and our own Secretary of the Treasury, Don Regan; and Chairman of our Federal Reserve

Board, Paul Volcker—who, working with their counterparts, have done an excellent job. There is a strategy, and within that strategy a case-by-case effort, to help countries get their house in order. And then, as this has been happening, we've had the benefit—largely because of what's been happening in the United States—of a newly expanding world economy.

So if we can help countries get their house in order and then help provide, along with other countries, an expanding world economy, we provide the basis for working out from under the debt problem. And we see very considerable success in some countries. Others seem to be having a lot of trouble facing up to their problems.

I think that is a very difficult set of problems but one on which a great deal of headway has been made. And it was interesting to me, in looking at the annual report that's just come out of the Chairman of the IMF, to see their assessment that things are in much better shape now than they were, say, a year and a half or 2 years ago—not that there aren't plenty of problems ahead. But we do have a strategy, we are making headway, and we have a number of successes that we can point to.

Q. How will the recently published report detailing Soviet arms control treaty violations affect the Administration's negotiating posture toward the Soviets?

A. I don't know what recently published report you're talking about. There was a report made by the President to the Congress—last January, I believe it was—and seven instances were picked out, and they illustrate various kinds of problems connected with arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The problems are not simply the question of gross violations or not, although we believe there are instances of that, but also it illuminates for you, if you happen to be preparing to negotiate with the Soviet Union, that they're pretty good negotiators and they're pretty good at loophole designing. So you have to watch that, and you have to watch vague things in treaties that can mean different things to different people—as well as, of course, looking to the importance of verification measures that enable you to trace whether a violation is taking place or not—and, in addition, designing treaties so that their operation is in the mutual interests of both parties. Then there tend to be incentives built in by both parties to observe the treaty.

So there is a great deal to be learned from studies of these negotiations and the treaties. Some of it was brought out in a report the President made, as I said, last January. There are lots of other reports floating around, and they're in various stages of presentation and declassification and so on, and I don't know just when they might emerge.

Q. Since 1968, Panama has been under direct or indirect military rule. Panama's international position remains, clearly, Third World, pro-Cuba, anti-American, supportive of Sandinism and other forms of subversion in neighboring countries. The much vaunted elections held this past May is an excellent study in fraud, aimed at insuring a Panama with new faces, same direction.

With total loss of credibility as a democratic nation ally, how can the United States remain Panama's main economic support and endorse Panama's role in the Contadora process?

A. I have a feeling the person who wrote that question felt he knew the answer. [Laughter and applause.]

But I think—let me just address myself to the general point. There are problems around the world in every country, even our own. It is for us to try to engage with these problems and help them get resolved in the direction of democratic practice, in the direction of the rule of law, in the direction of widely shared economic development, in the direction in the Contadora process of a regional solution to a regional problem and so on.

Whether the election in Panama was perfect or not—I'm sure there were some problems there just as there will undoubtedly be some problems in our election coming up—for example, our percentage of people who vote will not stand up very well by the standards that we like to apply to other countries—but, at any rate, the election has produced an outcome, as it happened, going back to your very first question about the importance of students coming from other countries here—in particular, Panama. The person who was elected, Dr. [Nicolas Ardito] Barletta, went to college and got a Ph.D. degree in economics from the University of Chicago. I happen to know, I was on the faculty. [Laughter.] And I think he's quite an outstanding person, and I think he has a pretty clear view of what the nature of the stakes are between communist totalitarianism and freedom for his country and for the region. So we

will work for the best outcome possible in Panama and hope that it can be good.

I intend to go to the inauguration of my friend Mickey Barletta, and if we can help, as I say, in the movement toward democracy, toward the rule of law, toward economic development, I think it will be good for us as well as for them.

Q. How is the split government in Israel going to affect the Middle East situation?

A. It's called a national unity government, not a national split government [laughter]; and the interesting fact is that the two leading contending parties, neither one of which apparently could form a government because they couldn't get enough of the smaller parties to join either one or the other, did finally come together. And they have a broad national unity government that commands the votes of a very large majority in the Knesset. They have plenty of problems, and I'm sure they will be trying to address them.

From our standpoint, we intend to work sympathetically and cooperatively with whatever government the people of Israel choose. And I think it's important to note, as we sometimes look around the world—or even at home here—and see some of the struggles that we have in democratic government, to remember always the basic importance of freedom and democratic government, because it is that form of government that gives people a real chance to express themselves and to arrange a situation in their country to their liking.

Israel, with all the difficulties that their recent election has exposed, is an outstanding democratic government. And so we will be pleased to see what programs they'll put into effect and what they'll want to be working on and try to work cooperatively with them.

Q. Regarding Nicaragua, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, what should the United States have done differently to have avoided today's totally unsatisfactory situation?

A. I don't know. There's probably benefit in some 20-20 hindsight. It is a fact that the Sandinistas pledged to the OAS [Organization of American States] that they wanted to bring about a structure of government, in opposition to the Somoza dictatorship, that provided for openness, for pluralism, for democracy, for the rule of law—for all of these good things. And it is a fact that the United States very generously, with funds, tried to help them move in that direction.

Long before there was any real challenge, it became clear that that was not the direction they intended to move

in at all and very quickly, those who were really looking for the kind of government that was put forward to the OAS were ousted, or left themselves. And we have seen in Nicaragua an attempt—that's still going on, they haven't got there yet—but they're trying to develop a totalitarian form of government.

And so I think if we can find a fault in ourselves, it would be not realizing quickly enough just what was happening and putting into place the programs to resist at least the efforts in Nicaragua to destabilize their neighbors. I think that President Reagan is very clear-eyed about this.

In Central America I believe we are on the side of democracy. We are on the side of the rule of law. We are on the side of economic development for peo-

ple, broadly based. And we are having success and we have to stick with our program and try to bring about a much better and more peaceful Central America. It's very much in our interest. And the President's program has been gradually winning support in the Congress. I think it's fair to say he's always had strong support in the Republican-controlled Senate, but he's had great difficulty in the Democratic-controlled House—at least on some aspects of the program directly to do with Nicaragua.

So I hope that as people understand the situation better and better, they will see the importance of supporting President Reagan's program fully.

¹Press release 199 of Sept. 14, 1984.

²Press release 199A of Sept. 14, 1984.

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1985

Secretary Shultz's statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 11, 1984.¹

Thank you for the invitation to testify on the President's 1985 refugee admissions proposals.

The Congress has—in the Refugee Act of 1980—stated that the U.S. resettlement program is intended for refugees of "special humanitarian concern to the United States," in accordance with a determination made by the President after appropriate consultation.

After most careful study and reflection, the President proposes a regional refugee admissions ceiling of 70,000 for FY 1985, a small reduction from the FY 1984 level.

Within this overall ceiling of 70,000, the President is proposing a new, separate ceiling for admissions under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) orderly departure program from Vietnam and some adjustments in geographic ceilings.

I am here, representing the President, to consult with the Congress about our 1985 admissions program. We are here today not only to present this proposal for your consideration but also to answer your questions and receive your views.

We hope the 1985 admissions program will receive the same broad bipartisan support that it has enjoyed in previous years.

The proposed admissions ceilings for FY 1985 are:

- 50,000 for East Asia, including 10,000 for a separate orderly departure program in Vietnam;
- 9,000 for Eastern Europe and Soviet Union;
- 5,000 for the Near East and South Asia;
- 3,000 for Africa; and
- 3,000 for Latin America and the Caribbean, for a total of 70,000 worldwide.

In addition, the President is announcing two new initiatives aimed at resolving pressing refugee problems in Southeast Asia.

First, the United States will accept for admission all Asian-American children and their qualifying family members presently in Vietnam—hopefully over the next 3 years. Because their undisputed ties to our country, these children and family members are of particular humanitarian concern to the United States.

Second, the United States is proposing a distinct program within the UNHCR's orderly departure program from Vietnam for the resettlement of political prisoners currently and

ously confined in the "re-education" prisons in Vietnam and their aying family members. Various esmen for the communist regime in am have claimed they would be g to release all of these political sners for resettlement. But despite ars of efforts to arrange for their rture under the UNHCR's orderly rture program, the Vietnamese released for resettlement only a ful of these persecuted people. This initiative has as its goal the rture from Vietnam of 10,000 of e persons for resettlement in the ed States over the next 2 years. e current and former political oners are of particular humanitarian ern to the United States.

Success in both of these initiatives require the goodwill and cooperation e Vietnamese Government. We e the Vietnamese will now respond ese new appeals.

eds of the 8 Million Refugees

re are nearly 8 million refugees in world today. In response to this ic situation, the United States and international community actively durable solutions. In order of erence, these solutions are:

- Voluntary repatriation to the ees' homelands;
- Permanent resettlement in the ntries of first asylum; or
- Resettlement in third countries, nding the United States.

International refugee assistance pro ns, for which the United States pros about 30% of the funding, help ide basic care and maintenance for refugees until one of these solutions be achieved.

We believe that our proposed admis s program for 1985—coupled with expected admissions programs of the er resettlement countries—should et the requirements for resettlement he coming year. We will continue to k closely with the UN High Commis sioner for Refugees and with other coun s to ensure that the responsibility for ettlement is shared equitably.

This international resettlement ef t—along with the planned contribu is by the United States and other or countries for refugee relief oad—should hopefully meet the basic ds of the world's refugee population.

Accomplishments of the Last 10 Years

Over the last 10 years the U.S. refugee program has compiled an impressive list of accomplishments.

- Since April 1975, we have successfully integrated into American society more than 700,000 Indochinese refugees.

- Since 1980, we have accepted for resettlement over 30,000 people from Vietnam under the UNHCR's orderly departure program, including many Asian-American children and a smaller number of former political prisoners—many of whom might have otherwise been tempted to undertake the dangerous clandestine escape from Vietnam by boat.

- By contributing over \$240 million in relief aid, the United States has played a leading role in averting a serious famine in Kampuchea and in providing life-sustaining assistance to the Khmer people forced to live a precarious existence along the Thai border.

- Our refugee assistance and resettlement programs have been a key element in maintaining regional stability and strengthening the security of our friends in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as other first asylum countries around the world.

- Even as we coped with a vast outpouring of refugees from Indochina, our resettlement programs have continued to give a chance for a new life to thousands of refugees fleeing persecution in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Iran.

- Since early 1980, with the UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan, the United States has taken a leading role in providing over \$350 million in food, shelter, and other assistance to approximately 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

- International relief efforts, to which the United States has contributed about \$100 million this year, have saved tens of thousands of lives in Africa. In a new international effort resulting from the recent Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II)—held in Geneva this past July—we are working closely with African asylum nations to improve their ability to provide safe and humane asylum to nearly 2 million refugees.

An important measure of the refugee program's priority in our country is this: during a time of budget restraint, both Congress and the executive have left the refugee program largely uncut—in recognition of the

critical needs it addresses and, I believe, of its efficient management.

Rather than dwell on our accomplishments, however, we must press ahead with the urgent tasks before us, for many of the yet unresolved problems are grave.

UNHCR Orderly Departure Program

I would now like to discuss in detail our proposal for a new, separate ceiling for admissions under the UNHCR orderly departure program (ODP).

In early 1984, the number of ODP departures from Vietnam for the United States exceeded 1,000 per month for the first time since the program began.

Total departures to the United States and other resettlement countries have reached an average of 2,200 per month, and in FY 1984 ODP departures to all countries will exceed the number of boat arrivals for the first time. Despite continuing problems, the UNHCR orderly departure program is working and is increasingly becoming an alternative to hazardous boat escapes from Vietnam.

The reason the President is proposing the establishment of a separate orderly departure program ceiling for FY 1985 is to ensure that a growing ODP is not perceived as reducing the number of refugees admitted to the United States from first asylum countries.

We estimate that this ceiling of 10,000 would permit the departure from Vietnam of some 18,000 refugees and immigrants in FY 1985, some 7,000 of whom would enter the United States as refugees in FY 1986, following completion of language training and cultural orientation at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Bataan.

At UNHCR-sponsored meetings in Geneva in October 1982 and October 1983, we urged the Vietnamese to permit an expansion of the orderly departure program. We expect to meet, under UNHCR auspices, with the Vietnamese in Geneva again this October, and will present to them at that time our revised plans for the future expansion of the orderly departure program.

Our revised plans include, first, a basic restructuring of the U.S. program. Rather than having one ODP program into which we combine all groups of particular concern to the United States, we would propose to divide ODP into three separate subprograms, and to measure mutual performance against specified processing levels and guidelines for each program.

The three subprograms would be:

The regular program, for spouses and children of American citizens, ex-U.S. Government employees, and ethnic minorities of special humanitarian concern;

The Asian-American program, for Asian-American children and close family members included in the same household as the child; and

The political prisoner program, for current and former political prisoners and specified family members.

For the regular program, we would plan to process and move from Vietnam up to 10,000 persons (refugees and immigrants) during 1985. Within the 10,000 level, we would inform the Vietnamese that we would expect them to grant exit visas to a much greater proportion of persons from our special priority lists.

For the other two programs, I have already described the specific new initiatives designed to prompt the processing and movement of these much-abused populations. We would set processing and movement levels for these programs sufficient to launch and maintain steady movements for each group during 1985.

Proposed Admissions Ceilings

I now turn to the proposed admissions ceilings for the geographic regions of the world.

East Asia. In my statement on July 13 of this year to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' conference, I praised the member nations of ASEAN for the vital role they have played in granting first asylum to over 1.3 million Indochinese refugees, who since 1975 have been forced to flee their homes and seek safety. I characterized the entire refugee resettlement process from first asylum to final resettlement as "international cooperation at its finest." Further, I noted that if the process is to continue on the present successful track, we must all continue to shoulder our share of the burden. I pledged that we in the United States will do so and urged others to do so as well.

Our resettlement of over 700,000 refugees from first asylum countries in Southeast Asia, and more recently through the UNHCR orderly departure program, has been a major factor for continuing stability in the region since 1975. The generosity of the American people in receiving these refugees into our society—along with similar efforts by many other countries—has enabled

the first asylum countries to leave their doors open and at the same time avoid potentially destructive economic, social, and political pressures.

We should not lose sight of the fact that it is Hanoi's oppressive policies toward its own people and its military occupation of its neighbors that must cease before there can be a lasting solution to the Indochinese refugee crisis. It is these policies which are the root cause of the continuing exodus of refugees and the unwillingness of the people who fled Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos to return to their homes.

The number of Vietnamese boat arrivals in first asylum countries continues to decline for a number of reasons. These reasons include the UNHCR orderly departure program which has provided a safe and legal means of leaving Vietnam; a shortage of boats available to refugees; and reported restrictions by the Vietnamese authorities on clandestine departures. However, there is still a large number of refugees fleeing Vietnam by boat.

Refugee boat arrivals in Southeast Asian countries will equal about 26,000 for FY 1984 compared to about 32,800 arrivals in FY 1983 and 49,000 arrivals in FY 1982.

Resettlement by other countries during the current fiscal year should reach about 38,000, the same as last year. With the United States and other countries continuing at about the same level of resettlement in the coming fiscal year, the total refugee population in Southeast Asian first asylum camps should drop to approximately 116,000 by the end of FY 1985, down from a high of 409,000 at the peak of the Indochinese refugee crisis in 1979, and a significant reduction from the level of 176,000 at the beginning of the current fiscal year.

To lessen the Indochinese refugee burden on Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, the United States has maintained a relatively high rate of resettlement from the region. We believe that admission of 40,000 refugees in FY 1985 is our fair share—a level equal to the number of refugees we expect will be admitted by the rest of the refugee resettlement countries combined. This should encourage other resettlement nations to continue to participate in resettlement from Southeast Asia. Processing by Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officers has been smooth and efficient during FY 1984, thanks in part to improved casework by the voluntary agency representatives in the field and

to the effect of the revised INS refugee processing guidelines issued in August 1983.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Despite its international obligation under the Helsinki accords to allow freer emigration, the Soviet Union continues to prevent Jews and other persecuted minorities from leaving. We have urged the Soviets to honor their agreement and to issue exit permits to those who wish to leave, and I intend to make the point with Foreign Minister Gromyko when I meet with him at the United Nations. The severe Soviet restriction on Jewish and other emigration regrettably reduces the need again this year for proposing a large refugee admissions ceiling for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in FY 1985.

On the other hand, we want to maintain a sufficiently high ceiling to provide for our fair share of the normal outflow of refugees from the countries of Eastern Europe. We estimate that a ceiling of 9,000 admissions should be adequate for this purpose.

Near East and South Asia.

The Near East and South Asia region has several major refugee-producing situations, particularly in Afghanistan and Iran. In most cases, the refugees coming from this area are able to find continuing asylum in the region. We estimate that a refugee admissions ceiling of 5,000 will be sufficient to provide for those persons requiring resettlement who are of special concern to the United States, especially persecuted Iranian religious minorities such as the Baha'is and persons from Afghanistan whose positions in former Afghan government or association with the United States make them particular targets of persecution.

Africa.

The generous hospitality of African countries of first asylum and some limited possibilities for voluntary repatriation have mitigated the need for any significant resettlement outside Africa. However, there remains a relatively small number of African refugees for whom asylum or integration in the region is not feasible. We are proposing a ceiling of 3,000 for Africa to accommodate these special cases.

Latin America and Caribbean.

Finally, we are requesting 3,000 admissions for potential refugees from Latin America and the Caribbean who might require resettlement in the United States. This is an increase of 2,000 over FY 1984 and should be adequate to permit the admission of refugees for whom resettlement in the United States is the most appropriate option.

English Language Training and Medical Programs for Refugees

have dedicated significant time, money, and effort to developing programs to help refugees prepare for their lives in America.

For example, in 1985 we anticipate further improvements in both the English-as-a-second-language and cultural orientation (ESL/CO) programs in the medical screening program. The Department of State is concerned about the quality of refugees' preparation for life in the United States and the roughness with which medical problems are detected and treated. These programs have a direct impact on the stress and cost of refugee resettlement in the United States.

Funds are available in the Department of State's migration and refugee assistance budget requests to extend ESL/CO training in Southeast Asia for the refugees by 4 weeks, providing newly arriving Indochinese a stronger English-language preparation. An expanded medical and dental care facility recently began operation at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Iloilo. This facility, paid for in large part by the Japanese Government and largely staffed by volunteer Japanese medical personnel, is an excellent example of international cooperation in dealing with the Indochinese refugee problem.

These medical services will help reduce the cost to the U.S. Government of medical and dental care for refugees, who will now receive this treatment before their arrival in the United States.

Refugee Resettlement in the United States

Once refugees arrive in our country, we begin the important task of helping them become self-sufficient. The Department of State cooperates and collaborates with private voluntary agencies in this country to improve this transition process through which refugees become integrated into American society.

During the reauthorization deliberations for the Refugee Act, it became abundantly clear that the Congress desires a strengthened role for the private sector in assisting refugees to start to build productive, self-sufficient lives in their new country. The Administration concurs wholeheartedly with this goal.

We look forward to a reauthorized Refugee Act to clarify and strengthen

the private sector's role. Meanwhile, we will continue to work with the voluntary agencies to assure that refugees receive the full range of initial reception and placement services during their first critical months in the United States.

We have created an effective network of governmental and private organizations to assist refugees. We believe the reception and placement program is working well and that further improvement can be expected in line with the refugee assistance amendments of 1982, the revised provisions of the cooperative agreements, and the reauthorized Refugee Act.

Assistance to Refugees Abroad

While the proposed admission of refugees in FY 1985 is the focus of this hearing, it represents only one part of U.S. refugee policies and programs, and approximately one-third of the \$335 million of the 1984 refugee budget. About two-thirds of that budget—\$227 million—is the U.S. contribution to international assistance for refugees.

The magnitude of the overall world refugee situation has not changed appreciably since the Administration's last consultation with this committee in September 1983. We estimate the current world refugee population at slightly more than 8 million people. With bipartisan congressional support, the United States has responded generously with assistance funds and commodities for those refugees in need. Most U.S. assistance is channeled through international organizations. As in past years, the United States will contribute about 30% of the total budget of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Other contributions will be made to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) in Southeast Asia, as well as to a number of smaller U.S. and international voluntary agencies involved in refugee assistance. Total U.S. refugee assistance expenditures in fiscal year 1985, including food aid, are projected at \$286 million.

Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, the United States plans to contribute its fair share of approximately 30% of the budget of the UN Border Relief Operation, which provides life-sustaining assistance to approximately 240,000

Khmer living in camps on the border with Thailand. I would like to call special attention to the exceptional performance of UNBRO and the Thai Government in evacuating endangered Khmer refugees during recent Vietnamese military attacks. Loss of life was kept to a minimum, as both evacuation and relocation operated with extraordinary efficiency and timeliness.

Antipiracy Programs. We were very pleased that the UNHCR-Thai Government antipiracy program was renewed for another year in June. The United States has taken the lead—with strong congressional support—in underwriting this program with a pledge of \$1.5 million toward the \$3.6 million budget. While the number of pirate attacks are down from previous years, they are still much too high and a matter of grave concern and action by humanitarian governments. We will continue to support all efforts to eliminate pirate attacks and to ensure that the unfortunate victims of these attacks receive necessary counseling and improved medical care.

The United States will also continue to support other antipiracy programs, both through the UNHCR and bilaterally, from funds earmarked by the Congress for the fight against piracy in Southeast Asia.

Near East and South Asia. The world's largest concentration of refugees continues to be the nearly 3 million Afghans who have been forced to seek asylum in Pakistan due to the Soviet Union's brutal occupation of their homeland since December 1979. This large refugee population has been generously assisted by Pakistan, whose government and people have provided asylum to their Afghan neighbors for almost 5 years. In particular, the Government of Pakistan has permitted many Afghans to obtain wage-earning employment or start their own businesses in Pakistan, actions of exceptional generosity toward a refugee population.

As in past years, the United States will provide about 25% of the budget of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees which provides education and health services to 2 million refugees.

Africa. Over 2 million refugees have been compelled to leave their homelands in Africa to seek refuge from war and famine in neighboring countries.

The already strained economies of Sudan and Somalia have had to cope

with the additional burden of accommodating more than a half million refugees. The continuing instability in neighboring countries is imposing a considerable strain on the host countries which, despite the best intentions, are unable to sustain this sizable influx without continuing generous international assistance.

President Reagan's proclamation of this past July 9 as African Refugees Relief Day symbolized a continuing commitment by the United States to assist refugees in Africa.

The Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, held in Geneva July 9-11, set new goals for assisting refugees in Africa to achieve self-sufficiency and for assisting first asylum countries by strengthening their infrastructures in refugee-impacted areas. The U.S. delegation to the conference, led by Attorney General Smith, strongly supported these goals. The United States will be studying the funding of various projects proposed by the African countries aimed at providing long-term assistance to their refugee populations.

Central America. Our refugee programs in Central America support our overall objective of strengthening the forces of moderation against extremism of both the left and the right. Our assistance for El Salvador's displaced persons helps those who have fled guerrilla-infested villages for areas more firmly under government control, thereby strengthening President Duarte's government. Our assistance for Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and Costa Rica keeps the flame of freedom alive for people like the Miskito Indians who have fled Marxist repression. Our assistance also benefits individuals who are potential victims of rightwing violence or who are simply fleeing the depredations of vicious guerrilla conflicts. By maintaining our first asylum policy and supporting refugee centers located in Central America, we also ease the pressure of more massive illegal immigration to the United States.

Bipartisan Congressional Support

The U.S. refugee program has enjoyed broad bipartisan support over the years, and under the leadership of President Reagan I assure you that it will continue to be given high priority within the Administration. We are indebted to the great work of many dedicated Senators and Congressmen. I would like especially to express my gratitude and deep respect for the work of Chairman Thurmond and Senators Simpson and Kennedy.

I know there are many other members of the Senate—from both sides of the aisle—who have devoted their time and energy to the delicate and difficult task of refugee admissions and assistance, but I think it is fitting that the senators I have mentioned are singled out for special praise.

In the House, bipartisan support for refugee and immigration legislation has been equally strong. I salute in particular the leadership of Chairman Rodino, and Congressmen Mazzoli, Fish, Lungren, and McCollum, whose distinguished work has done so much to advance the cause of enlightened refugee policy in the United States.

On behalf of the President, I urge the Congress to continue its strong support for the refugee program and to assist in providing the budgetary and admissions resources which will be required to carry it out.

Refugee assistance and resettlement depends for its success on international cooperation. On the whole, the international community, excluding the Soviet Union and its allies, has met the challenge of this immense humanitarian task.

The U.S. refugee program is also a model of U.S. Government interagency cooperation and an excellent example of cooperation among governmental and private organizations throughout the United States. The resettlement of refugees has drawn upon the idealism and dedication of Americans from all

walks of life. It is a program in which local initiative has counted for as much as federal funding.

We believe the 1985 admissions program we are discussing today and the 1986 program which is currently being developed within the Administration will be sufficient to meet anticipated refugee needs and to launch the initiatives I discussed earlier.

In order that the Congress and the Administration may continue to work jointly on the refugee program, we would be prepared, at mid-year, to meet with the relevant committees in both Houses to review our progress—particularly with regard to the initiatives with the Vietnamese.

Conclusion

We can all take justifiable pride that the United States is recognized throughout the world for its leadership in humanitarian assistance to and protection of refugees. We have given much help the refugees of the world, but we have also benefited from the talents and hard work of the many refugees whom we have accepted for resettlement in the United States. Beyond the contribution of such well-known figures as Solzhenitsyn and Rostropovich, thousands of other refugees from persecution have greatly enriched our national life with their talents and hard work. We must be aware of the costs of our refugee program, but we should not forget its valuable contributions to the social and economic life of our country.

I thank the Congress and the American people for making it possible for us to meet the awesome challenge of aiding the world's refugees.

¹Press release 198 of Sept. 12, 1984. A complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

Secretary's Interview "Meet the Press"

Secretary Shultz was interviewed on TV's "Meet the Press" on September 18, 1984, by Bernard Kalb, Bill Monroe, Marvin Kalb (moderator), NBC; Rowland Evans, The Chicago Sun-Times; and Hedrick Smith, The New York Times.¹

Q. How would you describe the present state of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, how serious or how dangerous do you consider it to be?

A. There's no doubt about the fact that the situation between our two countries is a cool one and that there is competition between us. I don't think that the situation is dangerous in a literal, military sense; but the President and all his working with him have addressed themselves to this relationship very hard for a very long time, and continue to do so to be sure that we do everything possible to see that the relationship is a constructive one, having in mind that "constructive" has to be realistically addressed to the nature of their society and the interests of the United States and our allies.

Q. Former Vice President Walter Mondale seems to feel President Reagan is partly to blame for the tensions. Let me ask you for comment on his remarks by Mr. Mondale. He said that President Reagan is the first American President in 50 years who has not met with a Soviet leader; also the first American President since the Hiroshima bomb went off never to have negotiated arms controls.

A. The point is not to have meetings to achieve something. In President Reagan's Administration, a great deal has been achieved in our relationship with the Soviet Union.

First of all, in the United States itself, in restoring our preparedness and our strength, in restoring our outlook and self-confidence, in restoring our economy so that we bring to that relationship and to our own well-being a much greater strength. Beyond that, as we have dealt with the problems that came up as a result of the Soviet Union's behavior, their tendency, which we saw in some past periods, including that in which Mr. Mondale was responsible—or partly responsible—the tendency for the Soviet Union to be able to move into new situations and acquire

additional territory has been stopped and, in fact, turned back in some instances.

Q. Do you feel there is no deficiency or no embarrassment in the fact that President Reagan is the first American President in 50 years who has not met with a Soviet leader?

A. I don't see any embarrassment about that at all. As a matter of fact, when you consider the health problems of the Soviet leaders during President Reagan's term, it's a little hard to see how he might have met with the leader of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I can tell you, from my own work with the President not only in major meetings but in the private meetings that he and I just have together as individuals, that he spends a great deal of time thinking and working on this problem and on this relationship. And, as with any president, I think, one of his overriding concerns is to achieve a situation of peace and a constructive relationship, but as I say, within the framework of being realistic and seeing to it that the interests of the United States are going to be served in any agreement or negotiation that might take place.

Q. You mentioned the health problems of the Soviet leaders. Two of them have died during Mr. Reagan's term—Yuriy Andropov and Leonid Brezhnev. Wouldn't their funerals have made a good occasion for the President to have gone to Moscow, seen the new leaders face to face and begun to ease the tensions?

A. I don't think particularly so, because funerals are a time, of course, when there are a lot of people around to talk to, but they are also events that consume attention and don't lend themselves to lengthy interchanges. On the other hand, on both those occasions, the President did send Vice President Bush, and I happened to be present on one of those, and I can tell you that Vice President Bush did a wonderful job of representing this country in those meetings.

Q. Mr. Monroe mentioned former Vice President Mondale. He has said that if he were elected President, he would immediately call for a pause in American testing of nuclear weapons and that within 6 months, he would meet with the Soviet leadership. Isn't that something the Administration could have done?

A. I don't think it's a good idea to suddenly turn back our own capability to be prepared and to deter. It's certainly a good idea to have constructive meetings if such can be held; and there are lots of meetings between U.S. and Soviet officials and I'll be having one with Mr. Gromyko on the 26th of September, I think it is. But at any rate, to stop your own capacity to be prepared and to deter aggression is just as reprehensible as not being prepared to engage in negotiations for peace.

Q. On the specific issue of arms talks, the major ones have been suspended; the Russians offered in late June to talk about antisatellite weapons. One of the things which they have called for is a moratorium in our testing of antisatellite weapons. In the interest of getting some arms talks going, wouldn't that be a good idea?

A. We responded affirmatively to the Soviet request, or suggestion that we have a meeting in Vienna and discuss—the militarization of outer space was their phrase—and we're prepared to do that. We think that one of the most threatening uses of outer space, in a military way, is the use of it for ballistic missiles to go through outer space and to hit other countries. That's the most threatening thing. So we think it's important to discuss defensive and offensive systems that go through outer space and we said so. But we're prepared to meet with the Soviet Union, in Vienna or elsewhere, with or without a prearranged agenda, and discuss the problems of outer space, including questions about a moratorium on testing but not to do it before we have the meetings.

Q. You said in an answer to Bill Monroe that you didn't consider the situation particularly dangerous today between the United States and the Soviet Union. A high official in the CIA has prepared a memorandum which is now on Bill Casey's desk, I understand, which states that the period immediately ahead, contrary to what you said, may be the most dangerous the two countries have ever faced, he said, because they may choose a high-risk course to change the correlation of East-West forces before the West gets too strong. Does the CIA know something that the State Department does not?

A. Probably they know lots of things we don't know, but they try to keep us well informed; in fact, their job is to see that important intelligence goes to the

President and to me and to others involved in our foreign policy. I don't know whether you are quoting the memorandum that you published in your column the other day—

Q. Yes, sir.

A. That is the opinion of an individual, and individuals have lots of different opinions in the CIA. They have a process—we have a process in the government of people putting their opinions on the line and evaluating them and coming to some judgment. And the judgment that that memorandum comes to is not the overall judgment, and there are a number of things in there that we consider to be wrong.

However, let me just add one more thing. I don't think it's a good idea for documents in the CIA to be leaked; I don't think it's a good idea for them to be published; and I don't intend to engage in further discussion of it.

Q. But let's leave the document aside and talk about the correlation of forces. Isn't it true that there could be a problem as the Soviets see the Reagan rearmament program moving ahead very well and the United States catching up and perhaps even moving ahead? Isn't that a signal to the Soviet leadership of future danger?

A. Our deterrent capability is very strong right now, and, as a matter of fact, the deterrent capability has essentially kept the peace, through NATO and through our alliances, through this long period, and it will stay in that capacity. We have put before the Soviet Union a wide variety of proposals to reduce the level of armaments—of nuclear armaments, of chemical weapons, of conventional armaments, to the confidence-building measures—a whole array of measures have been put before them and so they should see from that that our objective and the President's objective is to bring this all down.

Q. Doesn't the destabilizing effect of two leaders and now maybe a third leader coming to the fore in a brief 4 years in the Soviet Union increase an imbalance of political forces in the Soviet Union that makes them slightly more dangerous than they would be under a continuous leadership?

A. I think it's very hard to say, and our knowledge of the internals of the Soviet Government's working is not as great as we would like it to be. On the other hand, from my standpoint, I see a functioning government. I spend a lot of

time with Ambassador Dobrynin. I've met a number of times with Foreign Minister Gromyko. And we deal with the government that's there and there is one there.

Q. You'll be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations on September 26th. What are your expectations as a result of that meeting?

A. I go into it, I think, well prepared to talk about the subjects that we find most compelling for a meeting like that. I've had a number of discussions with Mr. Gromyko. The last one we had in Stockholm, I think we both agreed, was a useful meeting. And I would expect to have a useful meeting with him.

Q. Low expectations or high expectations?

A. I just hope that we'll have a useful meeting. I don't want to try to set any level of expectations.

Q. Are you looking forward to a second meeting?

A. There has often been a second meeting, if there is a need for it, and if there is a need for it, certainly it's easy enough to arrange it. It's not a problem to arrange meetings if there is something worthwhile to talk about.

Q. Will you be inviting Soviet Minister Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with President Reagan?

A. What we have to announce right now is the fact that I'll be meeting with Mr. Gromyko, and what other events may be scheduled remains to be seen.

Q. Critics have raised the question, based on candidate Reagan's remark of 4 years ago, are you better off then than you were 4 years earlier, as to whether the United States today is better off in foreign policy than it was 4 years ago. When I ask that question against the background, for example, of a stalemate in the Middle East, a deepening chill in U.S. relations with the Soviets, the American involvement in what is increasingly emerging as some sort of Central American quagmire with a possible risk of U.S. military involvement, I can anticipate your defense but the question still stands there. It's hard to see real areas of progress in foreign policy.

A. The question may stand there, but the reality is altogether different. In the first place, as I was saying earlier, the United States is a different country

in all sorts of ways—I don't want to repeat myself. In the second place, as you look around the world, our alliances are strong; our friends are increasingly strong.

You mentioned Central America. When the President took office, I think there was a widespread feeling that somehow or other it was going down drain, and nobody feels that way now. On the contrary, democracy is on the march in our hemisphere. Over 90% of the people who live in our hemisphere will be living under conditions of democracy or countries, such as Brazil moving rapidly in that direction. So I think we are making marvelous headway.

We have a cool situation, as we've been talking about, with the Soviet Union, but that doesn't mean that we haven't made progress. Our alliance with Europe is strong, and so on. I could go around the world and give you a different picture.

Q. Last night on an NBC documentary called "The Real Star Wars" Defense Secretary Weinberger said that the Soviet Union is in violation of the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty. Do you share that view?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. All right. In what way have they been in violation, and why haven't you done anything about it?

A. They are in the process of constructing a radar that we believe is a violation, if it is put into being, of the ABM Treaty. It is still under construction, and it has a long ways to go as far as we can see. And what we have done about that is take that up with them. There is a setting where such questions are brought up and discussed, and the process is going on.

Q. Do you feel that in order to pursue the President's Strategic Defense Initiative that the ABM Treaty will have to be renegotiated?

A. The President's program is an essential thing for the defense of the United States. It is a research program at this point—a development program—and whether anything in the way of deployments, which is when you'd get into the ABM area, takes place remains to be seen.

Q. Don't you feel that the treaty would have to be renegotiated as you proceed, if you realistically proceed with a strategic defense initiative? You're going to come upon a time very shortly when you'll have to either scrap it or renegotiate it. What is your view?

. That remains to be seen, whether it will come to that time or just what construction of the results of this—the Strategic Defense Initiative—turn out to be.

Q. East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania have been showing occasional flashes of independence from Moscow. You and President Reagan said in recent weeks that the United States does not accept the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It's not new American policy; other presidents have followed that same line. But the fact that you and the President said that in recent weeks, does that indicate the United States is really trying to pull away East European nations from the Soviets?

A. We have said just exactly what I have quoted. We are glad to have better relationships with the countries of Eastern Europe, and we feel that people in those countries should have a national dignity and freedom, like anybody else, and we deal with them on that basis. There isn't any big, new campaign of this kind.

Q. Are you actively working more now than a couple of years ago for better relations, for example, with East Germany?

A. We have had some meetings with people from East Germany. I'm going to meet the Foreign Minister of East Germany, up at the United Nations, and we would like to see our relationship improve, certainly.

Q. You've put great stress today on the importance of rebuilding the American military deterrent. The President suggested during the 1980 campaign, and often since then, that rebuilding the American strategic defenses would make the Soviets more willing to talk and give them more incentive to negotiate arms control treaties. Since that hasn't happened, should people believe that a strategy would work in a second Reagan term?

A. The first point to notice is that we're trying to be prepared—prepared to deter aggression as well as prepared for negotiations, prepared for peace. But the object of seeing to our defense capabilities is not to bring about negotiations but to be prepared.

I think that if the Soviet Union sees that they can't get their way by virtue of a lack of will power in the United States or in the free world, then they may very well come to the conclusion that they are better off to negotiate and try to bring down these levels of arms, in which case, I can tell you, the President is more than ready.

Q. How long do you expect we'll have to wait before they'll get to that point and there will be some way of stopping the arms race?

A. Of course, we have negotiations going on in multilateral areas, a great many of them right now, and we hope that they will get somewhere. We've had some discussions with the Soviet Union on less important things than the big items that you have in mind and I have in mind that have been working, and so we'll keep at it. I just can't make a prediction about what may happen in 1985 or beyond. But the big thing is the United States will be prepared—be prepared to defend our interests and deter aggression and will also be prepared to work, and continuously work, for peace in this world.

Q. You've just said that the Russians have violated the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. The general advisory committee of ACDA, the arms control agency, has been ordered by the President to put out a fumigated version of a whole new series of violations. Question one: Why on earth do we want to find new agreements with the Russians when we can't make them live up to the old ones, the existing ones?

A. It's important for us to maintain as strong a dialogue as we can, based on a realistic appraisal of them and of the nature of any agreements we reach, because of their strength and because of the fact that between us there is such an overwhelming capability to cause military damage.

And so we should examine the history of agreements and negotiations and learn from that, as much as we can, about what kind of approach they take, how to redress this balance, how to bring about agreements that are both verifiable and basically in the interests of both parties to carry out.

Q. I understand that, but can we stop cheating, yes or no?

A. We can have better provisions for verification. We can learn from our experience. And as far as cheating is concerned I think verification is the kind of answer we have to look to.

I remember when I was Secretary of the Treasury, a long time ago, and had the IRS as part of my Department. We have a voluntary tax system in this country and they always used to say that conscience is that small voice saying, "Somebody may be watching," and I think we have to watch.

Q. About the South Korean airliner, our position—the U.S. position—has been that we did not know it was shot down until after it was shot down, even though it had been off course for some period of time.

A. That's not a position; that's a statement of fact.

Q. That's the fact. Let me ask whether there was not a serious intelligence failure, and I ask it in this context. Suppose these were Russian aircraft going toward Alaska in that several-hours flight and our intelligence units in the Far East did not pick that up? By the U.S. fact position, isn't that an absolute declaration of a huge intelligence failure on the U.S. part?

A. I don't believe so. After all, the plane that was off course was over Soviet territory. We don't consider every airplane flying over Soviet territory to be some sort of a threat to us.

¹Press release 195 of Sept. 10, 1984. ■

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With David Brinkley"

Secretary Shultz was interviewed on ABC-TV's "This Week With David Brinkley" on September 30, 1984, by David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC News analyst.¹

Q. Mr. Gromyko is back in Moscow now, having finished off here his last hours talking with you. Tell us about it. What happened? What do you make of it? What can you tell us about it?

A. The last meeting, of course, was kind of a wrap-up from the President's meeting. But if you take, I think properly, the span of meetings that we had with him—in New York, the President's speech, his speech, his meeting with the President, and the wrap-up meeting together—what happened was a sometimes intense, sometimes discursive discussion of practically all the subjects that we are concerned about together with the Soviet Union, and then at the end, an agreement on the importance of keeping in touch, as the phrase was, but particularly as we came to the end of the meeting yesterday, to do so carefully, systematically, through diplomatic channels, in the expectation now that we would explore all of these issues, and at least we can hope, perhaps negotiate out some important things.

Q. It seems that when Americans talk about Soviet-U.S. relations under any Administration, it turns out the centerpiece of our relations is arms control. How much time, in the meetings that you had and the President had with Mr. Gromyko, was devoted to arms control, as opposed to human rights, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the rest?

A. We always make a point of bringing up a full range of issues in any of these meetings with a Soviet leader. I do with my meetings with the Ambassador here, or in the many previous meetings I've had with Mr. Gromyko. So we talk about our human rights concerns always, and we talk about bilateral issues, some of which we have reached agreements on in recent times. We talk about regional trouble spots that we're concerned about and they're concerned about, and we talk about arms control issues. That's our agenda. And that agenda was very much in full force during these talks.

Q. On the basis of the last 15 years, why do serious people believe in the arms control process? You heard Mr. Aaron say a moment ago that there are grounds for serious agreement between the countries—common ground can be found, but we've had 15 years' experience with the process, and an arms race continues under the umbrella of arms agreements.

A. Now people are saying that the technology of verification is falling short, the technology of cruise missiles and the rest makes arms control perhaps a dead end. Do you believe that?

A. There are many problems with arms control. I don't think it's a dead end. The approach that President Reagan has taken is not to control the buildup of arms, but to reduce it. And as he said many times publicly, ideally, he would like to see nuclear arms reduced to zero, and he has shown that sense of direction to his proposals on strategic arms and in his proposals on intermediate-range weapons, to start with the idea of "let's eliminate them entirely." The zero option. It's a good option.

Q. Can you cite any contribution to U.S. security over the last 15 years from arms control?

A. I think there probably have been some restrictions on the degree of buildup that have come about through that process, but I think the process has tended to focus on limiting the expansion rather than on actual reductions. And also you have a problem in the fact that they were concentrated on a part of armaments, principally launchers; and it's just like controls—whether you're talking about wage and price controls or any other kind of controls—people tend to try to get around something that is controlled, and so we see now many warheads on a launcher.

Q. You've put a very positive spin on this series of meetings, particularly the one with the President.

A. Not very positive. It's a sober and intense meeting, and our object—the President's object in this—was to get across, in his own way—his intensely personal and strong way—to the top levels of the Soviet leadership the fact that, first of all, the United States is a strong, vibrant country, and we intend to be able to defend our interests anywhere.

Q. Do you think the Soviets should realize that?

A. And he should realize that. And second, that we were very realistic about them; and third, that we are very much prepared and serious in wanting to engage them in constructive discussions. All three of those things are out there, and I think—at least, as I watched the President in this discussion—he managed to get his message across.

Q. Having said that and done that as you know, Mr. Gromyko immediately put out a statement after meeting with the President which was very negative, saying in so many words that he found nothing—no change in position, no change in attitude—that would justify any reason to hope that things could be better. Why did he do that?

A. He put out different statement as the week went along.

Q. I'm talking about the one after meeting with the President.

A. And I think that, as I said, the meetings have to be looked upon in the continuity and what we will do is very carefully establish different places where we will talk about the important subjects.

Q. Can you name the next place?

A. No. The next places will be here, and in Moscow, as we talk with the respective Ambassadors.

Q. Through our Ambassadors?

A. And we will establish—of course there are some things that are simply ongoing—going on right now with quite a lot.

Q. Are you then saying that this series of meetings will result in the Soviets' coming back to the arms control table, or some table if not Geneva to discuss arms control? If so, when?

A. It remains to be seen exactly what the structure and place will be, I'm not going to try to predict their behavior other than I think it is fair to say that we will have some discussion and some effort to line these things up.

Q. In that connection, did the President suggest to Mr. Gromyko that we might, in fact, agree to a moratorium on testing weapons in space before a negotiation on that subject began?

A. No.

Q. Gromyko, the Kremlin, Chernenko, the Soviet leadership in general, keep saying to us, "We want

es, not words." He probably said a ten times in these few days he in Washington.

A. We say the same thing.

Q. When he says "deeds not words," what deeds? What does he want? He wants us to remove our files from West Germany, Western Europe, which we're not going to do?

A. He wants us to put a freeze on modernization of our defensive and current forces; he wants us to put a freeze on our efforts to do our research and develop our thinking about outer space. He wants to freeze all of that—there have been some people in this country who have proposed that. But it's not sensible, from our standpoint. There's no reason why we should give them what they want in order to start discussions. We should start discussions to find things that are mutually agreeable, and then work out the agreements on them.

Q. There was a story in *The Washington Post* this morning—I don't know if it's a White House leak or what—saying that the arrangements for Gromyko's visit were kept secret to prevent the Defense Department from finding out about it and interfering with it.

A. [Laughing] That's nonsense.

Q. Is that all, just nonsense? You say it's nonsense they were kept secret or nonsense of the Defense Department to interfere?

A. As the notion of having this meeting and working on it developed, of course, the President kept it to himself and to a few other people, but the Defense Department was completely involved in the preparations. The Secretary of Defense was present at the last briefing and others with the President before the meeting; he was present at the luncheon with Mr. Gromyko. So this is a fair story.

Q. All right. I'd like to follow up on the previous question about deeds and words. You say what deeds they want from us. What deeds are they going to do for us?

A. That's what we need to work out in negotiation, but any negotiation is intended to have a result that's to the mutual advantage to the parties, and that's why anyone trades with anyone else. I suppose an example before us is the sales of grain to the Soviet Union. It's to their advantage to be able to buy the grain; it's to our advantage to sell it. That's why it's taking place.

Q. You have said that the tide of history is against the Soviet Union. The President has said that the Soviet Union is heading for "the ash heap of history." And a lot of people in the Administration say they have alcoholism, disease; it's a kind of Third-World country with a Third-World economy almost—the Soviet Union.

Do you think that if we just keep the pressure on, that the internal strains on their society are going to cause a kind of disintegration? Is that one of the premises of our policy?

A. I don't think that we'll see a disintegration of the Soviet Union, or certainly we shouldn't build that into our thinking.

I do believe that the evidence—there is going to be competition between the systems, and the President and Mr. Gromyko both said that to each other. I believe our system is infinitely superior, that the facts are showing that all around the world, and in that sense, I think history is on our side.

Q. But the extension of this premise is that an arms race is in our interest because we can compete and we can carry it on more easily.

Q. That we can afford it and they can't.

Q. We can afford it, and eventually, they will buckle under the strain and get reasonable.

A. I think that's absolute nonsense. The thing that you have to look at is the fact that there are huge arsenals of nuclear weapons being built up. They are very dangerous.

I watched the beginning of your show, and you said, I think, that these were the only two countries that could start a major conflagration. That is absolutely wrong, and it represents the problem. Lots of countries around the world can start something and draw the superpowers into it, and so there is danger—and danger from these weapons.

That is why the President has so persistently sought reductions—not a freeze, not a control of the buildup, but reductions—and reductions, ideally, to zero. That's his object.

Q. Now that President Reagan has called former President Carter to assure him that he didn't mean that he, Mr. Carter, was responsible in any way for the latest Embassy bombing in Beirut, who is going to take responsibility? What person or number of people are going to take responsibility?

A. Let's be clear about the responsibility. The responsibility is with people who, through the use of terrorism, are trying to have an impact on U.S. policies, are trying to have an impact on our quest for peace and stability in the Middle East and other parts of the world. It's the threat of terrorism that is responsible, and that is what we have to fight against.

There is somehow this notion that, in response to this, somebody's head has to roll. Maybe so, and I'm willing to have it be my head any time anyone wants—

Q. Are you responsible?

A. —as I certainly feel responsible. Absolutely.

Q. Should you have—

A. And I take that responsibility very seriously.

Q. I know you do, since you've "beefed up" security.

A. However—wait a minute. Now, wait a minute. We had just—people had just—

Q. [Inaudible] ascribed to that.

A. You listen to me now. The people—I feel so strongly about this—the people out there in Beirut are serving our country in a risky environment and they understand that very well. They are doing everything possible to improve their security, and it's up to us to help them.

The Ambassador, Reg Bartholomew, is a hero. He has come close to being killed three times, most recently in this latest episode. Do you think that he wants anything less than strong security around him? He absolutely does. And a lot has been done. There is more that can be done, and we're going to do it.

Q. But the people in Iran in 1979 were serving our country in the same way that you've described the people in Beirut.

A. Absolutely, they were.

Q. And I'm sure you would say the people who were responsible for seizing them were the Iranians—

A. Sure.

Q. —and yet it did not stop Ronald Reagan, during the debate on October 20th of that next year, 1980, of saying to President Carter that he had been warned and he either should have beefed up security or removed the people from the Embassy. So we're not talking about, are we, who wants Americans to be safe the more or the less? We're talking about why,

after the first Embassy bombing by truck and the second bombing of our Marines by a truck, there weren't adequate security devices to keep a third Embassy from being bombed by a truck.

A. There were many additional devices, and obviously, we didn't have everything that we needed. The truck was stopped, or the van was stopped. The damage was less than it had been on earlier occasions and less than it could have been although it was severe, and the situation must be worked on continuously.

We have to remember that our Ambassadors around the world and the people who are working in our Embassies are in a tough situation—they're on the front lines. They also have a mission to perform that involves them, as Reg does, going around in Beirut, going around in other places. We've had an Ambassador shot in Rome; the Saudis had their Embassy blown up in Beirut; the Kuwaitis have been attacked; the French have been attacked. The problem is getting hold of this issue of terrorism, and we are working on it. Don't mistake that.

Q. So I take it that you think, unlike the Long commission which fixed responsibility for the bombing of the Marines—and then the President said, "It's mine, ultimately, I'll take it"—that you think there won't be a commission this time, there won't be an investigation that points to someone and says, "You are responsible"?

A. There is an investigation. It has given us some preliminary views. I met this morning with Ambassador Murphy [Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] who has just been around in the area.

Q. Would you tell us what he told you?

A. There is another team coming back with additional evidence, and we continue to look into this. If there is some negligence involved, we'll find it. However, we're not in this investigation business to see if we can knock somebody's head off. Our purpose is to find out what additional we can do to enhance the security of our Embassies. That's the ball on which we need to keep our eye.

Q. Let me return to U.S.-Soviet relations. First of all, do you expect to be dealing with them for 4 years as Secretary of State? Do you intend to stay on for 4 more years?

A. I think that the chances of a more constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union, assuming Mr. Reagan is

President, are reasonably good. But, of course, that remains to be seen, just how they will react.

I do have confidence in what the President's view is, and it is that we should stay with the same strategy he's had from the beginning. We have to be realistic; we have to be strong; and we have to be ready to work out constructive agreements with them, assuming they want to do it.

Q. If you're Secretary of State for 4 more years, and at the end of 4 years, there has been no arms control agreement, would you consider that a failure? Or is it perhaps a test of democracy to be able to not make agreements, to say that's not satisfactory?

U.S. Response to Africa's Food Needs

Background

Per capita food production in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen 20% over the last two decades. Population is growing at a faster rate than agricultural production. In many countries, economic policies have subsidized urban populations at the expense of the farmers. As a result, farmers no longer have sufficient incentive to produce for the marketplace.

In addition, the worst drought since the mid-1970s—and perhaps in this century—continues to spread suffering and hunger throughout much of Africa. Especially in the Sahel, southern Africa, and the Horn, food shortages in some two dozen countries have reached emergency proportions.

The United States continues to be the largest food aid donor to Africa, providing more food aid than all other donors combined. Moreover, our total food aid has increased by 35% in the past 2 years. According to the latest Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report, we provide five times more food aid to Africa than the second largest donor country. Our share of total food aid actually delivered to the 24 FAO-designated "food emergency" countries during 1982-83 averaged 40%, an amount approached only by the combined donations provided by all European Community countries.

A. There is nothing particularly wonderful about agreements for the sake of agreements. In fact, I think the worse thing in the world we can do in the Soviet relationship is to get in the position where we feel, and they know that we want an agreement for the sake of an agreement, because then they will really put the squeeze on us.

You have to be relaxed about the need for an agreement if you're going to get a good one. The only agreement worth getting, from our standpoint, is one that serves our interests. And that's the ball, again, on which we have to keep our eyes.

¹Press release 208 of Oct. 1, 1984. ■

Immediate Help

To meet the immediate crisis, the United States is providing unprecedented quantities of food for sub-Saharan Africa. Far in this fiscal year, the United States has approved some 450,000 metric tons of emergency food assistance to more than 30 needy African countries. The value of these shipments, including freight costs, exceeds \$160 million.

Under all food assistance programs this year, the United States will ship more than 1.3 million metric tons of food to Africa, valued at more than \$1 billion including ocean freight.

Overwhelming bipartisan support exists for providing emergency food aid to Africa. Earlier this year, Congress approved a \$90 million emergency food supplemental and later added \$60 million. Legislation also is pending to provide an additional \$175 million of regular food assistance worldwide, of which a portion is expected to go to Africa.

Further Steps

Since the Food for Peace (PL 480) program was enacted in 1954, the United States has sent 653 billion pounds of food worth \$32 billion to 1.8 billion people in more than 100 countries around the world. On the 30th anniversary of that program on July 10, 1984, President Reagan announced a major initiative that will allow the United States to respond more quickly and effectively to the food needs of the people of Africa and other Third World countries suffering from hunger and malnutrition.

Arms Control: Where Do We Stand Now?

by **Kenneth L. Adelman**

Address before the World Affairs Council in San Diego on August 30, 1984. Ambassador Adelman is Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

It is a great pleasure to return to San Diego and to your World Affairs Council. Last time, I found the interest expressed and questions asked to be among the best I have heard.

What has happened in arms control since the last time I attended one of your meetings? A lot on our side; little on the Soviet side. Arms control without the Soviets is like boating without the water. President Reagan, however, has taken several arms control initiatives since our last discussion.

- In the strategic nuclear arms talks, or START, he authorized new approaches to bridge the gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions, including a "build-down" proposal that would guarantee major reductions in nuclear missile warheads.

- The President sent Vice President Bush to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last April to present the U.S. draft treaty for a complete ban on chemical weapons throughout the world. We have had several discussions with other countries, including the Soviet Union, on this proposal. We look forward to serious negotiations. Banning these gruesome weapons is both important and urgent, as I noted last year. Since that time, following visits to Japan and China, I led a delegation to Thailand to see first-hand and investigate the use of chemical weapons. It drove home once more the need to nip this potentially devastating weapon system in the bud.

- Just recently, the United States and the Soviet Union have completed an agreement to upgrade the communications link between Moscow and Washington, the so-called Hot Line.

- A little over a month ago, the President announced his willingness to take up the Soviet suggestion for negotiations on space arms control. Unfortunately, so far the Soviet Union has appeared unwilling to take "yes" for an answer.

- The President has initiated new U.S. flexibility in the talks to reduce conventional weapons in Europe, and we have also developed proposals in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that would significantly reduce the risk of surprise attack.

- In another area, during the President's summit visit to China last April, it was agreed to open a fresh dialogue between the United States and China on arms control issues. To that end, I led a team to Beijing in July where we had several good exchanges.

With the few exceptions noted, the Soviet Union has been unwilling to engage in any real negotiations. In fact, as you know, at the time of our last discussion, they were right on the verge of walking out of the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations and then suspended indefinitely the strategic arms talks. Commentators frequently assert that the Soviets are not likely to undertake serious negotiations before the U.S. election so as not to help the candidacy of Ronald Reagan.

And, as you know full well, we are entering the height of the political season. This hallmark of our great democratic system—for which we should all be eternally grateful—is, nevertheless, a time of intense partisanship and daily hyperbole.

Arms control remains one of the most critical issues facing our country. Success still requires a high degree of bipartisan support. But it has not escaped, and may never escape, becoming part of the political debate. This is proper—the American people should decide big issues via our electoral process.

It is all the more important, therefore, to clearly distinguish opinion from fact. As a former Secretary of Defense once remarked: Everyone is entitled to their own opinions but not to their own facts.

One of this season's cries is that the prospects for nuclear arms control have been disastrously set back, if not killed, during the past 4 years. Mark Twain once commented from Paris that reports of his death were premature. The reports on the "death" of arms control are worse than premature; they are dead wrong.

The five-point initiative includes:

- Prepositioning of grain stocks in selected Third World areas to shorten response time; temporary sites in Africa under review;
- Creation of a special \$50 million presidential fund to allow a more flexible response to severe food emergencies;
- Financing or payment of ocean inland transportation costs associated with U.S. food aid in special emergency cases;
- Creation of a government task force to provide better forecasts of food shortages and needs; and
- Establishment of an advisory group of business leaders to share information on Third World hunger and food production.

Long-Term Assistance

The United States has emphasized production and supporting activities in its African economic assistance programs. These programs assist in research, training, institution-building, irrigation, seed production, and extension. Improvements in the policy framework, particularly in incentives for farmers and markets, is an urgent concern.

As part of the Administration's proposed \$1.1 billion economic assistance program for Africa in FY 1985, the President has asked Congress to approve the first portion of a 5-year, \$500 million African Economic Policy Initiative. That initiative will offer tangible support for countries prepared to undertake the difficult policy reforms needed to improve productivity, especially in agriculture, and provide farmers incentives to produce more food.

The United States is asking the international community to join in this effort and is urging the World Bank to expand its coordinating role among donors to take the lead in working with African governments in designing policy reforms.

Other Administration measures to increase food production in Africa include support to private American organizations seeking to provide agricultural and fisheries technology, know-how, and capital investment. In several countries—such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Somalia, and Guinea—the Administration is encouraging private investors, both American and African, to expand the food production base.

Today, I would like to focus on three related questions. First, why have we seen no arms control agreement concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1979? Second, has the world thereby become a more dangerous place? Finally, and most importantly, what are the chances for nuclear arms control over the next 4 years?

Why No Agreements?

I would be a rich man today if I had a nickel for every time that I read or heard the assertion that the problem in arms control is that the Reagan Administration does not take it seriously. But repetition does not make it so. This assertion, like others, flies in the face of the facts.

In fact, one of the reasons we do not have an agreement is precisely because the President is serious about arms control. Let's not fool ourselves. Getting some kind of an agreement is no big problem. If the President told me to get any agreement quickly, we could bring one home on strategic nuclear arms, on intermediate nuclear arms, and possibly others. That could be done most easily by signing the Soviet proposals.

If the President told me to get any agreement quickly, we could bring one home on strategic nuclear arms, on intermediate nuclear arms, and possibly others. That could be done most easily by signing the Soviet proposals.

But President Reagan wants a balanced agreement, not one slanted in favor of the Soviets. He wants an agreement with real bite, not a cosmetic one that may have some popular appeal but no real effect. So he has stuck by his principles in seeking an agreement that will truly enhance international stability, greatly reduce the number of nuclear warheads, and be effectively verifiable.

Sacrifice these principles and an agreement would come easily. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine such an agreement being in the U.S. interests or helping to advance the cause of arms control.

It is for these same reasons that the President opposes the nuclear freeze. While that idea enjoys a lot of public support generally, most of that support quickly turns to opposition if we cannot

verify a freeze—which we cannot—or if it would be more advantageous to the Soviets—which it would. The freeze makes for a good bumper sticker but *not* for good arms control. As President Carter's national security adviser said just recently: "... the nuclear freeze is a hoax. It's not achievable. It's not verifiable."

Strategic arms control today is surrounded by disappointment. This has been the case for some time. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported on the SALT II Treaty in 1979, it closed on the note that they were "disappointed that more could not be achieved." They found it paradoxical that "a vast increase in the quantity and destructiveness of each side's strategic power" would occur during the period of a treaty to limit nuclear arms. "To be worthwhile, and to preserve the base of support in the United States for the arms control process," the committee concluded that the next strategic arms agreement "must achieve much greater progress in reductions and qualitative limits."

The agreements to date have not greatly affected, much less ended, the strategic buildups and arms competition on both sides. Quite the contrary. Dur-

nuclear negotiating table. This brings to perhaps the two most critical reasons why we have not concluded a nuclear arms control agreement in the past 4 years—first, the Soviet preoccupation with the issue of intermediate-range, land-based missiles; and second, the turnovers of leadership in the Kremlin.

When President Reagan entered office, the question of intermediate-range land-based (INF) missiles had been on the front burner for well over a year. The Soviet Union had proceeded to buy up its new, three-warheaded INF missile—the SS-20. NATO had no comparable system to counter and, in 1979, decided that the United States should deploy some systems unless the Soviet would agree to limits that would obviate that need.

From President Reagan's first day onward, a major Soviet foreign policy objective was to defeat those deployments and to drive a wedge between Western allies. A massive propaganda campaign, as well as covert programs were harnessed to this Soviet effort. In many respects, it was an onslaught.

The Soviets agreed to negotiation on INF systems, but never waived their insistence on a "half-zero" option—namely hundreds of INF warheads on their side and zero on ours. At the same time, they continued to deploy the SS-20s on an average of one a week, and their attempts to intimidate the Western publics intensified. The Soviet knew, of course, that their position was patently unacceptable.

The President, for his part, offered first to eliminate this kind of system together. He then offered to limit the to any level as long as it involved significantly lower and equal levels. He took other negotiating steps designed to draw the Soviets out and strike a good bargain.

But none of this worked. When NATO stayed the course and the INF deployments went forward in 1983—they had been planned for 4 years—a major Soviet objective was defeated. They walked out of the INF talks as they had threatened. They then suspended the talks on strategic nuclear arms.

It is well to remember that the Soviets left those talks *not* because of the way they have been handled by the Administration, *not* because of what some people view as too harsh rhetoric and *not* because we are proposing deep cuts in strategic arms. They left, quite simply, because the West would not allow itself to be intimidated into giving up or accepting a lopsided agreement is also well to remember that the overwhelming Soviet concern with INF si

ing the time of the SALT agreements, U.S. missile warheads have doubled; Soviet missile warheads have quadrupled. The Soviet buildup has been particularly massive. Since the second strategic arms accord was signed in 1979, for example, they have added nearly 4,000 new ballistic missile warheads.

Arms control must do better, and no one wants it to achieve more than President Reagan. For this reason, he has embarked on an ambitious arms control agenda—involving deep reductions in nuclear weapons. He has offered flexibility, told the Soviets we will meet them halfway, and been ready to have his team meet anytime, anywhere.

But, as you know, the Soviets have not been able or willing to stay at the

as, in many respects, preoccupied agenda and impeded any possibility of achieving arms control agreements. In this light, those going around the country lamenting no arms control agreement over the past 4 years should be able to answer some tough questions. Did the Reagan Administration have moved away from NATO-wide policy on arms control adopted during the Carter-Mondale Administration? Or should the Reagan Administration earlier have accepted 1,000 INF missile warheads for the Soviets and zero for us? Would any sensible Senate have ratified such a treaty?

Arms control has also been inhibited by rapid leadership changes in the Soviet Union. Usually, these changes on the American side. In the first years of strategic arms discussions, different U.S. Presidents faced the General Secretary in charge of the Soviet Union. We saw serious breaks in continuity on the U.S. side, as the elections have normally been marked by challenges opposing the incumbent's arms control approaches.

During President Reagan's term, however, we have seen a role reversal. President Reagan has faced three different Soviet leaders in his first 3 years in office. The disruption there, of course, has little to do with any newcomers opposing their predecessor's approach, as much to do with stagnation in Soviet arms control making and policy. Serious arms control negotiations achieving balanced compromises require extremely tough bargaining—not between governments but equally between governments. In the past 4 years, we have not seen that kind of consolidation of power that would enable the new leadership to make such tough decisions. All three Soviet leaders have been afflicted with serious ailments. Stagnation in Soviet policy lingers

Just recently, for example, the Soviet President responded positively to a U.S. proposal for talks this September on arms control. He also noted that the United States would take that as a sign to urge the Soviets to return to talks on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. It is crucial that the Soviet Union should not be distracted from the central issue of nuclear arms control just because the Soviets have walked away from those talks.

The President's quick and favorable response may well have surprised the Soviets, caught them off guard so to speak. Whatever, in the give-and-take, the Soviet positions hardened, and they appeared more confident. The prospects for these talks to fall are, therefore, not looking good.

But this President will, I can assure you, never give up hope and never give up trying.

Is the World More Dangerous?

It has become fashionable to depict U.S.-Soviet relations as tumbling to their lowest point ever in the postwar era. Indeed, the picture is often portrayed so as to suggest that we are on a road to nuclear war somewhere in the not-too-distant future. But, is it all really true?

Many of the words from Moscow have been harsh, indeed aggravating. The refusal of the Soviets to participate in nuclear arms talks is lamentable. The increased patrol of Soviet submarines off U.S. coasts is worrisome even though they have prowled these waters for many years.

But are we really less secure today than we were earlier, or just 4 years ago? I think not. Quite the contrary.

Look back just two decades, for example, and compare President Kennedy's 1,000 days in office to Presi-

East erupted, and the Soviets threatened to intervene with their own troops in the conflict, prompting us to go on strategic nuclear alert. Those too were dangerous days.

In many ways, 1979 symbolized the whole decade. During the first 6 months, Secretary Vance and Ambassador Dobrynin met some 25 times, followed by the Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna where SALT II was signed. Still regional crises flared. There was the flap over a Soviet brigade in Cuba; the false Soviet statements adding fuel to the already-blazing fires in Iran after the American hostages were seized; and, most seriously, the massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—called by President Carter the greatest crisis since World War II.

It is remarkable to recall that in each year from 1975 to 1980, armies largely supplied by Moscow or Soviet forces invaded or seized control of a different country: South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977, Cambodia in 1978, and Afghanistan in 1979.

... the Soviets left [the arms control] talks . . . because the West would not allow itself to be intimidated into giving up or accepting a lopsided agreement.

dent Reagan's first 1,200 days. The Kennedy era is popularly recalled as one of smooth and skillful American stewardship over foreign affairs. Yet during that brief time, we endured the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a disastrous U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna, a buildup of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and, certainly not least, the Cuban missile crisis. Those were dangerous days. Events during the past 3 plus years certainly do not match that cascade of crises.

Likewise in the 1970s, when the U.S.-Soviet dialogue was so rich and hopes for detente so high, regional crises were still severe. From 1970 to 1976, while American and Soviet leaders held five summits and engaged in an array of arms control negotiations with each other, the Soviet Union backed and armed the continuing infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam—making a peaceful settlement of the conflict impossible. The Middle

Nothing on the scale of such crises has happened over the past 3 years. This is all to the good. Even a harsh critic of the Administration's handling of Soviet affairs has written that "Soviet expansionism has been slowed; embittered and impacted as the Soviet-American relationship was, it was also remarkably free of full-scale crises" during the Reagan Administration. He points out that of the three major wars during this period—Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, and the Falklands—"none had become a super-power confrontation."

This is a key point. The world is not more dangerous today. The factors that make it more stable, that dampen changes of nuclear conflict, are active U.S. diplomacy and relationships and increased U.S. deterrent strength.

To be sure we need to improve the current state of affairs. President Reagan is attempting to do just that. Besides strengthening allied and other relationships, restoring a credible military posture, and embarking on a

wide-ranging arms control agenda, he has actively sought to reopen and deepen the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

What Does the Future Hold?

At this stage, it is difficult to forecast when or whether the Soviet Union will bring itself to accept significant nuclear arms limitations. We do not know whether it will accept deep reductions in nuclear forces. We do not know whether our strategic concepts can become compatible enough to agree on how to distinguish the more threatening kinds of weapons. We do not know if the Soviets will accept true strategic equality or continue to mask their demand for strategic superiority in the guise of what they call "equal security."

But we do know that we cannot find out unless we try. If, after enough time and with enough incentives, the answers to these central questions are "no," then we will have learned something rather important about the Soviet Union and its real intentions. If the answers turn out to be "yes," we will have taken together a giant step forward in making the world a much better and safer place.

I for one have hope for the future of arms control. This hope is grounded in several reasons.

First is the simple fact of continuity that will come with the second Reagan Administration. It brings a considerable amount of accumulated expertise and lessons learned both about arms control in particular and about dealing with the Soviets in general.

Second, the President's strategic modernization program started in 1981, with its base of a much healthier U.S. economy, provides considerably more incentives to the Soviets to come to terms than previously existed. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative, what is popularly criticized as "Star Wars," also adds incentives.

Third, the fact that the initial INF deployments are already behind us gives us a better stage.

Fourth, I think it is safe to assume, that, no matter how long the stagnation in the Kremlin persists, the Soviets will surely not change leadership as often as they have over the past 4 years. We can thus hope that the Soviet leadership will be able and willing to engage in real negotiations.

Finally, we are ready for tough bargaining and equally tough trade-offs once the Soviets return. As I discussed with you last year, even under the best of circumstances, a strategic nuclear agreement will require a lot of hammering out in light of the two sides' dif-

ferent doctrines, force postures, goals, etc. This preparation has, in fact, been underway in the Reagan Administration for some time. We have not wasted the time just because the Soviets walked out. When the President said his team was ready, he meant it substantively, not just logistically.

So if you hear during this season that arms control has been killed or is

dying, I hope you will not lose sight of these facts. I trust you will also not lose sight of the fact that the United States, from the President on down, must hang tough and persevere in its objectives if we are ever to fulfill the promise of arms control. Enhanced stability and great reductions in weapons are key goals, and we should not compromise them. ■

CDE Talks Resume in Stockholm

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 11, 1984¹

The third round of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) opens today in Stockholm. The U.S. delegation, headed by Ambassador James Goodby, will be returning to the negotiating table with the delegations of Canada, our European allies, the European neutral states, and the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The Stockholm conference arises out of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which produced the Helsinki accords of 1975. In the various follow-up negotiations that form part of the "Helsinki process," we and our allies continue to seek balanced progress in both the security and human rights areas. The CDE negotiations, which began last January, are a potentially productive new part of the broad East-West dialogue.

The United States and other Western nations have proposed at the Stockholm conference a series of concrete measures for information, observation, and verification, designed to reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation or surprise attack. These measures would apply to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has taken a more rhetorical approach to the conference, seeking the adoption of declarations which are embodied in other national agreements. In an effort to bridge this difference in our approaches, I made it clear in my address to the Irish Parliament in June that the United States will consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force as long as the Soviet Union will discuss the concrete measures needed to put that principle into action.

This new move on our part has not yet been met with a positive response

from the Soviet Union. With the summer break behind us, we hope the Soviets will now be ready for the flexible and take negotiating process which is necessary to move forward.

To prepare for the third round, Ambassador Goodby has consulted closely with our allies and conducted useful talks here in Washington with the heads of the Soviet delegation to the conference. The Ambassador and his delegation continue to enjoy my strong support in their efforts to achieve concrete results at Stockholm.

Our work in the Stockholm conference complements our many other efforts to reach agreement on confidence-building measures. We and our allies have put forward similar proposals in the Vienna talks on East-West conventional force reductions (MBFR). Furthermore, the United States has advanced confidence-building measures bilaterally with the Soviet Union in our successful effort to upgrade the "Hot Line" communications link and in our proposals for additional direct communications between our two countries. We have also made such proposals in the negotiations on strategic arms (START) and intermediate nuclear forces (INF).

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not returned to the START and talks since walking out of these two negotiations late last year and also been unwilling or unable to follow through on its own proposal for talks on space arms control issues. I am convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union share a deep obligation to all humanity to get on with the urgent business of reducing nuclear arms. The United States is ready to do its part and sincerely hope that the Soviet leadership will soon find its way to return to the negotiating tables.

¹Text from White House press release.

ntus of Arms Control Talks

BIDENT'S STATEMENT, F. 21, 1984¹

I met with Ambassador Maynard, the new U.S. representative to mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. This negotiation which involves members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, aims at enhancing stability and security in central Europe through the reduction of conventional forces to equal, lower levels of power on both sides. Such reductions would reduce the risks of war in Europe and promote mutual confidence. Ambassador Glitman and I discussed the current status of the negotiations and the prospects for progress when they resume at the end of this month. I reviewed recent efforts by the United States and our NATO allies to renew momentum to the negotiation and to produce an equitable and durable agreement. Specifically, on September 19, 1984, the West put forward a new initiative which addresses in a flexible manner the basic issues which formed the way of an MBFR agreement. These issues include the "data problem"—i.e., the dispute over the size of Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe—and the question of verification.

The Eastern response to this latest Western initiative to move toward an effective agreement has been disappointing. The Soviet Union and its allies have refused to engage in a detailed discussion of the proposal. If our proposal is judged on its merits, substantial progress could be achieved in these negotiations. Now that the Eastern negotiators have had several weeks during the summer recess to address the Western proposal in their capitals, we hope they will return to Vienna with a constructive response.

Ambassador Glitman and his Western colleagues have my full support for their efforts to move these negotiations forward. We in the West will do our part to achieve concrete results, and we have urged Ambassador Glitman to take every opportunity to probe for possible areas of movement.

Our efforts in MBFR are part of our broader commitment to achieving progress in arms reduction and other security negotiations. About 2 weeks ago the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe resumed its efforts to negotiate confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack. The United States and other

NATO participants have put forward major, concrete proposals in Stockholm that would significantly enhance security in Europe.

Similarly, in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the United States has put forward a proposal for a complete, verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

In the Geneva negotiations on both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces—the START and INF talks—the United States has put forward major proposals that would radically reduce or, in the case of INF, totally eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles in U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Unfortunately the

Soviet Union walked out of these talks late last year and still has not agreed to return.

In June the United States agreed without preconditions to the Soviet offer to hold talks on space arms control issues. However, the Soviet Union has thus far been unwilling to follow up their own proposal by beginning such negotiations.

It is my firm belief that the United States and the Soviet Union share a special responsibility to take the lead in bringing about real reductions in the levels of forces. We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda in discussions with the Soviet Union.

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 24, 1984. ■

Review Conference Held on Environmental Modification Convention

The first review conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was held in Geneva September 10-20, 1984.¹ The U.S. delegation was headed by Thomas H. Etzold, Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

Following is the final declaration issued by the review conference on September 20.

The States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, having met in Geneva 10-20 September 1984 under the provisions of Article VIII to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being realised and in particular to examine the effectiveness of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article I in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Continuing to be guided by the interest of consolidating peace, and wishing to contribute to the cause of halting the arms race, and of bringing about general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and of saving mankind from the danger of using new means of warfare,

Reaffirming their determination to continue negotiations with a view to achieving effective progress towards further measures in the field of disarmament,

Considering that the Convention constitutes a contribution to the strengthening of trust among nations and to the improvement of the international situation in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognising the continuing importance of the Convention and its objectives, and the common interest of mankind in maintaining its effectiveness in prohibiting the use of environmental modification techniques as a means of war,

Affirming their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security,

Considering also that universal adherence could further the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes and facilitate international co-operation in such use, in the interest of all States, including in particular developing States,

Appealing to all States to refrain from any action which might place the Convention or any of its provisions in jeopardy,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Parties to the Convention reaffirm their strong common interest in preventing the use of environmental modification techniques for military or any other hostile purposes. They reaffirm their strong support for the Convention, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions.

Article I

The Conference confirms that the obligations assumed under Article I have been faithfully observed by the States Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued observance of this Article is essential to the objective which all States Parties share of preventing military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

Having re-examined the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article I, the Conference is convinced that, taking into account the relevant understandings and the present state of technology, they remain effective in preventing the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The Conference recognises the need to keep under continuing review and examination the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article I, in order to ensure their continued effectiveness, taking into account any developments which might take place in the relevant technology, and having regard also to the different views expressed in the course of the debate on this Article on the question of expanding its scope.

Article II

The Conference reaffirms its support for this article containing the definition of the term "environmental modification techniques." The Conference is of the opinion that this definition, taken together with the understandings relating to Articles I and II, is adequate to fulfill the purposes of the Convention.

Article III

The Conference reaffirms that Article III is without prejudice to any rules of international law which may apply to environmental modification techniques used for peaceful purposes. The Conference notes with satisfaction that the implementation of the Convention has not hindered the economic or technological development of States Parties. The Conference recalls that States Parties have undertaken to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. The Conference further calls upon States Parties also to provide and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the research on and the development of such environmental modification techniques. Furthermore, and in order to ensure the widest possible exchange of such information, the Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to receive such information for dissemination. For this purpose the Conference requests the Secretary-General to utilize to the maximum extent the United Nations agencies with com-

petence in environmental topics. The Conference also calls upon States Parties in a position to do so to continue to contribute to and strengthen, alone or together with other States or international organizations, international economic and scientific co-operation in the preservation, improvement and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article IV

The Conference notes the provisions of Article IV, which requires each State Party to take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control and invites States Parties which have found it necessary to enact specific legislation, or take other regulatory measures relevant to this Article, to make available the appropriate texts to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, for the purpose of consultation.

Article V

The Conference notes with satisfaction that no State Party has found it necessary to invoke the provisions of Article V dealing with international complaints and verification procedures. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Paragraph 1 of this Article, which contains the undertaking of States Parties to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, and of Paragraph 2, which provides for the convening of a Consultative Committee of Experts. In view of the Conference the provisions of Article V, Paragraphs 1 and 2, do not exclude the possibility of consideration, by States Parties, of the summary of findings of fact of the Consultative Committee of Experts.

The Conference also notes the importance of Article V Paragraphs 3 and 4, which, in addition to the procedures contained in Article V Paragraphs 1 and 2, provide that any State Party which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention, may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and under which each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

The Conference considers that the flexibility of the provisions concerning consultation and co-operation on any problems which may arise in relation to the Convention, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention, should enable complaints or disputes to be effectively resolved.

Article VI

The Conference notes that during the operation of the Convention no State Party has proposed any amendments to this Convention, under the procedures laid down in this Article.

Article VII

The Conference reaffirms that the Convention should be of unlimited duration.

Article VIII

The Conference notes with satisfaction the spirit of co-operation in which the Review Conference was held.

The Conference, recognising the importance of the review mechanism provided in Article VIII decides that a second Review Conference may be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not earlier than 1989. If no Review Conference is held before 1994 the depositary is requested to solicit the views of all States Parties concerning the convening of such a Conference in accordance with Article VIII Paragraph 1 of the Convention.

Article IX

The Conference stresses that the six years that have elapsed since the date of entry into force of the Convention have demonstrated its effectiveness.

The Conference notes that 45 States have become Parties to the Convention and a further 19 States have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention. The Conference notes with concern that the Convention has not achieved universal acceptance. Therefore the Conference calls upon all signatory States which have not ratified the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to adhere to it as soon as possible and thereby join the States Parties thereto in their efforts to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Such adherence would be a significant contribution to international confidence and the strengthening of trust among nations.

¹For text of the convention, see B.U.L. of Jan. 10, 1977. ■

Cambodia: The Search for Peace

Paul D. Wolfowitz

statement before the Conference on
Cambodian Crisis on September 11,
Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here
with you as we recall the ongoing
tragedy in Cambodia. The presence of so
many people here testifies to the deep
and abiding concern that Americans
have for the people of Cambodia. It is
a testimony to the grievous
miscalculation made by Hanoi when it
invaded Cambodia. The world has not
forgotten Cambodia's plight. The prob-
lem for the international community
is how peace and independence
can be restored to Cambodia by ending
the present Vietnamese occupation
without permitting a recurrence of the
Khmer Rouge period.

Human Tragedy

Nations in history have experienced
cumulative disasters and destruction
which have engulfed Cambodia during
the past two decades. Hanoi's use of
Cambodian territory in its war against
South Vietnam and the attack on the Khmer
Republic by the communist Khmer
Rouge, with Hanoi's support, destroyed
Cambodia's economy and made refugees
millions of ordinary Khmer who
lost safety in Phnom Penh and other
areas. The war's end in 1975 unleashed
even greater tragedy, one that the
world still cannot fully comprehend.
The whole world knows of the hor-
rors that the Khmer people suffered
under Khmer Rouge rule. In their effort
to eradicate every vestige of the old
Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge tried to
destroy a culture which had endured for
more than a millennium. Thousands who
served previous governments were
publicly murdered and buried in mass
graves. The entire population was sent
to the countryside with whatever posses-
sions they could carry. Hospitals and
schools were abandoned, Buddhism—the
bedrock of the Khmer soul—was
suppressed, and traditional culture was sup-
pressed. Murder and starvation took the
lives of at least a million Cambodians,
and the total number who died during
the 3½ years of Khmer Rouge rule will
never be known.

Vietnam bears a heavy responsibility
for the Khmer Rouge, whom it spon-
sored and supported. It was the Viet-
namese Army which nearly destroyed
Cambodia's Army in 1970, opening the
way for the Khmer Rouge seizure of
much of the countryside. The Viet-
namese army continued to occupy major
portions of eastern Cambodia until after
1973. Hanoi supplied the Khmer Rouge
with the arms and supplies to battle the
Khmer Republic, including the Russian-
built rockets which terrorized the
civilians of Phnom Penh.

For a while after 1975, Vietnam con-
tinued to defend the new regime in
Cambodia. The few refugees to escape
Cambodia told of terror, murder, and
starvation. Attempts to inform the
world of the tragedy inside Cambodia or
assist the Khmer people were met by
silence from Phnom Penh and denuncia-
tions from Hanoi, which called the
refugees' reports an American-inspired
plot. Many writers and scholars in the
West could not or would not believe the
evidence about the Khmer Rouge, and
one even criticized published reports as
"wild exaggeration and wholesale
falsehood" in testimony before a U.S.
congressional hearing on human rights
in Cambodia. Vietnam, joined by the
U.S.S.R. and its supporters, tried to de-
fend Cambodia when the United Nations
at last inquired into conditions inside
Cambodia.

Vietnam, of course, had its own
reasons for assisting the Khmer Rouge.
Hanoi ultimately sought to control the
Cambodian communists as thoroughly as
it controlled those in South Vietnam and
Laos. In this, it failed.

Having failed to dominate and con-
trol the Khmer Rouge, Hanoi decided to
depose them and replace them with a
more pliable communist regime. On
Christmas Day, 1978, Vietnam invaded
Cambodia and rapidly drove the Khmer
Rouge from Phnom Penh, installing
Heng Samrin, a former lieutenant of Pol
Pot, as the leader of a new regime. In-
stead of solving the Cambodian problem,
Vietnam's occupation has simply thrust
it into a new phase, more threatening to
the security of its neighbors and hardly
any less threatening to the Khmer
people.

Vietnam's claim that it invaded Cam-
bodia to liberate the Khmer people from
Pol Pot and that it remains there only to
prevent his return to power is a thinly
disguised deception. Vietnam, which had

defended Pol Pot against international
criticism, deposed him only when it
became apparent that the Khmer Rouge
were unwilling to accept Vietnam's
leadership. Vietnam today rules Cam-
bodia through a puppet regime com-
prised of many former followers of Pol
Pot, including Heng Samrin himself.
Khmer Rouge who still follow Pol Pot
are welcomed back by the Heng Samrin
regime. It has publicly said they are free
to resume their lives after a brief period
of political indoctrination. Noncom-
munists, however, receive no such
welcome in Vietnamese-controlled
Cambodia.

Beyond the continued warfare, the
Khmer people now face the possibility of
an end to their homeland, except as a
name on the map, and the extinction of
an ancient culture. Thousands of Viet-
namese citizens are now settling
throughout Cambodia, abetted and en-
couraged by Hanoi. While the actual
number of Vietnamese immigrants is
unknowable, except perhaps to the Viet-
namese authorities, it is likely that hun-
dreds of thousands of Vietnamese na-
tionals have settled in Cambodia in the
past 4 years. Willibald Pahr, former
Austrian Foreign Minister and Chair-
man of the International Conference on
Kampuchea, recently stated in a press
conference that Vietnamese immigrants
number 500,000 at a minimum.

Heng Samrin regime documents,
moreover, instruct officials to assist
Vietnamese, both former residents and
new immigrants, in any way possible
and to consult with the Vietnamese ad-
visers before taking any action affecting
Vietnamese settlers. Vietnamese soldiers
serving in Cambodia are encouraged to
settle in the country and marry Khmer
women. Those who do so are to receive
Cambodian citizenship. Vietnamese im-
migrants are also given extraterritorial
status—violations of Cambodian laws
are to be dealt with by the Vietnamese
authorities, not Cambodian. Some new
refugees from Cambodia report that
villagers are required to provide housing
and food to new Vietnamese settlers.

When combined with Vietnamese-
imposed changes to Cambodian ad-
ministration and Khmer society, this of-
ficially sponsored Vietnamese immigra-
tion raises serious questions about
Hanoi's long-term intentions toward
Cambodia. It will be the ultimate
tragedy if Cambodia, decimated by war
and famine, should now be extinguished
as an entity, submerged, and colonized
by its much larger, more powerful
neighbor.

International Security Concerns and the World's Response

Beyond the human tragedy in Cambodia, the situation there is also a crisis for the international community because of its implications for the security of all nations, particularly those of Southeast Asia. Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia violates the UN Charter, which Vietnam signed, and threatens the system of collective security, embodied in the UN Charter, designed to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of all nations. No one lamented the demise of the Khmer Rouge, a regime detested everywhere. But Hanoi did not invade Cambodia for the purpose of returning Cambodia to its people. Instead, Vietnam installed a puppet regime of its own choosing, one comprised of former followers of Pol Pot and Khmer communists who had lived in Vietnam for many years, a regime that depends on a Vietnamese Army of occupation for its survival.

It should come as no surprise that Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia drew its most coherent response from the neighboring countries most directly threatened, the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN has taken the leading role in the search for a solution to the Cambodian crisis that can restore stability to the region and end the suffering of the Khmer people. That kind of solution must end Hanoi's occupation and prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power.

- Appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections or intimidate or coerce the population in the electoral process; such arrangements should also ensure that they respect the results of the free elections.

- Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order . . . before the establishment of a new government resulting from those elections.

- The holding of free elections under United Nations supervision . . . ; all Kampuchians will have the right to participate in the elections.

The final declaration also calls on all states to pledge their respect for Cambodia's independence, territorial integrity, and nonaligned status. These principles were endorsed in successive resolutions of the UN General Assembly.

In its various efforts to find a political solution, ASEAN has sought to work out the framework of a settlement which preserves the legitimate security concerns of Cambodia's neighbors, including Vietnam. ASEAN has repeatedly offered Hanoi the opportunity to work out the arrangements for a settlement. Vietnam has totally rejected the framework of the International Conference on Kampuchea. ASEAN has implicitly agreed to work for a solution through some other process as long as the key elements of Vietnamese withdrawal and elections are preserved. In 1983, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi offered to go to Hanoi for talks if Vietnam would pull its forces in Cambodia back 30 kilometers from the Thai

the possibility of movement on important negotiating points. Thach rejected those proposals also. The ASEAN foreign ministers have formally adopted Prince Sihanouk's call for national reconciliation, including the Heng Samrin faction. Vietnam remains silent.

Vietnam's conduct in Cambodia has isolated it internationally. The majority of nonaligned nations have joined ASEAN, Western Europe, Japan, and the United States in condemning Vietnam's aggression. Most of our allies and friends have joined us in supporting ASEAN's strategy of political and economic pressure on Vietnam to convince Hanoi that a political settlement of Cambodia is in its own interest. Australia suspended its economic assistance program in 1979. Japan and many European countries have reduced or frozen their own programs. Japan also offered financial support for implementation of ASEAN's settlement proposal, including the peacekeeping force and postsettlement reconstruction aid.

Neither ASEAN nor its friends, including the United States, are trying to bleed Vietnam. Humanitarian assistance to the Vietnamese people has continued from many quarters. It would be wrong, however, for the world community to continue normal relations of trade and assistance with Vietnam as long as it continues to occupy Cambodia.

If Hanoi is determined to continue its occupation of Cambodia regardless of the price it pays, economic and diplomatic pressure will not prevent it from doing so. The denial of trade and assistance by the West does, however, impose a cost on Vietnam in terms of benefits foregone and presents it with a clear choice. Hanoi, by its policies, chooses between the continued military occupation of its neighbor and normal relations with the rest of the world. The benefits Vietnam could derive from expanded trade and other contacts with the West and ASEAN, if it would alter the policies that led to its isolation, are obvious.

China's Position

In invading Cambodia, Vietnam has gained the enmity of its most powerful neighbor, China. It is ironic that China and Vietnam, countries which once described themselves as "lips and teeth" have now become bitter enemies. China, the United States, and ASEAN have a parallel interest in ending Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia through a political settlement which would also reduce Hanoi's dependence on the U.S.S.R.,

We cannot consider an improvement in U.S.-Vietnamese relations as long as Hanoi continues to occupy Cambodia.

ASEAN's Proposals

ASEAN seeks a political settlement that would restore an independent, neutral Cambodia under a government freely chosen by the Cambodian people and posing no threat to any of its neighbors. The UN-sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea met in July 1981 with 94 countries sending delegates or observers. Vietnam and its friends in the Soviet bloc refused to attend. Its final declaration contained four elements:

- An agreement on a cease-fire by all parties . . . and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible under the supervision and verification of a UN peacekeeping force/observer group.

border. Vietnam refused. In September 1983, the ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint "Appeal for Kampuchean Independence." In that appeal, they proposed a territorially phased Vietnamese withdrawal, coupled with an international peacekeeping force and reconstruction aid in the areas vacated, as part of a Vietnamese commitment to a complete withdrawal and elections. No mention was made of the International Conference on Kampuchea. Hanoi rejected this proposal as well.

This year, ASEAN has again sought to find a settlement formula which preserves Vietnam's legitimate security interests. During Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach's visit to Jakarta, Indonesian President Soeharto signaled

ing the opportunities for an expansion of Soviet interests in the region. We have consistently made our total abhorrence of the Khmer Rouge, whom the Chinese support in power and continue to support. China has, however, accepted the agenda of the International Conference on Kampuchea of free elections to establish a legitimate Cambodian government. It has also publicly supported the emergence of a neutral, noncommunist Cambodia after a Vietnamese withdrawal. The Chinese, like the United States and ASEAN, refuse to accept Vietnam's domination of Cambodia.

Instead of a positive response to ASEAN's efforts, Hanoi continues to insist that there is a Cambodia problem. ASEAN's concerns are dismissed as minor issues amenable to resolution through bloc-to-bloc talks between ASEAN and the Indochinese states. This approach is designed to draw ASEAN into open-ended talks about peace and security in Southeast Asia, which would serve to grant implicit recognition to the Heng Samrin regime. Vietnam refuses to discuss the fundamental cause of instability in South Asia—Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.

Policy

The U.S. response to the events in Cambodia has been a deepening concern for the welfare of the Khmer people and the stability of this important region. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is an inherently unstable situation because the Khmer people will never willingly accept domination by Vietnam and because Vietnam's neighbors cannot accept Vietnamese expansionism and aggression—nor can we.

Our objective, which is shared widely and most notably by the ASEAN nations whose security is most directly at stake, is a political settlement that will allow Hanoi's occupation and, by free elections, return to the Khmer people the right to choose their own leaders. Under free elections there is no danger that the Khmer Rouge would regain power. That is why the formula for a political settlement developed by ASEAN includes measures to ensure that armed groups, including the Khmer Rouge, do not interfere in the free elections to choose a postsettlement government. We support this approach. Such an approach provides the opportunity for the Khmer people to determine freely their own future; it provides stability to the other countries of Southeast Asia against the threat of

new Vietnamese aggression; it provides the key to ending Vietnam's dangerous dependence on the Soviet Union; and for Vietnam itself, it not only offers the promise of a neutral Kampuchea that poses no threat to Vietnam's security but it also offers the key to development of fruitful relations with its neighbors in Southeast Asia and with the Western industrial democracies from which all Vietnamese would benefit.

While the United States has a strong interest in such an outcome, we recognize that the interests of others are even more vitally engaged. For the Khmer people, their own national identity

legitimacy for their puppet regime in Phnom Penh;

- By maintaining and, if necessary, increasing our security assistance to Thailand, which is now a front-line state. Indeed, in the last 4 years, U.S. security assistance to Thailand has increased more than threefold; and

- By continuing to support the humanitarian efforts of the UN Border Relief Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In the fiscal year just ending, our contributions to those organizations for Kampuchean border relief totaled \$11.5 million.

The world cannot afford to forget Cambodia and leave the Khmer people to whatever cruel fate history and Hanoi devise for them.

is at stake and it is their efforts that will decide whether a truly national force, one free of both Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge domination, can be created. For the countries of Southeast Asia, their basic security is at stake, and it is proper that they should be the ones who take the lead—as they have—in exploring and testing Vietnamese willingness to consider a political settlement. Indeed, given our own bitter history in Indochina, no one should want to see this issue become primarily an issue between the United States and Vietnam. Such a development would only hopelessly complicate the already difficult road to a political solution.

However, the United States does have an important role to play in the search for a political solution to the tragedy of Cambodia, and we will continue to play that role:

- By continuing to make clear that Vietnam cannot have its cake and eat it too, that Vietnam must abandon its occupation of Kampuchea if it wants to have the benefits of normal relations with the United States;

- By working toward a political settlement that promises Vietnam and all the nations of the region a Cambodian Government that is not dominated by the Khmer Rouge, that is free of outside interference, and that is dedicated to growth and reconstruction within its own borders;

- By continuing to provide diplomatic and political support to the noncommunist Khmer resistance;

- By continuing to oppose Vietnamese efforts to gain international

The Khmer resistance coalition formed in 1982 is an important part of ASEAN's efforts to find a solution in Cambodia. The United States gives diplomatic and political support to the noncommunist elements in the coalition, under Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, which represent the genuine alternative to the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot and those under Vietnam. Last year the President met with Prince Sihanouk and Mr. Son Sann together in New York as part of our support for their efforts to liberate Cambodia. They represent the genuine voice of the Khmer people and have an important role still to play in their country's future. We do not give weapons to any of the resistance groups. We, of course, give no aid of any kind to and have no contact with the Khmer Rouge.

Vietnam and its supporters have regularly challenged the credentials of the Cambodian delegation to the United Nations as part of its effort to seat its client regime. The United States has always joined ASEAN in opposing these challenges on the technical ground that the United Nations can withdraw credentials only if there is a superior claimant to the seat. There is no superior claimant to the Cambodian seat. The Heng Samrin regime is certainly not a superior claimant. On the other hand, to leave the Cambodian seat vacant would be to deny Cambodia, a member since 1954, its right to participate in the General Assembly and to have its voice heard. Had the United Nations followed such a formula in 1979, Prince Norodom Sihanouk would have been denied the UN platform to plead Cambodia's case to the world.

The United States will continue to support efforts designed to maintain political and economic pressure on Vietnam until it agrees to work toward an acceptable political settlement in Cambodia. Some argue we should soften our stance toward Vietnam to give it an alternative to the Soviets. However, it is not the policies of ASEAN or the United States which isolate Vietnam and leave it dependent on the Soviet Union. It is Hanoi's own policy of invading and occupying a neighbor which leaves it without friends outside the Soviet camp. Only a change in those policies will allow Hanoi to expand its contacts with the rest of the world.

We cannot consider an improvement in U.S.-Vietnamese relations as long as Hanoi continues to occupy Cambodia. Normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam will require a settlement in Cambodia, as well as substantial progress and cooperation on accounting for Americans missing from the war in Indochina. Our interests in ASEAN and the strong feelings of the American people would permit nothing less.

The search for peace in Cambodia is still far from fruition, primarily because of Hanoi's intransigence and its determination to control Cambodia. It will not be easy to persuade Hanoi that an acceptable settlement in Cambodia is the only lasting solution to the instability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN, backed by the world community, has established a viable framework for a settlement. It is Hanoi which rejects all compromise.

A political settlement will be possible only once Vietnam realizes the disastrous results its policies have produced. Only a change in Hanoi's policy will reconcile Vietnam's interests with those of its neighbors and bring peace to the region. Until then, the international community must continue to maintain the pressure on Vietnam.

The world has many problems and other crises, other atrocities have driven Cambodia from the front pages. But in Cambodia, the dying, the suffering of those who have sought refuge along the Thai-Cambodian border, and the slow strangling of Khmer culture and society continue. The world cannot afford to forget Cambodia and leave the Khmer people to whatever cruel fate history and Hanoi devise for them. And the Cambodian people, who ask only to be left in peace, deserve better of the world. ■

Recent Developments in the Philippines

by Paul D. Wolfowitz

Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 1984. Mr. Wolfowitz is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to meet with you and other members of the committee today to discuss recent developments in the Philippines and their implications for U.S. policy.

U.S. Relations

An effort to address the implications of Philippine developments for U.S. policy can only begin with acknowledgement of the unique relationship that exists between our two countries. Relations between the United States and the Philippines rest on the foundation of shared history, common suffering during war, close people-to-people and institutional ties, a solid record of cooperation in economic development, and healthy trade and investment. Our close ties date back to the turn of the century. Together we have shared the suffering of World War II as well as the excitement and satisfaction of Philippine independence on July 4, 1948. We have also stood together in addressing the difficult problems of nationbuilding, economic development, and international security that have characterized the postwar period.

Our longstanding economic ties remain beneficial for both sides. The United States is still both the primary source of foreign investment in the Philippines and the largest market for Philippine goods. Both the U.S. Government and the private sector have played an important role in the economic development of the Philippines.

In part due to our shared history, the United States and the Philippines have tended to have a common view of international security problems. As a member of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], the Philippines has contributed to the development of regional stability and prosperity. Our common interest is concretely manifested in our close defense partnership based on the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty, and continuing close cooperation in defense and security matters. This security relationship is crucial to our efforts to provide an effective counter-

balance in the area to the growing military power of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Our facilities in the Philippines are central to our ability to protect the sea and air lanes of the region and to provide logistical support for U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The U.S. military presence in the Philippines thus fulfills a vital function in maintaining regional security and stability—a role that has been positively by virtually all of the countries of East Asia—and that stability in turn contributes to the remarkable economic growth of the entire area.

Recent Philippine Developments and the U.S. Response

The Philippines is currently experiencing its most serious economic difficulties since independence at a time of considerable political uncertainty. Long standing problems were brought to a head by the tragic, still unsolved, assassination in August of 1983 of opposition leader and former Senator Benigno Aquino. As the shock wave that assassination spread, political uncertainties grew, and an already difficult financial situation deteriorated precipitously.

It must be recognized that most of the problems faced by the Philippines today have fundamental institutional and political causes. The solutions will not be easy. In this situation, our approach must be guided by a number of considerations.

- While the Filipinos must determine their own politics and policies, the United States has a deep concern with the future of the Philippines and the health of its economy and political institutions.
- While it is up to the Filipinos to choose their government, it is not inappropriate for us to express our deep belief in the importance of the democratic process as they resolve their political problems.
- Our influence in the Philippines is significant, but our role is most effective when ours is a voice in a debate that is already formed in the Philippines.

With these considerations in mind, we have tailored our approach to the evolutionary political and economic dynamics now at work in the Philippines, which have developed a life of

own. We believe it has been, so relatively successful, evolutionary path in which Filipinos, in their own have actively taken on the challenge of revitalizing their own nation. The process has been difficult, and many very serious problems remain. President Marcos has responded flexibly to a number of difficult challenges over the past months. In the end, compromise, tact, good will, and common sense will be needed to solve the many remaining problems of the Philippines. So will a continued drop of understanding and support from the United States and the international community.

Support for the Philippine Economy

The roots of the economic crisis go back to policy decisions and investment decisions made in the 1970s. Its proximate causes were a growing public sector deficit, excessive borrowing from abroad, and, of course, a severe nationwide economic recession. The constraints created by the Aquino assassination led to capital flight and investment. Trade financing by foreign banks began to dry up. Fiscal balance-of-payments problems continued. The government sought a debt moratorium on repayments of the debt principal last October, an action that has since been thrice rejected. Total outstanding foreign debt—both public and private—is now \$26 billion. Although the Philippine trade balance has shown improvement in recent months, in part due to devaluations, the overall economic outlook remains bleak. Inflation is currently running at an annual rate of about 50% and 1984 is likely to register a negative GNP growth rate of 3%.

U.S. steps aimed at helping the Philippine economy weather this stormy period have included maintenance of bilateral assistance programs and expansion of Commodity Credit Corp. and Export-Import Bank credits; increased 180 Title II feeding programs in cooperation with the Philippine Catholic Church; support for World Bank and International Development Bank measures aimed at bringing about structural economic changes; and vigorous support for the International Monetary Fund standby program.

Progress toward recovery has been slowed by difficulties in negotiations between the Philippine Government and the IMF on the \$650 million standby program. The IMF and the Philippine Government appear finally to have

reached agreement on the basic elements of a standby arrangement, and we are hopeful that an agreement will soon be in place. With an IMF agreement in effect, debt rescheduling can proceed, and access will be opened to new foreign financing to reinvigorate the economy.

While the IMF agreement will pave the way for efforts to deal with the immediate financial crisis, there is growing recognition, both among Filipinos and in the international community, that the restoration of long-term growth will require structural changes in the Philippine economy, particularly in the agricultural sector where monopolies and other distortions of the market economy have prevented the full exploitation of the nation's potential. A widely publicized report by University of the Philippines economists recently addressed the question why the Philippines have failed to share the prosperity enjoyed by the other ASEAN nations. They concluded that the answer lies largely in such factors as the granting of special economic privileges by presidential decree. There is no reason to doubt that the Philippines, a nation blessed with abundant natural resources and an industrious and hardworking labor force, has the capacity to resume a path of long-term economic growth. We have made clear our view that for this to happen, the natural strengths of the Philippine economy must be allowed to develop in a free-market environment.

The Political Dynamic

It is in the political arena that the process of evolution is most apparent in the Philippines. The Aquino assassination reduced the credibility of the Marcos government among broad sectors of the Philippine public and unleashed political forces that had previously been largely quiescent. The democratic opposition began to press its longstanding political demands with renewed vigor. The Catholic Church became a vocal and persistent advocate of democratic reform. Organized groups of businessmen and professionals, gravely concerned about instability, began to speak out on the issues and to organize peaceful demonstrations, and a nonpartisan citizens group emerged to lobby for free and fair elections. The National Assembly elections on May 14 assumed major significance in the highly charged political atmosphere that followed the Aquino assassination.

The United States has used both public and private diplomacy to express our support for institutional reform in the Philippines. We have spoken out clearly on such questions as the necessity for a credible investigation of the Aquino assassination, the need for a new presidential succession formula, and the importance of rebuilding democratic institutions to get the country through the current period of political transition. Congressional measures such as resolutions, hearings, statements by members, and visits have helped convey our message. So have clear public statements of our views on truly free, fair, and open elections and increased contact with the democratic opposition and the newly active business and professional leaders, including meetings of key opposition and business leaders with Members of Congress and high level Administration officials.

The period since the Aquino assassination has seen numerous signs of encouraging political change. The independent Agrava board was appointed to investigate the assassination itself. The board's investigation has been impressively thorough, and it has developed a favorable reputation generally among most Filipinos. Its final report is expected to be issued shortly. The interest of the U.S. Government in this tragic incident has been clear from the outset, when we termed it a cowardly and despicable political murder. As the Philippine Government knows through both our public statements and our private diplomacy, we expect the circumstances surrounding this brutal assassination to be clarified and those responsible to be held accountable and brought to justice.

The postassassination period saw important steps toward political accommodation, including the establishment of an interim succession mechanism and agreement that the vice presidency will be restored in the next presidential election. The May 14 elections themselves, though far from fully open, proved to be a more successful demonstration of democratic vitality than most observers expected. Opposition candidates won roughly one-third of the seats in the new assembly. Cardinal Sin of Manila, while critical of government efforts to manipulate the balloting in many areas, termed the election "the freest and fairest since independence." The election was marked by a very high turnout—more than 80%—despite the effort of some elements of the opposition to promote a boycott. The number of

younger Filipinos who voted was an encouraging indication that the desire to participate in the democratic process remains strong in the Philippines. More than 200,000 citizen volunteers associated with NAMFREL [National Citizens Movement for Free Election] turned out to monitor voting.

How the political situation will evolve in the wake of the parliamentary election is still an open question. Clearly the process of revitalizing Philippine democratic institutions rendered largely ineffective by years of martial law remains far from complete. While sharing the view of most Filipinos that the election results represent an important first step toward a more open political system, NAMFREL, for example, has concluded that one-fourth to one-third of the races were marked by fraud and that the opposition would have won a majority in a fully open vote.

The new assembly, nonetheless, has altered the political equation and brought a new generation to the political scene. It has already made an impact. Such issues as the President's power to legislate by decree are being debated not only by the opposition but also within the governing New Society Movement (KBL), where such figures as Foreign Minister Tolentino and Prime Minister Virata have called for compromise. The role of the opposition may be enhanced by the greater degree of press freedom that has developed over the past year. Today the opinions of government critics appear regularly in the press, as does

coverage of such events as military abuse of civilians in rural areas.

Barring unforeseen developments, the forces in favor of rebuilding democratic institutions that have emerged over the past year seem likely to grow as the Philippines approaches the next major events on the electoral calendar—provincial and local elections in 1986 and the Presidential election in 1987. These elections will be crucial tests of the revitalization of political institutions in the Philippines.

The Growing Insurgency Threat

The Philippine situation is further complicated by a growing armed insurgency. The successes achieved in recent years by the New People's Army (NPA), the military component of the Communist Party of the Philippines, are related to the nation's broader political and economic problems. Depressed economic conditions aggravated by a rapidly growing working-age population, weak and ineffective local government administration compounded by budgetary shortfalls, a perception that the central government does not respond to the people's basic social and economic needs, lax and inequitable dispensation of justice, and instances of abuse of citizens by military or paramilitary forces all have contributed to support for the NPA, which has projected itself with some success as a group of idealistic political and social reformers.

Estimates vary as to the total strength of the NPA. The Philippine Government has publicly estimated that the NPA numbers some nearly 8,000 armed guerrillas. The NPA itself claims some 20,000 guerrillas, 10,000 of the armed, and a mass base of the 1-million range. More important than the numbers themselves are the long-term trends. Unlike the Huk of the 1950s, the NPA has expanded beyond the traditional center of Philippine radicalism—central Luzon to establish a meaningful presence in about two-thirds of the country's provinces. Both the number and scale of armed encounters with the armed forces are growing, and in so rural areas—especially in Mindanao—the government is widely perceived as on the defensive.

The future course of the NPA insurgency will depend most importantly on how effectively the government is able to deal with the root social, economic, and institutional factors that fuel rural dissatisfaction and which in turn relate to the overall political and economic challenges facing the Philippines. At the same time, a well-equipped professional military forces will be an essential element of government effort, and continued U.S. military assistance can play an important role in helping develop an effective military response. Strong democratic traditions, the strength of such moderate institutions as the Catholic Church, a dynamic business community and middle class, and an educated populace are important factors militating against a communist take over of the Philippines. The insurgency is nonetheless, a cause for concern about the future, a problem which calls not only for an effective military response even more importantly, for concerted efforts to deal with its root causes.

U.K. and China Reach Agreement on Hong Kong

SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 26, 1984¹

The U.S. Government welcomes the successful conclusion of 2 years of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China over the future of Hong Kong.

The United States has a strong interest in the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and believes the agreement will provide a solid foundation for Hong Kong's enduring future progress.

In this regard, we have noted statements by both sides indicating that Hong Kong's way of life will be guaranteed for 50 years from 1997 and that systems existing in Hong Kong will

continue in the special administrative region.

We expect the American business communities, both in the United States and Hong Kong, will see in this agreement good reason for sustained confidence in the future of Hong Kong as an attractive and thriving commercial center.

The United States will provide any assistance it can, in close cooperation with the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, to maintain Hong Kong's appropriate participation in international bodies.

¹Read to news correspondents, on behalf of Secretary Shultz, by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward the Philippines will continue to be guided by the following basic objectives in the difficult period that lies ahead.

Support for the Revitalization of Democratic Institutions. Healthy democratic institutions can help to assure both stability in the present and an orderly transition to the next generation of responsible leadership. While the pace of democratic revitalization and the precise shape of institutions are the exclusive responsibility of the Filipinos, we believe we have a stake in their success. The May 14 elections, despite imperfections, represent a reaffirmation by the

Philippine people of their support for the democratic process. Much more needs to be done, and the United States, a confirmed ally, will remain an interested and supportive observer. We are convinced that democratic stability and economic well-being are mutually reinforcing and will come about only through greater openness and competition both the political and economic spheres. As part of this effort, and in accordance with basic principles of U.S. foreign policy, we will continue to engage in active diplomacy on behalf of human rights, the most fundamental democratic institution of them all.

Economic Support. We are also prepared to continue to support Philippine efforts to overcome current economic difficulties and create a basis for stable, long-term growth. Healthy economic developments are more likely to emerge against a backdrop of basic confidence in the nation's economic future. The United States will continue to cooperate with the assistance efforts of the World Bank, IMF, and other international donors and lending institutions to provide what bilateral assistance we can. Our aid will continue to be guided by basic humanitarian purposes. Just this week we provided \$1 million in emergency assistance to help the Filipinos recover from the devastation of typhoons that left more than 2,000 dead and 1.5 million homeless, and we are rendering further rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance. As we seek to help the Philippine Government attend to the urgent needs of its people, it is important, however, that the United States, as well as multilateral lending institutions, do all possible to ensure that assistance programs contribute to the reforms needed to establish a basis for long-term growth. Future assistance, to be effective, should be accompanied by Philippine efforts to remove the constraints that currently block the realization of the full potential of the Philippine economy. We look forward to a close and friendly dialogue with the Filipinos as we seek to assist them in overcoming their economic difficulties.

Maintenance of Our Security Relationship. Our military bases and mutual security treaties will continue to be vital to the defense of our security interests in an area in which the Soviets, the Vietnamese, and the North Koreans are building up their military strength. The continued functioning of our base relationship is testimony to the commonality of our interests and goodwill on both sides. It is notable that our bases have not become a significant point of contention

in the highly charged political atmosphere that now exists in the Philippines. Our security assistance program in the Philippines is an integral part of this overall defense relationship. Our assistance, both economic and military, is also closely related to our interest in helping the Philippines prosecute a more effective effort against its communist insurgency.

The next few years will not be easy ones for the Philippines. The Philippine people face a difficult road to economic recovery, complicated by communist efforts to seize the nation by force. The course of reestablishing democratic political institutions may not be smooth.

We face a dynamic situation in the Philippines and are seeking to address it with a dynamic policy that builds upon the inherent strengths of Philippine society. Filipinos must make the hard decisions to restore confidence, to resolve the current problems, and to enable economic growth to resume. U.S. policy will be to assist the Filipinos to the extent we can as they determine for themselves the political and economic future of their country.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

President Meets With Foreign Minister Gromyko



(White House photo by Pete Souza)

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, SEPT. 11, 1984¹

I've invited Soviet Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to meet with me at the White House on September 28th, and Mr. Gromyko has accepted.

I believe it's important to use the opportunity provided by Mr. Gromyko's presence in the United States to confer on a range of issues of international importance.

One of my highest priorities is finding ways to reduce the level of arms and to improve our working relationship with the Soviet Union. I hope that my

meeting with him will contribute to this goal, as our Administration continues to work for a safer world.

SECRETARY'S PRESS BRIEFING, SEPT. 28, 1981¹²

President Reagan had a useful and intense interchange of views with the Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Gromyko. The meeting lasted around 3½ hours altogether, including the working luncheon. The meeting was a very strong personal interchange between two individuals. And while some others had occasional things to say, it was very basically a meeting between two men.

The President's purpose was to put forward to Mr. Gromyko, representing the top level of the Soviet leadership, the President's view that we need to have a more constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and to express the many ways, again, that he believes this can be done. And through this lengthy interchange and conversation, I feel sure that, from the President's point of view, and our point of view, this position that we have was made clear.

Q. Can you tell us how Mr. Gromyko reacted to this position that you just outlined?

A. I think you have to ask Mr. Gromyko for his reactions. I'm not going to try to characterize them, except to say that from our standpoint, it was a very strong and useful interchange, and Mr. Gromyko, of course, expressed his views very powerfully and aggressively, as he always does. And the President listened to him carefully.

Q. What was the agenda—what did they talk about, and what do you mean "strong"? What do you mean by "strong"?

A. Forceful and direct. So that—there was a desire, I think, on the part of both parties to try to be as clear as possible and not to dress up a subject at all. These discussions were very direct. It started with the President making a statement of his views, and then Mr. Gromyko made a statement of his, and then the interchange started, and as I say, carried on through the lunch period.

Q. You use the word "intense." Are you suggesting that they argued? Was the atmosphere angry?

A. It wasn't angry. It was calm and deliberate and businesslike throughout. But by intense, I mean that both men

were really engaged in this conversation and were both, I think, fully aware of the importance of it. And so, in that sense it was a strong and intense interchange.

Q. Did anything come out of this meeting that would lead to further meetings between either you and Mr. Gromyko or the President and Mr. Gromyko or a summit?

A. The objective of the President was to put forward his view, which would continue to be his view if he is reelected. As far as an outcome is concerned, at the end, of course, as I think the President said as he was leaving, we agreed to stay in touch, and I'm sure that we will.

Q. Was there anything out of this meeting that would lead you to think that there would be a likelihood of the Soviets returning to any of the arms talks or of talks beginning on the space weapons?

A. I don't want to try to predict the start of any particular talks. The object wasn't to try to focus on any particular thing of that kind but to try to clear the air of general issues involving where we think this relationship should go; involving the importance of coming to grips with the problem of immense nuclear arsenals and doing something to reduce them—those broad and very significant questions. Question of preventing the militarization of outer space and issues of that kind were all discussed in the course of the meeting.

Q. Do you think the relationship was changed as a result of this conversation, or these conversations today?

A. It remains to be seen, of course. I was, I'd have to say, very impressed with the spirit and knowledge and intensity of the President's discussion, and I think it simply must have come through that this was a man talking with great conviction and a sense of importance of what he said.

Q. Did Mr. Gromyko respond either positively or negatively to any of the specific suggestions that the President made in his UN speech? Number one. And number two: Can you tell us a little bit about the session that the two men had alone in the Oval Office when the rest of you headed off for lunch?

A. There were some references to the President's UN speech, but I don't want to characterize it beyond that.

The brief meeting that the two men had alone was something that the President wished to do, and he had some things that he wanted to say privately to Mr. Gromyko. And that's as much as I care to say about it.

Q. Was there anything that you heard there—any suggestion from the Soviets, any surprises about anything that Mr. Gromyko had to say that suggested something that you didn't already know or hadn't heard before?

A. I think that an interchange like this is always an educational thing for all parties. And I felt privileged to have been there. But I can't put my finger on some particular insight that I'd care to single out.

Q. Did you detect any change of positions on the Soviets' part on anything?

A. The object wasn't to test out a question of their position on this, that or the other but rather to set out general objectives and the confidence the President in wishing to try to obtain those objectives, to put behind that confidence, as he did in his UN speech, many substantive suggestions that are out there for negotiation and discussion as well as the procedural ideas that were contained in the President's UN speech.

Q. What do you mean by "stay in touch"? Does that mean there are no specific plans for any further meetings? Does that mean that the idea President had for multilevel, Cabin level exchanges was not accepted?

A. There are all sorts of ways to stay in touch. And just exactly how it will come about remains to be seen. Of course, we have regular and continuing dialogue at the ambassadorial level, with Ambassador Hartman in Moscow and with Ambassador Dobrynin here, and that represents a continuing vehicle for organizing any further discussions that might be needed.

Q. You said yesterday at the United Nations that you were sad and disappointed at Mr. Gromyko's speech. You said that, as the President had said several days before, that the United States would continue to try to get the Soviet Union to behave in a constructive way in international relations in the cause of peace. And I want to recall that to you. Do you believe that this meeting today in a way advanced the cause of peace? Wasn't Gromyko constructive?

A. In my opinion, the meeting definitely advanced the cause of peace and I think when you have a genuine

intense discussion between two people at the top of these two most important governments, and it is a genuine, businesslike, but intense discussion that's sure to be helpful.

Q. Did it clear the air, as far as concerned?

A. Clear the air—there's lots of it, there's lots of apprehension, there's lots of differences of opinion, and I think one discussion is going to clear the air completely. But I think it probably made some progress in that direction.

Q. The Foreign Minister, in his speech at the United Nations, said the United States would have to use words with concrete deeds. Is that still the Soviets' position, and is it his view that the United States has to do something in certain areas if the Soviets will reciprocate?

A. I think both the United States and the Soviet Union—although I'll only speak for the United States—feel that what counts is what is done, deeds. And that's why, as the President has approached this relationship right from the beginning of his Administration, he has concentrated on substantive matters. By this time, there is a very long list of substantive suggestions, proposals, treaties. And he added some in his speech. So I think that it's perfectly correct to focus on deeds, not on the general atmosphere that can be created by discussions isn't a positive thing to do. But the essence of the matter is what is actually going to be done.

Q. Are both sides going to follow up the meeting now with some deeds?

A. The agreement at the end of the session was that we will stay in touch, follow one side or the other will come up with specific suggestions will emerge from that process. But I remind you that from the area of nuclear armaments to space to chemical warfare confidence-building measures to nuclear test sites, there is a wide array of substantive proposals—deeds, if you like—that the United States, the President has put on the table for the consideration of the Soviet Union.

Q. Is it fair to sum up by saying that the two men spoke forcefully at their known positions, and that nothing is really likely to come in any concrete fashion until after the election?

A. That wouldn't be my summary, I don't know just when further discussions may take place.

Q. What about the first part?

A. You caught me so much at the end, that you'll have to repeat the first part—but I'll think I'll stand on a summary. I've been trying to summarize in the brief statement I made in the beginning and in response to your questions.

Q. Do you think the President's attitude about the Soviets has changed at all as a result of his personal meeting with Mr. Gromyko? He's been pretty hardline toward the Soviets in the past.

A. The President has consistently had a set of ideas that have guided his policy. And they've really been pretty consistent throughout his presidency. He has, from the beginning, insisted that we have to be realistic about the differences between our systems and other aspects of Soviet behavior. He has, from the beginning, been consistent in saying that we must build our strength—our military, our economic, our spirit—and he has said from the beginning that we also must be ready to negotiate. And there is an interplay among those three things, and that remains the case today. And I don't think the President has changed at all during the course of this period. Right now, particularly given the fact that many of the problems that were present at the start of his Administration have been dealt with, or are in the process of being dealt with, certainly there is a great emphasis on the importance of negotiation about the many overriding issues that are before us.

Q. Did the President raise human rights in any fashion to the Foreign Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. How did he do that?

A. The President—the question was: Did the President raise human rights?—and the answer is: Yes, he did, certainly. And I think, again, the President has said from the beginning that in all meetings with the Soviet Union, this subject will be raised, and he did so.

Q. Can you tell us what he said, can you elaborate in any way?

A. No, I think I just will be glad to give you subjects that were talked about, but as to the content individually I'm not going to give the names that he mentioned or anything of that kind.

Q. Do you think that this meeting will help President Reagan for his reelection? [Laughter.]

A. I have no idea. [Laughter.] That's not my field. From the standpoint of this meeting, it is a meeting that the

President and I started talking about some time ago. The President has thought about the substance of it very carefully, undertook it in the spirit of a person, a human being who is President of the United States and who is dealing, as he deals with the Soviet Union, with matters of overriding importance. It was, as I've said, a very serious, businesslike but intense meeting dominated by important substance throughout.

Q. Would you list the subjects? Just list the subjects that they covered.

A. A great deal of the time was spent, at the beginning, on stating views and having discussion of these overriding issues of the nature of our relationship, where it is heading, the importance of dealing with the nuclear threat, and things of that kind. It was, in a sense, philosophic but, nevertheless, connected to overriding issues. And both men discussed that, and I don't recall just how much time, in total, was spent on that.

There was a considerable amount of time spent discussing, in particular, but not negotiating about—just discussing—the problems of nuclear weapons and what could be done about them.

There was some discussion of regional issues and particularly the Iran-Iraq situation, the situation in Lebanon, and the Palestinian issues. Those were basically the kinds of topics covered. And, as I said earlier, the President explicitly did bring up the problems of human rights concerns.

Q. Was there anything on which they agreed and, if so, could you itemize?

A. I said that they agreed to keep in touch. And that was the end point. And I think that, at the end of an intense discussion like this, it's not the sort of thing where you agree, "All right. We'll do X, Y and Z." But rather that an effort has been made, on both sides, I'm sure, I know from the President's side, to get across, on a very personal level, his own convictions and his own views and depth of feeling about this subject. And, at least from my perspective, he did a very good job of it.

Q. Why did he want to talk to Gromyko alone? Do you think it was to convey this personal view of his? Over and beyond the official—

A. He had some points that he wanted to make to Mr. Gromyko alone, and he did it that way because he felt that just two individuals, all by

themselves in a room, even though the others of us who were sitting around were not too numerous, nevertheless, there's something about a close one-to-one statement that perhaps carries special weight. And so he had some things that he wanted to give that weight to.

PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS, SEPT. 29, 1984³

This has been a busy week of diplomatic activity for America. I've addressed the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings, and met with a dozen world leaders. Among them were the new leader of our neighbor to the north, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and, as you know, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

To the delegates at the United Nations, I emphasized America's dedication to world peace through confident and stronger alliances and a constructive dialogue with our adversaries. I told them of the importance we attached to seeking peaceful solutions to regional conflicts plaguing many nations and the need for democratic principles and human freedom as the foundation for a more prosperous, peaceful world.

At the IMF and World Bank, I reported that an American economic renaissance is under way, leading the rest of the world from the darkness of recession toward brighter days of renewed hope and global prosperity.

World economic growth today is nearly twice what it was 4 years ago. And inflation in the industrial countries is half of what it was. The growing economic interdependence of our world is creating a ripple effect of good news for those countries committed to sensible policies—policies which allow the magic of the marketplace to create opportunities for growth and progress, free from the dead weight of government interference and misguided protectionism.

But we can't build an enduring prosperity unless peace is secure. Our relations with the Soviet Union have been at the center of my attention, and yesterday I met with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the White House for a thorough exchange of views. I've said from the outset of my public life that a successful U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must rest on realism, strength, and a willingness to negotiate.

Last January, I spelled out clearly our goals for U.S.-Soviet relations—to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat and use of force in resolving disagreements, to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, especially nuclear arms, and to establish a working relationship between our two countries marked by a greater understanding.

In our meeting yesterday, we covered all issues which separate us. And while I told Mr. Gromyko of our disappointment that his country walked out of the Geneva nuclear arms reduction talks last year, we remain ready to discuss the entire family of arms control issues as soon as they are. It's in both our interests that these talks commence promptly and that progress be made. Our two countries have no more solemn responsibility than to reduce the level of arms and to enhance understanding.

Mr. Gromyko and I also discussed major trouble spots in the world. And I told him that it's vital for us to exchange views and help find lasting solutions to these regional disputes. We didn't seek to gloss over the hard issues that divide our two countries. We were not looking to paper over these differences. Indeed, I made plain to Mr. Gromyko what it is about Soviet behavior that worries us and our allies.

But they were useful talks. I made it clear that we Americans have no hostile intentions toward his country and that

we're not seeking military superiority over the U.S.S.R. I told him, "If your government wants peace, then there be peace." And I said that the United States is committed to move forward with the Soviet Union toward genuine progress in resolving outstanding issues.

Pursuing peace, prosperity, and democracy are not new goals. They've been at the heart of an American foreign policy that down through the years has sought to promote individual freedom and human progress in the world.

I think one great change has taken place in the world over the last 4 years. The tide of freedom has begun to rise again. Four years ago, American influence and leadership were ebbing. Defenses were neglected, our economy was collapsing, and other countries were being undermined by communist-supported insurgencies. Today, our economy is vibrant, our strength is being restored, our alliances are solid, peace is more secure.

Now the Soviets will return home ponder our exchanges. And while they know they will not secure any advantages from inflexibility, they will get a fair deal if they seek the path of negotiation and peace.

¹Made at the beginning of a question answer session with reporters at the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17, 1984).

²Press release 213 of Oct. 9.

³Text from White House press release.

Anniversary of the KAL #007 Incident

Following are an article which appeared in the August 31, 1984, edition of The New York Times by Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, and a Department statement issued the same day.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT

On Saturday, it will be 1 year since the brutal and senseless destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007.

The Soviet Union still has not offered restitution for downing the airliner. In fact, the Soviet Union has never admitted its mistake in the death of 269 innocent people. Instead, Soviet leaders have publicly implied that they are prepared to do the same thing.

In recalling this needless tragedy, it is important to keep in mind what actually happened. A Korean airliner

strayed off course and inadvertently violated Soviet airspace. A Soviet fighter shot it down, without adequately identifying it, without proper warning—and without justification.

The tragedy of KAL 007 results not from the airliner's navigation error but from the Soviet Union's reaction to that error. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has internationally recognized procedures for dealing with civil aircraft that fly off course. The Russians did not follow those established ICAO procedures before any action.

From the first days after the shooting down the Soviet propaganda and disinformation machine has been in high gear, attempting to place the blame on anyone but themselves. For the pas

the machine has continued to churn money, hoping to persuade convincingly here and abroad that it is some sort of spy plane.

Some of the Soviet propaganda has, inevitably, been picked up and replayed by others who are busy taking advantage of unavoidable gaps in our knowledge of what happened. This has led to a genre of spy plane theories that start from the premise that the government must be guilty. They argue that somebody here must have known that the airliner was off course. No effort was made to warn the plane, this—to the spy plane theorists—means that we either sent the plane over Soviet airspace, or passively let it continue off course so that we could reap intelligence benefits.

The truth is that America does not use civilian airliners for intelligence purposes. Nor was KAL 007 involved with intelligence in any way. We had no knowledge of the fact that the Korean plane had deviated from its course or that it had been shot down, until several days after the tragedy had occurred. The Russians knew where the plane was. They tracked it for 2½ hours without shooting it down.

Moreover, no credible evidence exists to support the conspiracy charges. The shootdown was investigated at length by two different international teams of impartial experts working for ICAO. Their findings were confirmed in two separate reports by the ICAO. Among the reports' findings were the following.

KAL 007 departed Anchorage in accordance with Korean Air Lines' standard practice, so that the plane would land in Seoul around 6:00 a.m. Customs and immigration services were located at the international terminal.

There was no evidence that the crew of KAL 007 was at any time aware of the flight's deviation, in spite of the fact that it continued along the same usual off-track flight path for some 50 minutes and 26 minutes.

The December ICAO report also stated that:

The Soviet Union did not make extensive efforts to identify the aircraft through in-flight visual observation and

The aircraft was shot down by at least one of two air-to-air missiles fired by a Soviet interceptor, whose pilot

had been directed by his ground command and control unit to "terminate the flight."

On the basis of the ICAO investigative reports, the ICAO Council in March voted overwhelmingly to condemn the use of armed force against KAL 007. Twenty states voted for this resolution and only the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia opposed.

This was not the first time the Soviets have shot down a civil aircraft. In 1978, when a Korean Air Lines 707 strayed near Murmansk, the intercepting Soviet fighter pilot positively identified it as a civilian airline and was ordered to shoot it down anyway. At that time, luckily, only two people were killed because the 707 pilot landed on a frozen lakebed.

Actions such as these underscore the problems that the world community and any U.S. Administration have in dealing with the Soviet Union. We must be realistic. However shocked we are at Soviet callousness, we are not surprised; we cannot afford to be. The clear lesson of such tragedies is that the Russians' first inclination is still to use force to impose their views, regardless of international law or practices.

In dealing with a country that prefers to shoot first and explain later whatever the international ground rules, we must be strong, in order to protect our interests, to help defend our allies and to help maintain the fragile rules of good conduct and civility that have been built up over the years. We must be ready to talk with the Russians, but we must be firm and patient in trying to negotiate equitable solutions to the many problems which faces us both. Although they may not like it, this is a policy the Soviets understand and should respect. It is also the policy most likely to achieve lasting results.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT¹

One year has passed since the tragic shootdown of Korean Air Lines Flight #007. Two hundred sixty-nine innocent people from 13 nations lost their lives on this day 1 year ago. We wish to express our sympathy to the families and friends of those who were killed on that day.

America, which lost 61 of its citizens in this senseless and unjustified action, shares with the families of victims from Japan, Korea, and 10 other countries deep sadness and shock over our common loss. These sentiments have not been diminished by the passage of a year.

We share with them also a continuing sense of outrage at the brutal attack on an unarmed civilian airliner. This act is an international issue of concern to all nations and is not primarily a U.S.-Soviet problem.

We share the sentiments expressed in the resolution, which was adopted on March 6, 1984, by the ICAO which condemned the use of armed force against the Korean airliner. The resolution also reaffirmed that such use of armed force constitutes a violation of international law and is incompatible with elementary considerations of humanity.

There can be no real compensation for the loss of life in this tragedy. Nevertheless we are deeply troubled by the fact that the Soviet Union has never apologized for its action nor offered restitution to the families of the victims.

Finally, we must do what we can to ensure that such an event never happens again. To that end the United States calls upon the Soviet Union to join the international community in observing accepted practices with regard to the safety of civil aviation. The world simply will not accept the repetition of such a senseless tragedy.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

Human Rights Practices in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda

by Elliott Abrams

Statement before the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 9, 1984. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.¹

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittees on Africa and on Human Rights and International Organizations on the human rights situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Uganda. These countries are strategically located in East Africa. To the extent that the region is stable, peaceful, and prosperous, our own interests are directly served. In general we have good bilateral relations with most of the countries in the region.

Sudan and Somalia, especially, have cooperated closely with the United States in several ways. For example, Sudan has been a source of important public support for our efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East, and Somalia provides military access for the United States. We have large assistance programs in Sudan and Somalia and a more modest program in Uganda. We have provided substantial refugee and humanitarian assistance to all the countries of the region. We are, in short, deeply involved in the region and have important relations with the countries of the region.

They, however, are experiencing great difficulties. The entire region has suffered from severe drought, very large refugee flows, and extreme economic hardship. In addition, each country has recently had or is currently experiencing revolution, civil war, or both. Ethiopia, with Libyan cooperation, has attempted to destabilize its neighbors by arming Somali and Sudanese guerrillas. They, in turn, look with great concern at massive military deliveries to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviets have provided some \$4 billion in military assistance to Ethiopia since 1977, and the Ethiopian Army is much larger than the Sudanese and Somali Armies combined (about 2:1). Moreover, the tripartite alliance of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia is itself a threat. Thus, the countries of the region are simultaneously facing a variety of economic and political strains in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion.

The harsh history and overall poverty and instability of the region are at the root of the human rights picture there. Although most of the countries of the region do not fully share our own notions of democracy or respect for individual rights, a most troubling aspect of recent history is the deterioration of the human rights situation viewed on the basis of their own standards and traditions these governments claim to respect. In some cases—notably in Ethiopia—the heavy hand of Marxism, in many ways, has exacerbated an already harsh traditional Ethiopian attitude toward emigration, for example. In Sudan religious conflict threatens one of Africa's most hopeful experiments in peaceful resolutions of civil war and establishment of a multicultural country. In Uganda, where in the early post-Amin years exiles returned to establish a multiparty parliamentary democracy with a notably free press, recent trends indicate that the human rights situation in Uganda today is among the most grave in the world.

The situation in East Africa poses serious questions for the United States. We must be careful neither to condone unacceptable behavior nor to mislead potential adversaries of our own troubled friends. We must respond to threats to our interests in the region in a manner consistent with our concern over human rights abuses. Although we recognize the historical roots of such current behavior and realize that neither pure democracy nor full respect for internationally recognized human rights is likely in the near future, we will not shrink from expressing our concern over human rights abuses even to our closest friends. Indeed we have done so, and the remarks I shall make regarding individual countries have been made previously both publicly and directly to the leadership of the specific countries.

At the same time, these countries are facing numerous, serious problems, and the United States should do more than simply complain. To the extent possible, we should offer constructive assistance and counsel with the hope that through candor and cooperation we can assist our friends through an especially difficult period in their history and hope that before long they can achieve improved economic develop-

ment, greater political stability, and the process, an enhanced human rights environment.

Sudan

The human rights situation in Sudan deteriorated considerably in the last year. Key developments have been government's decision last September to incorporate traditional Islamic punishments into the penal code, the advent of active insurgency supported by Ethiopia and Libya and by southern rebels espousing traditional grievance and opposing Islamization in the non-Muslim south, and finally, the government's declaration of a state of emergency April 29 resulting in the establishment of summary tribunals. Beginning with the announcement last fall that *sharia*, or Islamic law, would be applied more broadly, it was unclear how the new laws would be enforced against Sudan's different confessional groups which for family law matters have governed by their own customs and laws. It appeared that for certain crimes, such as intoxication and adultery, Muslims would be punished more severely.

In December the first *sharia* sentences involving amputation of the right hands of two convicted thieves, both Muslims, were carried out in Khartoum. During the earlier part of the year, the regular courts in the Khartoum area continued to pass amputation sentences. However, because of apathy and the general backlog of cases, more than half a dozen amputations were carried out during the first 4 months of 1984, although some 40 prisoners, including several non-Muslim southerners, were reported to be awaiting amputation in al-Kober prison in Khartoum. Many observers believe that the courts would find a way effectively to exempt non-Muslims from the form of punishment, and Sudanese officials said at the time non-Muslims would not suffer these punishments.

However, President Nimeiri's declaration of a state of emergency April 29 and the establishment of emergency courts with summary jurisdiction over criminal cases greatly accelerated the execution of these punishments. For the first time, southerners living in the Khartoum

subjected to these punishments, including cross limb amputations, in which, for example, the right hand and foot are severed. Although emergency courts in other northern cities have begun to mete out *sharia* punishments, tribunals established in the south do not enforce the *sharia* provisions of the penal code. According to most estimates, the number of amputations under the state of emergency now exceeds 50, including several non-Muslims.

It is not clear whether foreigners are expected to be exempted. The curfew and arbitrary searches for military units during the state of emergency affecting expatriates living in Khartoum, the Italian lay religious worker was arrested for possession of alcohol.

The extreme form of punishments has been reduced down by the emergency courts, generating dismay abroad and in the Muslim south, further fueling the insurgency led by the SLM (Sudan Liberation Movement) insurgents. The Libyans and Ethiopians moved quickly to "fish" these troubled waters. Unlike other Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen where *sharia* is normally applied only to Muslims and administered by trained jurists applying elaborate procedural safeguards, the three-man tribunals in Sudan consist of a policeman, a military officer, and a civilian regarded as pious but usually untrained in law.

The Department has publicly condemned limb amputations as cruel and inhuman punishment and a clear and flagrant violation of human rights. We have also made it clear that we will not support a military solution to conflict in the south, and we have pointed out the evident connection between *sharia* and the southern insurgency. In several bilateral exchanges with the government, including a visit to Sudan by one of our deputies, Mr. Fairbanks, we have communicated our concern over the deterioration of human rights in Sudan.

Though we should be cautious about expecting dramatic or immediate improvement, there is some evidence of response to the concerns expressed by our own citizens and by friends abroad. The government has taken steps to restrict arbitrary searches by soldiers, particularly in the home. We understand that when searches are conducted, an official must now be present. A recent government decision now allows appeals against the previously summary judgments of the emergency courts. President Nimeiri has withdrawn, at least for the

time being, draft constitutional amendments that were widely resented by southern Sudanese as giving Islam a dominant position in the country and as removing certain protections they have enjoyed under the existing constitution.

While these latest steps represent only modest progress, we are encouraged that the government is responding to international concern over human rights developments in the Sudan. We will continue to urge the government to moderate its domestic policies, including the application of *sharia* punishments. However, we must recognize that Sudan may not repeal *sharia*. Nevertheless, they can apply it moderately, gradually, more humanely, using personnel trained in the law and procedural safeguards and with greater restraint toward non-Muslims.

Ethiopia

The human rights picture for Ethiopia is bleak. The nation suffers under dictatorial rule by Chairman Mengistu and a small group of former military officers with a Marxist agenda—an agenda that inevitably sacrifices the individual for creation of the socialist man. The state exercises complete control over the press, education, labor activities, political processes, the legal system, and freedom of movement. Marxist instruction is pervasive in the secondary schools and universities. Those suspected of being unsympathetic to the regime are watched and closely controlled by the neighborhood committees, and arbitrary arrest is common. The Soviet system of "participatory democracy" of mass organizations is substituted for real democratic processes. No dissent is allowed. There are no civil and political freedoms. We are not at this stage sure what effect formation of a workers party in September will have, but it should promote more radical elements of the revolution.

In limited respects the human rights situation has improved over the past few years. There has been no renewed terror on the scale of the mass arrests and executions of 1977-78. It is generally considered that outside the famine areas, life in the countryside has improved somewhat. Since the revolution, peasant families have been able to form their own holdings, and while collectivization of peasant holdings is being encouraged, it is not yet being forced on the small peasant farmers. The government has built a large number of schools, hospitals, and roads. Primary schooling

is now available to everyone in urban areas, and secondary schooling is open to a high percentage of the young in cities. As a result of this and an energetic adult literacy campaign, the government now claims a literacy rate of 67%. This no doubt is exaggerated, but undeniably there has been great progress in the area of literacy and also some in public health. There have been major amnesties of political prisoners in September of 1982 and 1983. Religious expression is still tolerated to an extent.

These positive factors are more than counterbalanced, however, by the creation of a workers party and the trend toward greater Marxist-Leninist institutionalization of the revolution and by worsened economic conditions. The Christian Amhara continue to dominate other ethnic groups differing in language and religion. Life in general is increasingly difficult. The security situation in the north has deteriorated and fighting has spread with innocents caught in the crossfire in the central government campaign against Tigrean and Eritrean insurgencies. The government's campaign has also led to arbitrary military conscription, with military forces sweeping through cities and villages, hauling young men off never to be seen again. Most significant, drought and famine have devastated the countryside, affecting nearly 5 million people. Centralized planning and collectivization have not helped the economy; Ethiopia remains one of the 10 poorest nations in the world. Despite this widespread deprivation, a new elite class is emerging, composed of those connected to the government.

As a result of the drought, insurgencies, civil strife, and repression, over 1 million Ethiopians have fled their country. More are leaving every day; many walking 15 days, selling their possessions and livestock to pay for food during their trek. Shortages of certain foods and commodities have increased in the cities, due in large measure to an economic system that provides few incentives for farmers to grow more than they can consume.

More recently, there are reports of Ethiopian obsession with security surrounding the September 10th anniversary celebrations, with roundups of those suspected of counterrevolutionary sympathies. Local neighborhood committees are participating in mandatory drills and have increased patrols.

It is not possible to speak with assurance on the situation of the Ethiopian Jews due to the fact that visits in

Jewish villages are infrequent and controlled. In late 1982, however, the government began again to permit U.S. and Israeli delegations limited access to Jewish villages. This extended until early 1984. In February of this year we learned that foreign visitors to Gondar were no longer being allowed to go to Ethiopian Jewish villages, except to Wolleka, which is very near to Gondar City and not exclusively Jewish.

While the situation of the Ethiopian Jews generally has improved in the legal sense, with their being allowed to hold land and participate in peasant associations, friction between the Ethiopian Jews and the government continues, mainly due to official efforts to restrict emigration. Ethiopian Jews are still subject to local prejudice, but they do not appear to be singled out for discrimination. We have no evidence of genocide. Like other Ethiopians, the Jews live very difficult lives in extreme poverty and suffer human rights violations. They are also subject to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, as are thousands of others in Ethiopia. We realize this is a sensitive issue among the American public and Congress and are watching the situation closely and doing what we think is useful to help.

Somalia

While human rights conditions in Somalia are far from ideal, Somalia is probably the bright spot among the countries we are considering today. Somalia has been ruled for the past 15 years by President Mohamed Siad Barre, as head of the armed forces. Although the country's Constitution, adopted in 1979 after a nationwide referendum provides some guarantees of political and civil rights, these rights are tightly circumscribed, and open criticism of the government is not permitted.

The ultimate source of the President's political authority is the military. The importance of the military in Somali society is reinforced by the continuing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia over the area of the Ogaden Desert in Ethiopia occupied by ethnic Somalis. Continuing conflict with Ethiopia has resulted in heavy defense expenditures and a massive refugee flow into Somalia.

The principal arm of Somalia's security apparatus is the National Security Service, which can arrest and detain people indefinitely. The government has shown no hesitation in imprisoning people whom it sees as a

threat to security. However, political prisoners, in the past, have been released and rehabilitated, with some of them taking responsible positions in the government. In spite of a constitutional provision guaranteeing formal charges and a speedy trial, the Somali Government does detain defendants without charge in cases involving national security. Six high government officials arrested in June 1982 have still not been charged but remain in prison. There is an estimated total of 350-500 political prisoners, 200 of whom are being held without charge. In the past 18 months, we have seen no cases of arbitrary killing for political reasons, nor any instances of disappearance. There are occasional allegations of torture, but these have not been substantiated.

The Somali court system, in both criminal and political cases, is subject to review and control by the executive. In regular courts, judges refer to the Koran in rendering legal decisions pertaining to family matters such as marriage and inheritance. The National Security Court, established in 1969, has authority with no right of appeal in cases of crime against the state. Its deliberations are secret.

Somalia's media are owned and operated by the government. They are devoted to disseminating information and opinion acceptable to the government. Dissenting views are not allowed expression in public. All non-religious organizations and public gatherings in the country are subject to government control or close supervision. Internal travel is not restricted in Somalia, but there are numerous police and military checkpoints in the towns, border areas, and places where interclan violence is occurring. Islam is the state religion and is adhered to by 95% of the population, but there is little government interference in religious matters.

The Somali Government is willing to discuss specific human rights cases and has communicated with Amnesty International. However, it has refused permission for foreign officials or human rights organizations to visit political prisoners. In 1983 Somalia did allow an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) team to visit and inspect facilities for prisoners of war from the conflict with Ethiopia and to meet with a number of these prisoners.

Uganda

Over the last year, the human rights situation in Uganda has deteriorated alarmingly. In recent months repeated reports of large scale civilian massacre, forced starvation, and impeded humanitarian relief operations indicate that Uganda has one of the most serious human rights problems in the world today. This is especially tragic because friends of Uganda hoped that the country would continue to make progress away from the terrible Idi Amin years. That progress was clearly evident in the first 2 years of the post-Amin period.

Dr. Milton Obote, President of Uganda from 1962 until his overthrow by General Idi Amin in 1971, was returned to power in the December 1980 general election. At first the Obote government made slow but steady progress to overcome the ill effects of the terror and economic disruptions of the previous decade. Faced almost immediately by an insurgency campaign led by Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army, operating primarily in the Luwero triangle region, as well as by periodic raids from remnants of Idi Amin's forces in the northwest, the Obote government nonetheless tried to stabilize the international security situation and work with international relief agencies to deliver assistance to Ugandans.

Since December 1983, however, when Uganda's key military leader David Oyite Ojok died, the decline in security situation has accelerated. The army, although never adequately trained or disciplined, worsened significantly the absence of effective leadership. A government rebels have successfully challenged the ineffective government forces. As a result, the demoralized and under-paid, under-fed and ill-equipped army, in incident after incident, has been using its defensive operations as an excuse for looting and for the rape and murder of innocent civilians. Army atrocities have been most numerous in the Luwero triangle north of the capital which is heavily populated by refugees and in the northeast Karamoja district where the government conducts operations against a pastoral tribe long engaged in cattle-rustling as a chief economic activity but now in possession of considerable modern weaponry. Since May there have been an increasing number of reports of brutal massacre of women, children, displaced persons and other noncombatants in the Luwero

in Karamoja. What is most disturbing about recent reports is not that they are incomplete (although we certainly desire more information) but that nearly every source we do consult provides reliable reports of large massacres.

In the face of the worsening security situation, the government is becoming more and less able to exert its influence and focus on development and national unity. There are discussions within the government on how to address the insurgency and other forms of instability. Some senior officials advocate harsher treatment against political opponents and the denial of aid to civilians suspected of supporting insurgents. Until recently efforts to provide relief assistance for 150,000 persons who had been displaced by army insurgency activity were going reasonably well. However, renewed successes by the armed insurgents, including the abduction of international relief workers in January 1984 and the attack on Masindi in February, led to the government's restricting relief operations in March.

The cumulative effect of the restrictions and the disbanding of relief centers has been to deny aid to the resettled and the displaced, resulting in extreme suffering. It is widely believed in Kampala that the exclusion of church and external relief workers from the Luwero region was being done to thwart the efforts of the international community to foster developments within this area of conflict. In response to urging by the diplomatic and humanitarian communities, the ban has been relaxed on relief operations into the Luwero region.

However, because of the security situation few relief agencies are operating in the Luwero region. Just last week four ICRC workers were attacked by rebels and three wounded by fire while driving in their vehicle. Nonetheless thousands are now out of touch of relief assistance. Children, lacking mothers, and the elderly are dying of starvation in substantial numbers. The problem is not a simple one and not one the government can control. Within the government and relief agencies are great obstacles in addressing the problem. An official ban remains on relief operations in Karamoja.

No ambassador in Kampala has been more active than U.S. Ambassador Allen is in trying to address the wide-

spread human suffering in Uganda. He, like his Western colleagues, has strongly urged the Government of Uganda to act to end the violence and inhumanity by insurgents and by undisciplined security forces. Recently Vice President Bush took advantage of the visit of the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda, who is personally close to President Obote, to expose him fully to the extent of our concerns. Subsequently, I personally met with Archbishop Okoth, as did other senior Department and Administration officials, and reiterated in the clearest of terms the Vice President's message that the spiral of violence and human rights violations must be halted. A number of Administration and congressional visitors have traveled to Kampala recently and have personally delivered similar messages to President Obote and to the most senior members of his government.

Some Ugandan officials have replied that the violence against civilians in the affected districts is an unavoidable reaction to guerrilla attacks or justifiable retribution against those civilians suspected of harboring or otherwise supporting insurgents. Elements who share this hardline view have expanded their power in the aftermath of General Ojuk's death. The insurgency is part of the problem, as is weak army training and discipline. But we cannot accept this explanation wholly and have so told government officials in our representations. President Obote cannot wave a wand and end the violence in Uganda, but clearly his government must do more to lessen it.

The United States, despite its vigorous efforts, has also had limited success. We are reviewing our Ugandan policy to see what constructive steps should now be taken. It is still our view, however, that we continue to work with the Ugandan Government to reestablish the environment that gave everyone hope after the ouster of Amin. Our Embassy in Kampala is a visible sign of our faith that the United States has a role to play in helping to make life better for Uganda. We have to remember that there are large parts of Uganda free from violence, where people are putting their lives together after the grim years of the Amin regime, where sound government policies and donor assistance have been creating opportunities for more food production, health, education, and employment. Little would be served, least of all the in-

terests of Ugandans, by taking actions which would hurt these areas of progress and at the same time irrevocably decrease our influence with the Ugandan Government. Other donors feel the same. We believe that working multilaterally with other donor nations and other African countries will be the most effective way to encourage and help the Ugandan Government to stop the violence.

How can we help more to curb the sources of violence and encourage the influence of moderation? What other steps should be taken? These are difficult questions and ones we are grappling with. The Administration will continue to follow the situation in Uganda closely. You can be assured it is receiving constant, serious attention at senior levels.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Urges Ratification of Genocide Convention

Following are a Department statement of September 3, 1984, and a statement by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 12.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPT. 5, 1984¹

On August 22, the Administration completed an extensive review of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. As a result of that review, and at the strong urging of the American Bar Association and other interested groups, the President concluded that it would be in the nation's best interest for the United States to ratify the Genocide Convention.

The commitment of our country to prevent and punish acts of genocide is indisputable, yet our failure to ratify this treaty—which has now been pending before the Senate for 35 years and has been supported by Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter—has opened the United States to unnecessary criticism in various international fora.

We can refute such baseless criticism by ratifying the convention, and more importantly, we can utilize the convention in our own efforts to expand freedom and fight human rights abuses around the globe.

In 1976 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the convention and recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to three understandings and one declaration. This approach exceeded the clarifications considered necessary by the Nixon Administration, but the President supports these understandings and declaration, and we believe they will help secure Senate advice and consent to ratification of the convention.

We look forward to working with the Senate to resolve any issues that may arise in connection with its consideration of this treaty. Ratification of the Genocide Convention would reaffirm, in this international legal context, the fundamental and timeless American commitment to human rights.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS, SEPT. 12, 1984²

It is an honor for me to testify for the Administration in support of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. A long list of eminent Americans—many from Congress, many from the executive branch, and especially many dedicated private citizens—have labored over the past 35 years to see the Genocide Convention receive the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. Both Republican and Democratic Administrations have worked for the convention's ratification. Today's hearing marks another milestone in this distinguished effort, and it provides the Senate once again an opportunity to consider the convention's ratification. It is the Administration's hope that the Senate will finally provide its advice and consent to the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention and add America's moral and political prestige to this landmark in international law.

The Genocide Convention was born from the ashes of the Holocaust. The horrors of the Nazi death camps prompted the rise of an international treaty that recognized that in this, the bloodiest of centuries, technology employed in the hands of totalitarian tyrants made possible mass murder of a special kind. As stated precisely in the language of the convention, genocide is defined as certain specified acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such. These acts include:

- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

As Senator Javits remarked eloquently in hearings before this committee in 1977, "Genocide is murder and more." Such acts are a crime against humanity itself and merit the special sanctions of the international community.

The United States distinguishes itself by the moral dimension it brings to its foreign policy. As Secretary of State Shultz has stated, human rights are at the core of our foreign policy because they are central to our conception of ourselves. The United States, one of the chief recipients of the survivors of the Holocaust, has found itself in the embarrassing position in international fora of having failed to ratify the convention, thereby not expressing formally through an international treaty our staunch opposition to the heinous crime of genocide. Many of the adversaries in the world, particularly the Soviet Union, have ratified the convention and they frequently use the U.S. failure to do so to castigate us, unfairly and propagandistically and to denigrate our strong human rights posture and divert attention from their abuses. Ratification of the Genocide Convention will reduce, those to whom human rights are only empty words, the opportunity to attack the United States.

Of course reasons have been stated in the past for opposing the treaty. Some make the point that present U.S. law, particularly the Federal civil rights statutes, prohibit and punish acts that fall under the Genocide Convention and that we need not enter into another international covenant. However such arguments ignore both the unique character of this horrible crime and the fact that one of the major purposes of the convention is to oblige states to pass national legislation against it. Moreover such arguments ignore the great symbolic value of the Genocide Convention and the benefits which will accrue to public diplomacy by U.S. adherence to the convention.

It is interesting that the Soviet agency TASS has already started to attack the Reagan Administration for expressing its support for the convention. The Soviets harshly criticized a State Department spokesman because he referred to the convention's symbolic value. But the Soviets frequently attack what they fear most. They know that symbols convey meaning, and they also know that the U.S. lending its political and moral prestige to the convention will enormously enhance its value as instrument of world opinion to prevent genocide.

Constitutional questions have been raised in the past over the Genocide Convention. It is quite understandable that people are concerned that international law not trifle with the American Constitution, one of the greatest

ments in the fragile history of liberty and a document which has named institutions that have guaranteed and extended liberty for 200 years. After comprehensive legal review by the State Department and the Justice Department, and with the one agreement and three understandings from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1976 proposed for inclusion in the resolution of ratification, we are firm in our conviction that all constitutional questions have been answered. These questions have

centered mainly on the issues of states rights and extradition.

But before closing, I would like to note that, when the history of the U.S. ratification of the Genocide Convention is written (and it is our fervent hope that it can begin to be written shortly), the endorsement by the American Bar Association (ABA) of the Genocide Convention in 1976, after having previously opposed it, will prove, I think, to have been a decisive event. The ABA has worked tirelessly since then to see the convention ratified, and its legal ex-

planation and defense of the present proposals should satisfy all of the prior constitutional objections to the convention.

We have all delayed too long. The best time for advice and consent to ratification is right now.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes.

²The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

U.S. Embassy Bombed in Beirut

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
JULY 20, 1984¹

The Secretary of State has expressed all feelings about the senseless, brutal attack on Americans and Lebanese living in Beirut. This cowardly attack can be understood by the world as another reminder that the rule of law and civilized norms of behavior are threatened by those who use terrorism as a political weapon.

Let me give you a rundown on where we stand as best as we can understand it at this time.

At 11:30 this morning Beirut—which was 4:30 this morning our time—a van approached the north entrance access road at the Embassy compound, northeast of Beirut. The annex is located on a residential street backed at both ends by barricades. The occupants—we think there were four—of the vehicle opened fire on the Lebanese guards at the barricade—this was at the north end of the street running outside the annex—and killed them.

The vehicle came under fire from the Embassy guards, but it maneuvered through the barricade and the checkpoint and proceeded for about 500 feet toward the Embassy building. It was stopped by the fire—the vehicle was apparently pretty badly shot up at that stage—and the occupants may, indeed, have been killed at that stage. But, nevertheless, the vehicle stopped some 20 feet short of the northern end of the Embassy, still on the street, and at that point it exploded.

We understand that in addition to the Lebanese guards, there was fire onto the vehicle from Americans who came out of the Embassy, and we also understand that a guard who was with the British Ambassador—who was visiting the Embassy at the time—also opened fire on the vehicle.

The building was severely damaged, although the floors did not collapse. We have varying reports on casualties, including a number of deaths. Among the killed, we believe were two Americans. Among the wounded were 20 Americans; four of them were treated and released, and the rest have been confined to the hospital. We do not have accurate figures on the number of Lebanese killed and injured at this time.

Beginning at 7:00 this morning, State Department officials began notifying the families of Americans stationed at the Embassy to provide them with information as it became available.

Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew was in the building at the time. He was in his office on the fourth floor. He was briefly buried under rubble, but he cleared that; he walked out of the annex. He has cuts and bruises. He was taken to the hospital for treatment of them. He is still in the hospital. We expect him to be there for another day or two. He is in charge from the hospital. He is telephoning various officials and is in touch with us directly by phone from his hospital room. He spoke to Secretary Shultz earlier in the morning; he spoke to the President earlier today.

As I say, the British Ambassador was in the annex at the time, and he was slightly injured; I gather along the lines of Ambassador Bartholomew.

The Department learned of the attack at 5:24 this morning. We established an open line with the Embassy office in west Beirut at 5:26. That line has remained open since. The Secretary of State and senior officials were informed immediately. The Secretary was at home at the time, accelerated his departure, came to the office somewhat earlier, was in the Operations Center early this morning, and went over to be with the President before the President left town.

Responsible officers were quickly assembled, and a working group went into force at 8:00 under Arnie Raphel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

We have been in constant communications with the Embassy office in west Beirut. Communications have now been established between the Department and the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Yarze, and a number of people from the annex in east Beirut have moved into the Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The west Beirut Embassy office is closed for business but is under guard.

The Secretary of State has asked Assistant Secretary [for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] Richard Murphy to lead a team to investigate the situation and lend assistance to Ambassador Bartholomew and his staff, and

Assistant Secretary Murphy will be leaving swiftly. He will be joined by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who is Director of the Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning. Ambassador Oakley was in London when this tragedy took place, and he will make his way, also speedily, to Beirut.

All our diplomatic posts have been informed, and, in fact, there was already in effect an alert following suggestions of threats against the Embassy a little earlier this month, so there already was an alert in effect. But since today's developments, Embassies have been informed of what has happened and given the further warning to be alert.

The Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Rabin, on behalf of the Israeli Government, has been in touch with Ambassador Lewis, our Ambassador to Israel, and offered all possible assistance from Israel, including hospital facilities. We have had similar offers from two other governments—the British Government and the Government of Cyprus. We have State Department medical officers assigned to Cairo, and they will be traveling to Beirut, even as we speak, to assess the situation there.

¹Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■

U.S. Imposes Additional Export Controls on Iran

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
SEPT. 27, 1984¹

I would like to call your attention to an action announced by the Department of Commerce.

Effective upon publication in the *Federal Register* September 28, the United States has imposed additional controls on exports to Iran. The new controls tighten and extend the antiterrorism export controls which have been applied to Iran since early this year. Henceforth, a license would be required, and normally not granted, for any exports of aircraft or spare parts for aircraft, regardless of value or weight, and for export of outboard motors of 45 horsepower and above. Formerly, the controls did not cover aircraft consigned to a commercial carrier or which were valued at less than \$3 million,

helicopters of less than 10,000 pounds, spare parts, or outboard motors.

In addition, exports of goods and technology subject to control for national security purposes, regardless of value, if destined for a military end-use or end-user will be subject to denial policy. Formerly, such items were not subject to antiterrorism controls unless valued at \$7 million or more.

All items previously controlled under the antiterrorism controls, including crime control and detection equipment and certain military vehicles and equipment on the regional stability list, continue to be controlled. The policy of denial for the export of munitions list items, chemical weapons components, and nuclear-related items to Iran also remain in force.

¹Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Alan Romberg. ■

NATO Conventional Defense Capabilities

TER TO THE CONGRESS,
 P. 12, 1984¹

sent to section 1104(b) of the FY 1984
 re Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94), this
 contains my views and recommenda-
 on improving NATO conventional
 capabilities. These views and recom-
 mends take into consideration the find-
 of Secretary [of Defense Caspar W.]
 nberger's report on "Improving NATO's
 onventional Capabilities." I have reviewed
 report and endorse its recommendations.
 te product of thorough research and
 as a candid assessment of NATO's
 ements to date and additional needs for
 future.

ow disagree with the pressing need to
 re NATO's conventional forces in order
 nance deterrence and defense. The quali-
 of NATO's equipment and the readiness
 ill of the forces manning that equip-
 ave improved significantly over the
 several years. The absolute defense
 alities of NATO forces are substantially
 or today than three or four years ago.
 ver, the measure of adequacy in deter-
 end defense is not any static or ab-
 ability, but a dynamic relationship to
 eat opposing that defense. The War-
 ct threat has increased by an even
 or qualitative and quantitative incre-
 ecreasing the necessity that NATO be
 more efficient and effective.

nalyzing the requirements for conven-
 orce improvements we must remem-
 at NATO's principal objective is not to
 ind win a war, but to ensure that a war
 Europe does not occur. Further im-
 vements in conventional capability would
 ant a vital element of overall deterrence
 lessen pressure for early escalation to
 er confrontation. At the same time, as
 OD report concludes, conventional
 ce cannot totally supplant the nuclear
 esion of deterrence. NATO must also
 ue to maintain a credible nuclear deter-
 eas outlined in Secretary Weinberger's
 on NATO's Nuclear Posture.

NATO's strategy must be based on the
 aphic and political realities of NATO,
 he fact that NATO, as a defensive
 are, concedes the initiative at the outset
 of conflict. In this context, flexible response
 forward defense provide the only viable
 erent and defense strategy for the
 ace. NATO's task is to do a better job of
 ing the forces and the doctrine to sup-
 port the strategy.

The United States can be proud of our
 leadership by example over the last several
 years. We must continue to pursue those pro-
 grams we have already begun, while seeking
 even more effective ways to enhance conven-
 tional defense. The support of Congress, in
 providing the funding for operations and
 maintenance costs, readiness, sustainment
 improvement, new equipment, force struc-
 ture, research and development, and other
 defense programs, is essential to our efforts.
 However, the United States cannot fill the
 gap alone. Every member of the Alliance
 must participate in improving conventional
 forces. The Allies recognize the need, and
 now must make the additional sacrifices
 needed to improve further NATO's military
 capabilities. The recent debate in the U.S.
 Senate will provide reinforcement to those
 Allies trying to assume their proportional
 burden. We will continue to prod all Allies to
 make better contributions to NATO defense.

Secretary Weinberger's report and the
 Supreme Allied Commander-Europe's
 (SACEUR's) independent assessment spell
 out the most important areas that need im-
 provement. I agree with their recommenda-
 tions. We must carefully balance our efforts,
 both by program area (such as readiness) and
 by task (such as defense against a first
 echelon). We must ensure that defense ef-
 forts and resources provide the most effec-
 tive product for defense. We must critique
 the application of resources until we are
 satisfied that they are producing the optimum
 defense capability possible. No one can afford
 wastefully duplicative development programs,
 nor pursue programs that have only a limited
 military need. In sum, we must have a
 military strategy and an investment strategy.
 And these strategies should encompass our
 own programs and those of Allies—in closer
 integration and cooperation than ever before.

The fundamental and inescapable reason
 for American cooperation and leadership is
 that a strong NATO defense is in our basic
 national self-interest, and we simply cannot
 succeed by ourselves. The plans and pro-
 grams in the current United States defense
 budget and five-year defense plan support
 these objectives. While we will continue to
 review plans and modify requests to fit new
 opportunities and requirements, enduring
 Congressional willingness to support required
 defense programs is essential if we are to im-
 prove NATO's conventional defense. No plan,
 no matter how well conceived, can succeed if
 the resources to achieve it are insufficient or
 inconsistent. We and our Allies have recog-
 nized NATO's conventional defense problems,
 and have taken the first steps toward
 recovery. Now, we must accelerate our ef-
 forts.

Making the changes necessary to supple-
 ment existing plans to replace those which
 become obsolete requires bold thinking and
 leadership. We will continue to consult closely
 and frequently with our NATO Allies and
 with the U.S. Congress on new and better
 ways to use defense resources. There is no
 "instant" solution to any of the existing prob-
 lems. Solutions will be achieved only by a
 long-term commitment. Nonetheless, we must
 start down the right paths, which are
 presented in Secretary Weinberger's report.

United States programs emphasize the
 need to provide the strategic lift to rapidly
 supplement in-place forces and to augment
 the thin strategic reserves available to
 SACEUR. We are working with Allies to en-
 sure that Europe is prepared to receive these
 reinforcements and get them to where they
 can be most effective. We have stressed the
 need to increase the funding levels in the
 unglamorous but tremendously cost-effective
 Infrastructure Program. For example, by
 providing shelters and other supporting
 capabilities for aircraft, we can substantially
 improve the survivability and hence the
 capabilities of our Air Force.

Improving NATO's deterrent and defense
 posture will also require the Alliance to move
 in entirely new directions and to modify ex-
 isting projects. "Exploitation of Emerging
 Technologies" is a fine example of new direc-
 tions. This initiative, proposed by the United
 States in mid-1982, has already stimulated
 identification of projects for accelerated
 development. Although it will still be several
 years before this initiative contributes direct-
 ly to NATO's defense capabilities, this effort
 marks an important first step in using the
 West's major advantage: its technological
 base.

In the short term, we must improve the
 deterrent capability of the conventional leg of
 NATO's deterrent Triad by increasing
 readiness and sustainability. Over the longer
 term, we must devote the necessary
 resources to provide all of the elements of an
 effective defense. This will require a clear
 understanding by the publics in all NATO
 countries of the nature and magnitude of the
 threat we all face.

I ask the Congress to join in the impor-
 tant endeavor of strengthening NATO's con-
 ventional defense.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas P.
 O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of
 Representatives, and George Bush, President
 of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation
 of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17,
 1984). ■

Tactical Nuclear Posture of NATO

LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
SEPT. 12, 1984¹

Pursuant to section 1105(b) of the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94), this report contains my views on the DoD report on the tactical nuclear posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This is the first of four reports required by the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act. It analyzes some of the most crucial problems facing U.S. NATO defense policy, both because of the weapons involved and the essential role of nuclear weapons in NATO's deterrent posture.

I have reviewed Secretary [of Defense Caspar W.] Weinberger's very comprehensive report on the nuclear posture of NATO, and I strongly endorse the report's recommendations. I therefore urge the Congress to provide the necessary support so that the agreements reached within the Alliance for improving NATO's nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNF) can be sustained.

The military threat to the Alliance has not lessened since the last report in 1975. There have been significant improvements by both the U.S. and the Europeans in conventional and nonstrategic nuclear forces over the last several years. Nonetheless, the quantitative military balance has, in fact, worsened. Our goal remains not to match the Warsaw Pact system-for-system or warhead-for-warhead, but to maintain forces adequate for credible deterrence and defense. NATO can accomplish this objective by continuing force improvement, including both nuclear and conventional modernizations, and by developing more effective use of our defense resources. Meanwhile, we will continue to work to achieve equitable and verifiable arms reductions which would assist NATO to obtain greater stability and security at lower levels of defense effort.

In October 1983, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), as part of the theater-wide improvement of NATO's nuclear posture, decided to withdraw an additional 1,400 warheads over the next five to six years, in addition to the 1,000 warheads withdrawn in 1980. The basis for these decisions was a broadly supported Alliance study. This study was used as the cornerstone for the DoD report. Thus, the recommendations and intermediate steps outlined in the DoD report to improve NATO's nuclear posture are fully consistent with the views of our Allies.

I am fully aware of the views in the Congress, that we should do more to improve our conventional forces. I intend to take a balanced approach to improving our capabilities in both areas. You have received a report from DoD which looks at conventional plans and requirements in detail. I shall be providing my views on how to pursue some of those recommendations soon. It is true that we need to continue to improve our conventional forces. However, it is essential that, in the process of examining conventional problems, we not lose sight of the very essential, significant contributions that credible, survivable, and stable NATO nuclear forces make to enhancing conventional defenses or of the fact that such nuclear forces are presently our most credible deterrent to chemical attack.

I especially endorse those recommendations that improve the survivability of NATO's nuclear forces. Closely associated security improvements will also do much to improve the safety of our weapons in peacetime. I have placed significant emphasis on carrying out such improvements. I intend to encourage our Allies to take an equally serious view of the problem. We are working through several NATO organizations to obtain Allied assistance in and agreement to making needed improvements.

At Montebello, Defense Ministers agreed to make further stockpile reductions which leave the stockpile at its lowest level in the last twenty years. At the same time, the Allies agreed that NATO must pursue appropriate modernization programs so that this reduced stockpile will continue to constitute an adequate and credible deterrent. I will support both the stockpile level decision and the modernization programs which will ensure a credible deterrent. Present U.S. defense programs and budgets provide the means to implement these decisions. I ask for your support to ensure that they can be carried out in an orderly and timely fashion. The DoD report accurately documents the need, and outlines the remedial measures which we will be pursuing. The associated requirement to improve our target acquisition and communications capabilities is also well documented in the report.

As I mentioned earlier, NATO's nuclear posture correctly constitutes NATO's most effective deterrent against Soviet use of chemical weapons. We must do better than that, which is why the U.S. should develop limited but modern chemical capability to serve as a direct deterrent against Soviet chemical use. U.S. defense budgets and programs include the necessary steps to sustain this deterrent.

NATO Allies are aware of the requirements for nuclear modernization and improvements in survivability and security. U.S. will continue to provide the leadership and encouragement to stimulate the Allies participate in their portions of future programs. As a result of the 1979 dual-track decision on LRINF [long range intermediate range nuclear forces], NATO is proceeding with deployments in the absence of a satisfactory negotiated arms reduction agreement which would make such deployments unnecessary. I stand fully committed to see equitable and verifiable arms reduction solution, and, as I have said many times, the U.S. is ready to recommend negotiations with preconditions at any time. Until such a negotiated solution is reached, however, the U.S. must provide the means to ensure that the nuclear posture of NATO does not deteriorate to such a degree that deterrence is threatened.

NATO's conventional, chemical, and nuclear forces are inextricably linked in achieving the Alliance's objective of deterrence and defense. If we are to maintain deterrence and live in peace and freedom must continue to improve each capability. Secretary Weinberger's report on NATO nuclear posture has outlined the current situation and a practical way to proceed towards an enduring nuclear posture in NATO. I fully endorse his recommendations.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and George Bush, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Sept. 17, 1984).

Atlas of the Caribbean Basin

Introduction

Caribbean Basin Initiative Countries

Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda
The Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Montserrat
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
St. Christopher-Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Turks and Caicos Islands

This is the second edition of the Atlas of the Caribbean Basin. First published in 1982 in connection with the Administration's proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative, the atlas consists of maps and charts illustrating the basin's economic and political features. We have revised most of the original displays to reflect more recent data and events since 1982 and have added two maps (dealing with development assistance, not covered in the first edition).

The Caribbean Basin includes the islands of the Caribbean Sea as well as the countries on its shores. All countries that are potential beneficiaries of the initiative, which extends to the South American nations of Guyana and Suriname, are included in the atlas. The larger countries of the region—Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela—are not included; they are also providing economic assistance to their smaller neighbors. Cuba, a member of the Soviet bloc, figures in the maps on the military balance and political alignments and in a few of the economic displays intended to show developments in the region as a whole.

After nearly 20 years of economic growth, most basin countries were hard hit by the oil crisis and the worldwide recession beginning in the 1970s. The Caribbean Basin Initiative was the first of two special efforts by the United States to help these countries overcome their difficulties. Passed by Congress and signed by the President in the summer of 1983, the Caribbean Basin Initiative is designed to encourage private economic endeavor in these countries and by U.S. businesses. Its main feature is the elimination of U.S. customs duties on virtually all basin exports. The preferences are not available to countries under communist rule.

The second effort is the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act proposed by the President in February 1984. This proposal is based on recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, which met in 1983. Its scope is limited to Central America, where the effects of the recent economic setbacks are exacerbated by Soviet-Cuban intervention. The Central American plan proposes a large increase in U.S. official develop-

ment assistance along with additional military aid to promote economic growth and social progress while strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law.

Most of the maps and charts indicate the source of the data on which the displays and calculations are based. No sources are given on the trade maps, which are based on United Nations, 1981 Yearbook of International Trade Statistics; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Yearbook 1983; U.S. Department of Commerce, EM 450/455 (U.S. exports—domestic merchandise) and IM 150/155 (U.S. general imports); and data compiled from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trade Series C by Data Resources, Inc. Other numerical presentations without indication of source are based on official U.S. Government estimates.

Prepared by Harry F. Young

Editing, design, and production:
Colleen Sussman

Political Alignments

All but two of the Caribbean Basin countries are members of the Organization of American States (OAS), founded in 1948 to intensify the already existing cooperation among countries of the Western Hemisphere.

About half of the basin countries are full members of the Nonaligned Movement, a formal association of over 100 members organized to promote the interests of developing countries and act as an independent force in world affairs. Cuban communist leader Fidel

Castro was president of the movement from 1979 to 1983.

All English-speaking countries are members of the Commonwealth along with the United Kingdom and former units of the British Empire in other regions.

The Communist Party of Cuba, the Sandinista Liberation Front of Nicaragua, and Grenada's New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (New JEWEL Movement), which held power in Grenada from July 1979 to October 1983, are recognized by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as fraternal parties.

Political associations limited to the basin, and currently functioning, are the Organization of East Caribbean States (O ECS), formed in July 1981 to safeguard the independence of the sovereign members and establish a common foreign policy; and the Central American Democratic Community (CADC), founded in January 1982 to promote free elections, social reform, and human rights and to combat terrorism and aggression by external forces.

Independent Caribbean Basin Countries¹

(dates of independence)

Before 1945

Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

1960-65

Jamaica (U.K.)
Trinidad and Tobago (U.K.)

1965-70

Guyana (U.K.)
Barbados (U.K.)

1970-75

The Bahamas (U.K.)
Grenada (U.K.)

1975-83

Suriname (Netherlands)
Dominica (U.K.)
St. Lucia (U.K.)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (U.K.)
Belize (U.K.)
Antigua and Barbuda (U.K.)
St. Christopher-Nevis (U.K.)

¹Countries in parentheses are the former colonial powers.

Members of the:

-  Organization of American States
-  Nonaligned Movement
-  Commonwealth
-  Central American



Caribbean Basin countries have the world's smallest military establishments relative to their size. Cuba is the exception. With a population less than one-sixth as large as Mexico's, Cuba expends two-and-one-half times as much money for its armed forces. Hundreds of thousands of Cubans are enrolled in paramilitary organizations. And new Soviet equipment acquired since 1975 has greatly enhanced Cuban striking power.

Nicaragua is creating a military establishment similar to Cuba's comprising

ing a regular army, a militia (an actual fighting force probably not yet as effective as the Cuban ready reserve, its counterpart), and a territorial militia (still in its infancy). Had the communist government of Grenada carried out its military expansion plans, it would have created the world's largest armed force relative to population.

Soviet-bloc Military Presence'

Country	Number
Soviet combat troops	2,600
Soviet and East European military and security technicians	2,000
Cuban technicians	150
Nicaragua	3,000

¹Excludes civilian advisers in Cuba (6,000-8,000 Soviets) and Nicaragua (350 Soviets and East Europeans and 6,000 militarily trained Cubans)


Relative Military Strength'

Caribbean Basin:	Population (thousands)	Armed Forces (thousands)	Number of Jet Fighters
Barbados	251	0.7	0
Cuba	9,858	227.0	235
Dominican Republic	6,248	23.0	0
El Salvador	4,685	24.6	0
Jamaica	2,335	9.2	0
Guatemala	7,714	21.5	0
Haiti	5,690	8.0	0
Honduras	4,276	15.2	16
Nicaragua	2,812	45.8	0
Panama	2,058	14.5 ²	0

Other regional:

Colombia	27,663	70.2	16
Mexico	75,702	120.0	22
Venezuela	17,993	48.0	42

¹Countries not appearing in table do not maintain armed forces.
²This figure does not differentiate between police and military.



Economic Alignments

Hampered by small size and dependence on one or a few export commodities, Caribbean Basin countries have formed economic unions among themselves and joined in common endeavors with developing countries in other regions. All basin countries belong to the Group of 77, the developing countries' economic advocate, and the Latin American Economic System (SELA), a

permanent organization founded in 1975 to establish a common Latin American and Caribbean policy on international economic issues.

Some Caribbean countries belong to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States established in 1975 by agreement between 46 developing countries and the European Economic Community (EEC). ACP manufactured goods and some agricultural products have free entry into the EEC.

Since 1972 Cuba has been a member of the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (CMEA), founded in 1949 to promote international economic planning in the Soviet bloc. Organizations limited to the basin are:

- The Central American Common Market (CACM), founded in 1960 to establish a regional free-trade zone; and
- The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), established in 1973 to promote economic and

other cooperative endeavors among the English-speaking Caribbean countries. Seven of the smaller CARICOM members have formed the East Caribbean Common Market, now incorporated into the Organization of East Caribbean States.



MOST CARIBBEAN BASIN COUNTRIES PRODUCE and export one or a few agricultural staples—sugar, coffee, bananas, meat, spices, or rice. But none produces enough food to meet its own needs. While per capita food consumption increased in the 1970s, food production in most countries did not grow as fast as population. Cereals (especially wheat) are the leading food imports. Drought and hurricanes occur frequently. And in many countries land usage and marketing are inefficient.



Annual rate of change in per capita food production, 1971–80:

- +5% or above
- +2%–3.9%
- 0–1.9%
- 0 to –2.9%

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1980* (1981). No data for countries not indicated.



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Agricultural Exports

Most Caribbean Basin countries are dependent on the export of primary commodities (unprocessed or semi-processed agricultural or mineral products) or petroleum products refined from imported crude oil. Primary commodities characteristically are subject to severe price fluctuations as well as competition from synthetic products (corn sweeteners for sugar) or substitutes (other beverages for coffee). Efforts to

stabilize prices and markets through international commodity agreements generally have had little success over the longer term. The prices of principal Caribbean Basin agricultural commodities fluctuated widely in the 1970s and declined in the early 1980s.


Caribbean Basin's Average Share of World Exports, 1978-80



Raw or processed agricultural commodities accounting for more than 30% of export value, 1978-82:



Important second export item:



Mining and the refining of minerals are the chief nonagricultural export industries in the Caribbean Basin. In almost all countries where these sectors generate more than 40% of total export earnings, exports are dominated by a single commodity—which makes the national economy vulnerable to fluctuating prices. The demand for basin-produced metals and nonfuel minerals is expected to rise substantially in the mid-1980s. Some experts predict that minerals demand will reach spectacular heights

toward the end of the century and that this will create a large demand for investment capital. Approximately 40% of the bauxite produced in the region is processed into alumina. Only in Suriname is there further processing into aluminum. Estimates are that between 1977 and the year 2000 over \$5 billion will be needed to create the required additional capacity for bauxite production in developing countries. In all basin countries there was an increase in the manufacturing share of

the gross domestic product between 1960 and 1980. But the growth rate declined in the 1970s; and in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Panama, was lower in 1980 than in 1970. The Caribbean Basin accounted for 53% of the value of world exports of bauxite in 1978 and for 16% of alumina (aluminum oxide) and 15% of petroleum products in 1980.

Recoverable Nonfuel Mineral Deposits
(excluding bauxite)

Country	Mineral
Costa Rica	Gold
Dominican Republic	Gold, ferronickel
El Salvador	Gold
Guatemala	Antimony, barite, cadmium
Guyana	Diamond, gold
Honduras	Cadmium, gold, iron ore, lead, silver, zinc
Nicaragua	Gold, silver
Panama	Cadmium
Suriname	Diamond, gold



Recoverable minerals (see table)

Manufactured products or mining commodities accounting for more than 40% of export earnings:

Alumina and bauxite

Petroleum products

Light manufacturing

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative


Export Markets

Caribbean Basin economies depend heavily on exports to industrial nations. As developing countries, they receive preferential tariff rates from the United States, Japan, and European countries for many products. In the 1970s the United States was the largest foreign market for 11 basin countries and the second largest for almost all others. The European Economic Community (EEC) absorbs about 15% of the basin's exports, chiefly petroleum products, coffee, and bananas.

Chief U.S. Imports From Caribbean Basin Countries

(order of importance based on average value, 1980-82)

Petroleum products
Coffee
Sugar
Bananas
Bauxite
Apparel




The United States is the chief supplier of agricultural and manufactured goods to the Caribbean Basin. In the 1970s the U.S. share of basin imports (excluding crude oil imported from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]) refined or reexported by The Bahamas, Netherlands Antilles, and Trinidad and Tobago) grew from 33% to about 39%, while the share of the European

Economic Community (EEC) remained at 17%. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are the chief suppliers of crude oil for the refineries in Trinidad and Tobago, Iran for those in The Bahamas, and Venezuela for those in the Netherlands Antilles. For foodstuffs and manufactured goods these three exporters of petroleum products rely heavily on the United States.

Major Caribbean Basin Imports From the United States

(order of importance based on average value, 1980-83)

- Electrical machinery
- Apparel
- Cars, buses, trucks
- Petroleum products
- Wheat
- Paper and paperboard
- Synthetic resins



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Energy

The Caribbean Basin is dependent on oil imported from abroad. The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, and Netherlands Antilles acquire over 90% of their export earnings from products refined from crude oil purchased from Asian or Middle Eastern exporters or Venezuela. And all basin countries depend on imported oil for much if not all of their energy.


In the 1970s the cost of imported oil grew faster than basin export earn-

ings. To ease this plight, Mexico and Venezuela in 1980 initiated a program of guaranteeing oil shipments to certain Caribbean and Central American countries and to finance these with long-term, low-interest loans. Trinidad and Tobago (the only basin country that has major oil fields) offers a similar facility to CARICOM countries.

Efforts to develop new sources of energy have been supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development as well as the Organization of American

States, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Latin American Energy Organization, and other international bodies. Emphasis is on hydroelectric power and nonconventional sources of energy available in the area, such as agricultural wastes, the sun, and the wind.

Oil Imports as Percentage of Total Exports Value, 1978-82




Source: Calculations based on International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, Yearbook 1983 and February 1984 monthly report.

- ☐ Petroleum refining—chief export industry
- ☐ Productive oil and gas fields
- ☐ Petroleum exploration and drilling
- ☐ Beneficiaries of Mexican-Venezuelan oil facilities



Illiteracy, which hampers economic progress in many developing regions, is less prevalent in the Caribbean Basin. In 1960, at the beginning of the First UN Development Decade, all East Caribbean islands, Jamaica, The Bahamas, Belize, Costa Rica, Guyana, Panama, and Suriname were literate countries (that is, at least 75% of the population could read and write a simple sentence). With the help of U.S. and international aid programs, most of the other countries have substantially reduced the number of illiterates. In many places, however, primary and secondary education are deficient.




Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

Access to Potable Water

Access to safe drinking water is necessary for public health and economic improvement. Over 20 years ago the Alliance for Progress launched an effort to provide adequate water supplies and sewage disposal systems throughout Latin America. The need was greatest in Central America and in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Sanitation programs have been sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank,

the Inter-American Development Bank, the Pan American Health Organization, and other agencies. Although urban sprawl, due to heavy migration from rural areas, posed new obstacles, most Caribbean Basin countries now are able to supply safe water for a much larger percentage of the population.

Access to Potable Water
(% of population)



Source: Pan American Health Organization, Doc. No. ES 5 (June 1969), program budget proposed for 1984-85 (April 1983). Data for 1968 given only for the above countries.



Each year over 200,000 citizens of Caribbean Basin countries migrate to the United States. Most migrants leave home because of low wages and limited prospects. Over 60% come from the Caribbean islands—Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well as the English-speaking countries. More than two-thirds enter the United States illegally—crossing the border by stealth, or with forged papers, or with nonresident visas later ignored.

Although immigration to the United States has reduced the rate of population growth and the pressure of unemployment in basin countries, it has deprived them as well of professional persons and skilled workers needed for their development.


Estimates of Population and Yearly Number of Illegal Migrants to the United States from Chief Sources of Migration, 1977
(thousands)

	Population	Migrants
Barbados	240	4
Dominican Republic	5,400	35
El Salvador	4,500	25
Guatemala	7,200	15
Guyana	800	7
Haiti	5,010	11
Jamaica	2,900	29
Trinidad and Tobago	1,000	15

Population of Caribbean Basin Initiatives Countries and Cuba, estimates mid-1983
(thousands)

Anguilla	7
Antigua and Barbuda	79
The Bahamas	223
Barbados	251
Belize	154
British Virgin Islands	13
Cayman Islands	20
Costa Rica	2,624
Cuba	9,858
Dominica	74
Dominican Republic	6,248
El Salvador	4,685
Grenada	111
Guatemala	7,714
Guyana	833
Haiti	5,690
Honduras	4,276
Jamaica	2,335
Montserrat	12
Netherlands Antilles	247
Nicaragua	2,812
Panama	2,058
St. Christopher-Nevis	45
St. Lucia	119
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	134
Suriname	363
Trinidad and Tobago	1,211
Turks and Caicos Islands	8

Source: Bureau of the Census.



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative



Main sources of immigration to the United States.

Official development assistance (ODA) consists of grants or low-interest, long-term loans to developing countries from foreign governments or multilateral lending institutions (MLIs). Most Caribbean Basin countries are dependent on ODA for economic stability and growth.

Donor countries include members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Soviet-bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the industrial democracies' Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.


Western and MLI aid for the Caribbean

is coordinated through the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, sponsored by the World Bank. Some projects are supported by the Caribbean Development Bank, established in 1970 with funds from numerous countries, including the United States. A consultative group of bilateral and multilateral donors to Central America, sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, is planned; an organizational meeting was held in September 1983.

Cuba relies heavily on CMEA aid. Per capita, Cuba receives four times as much aid as the next largest CMEA recipient (Vietnam).

Per Capita Bilateral ODA, Average for 1979-82¹

(U.S. dollars)



¹For countries with a population more than 1 million.

Source: Calculations based on data in OECD, *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1979-82* (1984) and *Development Cooperation, Efforts and Policies of the Development Assistance Committee, 1983 Review* (1984).



Sources of ODA 1979-82:




Between 1979 and 1982, U.S. bilateral aid—that sent directly to another country and not channeled through a multilateral lending institution—accounted for more than 30% of official development assistance (ODA) to the Caribbean Basin (excluding Cuba). Although most bilateral U.S. aid is committed directly to individual countries, for over 20 years some aid has been assigned for regional projects in Central America and the eastern Caribbean.

The recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, coming after nearly 20 years of economic growth, highlighted the economic, social, and political fragility of many basin countries. Increased foreign aid was necessary. Between 1979 and 1982, U.S. ODA was doubled. And the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, presented in January 1984, has recommended further increases and a long-term plan of economic assistance for Central America. The goals are to help recipients over current fiscal dif-

ficulties, ensure long-term growth with equitable distribution of benefits, and strengthen democracy and the rule of law.

These programs would complement the Caribbean Basin Initiative, passed by Congress in 1983, which eliminates tariffs on virtually all basin exports.

In 1980–81 Nicaragua was the second largest recipient of U.S. economic aid in Latin America (El Salvador was first). No U.S. aid is now programmed for Nicaragua.



Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Accession deposited: France, Sept. 27, 1984.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983. Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Sept. 5, 1984.

Commodities—Common Fund

Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.¹
Ratification deposited: Somalia, Aug. 27, 1984.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, Aug. 8, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Liberia, Aug. 28, 1984.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accessions deposited: Netherlands, Sept. 7, 1984.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614.
Accession deposited: New Zealand, Sept. 7, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Australia, Sept. 7, 1984.

Jute

International agreement on jute and jute products, 1982, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 9, 1984.

Accession deposited: Indonesia, Aug. 31, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Nepal, June 18, 1984.

Marine Pollution

Convention for the protection and development of the marine environment of the wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 1983.¹
Ratified by the President: Sept. 6, 1984.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between States. Adopted at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the U.S. June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439.
Acceptances deposited: Australia, June 15, 1984; Japan, May 29, 1984.

Red Cross

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3363.

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S. Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365.
Accessions deposited: Vanuatu, Oct. 27, 1982.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.²
Accessions deposited: Cuba, Nov. 25, 1982; St. Lucia, Oct. 27, 1982.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.²
Accession deposited: St. Lucia, Oct. 7, 1982.

Seabed—Operations

Provisional understanding regarding deep seabed matters, with memorandum of implementation, joint record, exchanges of notes, and declarations. Signed at Geneva Aug. 3, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1984.

Signatures: Belgium,³ France, Federal Republic of Germany,⁴ Italy,³ Japan, Netherlands,^{3,5} U.K., U.S.

United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993. Admitted to membership: Brunei, Sept. 21, 1984.

Women

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.²
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Sept. 13, 1984.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: U.K., May 29, 1984.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 8, 1982, for the sale of agricultural commodities (TIAS 10483). Effected by exchange of letters at Dhaka Aug. 23, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 23, 1984.

Barbados

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Hamburg June 27, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1984.

Botswana

Agreement relating to the employment of dependents of official government employees. Signed at Gaborone June 15, 1984. Entered into force June 15, 1984.

Brazil

Agreements amending the agreement of Mar. 31, 1982 (TIAS 10369), relating to trade in cotton and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchanges of letters at Washington Aug. 3 and 9, 1984, and Aug. 20 and Sept. 10, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 9 and Sept. 10, 1984.

Canada

Agreement concerning the airworthiness and environmental certification of imported civil aeronautical products. Effected by exchange of letters at Ottawa Aug. 31, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1984.
Supersedes arrangement of July 28, 1938, amended (EAS 131, TIAS 7091).

Convention with respect to taxes on income and capital, with related exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Sept. 26, 1980; and protocol with related notes. Signed at Ottawa June 14, 1983; and second protocol. Signed Washington Mar. 28, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1984.

caons exchanged: Aug. 16, 1984.

nces arrangement of Aug. 2 and

1928, relating to relief from double
tax on shipping profits (EAS 4); con-
and protocol of Mar. 4, 1942, as
ie and supplemented, for avoidance of
e taxation and prevention of fiscal eva-
ne case of income taxes (TS 983,
247, 3916, 6415); convention of
1961, for avoidance of double taxa-
prevention of fiscal evasion with
taxes on estates of deceased per-
AS 4995).

Caribbean

ent concerning the establishment and
of a Voice of America radio broad-
in Costa Rica. Effected by ex-
ref notes at San Jose July 17 and
1984. Entered into force Aug. 7,

Central American Republic

ent amending the agreement of
1984, for the sale of agricultural
commodities. Signed at Santo Domingo
3, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 30,

greement for commodity imports,
annex. Signed at Cairo July 31, 1984.
re into force July 31, 1984.

endment to the program grant
ent of Aug. 29, 1982, as amended
S 0472, 10728), for decentralization sec-
support. Signed at Cairo Aug. 8, 1984.
re into force Aug. 8, 1984.

ent concerning emergency use of the
bled Forces Base at Hao, French
nia, by the U.S. space shuttle. Signed
ar Sept. 6, 1984. Entered into force
1984.

ent concerning fisheries off the coasts
e U.S., with annex and agreed minute.
eat Washington Sept. 21, 1984. Enters
ce upon exchange of notes following
olition of the internal procedures of both
rments.

a
ed loan and grant agreement for
ashtra minor irrigation. Signed at New
uly 31, 1984. Entered into force
3, 1984.

el loan and grant agreement for hill
sand and water development. Signed at
elhi July 31, 1984. Entered into force
3, 1984.

Chad

ent amending the agreement of
3 and Nov. 9, 1982 (TIAS 10580), as
red, relating to trade in cotton, wool,
manmade fiber textiles and textile prod-
effected by exchange of letters at
ngton Aug. 29 and 30, 1984. Entered
rce Aug. 30, 1984.

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 9, 1983, for the sale of agricultural com-
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at
Jakarta Aug. 31, 1984. Entered into force
Aug. 31, 1984.

Italy

Extradition treaty. Signed at Rome Oct. 13,
1983. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1984.
Ratifications exchanged: Sept. 24, 1984.

Supersedes extradition treaty of Jan. 18,
1973. TIAS 8052.

Memorandum of understanding for a
cooperative program in regional digital
seismic studies. Signed at Reston and Rome
June 7, 1984. Entered into force June 7,
1984.

Kenya

Agreement relating to the agreement of
Dec. 31, 1980, for the sale of agricultural
commodities (TIAS 9969). Signed at Nairobi
Aug. 24, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 24,
1984.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of
Feb. 26, 1979, as amended and extended
(TIAS 9419, 10324, 10446), relating to trade
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles
and textile products. Effected by exchange of
notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 25 and
Aug. 16, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 16,
1984.

Memorandum of understanding for procure-
ment of aircraft and provision of operational
and maintenance support for campaign
against narcotics cultivation and trafficking.
Signed at Mexico Aug. 30, 1984. Entered
into force Aug. 30, 1984.

Morocco

Memorandum of understanding on technical
cooperation in the earth sciences. Signed at
Reston and Rabat June 7 and July 16, 1984.
Entered into force July 16, 1984.

Mozambique

Investment incentive agreement. Effected by
exchange of notes at Maputo July 28, 1984.
Entered into force: Aug. 29, 1984.

Panama

Agreement concerning general security of
military information. Signed at Panama
Aug. 17, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 17,
1984.

Portugal

Technical agreement in implementation of the
defense agreement of Sept. 6, 1951, as
amended (TIAS 3087, 10050), with annexes
and related notes. Signed at Lisbon May 18,
1984. Enters into force when parties have
notified each other in writing that they have
satisfied their respective constitutional re-
quirements.

St. Christopher-Nevis

Agreement relating to radio communications
between amateur stations on behalf of third
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at St.

John's and St. Kitts July 6 and 9, 1984.
Entered into force Aug. 8, 1984.

Senegal

Air transport services agreement, with
memorandum of understanding. Signed at
Dakar Mar. 28, 1979.
Entered into force: Aug. 17, 1984,
definitively

Spain

Agreement on space cooperation. Effected by
exchange of memoranda at Madrid
Aug. 31, and Sept. 4, 1984. Entered into
force Sept. 4, 1984.

Sudan

Agreement amending the agreement of
Dec. 22, 1979, for the sale of agricultural
commodities. Effected by exchange of notes
at Khartoum Aug. 9, 1984. Entered into
force Aug. 9, 1984.

Sweden

Supplementary convention on extradition.
Signed at Stockholm Mar. 14, 1983. Entered
into force Sept. 24, 1984.
Ratifications exchanged: Sept. 24, 1984.

Thailand

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of
penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok Oct. 29,
1982.¹
Ratified by the President: Sept. 6, 1984.

U.S.S.R.

Agreement concerning diplomatic and other
visas, with agreed minute and oral under-
standing. Effected by exchange of notes at
Moscow July 30, 1984. Entered into force
July 30, 1984.

United Kingdom

Agreement concerning the Cayman Islands
and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange
of letters at London July 26, 1984. Entered
into force Sept. 6, 1984.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agreement of
Oct. 26 and 27, 1978, concerning trade in
men's and boys' wool and manmade fiber
suits. Effected by exchange of notes at
Belgrade May 22 and July 3, 1984. Entered
into force July 3, 1984.

¹Not in force.

²Not in force for the U.S.

³With declaration(s).

⁴Applicable to Land Berlin.

⁵Not a signatory to the memorandum of
implementation.

⁶Applicable to Isle of Man, Anguilla, Ber-
muda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman
Islands, Falkland Islands and dependencies,
Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn,
Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, St.
Helena and dependencies, Turks and Caicos
Islands, U.K. Sovereign Base Areas of
Akrotiri and Dhekelai on the Island of
Cyprus. ■

September 1984

Note: The editors solicit readers' comments on the value of the *Bulletin's* monthly chronologies. Unless a positive response is received, the chronologies will be discontinued.

September 1

Pravda reports that Soviet President Chernenko says an outer space weapons ban agreement with the U.S. will ease the way for discussions on other disarmament issues.

Greek and Turkish Cypriots approve a U.N. peace initiative to unite Cyprus.

Libyan leader Qadhafi says he has sent troops and arms to Nicaragua to help the Sandinista government fight the U.S. "on its own ground."

September 2

The Reagan Administration welcomes the statement regarding the Soviet Union's readiness for arms negotiations contained in President Chernenko's Sept. 1 comments, but dismisses criticism that U.S. interest is not genuine.

Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with President Nyerere of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam and President Kaunda of Zambia in Lusaka.

September 3-4

Assistant Secretary Crocker visits Uganda to meet with government officials in an effort to improve diplomatic communications. He also expresses U.S. concern over the human rights situation.

September 4

Canada holds elections for new representatives of the 282-seat Parliament.

Palau voters approve (66% in favor) a compact of free association with the U.S. The compact must now be accepted by a majority of the people and by both houses of the Palauan Congress.

September 5-6

Secretary Shultz meets with Reda Guedira, a Royal Counselor to Morocco's King Hassan, to discuss the recent treaty between Morocco and Libya. Guedira subsequently meets with Vice President Bush and National Security Advisor McFarlane on Sept. 6.

Ambassador Shlaudeman meets with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco in Manzanillo, Mexico. It is their fifth round of discussions in support of the Contadora process.

September 5

Canada's Progressive Conservative Party wins a majority in the parliamentary election. Its party leader, Brian Mulroney, replaces John Turner as Prime Minister.

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi thanks the U.S. for refusing to give asylum to seven Sikhs who hijacked a plane to Dubai in August. She adds that the U.S. decision will strengthen U.S.-Indian relations.

Assistant Secretary Crocker meets with President Moi of Kenya in Nairobi.

September 6-7

Assistant Secretary Crocker visits Lusaka to meet with a representative of the Angolan Interior Ministry.

The nine foreign ministers of the Contadora process meet in Panama to receive a new draft of the Contadora regional agreement.

September 6

U.S. vetoes a UN Security Council draft resolution calling on Israel to immediately lift restrictions on normal civilians in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon.

In a letter to Congress, President Reagan rejects granting import relief to the copper industry.

September 7

Department of State spokesman Hughes confirms a U.S. protest to Iran regarding the Sept. 3 attack on a Swedish member of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal by two Iranian members at The Hague.

September 8-15

Under Secretary Armacost visits London (Sept. 10), Paris (Sept. 11), Rome (Sept. 12), Bonn (Sept. 13), and Brussels (Sept. 14). While in Brussels, he meets with the North Atlantic Council and the EC Commission.

September 8

Botswana holds general elections. President Masire's ruling Botswana Democratic Party receives 29 of the 34 seats for Parliament.

September 9

Secretary Shultz reaffirms that the U.S. is ready to discuss mutual measures of restraint with respect to testing of new space weapons but would not accept the Soviet Union's proposal for a testing freeze prior to negotiations.

On NBC's "Meet the Press," Secretary Shultz says the Soviet Union is constructing a radar that is believed to be in violation of the antiballistic missile treaty.

September 10-21

The first review conference of the Environmental Modification Convention is held in Geneva. ACDA Assistant Director Etzold heads the U.S. delegation.

September 10

UN-sponsored talks to resolve disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots begin in New York. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar serves as mediator.

Ethiopia establishes the communist Worker's Party as its only legal party.

September 11

President Reagan says the Soviet Union can increase their purchase of wheat and/or corn by 10 million metric tons for the second year of a long-term grain agreement beginning Oct. 1. This increases the maximum level of grain to 22 million metric tons.

President Reagan meets with NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington.

Secretary Shultz notifies Congress of U.S. initiatives on the release of Asian-Americans and "re-education camp" prisoners from Vietnam.

The third round of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) opens in Stockholm. Ambassador Goodby heads the U.S. delegation.

The VOA receives a contract from a private group in Costa Rica for use of its transmitters to broadcast programs to C. and Nicaragua.

September 12

Soviet authorities detain five U.S. sailors on their supply ship, the *Frieda K*, while en route to Nome, Alaska, for violation of Soviet territorial waters.

U.S. Senate unanimously condemns recent arrests and detentions of political opponents of the South African Government and calls for the release of such prisoners.

September 13

Israel's Parliament approves (89 to 18, with abstention) a government of national unity that includes the Labor Party and the Likud bloc. Labor Party leader Shimon Peres becomes Israel's eighth Prime Minister and Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir will serve as Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for the first half of a 50-month term. Their positions will be reversed for the second 25 months.

September 14

Secretary Shultz certifies that the El Salvador Government is eligible for continued U.S. military aid because of its progress in land reform, human rights abuses, free elections, and other areas.

September 15

Ambassador Kampelman presents a State Department report on human rights violations in the Soviet Union to the Stockholm Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Panama announces its decision to convert the U.S. military training school into a scientific military school when it is turned over to Panama on Oct. 1 as called for in the 1977 Panama Canal treaties.

September 17

U.S. files an official protest over the Soviet Union's handling of the seizure of five U.S. seamen off the Alaskan coast for violating Soviet territorial waters. State Department spokesman Hughes says the protest notes stated that the U.S. was not given proper access to the men and they were asked to sign a statement declaring they had intentionally sailed into Soviet waters.

Brian Mulroney is sworn in as Canada's 18th Prime Minister.

September 18

UN General Assembly opens its 39th session in New York. Zambian Ambassador Banda is elected President.

President Reagan rejects restrictions on steel imports requested by the steel industry and announces a policy for negotiating steel trade with foreign supplier countries. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kauzlarich says the U.S. is calling for reform of GATT to return to its original goal and to "operate more efficiently and effectively in the interest of all of its members."

U.S. celebrates the 20th anniversary of creation of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Between 1964-1984, the U.S. government has assisted victims of 729 disasters in 121 countries. These disasters killed 2.2 million people and affected another 2.2 million. The U.S. has provided about \$1 billion in disaster relief.

September 19

Soviet Union releases the five Alaskan men to U.S. Coast Guard authorities in international waters of the Bering Sea. The U.S. signs an agreement with Somalia to contribute \$38.6 million to rehabilitate the port of Kismayu. Somalia will contribute \$3.4 million toward the \$42 million project.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

In testimony before the Senate, AID Administrator McPherson says the Ethiopian government has inhibited the distribution of emergency food supplies contributed by the international donor community.

The European Community welcomes President Reagan's decision to reject extra duties and quotas on imported steel. Japan announces his request for more voluntary export restraints by exporters.

The U.S. asks the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal to dismiss two Iranian members for attacking a Swedish member on Sept. 3.

September 20-21

Japan economic consultations are held at the State Department. Under Secretary of State Douglas A. Costle heads the U.S. delegation; Deputy Secretary of State George Shultz heads the Japanese delegation.

September 20

A truck loaded with explosives runs through a steel barricade at the U.S. Embassy annex in a northeastern suburb of Beirut and explodes 20 feet in front of the annex. Ambassador Bartholomew is injured. Two Americans and 13 Lebanese (all but one of whom were U.S. Embassy employees) are killed. A group calling itself "Islamic Jihad" claims responsibility for the bombing.

The international tribunal on U.S.-Iran claims suspends its work after receiving a request for the removal of two Iranian members who attacked a Swedish member.

September 21

Assistant Secretary Murphy leads a team to Beirut to investigate the annex bombing.

Brunei Darussalam becomes the 159th member of the United Nations.

The School of the Americas, a U.S. military training base in Panama, closes after 38 years of operation.

Nicaragua announces its acceptance of the Contadora revised act without modification and calls on the U.S. to sign the additional protocol to that act.

September 23-24

President Reagan holds bilateral meetings with Argentine President Alfonsín, Zaire President Mobutu, and Norwegian Prime Minister Willoch before attending a U.S. reception for heads of the UN delegations in New York on Sept. 23.

On Sept. 24, President Reagan addresses the 39th session of the UN General Assembly. He also meets with Kampuchean Prince Sihanouk at the United Nations.

September 23-October 5

Secretary Shultz attends the UN General Assembly where he holds bilateral meetings with numerous foreign ministers.

September 24

The State Department issues a worldwide alert to U.S. Embassies after a threat of further action against the U.S. by Islamic Jihad appears in the Lebanon newspaper, *As Safir*.

The International Atomic Energy Agency opens its 28th annual conference in Vienna. Ambassador Kennedy heads the U.S. delegation.

September 25-26

Ambassador Shlaudeman meets with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Tinoco in Manzanillo, Mexico. It is their sixth round of discussions in support of the Contadora process.

September 25

President Reagan addresses the annual meeting of the IMF and IBRD.

Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney meets with President Reagan at the White House.

TASS says President Reagan's speech at the United Nations on Sept. 24 shows no sign of change in U.S. policy and denounces it as election campaign rhetoric.

Jordan restores full diplomatic relations with Egypt.

September 26

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in New York to discuss Soviet-American relations and other issues of mutual concern.

China and the United Kingdom initial an agreement to restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China effective July 1, 1997.

Druze militia leader Jumblatt says the U.S. and France face further terrorist attacks unless they change their policies on Lebanon.

September 27

President Reagan meets with President Belaunde of Peru.

September 28-29

Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community, Spain, Portugal, the Contadora group, and the five Central American states meet in San Jose, Costa Rica, to discuss increased European assistance to the Central American region.

September 28

President Reagan meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the White House.

The U.S. imposes additional controls on exports to Iran.

The U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru, is hit by automatic weapons fire. Windows are shattered, but no injuries are reported.

September 29

Secretary Shultz meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the State Department. ■

PRESS RELEASES

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*194	[Not issued.]	
195	9/10	Shultz: interview on "Meet the Press," Sept. 9.
*196	9/12	Shultz: interview on "The Today Show."
197	9/12	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Vol. XII, Part 1: East Asia and the Pacific, Multilateral Relations, released, Sept. 14.</i>
198	9/12	Shultz: statement before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, and Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, House Judiciary Committee, Sept. 11.
199	9/14	Shultz: address before the Chamber of Commerce, Miami.
199A	9/14	Shultz: question-and-answer session following address before Miami Chamber of Commerce.
*200	9/17	Shultz: remarks to the Conference on Faith in Humankind: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust.
*201	9/18	Shultz: interview on "Good Morning, America."
*202	9/20	Shultz: remarks at the senior Foreign Service presidential awards ceremony.
*203	9/20	Shultz: remarks at the "Salute to USIA" ceremony.
*204	9/20	Shultz: interview on NBC Nightly News.
*205	9/20	Shultz: interview on ABC World News Tonight.
*206	9/21	Program for the official working visit of Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Sept. 24-25.
*207	9/24	Shultz: news conference at the Waldorf Astoria, New York, Sept. 23.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

USUN

Press releases may be obtained from Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
*1	1/6	Lichenstein: explanation of vote on the complaint of Angola against South Africa, Security Council.
*2	1/11	Smith: transnational corporations, UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, Jan. 9.
*3	1/19	Barabba: population, Population Commission.
*4	1/23	Barabba: population, Population Commission.
*5	2/3	Lichenstein: Nicaragua, Security Council.
*6	2/8	Keyes: public administration, ECOSOC.
*7	2/15	Sorzano: outer space, Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
*8	2/16	Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Security Council.
*9	2/21	Keyes: southern Africa, racism, and apartheid, Human Rights Commission, Geneva, Feb. 15.
*10	2/24	Lichenstein: membership for Brunei, Security Council.
*11	3/1	Dewey: donor's meeting or humanitarian assistance for Kampuchea.
*12	2/29	Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Security Council.
*13	2/29	Kirkpatrick: Lebanon, Security Council.
*14	3/8	Reynolds: women, Commission on the Status of Women, Vienna, Feb. 16.
*15	3/8	Gerard: women, preparatory meeting of the 1985 World Conference on Women, Vienna, Feb. 29 and Mar. 2.
*16	3/8	Gerard: women, preparatory meeting of the 1985 World Conference on Women, Vienna, Mar. 6.
*17	3/12	Benedick: population, preparatory meeting of the 1984 International Conference on Population.
*18	3/12	Sorzano: Indian Ocean zone of peace, ad hoc committee.
*19	3/27	Kirkpatrick: Sudan's letter to the President of the Security Council, Security Council.
*20	3/28	Clark: Libya, Security Council, Mar. 20.
*21	3/30	Kirkpatrick: Nicaragua, Security Council.
*22	4/4	Clark: Libya, Security Council.
*23	4/4	Sorzano: Central America Security Council.
*24	4/19	Clark: extension of UNIF resolution, Security Council.
*25	4/26	Goodman: energy, Committee on the Development and Utilization of New Renewable Sources of Energy.
*26	5/1	Feldman: East Asia and the Pacific, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Tokyo, Apr. 18.
*27	5/2	Dewey: donors' meeting on humanitarian assistance Kampuchea.
*28	5/2	Handley: narcotics, ECOSOC.
*29	5/2	Jones: nongovernmental organizations, ECOSOC.
*30	5/8	Ambassador Kirkpatrick's itinerary for visit to Asia, May 11-31.
*31	5/8	Bergaust: UN Decade for Women, ECOSOC.
*32	5/11	Micronesia exhibition at the UN.
*33	5/9	Keyes: development, ECOSOC Committee of International Development Strategy, May 8.
*34	5/9	Keyes: nongovernmental organizations, ECOSOC.
*35	5/11	Clark: Cyprus, Security Council.
*36	5/14	Sherman: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
*37	5/14	Fleming: population, ECOSOC.
*38	5/16	Keyes: human rights, ECOSOC.
*39	5/17	Keyes: human rights, Committee II.
*40	5/18	Sherman: Compact of Free Association, Trusteeship Council, May 17.
*41	5/18	Sherman: Micronesia, Trusteeship Council.
*42	5/22	Jones: women, ECOSOC.
*43	5/23	Sherman: Marshall Islands Trusteeship Council.
*44	5/24	Jones: women, ECOSOC.
*45	5/30	Herzberg: Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, ECOSOC May 24.
*46	5/30	Wake: human rights, ECOSOC, May 24.
*47	5/30	Jones: social development, ECOSOC, May 25.
*48	5/29	Sherman: TTPI, Trusteeship Council.
49	5/30	Sorzano: complaint of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Security Council.
*50	6/1	Sorzano: complaint of the GCC, Security Council.

- 6/1 Sorzano: disarmament, Disarmament Commission.
- 6/18 Kirkpatrick: work of the UNDP, UNDP Governing Council, Geneva, June 13.
- 6/20 Blocker: information, Committee on Information.
- 6/26 Eskin: outer space, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, June 13.
- 6/25 Blocker: information, Committee on Information.

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Department of State

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For multiple copies may be obtained by writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and Policy, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

Opening World Tensions, UN General Assembly, Sept. 24, 1984 (Current Policy #610).

Secretary Shultz

Opening Remarks to Holocaust Conference, Conference on Faith in Mankind: Rescuers of Jews During the Holocaust, sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, Sept. 17, 1984 (Current Policy #614).

Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension, Chamber of Commerce, Miami, Sept. 14, 1984 (Current Policy #611).

Speeded Refugee Admissions for FY 1984, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 1, 1984 (Current Policy #610).

Asia

India: The Search for Peace, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Conference on the Indian Subcontinent Crisis, Sept. 11, 1984 (Current Policy #613).

WMIAs in Southeast Asia (GIST, Sept. 1984).

Energy
International Energy Security: The Continuing Challenge, Deputy Assistant Secretary Wendt, Oxford Energy Seminar, Oxford, England, Sept. 14, 1984 (Current Policy #612).

Atlantic Council Meets in Washington, Sept. 29-31, 1984 (Bulletin Reprint).

General

Index of the GIST series (Sept. 1984).

Human Rights

Sixteenth Semiannual Report: Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, Dec. 1, 1983-Mar. 31, 1984 (Special Report #117). Human Rights (GIST, Sept. 1984).

Terrorism

International Terrorism (GIST, Sept. 1984).

Western Hemisphere

The Private Sector's Role in Latin American Development, Ambassador Mitterhoff, American Chamber of Commerce, Santiago, Aug. 30, 1984 (Current Policy #609).
Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, Assistant Secretary Motley, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 31, 1984 (Current Policy #605). ■

Background Notes

This series provides brief, factual summaries of the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of about 170 countries (excluding the United States) and of selected international organizations. Recent revisions are:

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Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State on September 14, 1984, released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XII, Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific; Multilateral Relations*. The volume presents over 1,000 pages of previously highly classified documents on policy deliberations and diplomatic negotiations between the United States and its major allies in East Asia and the Pacific during a time of conflict and tension.

In 1952 the United States was faced with the twin challenges of formulating policy with regard to the contingency of Chinese aggression in Southeast Asia and arriving at workable arrangements for both political and military consultations with major allies. The first 400 pages of the volume document the efforts of both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations to meet these challenges, including U.S. Government meetings at the highest level, the initial consultative meetings under the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) treaty, and military consultations with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand.

The main theme of the volume from the spring of 1954 onward, comprising almost two-thirds of its length, is the Eisenhower Administration's intensified concern with regional defense and

security in East Asia and the Pacific, which was caused by the collapse of the French effort in Indochina. Perhaps the most important of the developments delineated here is the negotiation and conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. Also presented is evidence of the Eisenhower Administration's continuing interest in the consultations under the ANZUS treaty and a policy debate over the nature and extent of U.S. economic aid to Asia.


Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Volume XII, Part 1, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Copies of Volume XII, Part 1 (Department of State Publication No. 9390; GPO Stock No. 044-000-02019-0) may be purchased for \$20.00 (domestic postpaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 20402. Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. The *Foreign Relations* series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy. The volume released September 14 is the ninth of 16 to be published covering the years 1952-1954.

Press release 197 of Sept. 12, 1984. ■

Atlas of United States Foreign Relations

The *Atlas of United States Foreign Relations*, prepared in the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, provides basic information about U.S. foreign relations for easy reference and as an educational tool. Comprising 100 pages with more than 90 maps and charts, it is divided into six sections and begins with:

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
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


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Department of State bulletin

Volume 84 / Number 2093 / December 1984

over: Secretary Shultz

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The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN'S contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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In conducting negotiations and discussions in the major areas of U.S.-Soviet relations . . . we have been guided by four basic principles.

. . . we must have a strong defense.

. . . we must be united both at home and with our friends and allies.

. . . we must be patient.

. . . we must be purposeful, flexible, and credible.

Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship Over the Long Term

by Secretary Shultz

*Address before the
Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of
Soviet International Behavior
in Los Angeles on October 18, 1984.¹*

distinguished audience knows well the Soviet Union presents us with a conceptual as well as a strategic challenge. Let me take advantage of this occasion, therefore, to raise what I see as some of these larger conceptual issues that face us in managing Soviet relations over the long term.

Differences Between Systems

Differences between our two countries are profound. You and I know that, and we need to reiterate it, remind ourselves of it, and reflect upon it. The United States and the Soviet Union have different histories, cultures, economies, governmental systems, force structures, geographical circumstances, and visions of the future. We cannot analyze the Soviet Union as if it were a mirror of ourselves.

We Americans stand by our values and defend our interests, but we also treasure our great store by pragmatism, compromise, and flexibility in international relations. Marxist-Leninist ideology subordinates all of these qualities to the so-called objective, scientific, and inevitable course of history. We can debate how fully Soviet leaders follow this ideology. Nonetheless, however, it helps shape a political system that does not accommodate well compromise or truly positive relations with its opponents. Their doctrine of class struggle teaches them that their opponents are doomed to crisis and defeat—and that the struggle between the two systems is a mortal struggle. The most notable, perhaps, is the very different relationship between the government and the people in the Soviet Union and in the United States. Our na-

tional policies are the product of open debate, deliberation, and political competition guided by constitutional processes. In the Soviet Union, policy is the exclusive domain of a self-perpetuating ruling elite. Soviet leaders do not ignore public opinion; on the contrary, they vigorously seek to control it. Theirs is a system marked by repression and hostility to free political, intellectual, or religious expression. A nation whose system is the legacy of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin obviously bears scant resemblance to one that draws its inspiration from Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln.

When we in America conduct foreign policy, we must meet certain requirements that Soviet rulers can disregard. An American president must win and sustain support from the Congress and the American people if he is to lead the nation on any path, if our policy is to follow a steady course and a coherent strategy. Through this process, we gain the sustenance and commitment that come from democratic participation. And in the complex world of the 1980s and 1990s, the effectiveness of our dealings with the Soviets will benefit from a level of national understanding of the Soviet Union beyond what we have required, or had, in the past. That is why what the Rand/UCLA Center seeks to accomplish is so important, and why I look forward to the contribution that you can make.

Complexity of Managing the Relationship

Today, despite these profound differences, it is obviously in our interest to maintain as constructive a relationship as possible with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is powerful; it occupies a very large part of a shrinking world; and its military strength, including its vast nuclear arsenal, is a reality that we cannot ignore. Its people are a great and talented people, and we can benefit from interchange with them. And we owe it to our own people, and to the future of the planet, to strive for a more constructive pattern of relations between our countries.

A brief review of the postwar period reminds us of how complex a task this is. For the past two decades, Soviet defense spending has grown at a rate of 3%-5% a year, even when the United States was cutting back its own defense expenditures. And the Soviets kept up this military expansion even in the face of mounting economic difficulties.

In the postwar period, the United States never sought to expand its territory nor used force to impose its will upon weaker nations, even when we were the world's preeminent power. The Soviets, however, have used force frequently—in East Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. And it was their threat of force that imposed martial law on Poland.

It has been argued that Soviet behavior is partly motivated by a historical insecurity, that they suffer from an endemic paranoia stemming from centuries of war and foreign inva-

sions. But this analysis is clearly inadequate. The problem is that the Soviets seek absolute security in a way that guarantees insecurity for everyone else. Their policies have created antagonism when opportunities existed for better relations; their vast military power—and their demonstrated willingness to use it—go far beyond legitimate self-defense and pose objective problems for the world community. The Soviets' interventionist policies in the Third World, for example, seem the result of ideology combined with new capability, not the product of "insecurity." In the past two decades they have expanded their influence in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central America by purveying arms and backing those who subvert neighbors or block peace.

The record shows that when the Soviets have perceived weakness, when they have seen a vacuum, they have seized the opportunity to gain an advantage. Their code of behavior has not included categories for voluntary restraint or self-denial.

And they have not hesitated to persecute those of their own people—whether intellectuals, religious figures, or average citizens—who dared to speak or write freely, or who sought to emigrate. After signing the Helsinki Final Act, which confirmed that human rights were a vital part of the diplomatic dialogue on peace and security in Europe, the Soviets and their East European allies even suppressed the very citizens' groups that were formed to monitor compliance with the Helsinki accord.

We are left with two inescapable truths: in the nuclear age we need to maintain a relationship with the Soviet Union. Yet we know that they have acted in ways that violate our standards of human conduct and rule by law and that are repugnant to us—and they will likely continue to do so in the future. What kind of relationship can we reasonably expect to have in these circumstances? How can we manage U.S.-Soviet relations in a way that can endure over a long period?

Question of Linkage

The U.S.-Soviet relationship, of course, is a global one. We impinge on each other's interests in many regions of the world and in many fields of endeavor. A sustained and sound relationship, therefore, will confront the fact that the

Soviets can be expected periodically to do something abhorrent to us or threaten our interests.

This raises the question of linkage. Should we refuse to conclude agreements with the Soviets in one area when they do something outrageous in some other area? Would such an approach give us greater leverage over Moscow's conduct? Or would it place us on the defensive? Would it confirm our dedication to fundamental principles of international relations? Or would it make our diplomacy seem inconsistent? Clearly, linkage is not merely "a fact of life" but a complex question of policy.

There will be times when we must make progress in one dimension of the relationship contingent on progress in others. We can never let ourselves become so wedded to improving our relations with the Soviets that we turn a blind eye to actions that undermine the very foundation of stable relations. At the same time, linkage as an instrument of policy has limitations; if applied rigidly, it could yield the initiative to the Soviets, letting them set the pace and the character of the relationship.

We do not seek negotiations for their own sake; we negotiate when it is in our interest to do so. Therefore, when the Soviet Union acts in a way we find objectionable, it may not always make sense for us to break off negotiations or suspend agreements. If those negotiations or agreements were undertaken with a realistic view of their benefits for us, then they should be worth maintaining under all but exceptional circumstances. We should not sacrifice long-term interests in order to express immediate outrage. We must not ignore Soviet actions that trouble us. On the contrary, we need to respond forcefully. But in doing so, we are more likely to be successful by direct measures that counter the specific challenge.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Carter said his opinion of the Soviet Union and its goals had changed more in 1 week than throughout his entire term of office. He canceled the grain agreement, withdrew his own arms limitation treaty from Senate consideration, refused participation in the Olympics, and stopped the annual meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko. But did his actions serve our economic interests? Did they further progress toward a better arms agreement? Did they get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan?

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner, in contrast, President Reagan was not derailed from his steady, firm, and realistic course. He never had illusions about the Soviet Union. After the KAL [Korean Air Lines] shootdown, he focused attention on the menace to civil aviation posed by such conduct. He made sure the world knew the truth about the incident. He also sent our arms control negotiators back to Geneva, because he believed that reducing nuclear weapons was a critical priority.

In the final analysis, linkage is a tactical question; the strategic reality of leverage comes from creating facts support of our overall design. Over the longer term, we must structure the bargaining environment to our advantage by modernizing our defenses, assisting our friends, and showing we are willing to defend our interests. In that way we give the Soviets more of a stake, in their own interest, in better relations with us across the board.

Need for a Long-Term Strategy

Sudden shifts in policy, stemming from emotional and perfectly understandable reactions to Soviet behavior, are no way to pursue our interests. It seems that the West, if it is to compete effectively and advance its goals, must develop the capacity for consistency, discipline and must fashion—and stick to—a long-term strategy.

But consistency is difficult for a democracy. Historically, American policy has swung from one extreme to the other. We have gone through periods of implacable opposition—forgoing negotiations, building up our defenses, and confronting Soviet aggression. Then, concerned about confrontation, we have entered periods of seeming detente in which some were tempted to neglect our defenses and ignore Soviet threats to our interests around the world—once again to be disillusioned by so-called Soviet action that sent us swinging to a more implacable posture.

We have tended all too often to focus either on increasing our strength or on pursuing a course of negotiation. We have found it difficult to pursue both simultaneously. In the long run, the absence of a consistent, coherent American strategy can only play to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Therefore, we must come to grips with the more complex reality of our

tion. A sustainable strategy must include all the elements essential to a advantageous U.S.-Soviet relationship. We need to be strong, we must be able to confront Soviet challenges, and we should negotiate when there are realistic prospects for success.

Purposes of Negotiation

Winston Churchill understood both the importance and the necessity of negotiating with the Soviet Union. In May 1953, he said, "It would, I think, be a mistake to think that nothing can be settled with the Soviet Union unless or until everything is settled." In the 1980s, as then, the process of U.S.-Soviet negotiation serves its purposes both to avert dangerous confrontations and to reach agreements that are in our mutual interest.

If we are to be effective in negotiating, we need a clear sense of what we want to achieve.

The United States seeks an international environment that enhances the economic, security, and prosperity of our people, our allies and friends, and all mankind. We know that such a lasting future depends, above all, on stability and global security. It cannot be achieved in a world where aggression is unchecked and where adventurous policies succeed. Nor can it be achieved in a world where the two superpowers refuse to engage in constructive relations.

To pursue our goals successfully we must persuade the Soviets of two things:

- First, that there will be no rewards for aggression. We are strong enough and determined enough to resist attacks by the Soviet Union to expand its control by force; and
- Second, that we have no aggressive intentions. We mean no threat to the stability of the Soviet Union. We are patient and willing, at all times, to discuss and negotiate our differences.

These conditions for successful negotiation exist when both sides stand firm from an agreement or stand to firm on the absence of an agreement. We have to accept the fact that on many occasions our respective goals may be incompatible, making agreements impossible to reach. When this occurs, we must not despair or panic about the future of our relations. Certainly, we must never accept disadvantageous agreements for the sake of making negotiations seem successful. Occasional

disappointments are part of the long-term process, and we should move on to seek negotiations when and where the conditions are ripe for progress.

Some argue that if you cannot trust the Soviets, you should not negotiate with them. But the truth is, successful negotiations are not based on trust. We do not need to trust the Soviets; we need to make *agreements* that are trustworthy because both sides have incentives to keep them. Such incentives operate best when there are clear and working means to verify that obligations undertaken are, in fact, carried out.

Each side will watch the other carefully to ensure that neither can gain a one-sided advantage by violating an agreement. If we spot Soviet violations, we must do what is necessary to protect ourselves and to raise the cost to the Soviets of further violations. We cannot allow them to use negotiations or agreements as a cover for actions that threaten our interests.

Sometimes it is said that plain statements by us about Soviet violations of agreements, whether on arms or human rights, harm our relationship. In our system, it is our obligation to speak out and tell the truth—to the Soviets, to the world, and to the American people. Our own values have claims on us, both to speak out honestly and to use our leverage when we can, and often quietly, for humanitarian goals. Those goals are not a burden on the U.S.-Soviet relationship; they are, for us, a key part of that relationship. If we can help a Shcharansky or Sakharov, or prevent the jailing of a priest in Lithuania, or ease the plight of Soviet Jewry, we have gained something worth negotiating for and worth using our influence to obtain—not to score points against the Soviets but because we are a moral people.

The experience of negotiations shows that the Soviets recognize reality and that tough, sober bargaining, when backed by American strength, can lead to mutually advantageous results. Negotiation without strength cannot bring benefits. Strength alone will never achieve a durable peace.

A Policy of Strength and Negotiation

Throughout this Administration, President Reagan has adhered to this approach. He has based his policies toward the Soviet Union on a solid foundation of realism, strength, and negotiation.

This approach has created the objective conditions for a safer, more constructive relationship in the years ahead.

In light of Moscow's history of taking advantage of any weakness, it is not surprising that we suffered setbacks in the 1970s. In light of the recent clear improvement in our relative position, it is not surprising that Moscow is complaining about our policy. The 1970s were a time when our economy was deeply troubled, when our military capabilities were eroding, and when our self-confidence and sense of purpose both at home and overseas were at a low ebb. The Soviets had grounds for believing that what they call "the global correlation of forces" had shifted in their favor. And we, in turn, had grounds for fearing that they might overreach themselves and present us with a challenge that we could neither ignore nor effectively counter.

Since then, the United States, in particular, and the West, in general, have made an impressive turnaround. We have begun to recover lost ground and to move ahead.

- Our own economic recovery is well underway. Sustained growth without inflation is within reach. The American economy has bounced back and is giving welcome impetus to global recovery.

- The much-needed modernization of Western defense capabilities is on track. The gaps in the East-West military balance that were expanding in the 1970s are being narrowed and closed. The Soviets' temptation to preempt or intimidate at any point on the spectrum of deterrence must be diminishing.

- We have restored the relations of confidence and harmony with our key allies in Europe and Asia, which have been the bedrock of American security throughout the postwar era. We have provided leadership in the community of nations joined to us by common values and common interest. Disagreements have, at times, been sharp, and debate vigorous, just as they are in our country. The result, however, just as here, has been increasing consensus on the challenges to the common security and widening agreement on what is required to meet those challenges.

- Most important, we have restored our own confidence in ourselves. We know that we are capable of dealing with our problems and promoting our interests and ideals in a complex and dangerous world. We have renewed our commitment to democratic values and human rights, a commitment that joins

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us not only to our allies but to other millions across the globe.

These achievements put our relationship with Moscow on a substantially safer, sounder, and more durable basis. Our credibility as a strong and resolute nation has been enhanced. In contrast to the 1970s, Moscow has not only failed to add any new territory to its extended empire in the 1980s but it has been unable to prevent adverse trends in Central America, the Caribbean, Asia, and southern Africa. Some in Moscow must wonder if the "correlation of forces" is not shifting against them.

We hold to the principle that America should not negotiate from a position of weakness, and this Administration has ensured that we need not face such a prospect.

But we reject the view that we should become strong so that we need not negotiate. Our premise is that we should become strong so that we are able to negotiate. Nor do we agree with the view that negotiated outcomes can only sap our strength or lead to an outcome in which we will be the loser. We will stay strong to enforce the peace; we will bargain hard to ensure that any agreement we sign is reliable and verifiable; and we will negotiate seriously to find solutions that endure.

In bargaining with the Soviets, we are prepared for modest advances as well as major breakthroughs. We have made limited proposals designed to stabilize the current state of relations. And we have made ambitious proposals that, if accepted, could put the Soviet-American relationship on a fundamentally new and safer footing.

In conducting negotiations and discussions in the major areas of U.S.-Soviet relations—arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral cooperation—we have been guided by four basic principles.

First, we must have a strong defense. The United States does not seek military superiority over the Soviet Union. But the Soviets must know that in the absence of equitable and verifiable agreements, we will proceed with defense programs that will deny them superiority. The test of arms control is whether it reduces the danger of war. An arms control agreement that controls the United States but does not control the Soviet Union would only increase the danger of war. We know we will adhere to agreements; based on their conduct, we cannot be sure they will. Therefore, agreements *must* be reliable and verifiable.

Second, we must be united both at home and with our friends and allies. We must continue to strengthen our alliances and friendships and, above all, reaffirm and reinvigorate our own bipartisan consensus about the need for a foreign policy based on realism, strength, and negotiation.

Third, we must be patient. We cannot abandon negotiations or change our whole strategy each time the Soviets misbehave. We must not allow ourselves to panic or overreact to every fresh demonstration of incivility or intransigence. Nor can we abandon our defenses or forget the importance of our friends and allies each time there is a period of negotiating success.

Fourth, we must be purposeful, flexible, and credible. We must negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of equality and reciprocity, in ways that demonstrate to the Soviets and to our friends our commitment to reaching agreements that are in the interests of both sides. We stand ready to join the Soviets in equal and verifiable arms reduction agreements, and we are prepared to move rapidly to discuss both offensive and defensive systems, including those that operate in or through space.

Future Prospects

This was the spirit in which President Reagan and I conducted our recent discussions with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko. We set out for him our agenda for the years ahead. We presented some new ideas for getting nuclear arms control negotiations on track and for achieving some worthwhile results. We offered a dialogue on regional issues, to avoid crises and aid the search for peaceful solutions. We urged the Soviets to take steps in the human rights area. And we outlined constructive measures to improve bilateral cooperation in a variety of fields.

Our discussions with Mr. Gromyko lead me to conclude that the Soviets are interested in continuing our dialogue and in exploring ways to enrich that dialogue and turn it into concrete results.

What can we expect? The Soviets may now realize that it is in their interest to engage with us on the larger issues in a constructive way. Their intransigence in walking away from negotiations has brought them nothing.

A patriotic Russian looking back over the history of our relations would find it difficult to construe how the policy of rejection that Moscow has followed has served his country well. And he would surely realize that such policy will prove even more costly in the future. In weighing his present choice, he would have to ask some very pointed questions.

- If the Soviet Union will not accept equitable arms agreements, then the United States and its allies will continue their modernization programs. Is there any Soviet gain in this result?

- If the Soviet Union pursues aggressive policies in the Third World, not least in our own hemisphere, then we threaten us and our friends, then we respond equally strongly. Isn't the level of armed conflict in the Third World high already?

- If improvement in Soviet human rights performance continues, as in the past, to be nothing more than the cynical manipulation of human lives for political purposes, then the Soviets cannot expect that international—and internal—pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn't the Soviet Union pay a price for this censure as for the isolation that goes with it? That price is large and steadily increasing.

We pose these questions knowing full well that a state founded on the theory that the global correlation of forces *must* move in its direction does not easily alter its course to suit new and changed circumstances. The temptation, if not the compulsion, is always present to create new facts to confirm an old theory. Therefore, we should count on, or even expect, immediate exciting breakthroughs.

But the way is wide open to more sustained progress in U.S.-Soviet relations than we have known in the past. In recent months, there have been at least a few signs of Soviet willingness to meet us halfway on some secondary contentious issues. We have been able to agree to upgrade the Hot Line, to extend our 10-year economic cooperation agreement, and to open negotiations to expand cultural exchanges. And, of course, Moscow has made it possible for us to resume high-level contacts. These are welcome steps: they just may have more substantial and productive momentum to come. And I can tell you, certainly that President Reagan welcomes yesterday's statement by Chairman Chernomyrdin that the Soviets are ready to pursue constructive dialogue with us.

A Forward Look at Foreign Policy

by Secretary Shultz

*Address before the
Los Angeles World Affairs Council
in Los Angeles on October 19, 1984.¹*

We cannot confidently fathom, much less predict, the direction of Soviet policy. We recognize that much of Soviet behavior stems from problems and pressures within their own system. Our comments and our actions are often far less relevant to their decisions than we might think. During this Administration, President Reagan has had to deal not with one Soviet leader but with a system, which has not made the negotiating process any easier. What we have begun to do over the last 4 years, and can continue to do in the future, is to persuade Soviet leaders that continued adventurism and intransigence offer no rewards. We have provided persuasive reasons for the Soviets to choose, instead, a policy of greater restraint and reciprocity. We must be comfortable with the requirements of a strategy, including its price, its risks, and its predictable periodic setbacks. We must be able to deter Soviet expansionism at the same time as we seek to negotiate areas of cooperation at lower levels of armaments. These are the essential elements of long-term policy. If we pursue such a strategy with wisdom and dedication, we have a much better prospect for achieving our goals: countering the current challenge, directing the competition into less dangerous channels, and eventually forging a more constructive relationship.

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My message today is simple and straightforward: the next 4 years have the potential to be an era of unparalleled opportunity, creativity, and achievement in American foreign policy. There are two fundamental reasons why: first, I see a new national consensus emerging here at home; and second, the agenda before us holds great promise for positive accomplishments abroad.

A New National Consensus

For much of the last 15 years, American society has been deeply divided over foreign policy. This period of bitter division, I believe, is coming to an end.

We all know that Vietnam took its toll on what used to be called the postwar consensus on foreign policy. Our two political parties still express very divergent views on international issues. But the American *people* no longer are as divided as that suggests—or as they once were.

Just as President Reagan has reshaped the national discussion of government's role in our economic life, so, too, in foreign policy there is a growing majority behind some basic truths: realism about the Soviet Union, appreciation of the need for a strong defense, solidarity with allies and friends, and willingness to engage our adversaries in serious efforts to solve political problems, reduce arms, and lessen the risk of war. Most important, there is a new patriotism, a new pride in our country, a new faith in its capacity to do good.

Restoring the people's confidence in American leadership has been perhaps the President's most important goal in foreign policy. Yes, we have rebuilt our military strength; yes, we have put our economy back on the path of sustained

growth without inflation; yes, we have conducted a vigorous diplomacy to help solve international problems. But these achievements reflect and reinforce something even more fundamental: our people's renewed self-confidence about their country's role and future in the world. The United States is a very different country than it was 5 or 10 years ago—and our allies and our adversaries both know it.

And we are engaged for the long term. Foreign policy is not just a day-to-day enterprise. The headlines provide a daily drama, but effective policy requires a vision of the future, a sense of strategy, consistency, and perseverance, and the results can only be judged over time. Our well-being as a country depends not on this or that episode or meeting or agreement. It depends rather on the structural conditions of the international system that help determine whether we are fundamentally secure, whether the world economy is sound, and whether the forces of freedom and democracy are gaining ground.

In the last 4 years, this country has been rebuilding and restoring its strategic position in the world for the long term. And we have launched a patient and realistic diplomacy that promises long-term results. That is why I believe the foreign policy agenda for the coming years is filled with opportunities. It is an agenda on which the American people can unite, because it accords with our highest ideals. It is an agenda that can reinforce the national unity that is itself my most important reason for optimism about the future.

It is an agenda that starts in our own neighborhood. Some say good fences make good neighbors. I say: to have good friends, one must be a good friend. That accounts for the unprecedented attention we have devoted to our relations with Canada and Mexico. I

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spent the first 2 days of this week in Toronto meeting with Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, in accord with our agreement with Canada to hold at least four such meetings each year. With Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda, I have met 12 times in the past 18 months, most recently in Mexico just last week. Mexico and Canada were the first countries on our agenda when we came into office, and we will continue these regular encounters with firm friends. They have strengthened our relations.

Let me now review our global agenda for the coming years: the great issues of global security; the need to resolve regional conflicts; the task of reinvigorating the international economy; and a new range of critical challenges that the headlines rarely mention.

East-West Relations and Arms Control

I will start with East-West relations because of their obvious importance. There can be little satisfaction or comfort in foreign policy progress on other issues unless the U.S.-Soviet relationship is soundly managed. The meetings with First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko last month indicated a Soviet willingness to consider a renewed dialogue aimed at easing tensions.

For our part, the United States is ready for a major effort in the coming

will thank their lucky stars that Ronald Reagan has given them the tools to defend American interests.

Clearly the Soviet leaders were more comfortable with the earlier trend, confident that the "correlation of forces" was shifting in their favor. A more vigorous and self-confident American posture in the world poses problems for them. The democracies are politically united and recovering economically, and the Soviets have suffered a number of setbacks: their political warfare against NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe was a failure. Their attack on the Korean airliner brought universal condemnation. Their Afghanistan invasion has met with tough, unyielding resistance. Poland has raised ominous questions about the viability of their East European empire. Their attempt to repair relations with China has gone flat. In southern Africa and in the Caribbean Basin, their clients are on the defensive. At home, they face deep economic difficulties and leadership uncertainties.

The Soviets' recent reluctance to engage with us is perhaps a symptom of these frustrations. But inevitably there will be an adjustment to the new reality. President Reagan made clear to Mr. Gromyko that we are ready and willing to work seriously toward a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. We are patient, and we are prepared.

Arms reduction is a top priority on our agenda. As the President put it, we

When the Soviets last June invited us to begin talks on limiting what they call the "militarization of space," we quickly accepted. We were ready, without preconditions, to talk about what they wanted to talk about. Unfortunately, they then sought to extract concessions from us before the talks began. These issues are important, and they deserve a U.S.-Soviet dialogue. Both offensive and defensive weapons can go through space, and our priority has been to get the competition in offensive strategic weapons under control. There is no shortage of important new issues to address. We stand ready to go to Vienna or elsewhere anytime the Soviets are ready and to do so without any preconditions about the substance of the agenda.

Beyond the issue of space, our agenda includes a range of other vital arms control initiatives: a ban on chemical weapons; negotiations on mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe; nuclear nonproliferation; and the measures of confidence-building and non-use of force being discussed at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

We prefer the path of negotiation and we are capable of defending our interests. All across the agenda, the Soviets will find us a serious interlocutor. If the Soviets are ready to reciprocate, the coming years could be a most productive period in U.S.-Soviet relations and see a positive contribution to security and stability for everyone.

Strengthening Our Alliances and Friendships

We are well positioned for a new phase of East-West diplomacy because our strength is buttressed by a new sense of vitality and common purpose among industrial democracies. The failure of the Soviet campaign against NATO missile deployments was a tribute to alliance solidarity. So, too, was the unprecedented joint statement on security issued last year at the Williamsburg economic summit, which saw Japan, for the first time, join as a partner in the security deliberations of the democratic world. This past June, the harmony of views among the London summit partners extended beyond economic and financial issues to East-West relations, terrorism and other global security concerns.

The agenda for the future is to address, in the same spirit, the problem

... there is a new patriotism, a new pride in our country, a new faith in its capacity to do good.

months and years. And the last 4 years have put the building blocks in place for a promising and productive second Reagan term. The Reagan Administration, with congressional support, has launched a major effort to rebuild our military defenses. For too long, there had been the perception—and the reality—of a global military balance shifting in favor of the Soviet Union. This trend weakened our foreign policy. Our modernization programs still have a long way to go, but today we face the future stronger and more secure. We are better able to deter challenges or to meet them. Future presidents, facing a potential crisis anywhere in the world,

are "determined to achieve real arms control—reliable agreements that will stand the test of time, not cosmetic agreements that raise expectations only to have hopes cruelly dashed." Therefore, we do not seek merely to freeze the present level of military competition with all its imbalances and instabilities. We are determined to achieve real, substantial, verifiable reductions in the most destabilizing strategic systems as well as in intermediate-range nuclear forces. Because the strategic forces of the two sides are differently structured, we are prepared to be flexible and to negotiate tradeoffs between areas of differing interest and advantage.

remain in alliance relations. We can move forward to a new and creative role in NATO under the guidance of Lord Carrington, the new Secretary General. It is time for our alliance to begin again at the task of modernizing conventional defenses, for this can raise the nuclear threshold and reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. As sovereign nations, we allies have our differences on economic issues, East-West issues, levels of defense spending, and other problems outside the NATO area. But we are bound together by our overriding common interest in resolving these differences and strengthening our cooperation.

There is one striking success of the last couple of years that gets little publicity and, therefore, may be virtually unknown to the American people. We have begun to build a network of new relations with our friends in Asia—relations that could well prove to be one of the most important building blocks of global prosperity and progress in the twenty-first century. Only a decade after Vietnam, the United States has more than restored its position in Asia. Our relations with Japan are strong, and our friendships there are remarkably improving. This is a major, lasting accomplishment.

In the past 4 years, our total trade with Asia and the Pacific region has grown greater than with any other region, and is expanding at an accelerating rate. In Japan, we have made progress in solving tough economic issues, largely because both countries recognize the overriding political importance of our partnership. ASEAN—the Association of South East Asian Nations—has become one of the world's most impressive examples of economic development and regional cooperation. Chinese Premier Deng's visit to Washington and the President's trip to Beijing have put our relationship with China on a smoother, more pragmatic track. Our China policy is that the United States can maintain mutually beneficial relations with a country that is ideologically very different from ours. It is an attitude we would be happy to apply to the Soviet Union if our attitudes and policy permit it. Our ties to Asia are not at the expense of our ties to Europe or the Americas, but they do offer, in my view, a unique and attractive vision of the future. The free economies of East and Southeast Asia are a model of economic progress from which other developing nations can learn.

Today, a sense of Pacific community is emerging with the potential for

greater collaboration among many nations with an extraordinary diversity of cultures, race, and political systems. Certainly this is not as institutionalized as our ties with Europe, but there is an expanding practice of consultation, a developing sense of common interest, and an exciting vision of the future. We may well be at the threshold of a new era in international relations in the Pacific Basin.

Promoting Peaceful Settlement of Regional Conflicts

If the past is any guide, world peace in future years is likely to be challenged by local and regional conflicts in the Third World—conflicts that take innocent lives, sap economic development, and retard human progress. The democracies have a strategic interest in not allowing such conflicts to be exploited by our adversaries. We have the same interest in helping to resolve or contain these conflicts and in helping to build a durable foundation for regional peace and economic advance.

The nuclear equilibrium has successfully deterred world war III, but it also tends to free our adversaries to take risks in local challenges to our interests around the globe. In the wake of Vietnam, as America looked mostly inward, the Soviet Union and its surrogates exploited many local conflicts to expand their influence. Today, Soviet adventurism no longer goes unchallenged. There have been no new Afghanistans, Angolas, or Nicaraguas on this Administration's watch. It is up to us to be vigilant and strong to ensure that this remains the case.

Freedom is still in the balance in much of the world. But today the prospects for long-term political independence and regional stability in the developing world may be better than at any time since the end of the colonial era.

Central America is a critical testing ground. Following generations of oligarchic rule, the future will belong either to the advocates of peaceful democratic change or to the forces of revolutionary violence. The outcome will directly affect our own national security and the peace and progress of the hemisphere.

Those people today who claim that the United States is relying on a policy of military pressure while refusing to negotiate do not know—or do not want to know—what is really going on in Central America. Our policy has been to

promote democracy, reform, and freedom; to support economic development; to help provide a security shield against those who seek to spread tyranny by force; and to support dialogue and negotiation both within and among the countries of the region.

The United States has played and is playing a key role in all these most significant efforts. We have provided critical military and economic help to the forces of democracy in El Salvador. We admire the democratic elements in Nicaragua who cannot accept the Sandinistas' betrayal of their revolution and export of violence. By giving heart to those who want freedom and justice, we have helped to build the stable foundation from which negotiations have become possible.

Our policy is beginning to work. It will succeed if we stick with it. I have just returned from Central America, and I can tell you that some far-reaching developments are underway. President Duarte of El Salvador took a bold step toward national reconciliation with his dramatic journey, unarmed, to talk with guerrilla leaders about peace. The joint communique agreed to at La Palma on Monday inaugurated a process that gives the Salvadoran people their first hope in years that peace could prove possible in a democratic framework. President Duarte's drive for peace and his election last spring set standards that Nicaragua's Sandinistas, who are refusing to allow open and competitive elections, would do well to follow.

Some progress is also being made in the wider regional negotiations. The latest Contadora draft treaty represents a step forward; the Central American countries most directly affected are working intensively to perfect it, to ensure that it fulfills its promise as a framework for regional peace. My trip to Nicaragua last June was followed by Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman's continuing negotiations with the Nicaraguans to advance the Contadora process. And most recently we have intensified our diplomacy with our friends in Mexico, Central America, and Europe.

We have no illusions about communist aims or methods, and we must show staying power if these diplomatic efforts are to succeed. If we succeed—and today there is fresh hope—Central America will enjoy a future of peace, security, economic advance, reconciliation, and spreading democracy. Today, Central America presents one of the most promising areas for significant progress in the period ahead.

In southern Africa, justice and stability require that apartheid—which, as President Reagan said, is “repugnant” to us and our values—must be replaced by an equitable political and economic system that truly represents all the people of South Africa. The key to peace in southern Africa more generally is a settlement that will bring independence to Africa’s last colony, Namibia, and remove Cuban troops from Angola. Working with our key allies, with the key neighboring states in the region,

resolutions, “litmus tests,” military solutions—these will never substitute for direct negotiation between the parties, which is the *only* way that lasting progress will ever be achieved. Nor is the status quo consistent with peace. The positions President Reagan set forth in his initiative of September 1, 1982, remain the most practical and workable approach. It is a lasting contribution to the settlement of this tragic conflict and to the effort to gain true peace and security for Israel.

Reinvigorating the International Economic System

The issues of war and peace, of global security, and of regional conflict, represent the traditional agenda of foreign policy. But there are important additional tasks—none more important than seeing to the health of the world economy.

There is no force in the world today doing more to invigorate the global economic system than the powerful economic recovery we see now in the United States. The impact of our expansion is both direct and indirect.

Directly, we are importing large amounts from other countries, both developed and the developing countries. Those purchases are spreading our expansion throughout the world by pumping tremendous new resources into the international economy. U.S. merchandise imports will grow by about 30% in a year.

Indirectly, we may be contributing even more to the world economy by the example we have set in shaping up our own economic policies. We have revised our tax system to create real incentives to work, to save, to invest, to take risks to be efficient. We have reduced government regulation, intervention, and control. We have opened opportunities for freer competition in transportation, finance, communication, manufacturing and distribution. Most important, we have spread the benefits of our recovery to the working population by creating new and better job opportunities, reducing inflation to one-third of its level 4 years ago, and reducing unemployment by one-third in less than 2 years.

This is a dramatic change from the state of the American economy 4 years ago. It has captured the attention of the world, and the policies that have brought it about are becoming understood. It is widely noted that similar policies are pursued in those parts of the world that have been enjoying the best economic growth—most strikingly in the Pacific Basin but in other countries as well.

Success inspires emulation. We now find, almost everywhere in the world, movements to decentralize, to deregulate, to denationalize, to reduce rigidity and to enlarge the scope for individual producers and consumers to cooperate through markets rather than only through government dictates. The indirect benefits that may come to the

Our modernization programs still have a long way to go, but today we face the future stronger and more secure.

and with South Africa, our patient diplomacy has helped to resolve most of the contentious issues that stand in the way of a Namibia solution under UN auspices. Such an achievement will end an ugly colonial war, reduce opportunities for Soviet penetration, and enhance African and international security. Here again, a long-festering conflict now shows a glimmer of hope, thanks in considerable part to our diplomatic efforts.

In Southeast Asia, we have supported the proposal put forward by ASEAN for a negotiated solution to the Cambodian problem. That proposal is based on the restoration of Cambodia’s sovereignty and the right of its people to choose their own government, free of Vietnamese occupation. It is the only sound and realistic framework for a solution, and we will continue to support it.

On the Korean Peninsula, we strongly back the confidence-building measures proposed by the Republic of Korea and the UN Command. We also endorse and encourage the active diplomacy led by the UN Secretary General to find a diplomatic solution in Afghanistan and Cyprus.

The area of regional tension to which the United States has devoted the most attention over the years is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Our commitment to Israel’s security and well-being is ironclad. So is our commitment to the pursuit of peace. The history of the past decade shows that negotiations work. The parties in the area must realize there are no shortcuts: ill-prepared international conferences, empty UN

The Iran-Iraq war shows that the Arab-Israeli problem is not the only source of tension in the Middle East—far from it. While avoiding direct American involvement in the Gulf war, we have worked successfully with other countries to prevent that war from escalating to threaten the overall stability of the region and to harm the free world’s oil lifeline.

In Lebanon, we negotiated the removal of 11,000 Palestinian terrorists from Beirut in 1982, and in 1983 we negotiated an agreement that would have ensured the security of Israel’s northern border, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and a restoration of Lebanon’s sovereignty. We are proud of that achievement, and whatever setbacks may come, we will not let up our efforts.

And we will not be driven out of the vital region of the Middle East by acts of terrorism. The United States will continue to prove itself a reliable security partner to all our friends in the area—including our many friends in the Arab world—against the forces of extremism and state-supported terrorism.

Today, many cry that terrorist attacks against us are our fault; that America must change its ways and change its policies. I can tell you that we will never waiver in our support for Israel. We will never cease to defend our values. And we will never abandon the cause that terrorists seek to destroy: America’s commitment to peace, freedom, and security around the world.

As President Reagan told the UN General Assembly: “In every part of the world, the United States is similarly engaged in peace diplomacy as an active player or a strong supporter.”

d's economies by following this example are likely in the long run to surpass by far the direct benefits they gain in the short run from our own expansion.

Two central issues which have been the focus of our attention, and which are prominently among the opportunities for further progress, are: managing the international debt problem and reinvigorating the global economy through a more open trading system.

Much progress has been made in managing the debt problem. A lasting solution lies in three areas: restoring growth in the world economy, maintaining open trade and investment opportunities in both developed and developing countries, and pursuing sound economic policies in the developing countries so they are in a competitive position to benefit from the global recovery. The United States is doing its part. It exports about one-third of all the manufactured exports of the developing countries and about half of all their manufactured exports to the industrialized world. In 1982, we provided more than 35% of the nearly \$84 billion in financial resources, public and private, that flowed to developing countries. With new resources available to the International Monetary Fund, its role as a catalyst for change and new debt financing has been strengthened. The current accounts of non-OPEC developing countries in 1984 should be about \$28 billion, less than half the 1982 high—largely because of the \$26 billion improvement in the trade balance with the United States.

If there are no shortcuts. Stable long-term expansion in the developing world will require sound economic policies, freeing up the market and encouraging private investment. If a country does not pursue sound economic policies, no amount of outside assistance or reform of the international monetary and financial systems can assure prosperity. But if a country manages its policies wisely, the benefits of sound policies can be increased by well-organized outside assistance and by effective systems of international trade and investment.

Trade will be absolutely essential, at the same time, that we maintain and strengthen the openness of the world trading system. Trade is the transmission belt of prosperity, and attempts to restrict trade by protectionism can retard the general recovery and exacerbate the debt problem.

The United States has the most open market in the world, and we have a President who is philosophically committed to an open trading system. His recent decision on copper imports was an important step in this regard; in the steel case he chose a course designed to focus on the removal of unfair trade practices rather than protectionism. He worked hard at the London summit to ensure that the summit declaration urged formal movement toward a new round of multilateral negotiations to liberalize trade. The only effective way to prevent protectionism from destroying a healthy world recovery is to move rapidly to negotiate a fairer and more open trading system for all countries.

As global recovery spreads, the benefits for our foreign policy will be enormous. A restoration of noninflationary economic expansion will advance all our political objectives. It will strengthen our allies and friends; it will facilitate the strengthening of our collective defenses; it will help fend off protectionism and ease economic disputes; it will reinforce our bargaining position in East-West negotiations; it will stimulate progress in the Third World, denying our adversaries new problem areas to exploit. It will improve the climate for international cooperation and spread new confidence in the future of democracy.

New Dimensions of International Cooperation

The agenda for the future also includes new dimensions of international concern. A few moments ago, I mentioned **terrorism**. Terrorism is a threat to which democratic societies, open and free, are particularly vulnerable. The growing phenomenon of state support of terrorism is a political weapon deliberately wielded by despotic and fanatical regimes and their henchman against the basic values of the Western democracies. The bombing of our Embassy in Beirut last month and the many attacks on other Western and pro-Western targets in Beirut show that the threat is ever present. And last week's cowardly bomb attack in Brighton, England, against Prime Minister Thatcher and members of her Cabinet shows again that the danger is not confined to the Middle East. Those who wage terrorist warfare against us are seeking to shake our commitment to our principles and to alter our policies of promoting peace, prosperity, and democracy. We will not yield to blackmail.

It is time for this country to make a broad national commitment to meet this threat. Congress must give us the resources and the legislative tools to do the job. We need, and we are getting, the resources to protect our facilities and personnel abroad. We need new tools of law enforcement. Sanctions, when exercised in concert with other nations, can help to isolate, weaken, or punish states that sponsor terrorism against us.

Our law enforcement agencies must continue to perfect their counterterrorism techniques and to work with the agencies of friendly countries, for terrorism is truly an international problem. Our military and intelligence agencies must be given the capability, the mandate, the support, and the flexibility to develop the techniques of detection, deterrence—and response.

All too often, we find terrorism linked to another problem of great concern: **narcotics**. We all know the domestic dimension of the drug problem, but there is a growing awareness in other countries that it is truly an international problem to which few are immune. Not only is drug abuse increasing in other countries, but the corrupting effect of drug trafficking on political and economic institutions is more and more widely recognized. Beyond the disturbing links between drug traffickers and international terrorism, we see certain communist governments, Cuba and Nicaragua in our own hemisphere, using the narcotics trade as a source of funds to support insurgencies and subversion.

The drug problem is a major concern of our foreign policy. Our strategy addresses the problem in its international dimension, including controls on the cultivation, production, and distribution of drugs; curbs on the flow of profits and the laundering of money; and relief against the impact on other countries as well as our own. We have reached important agreements with other countries on crop control, eradication, and interdiction. We have provided assistance to implement these control agreements, as well as aid for development and training in law enforcement.

But it is clear that more needs to be done, on an international as well as national basis. Worldwide crop production still provides a surplus of narcotics that greatly exceeds not only American but worldwide demand. Some countries have not done enough to reduce crop levels. We must promote cooperation to reduce cultivation further in all producer na-

tions. But we must also wage a determined campaign against drug use here at home, thereby sending the message to people in other countries, as well as to their governments, that we intend to control our own drug abuse problem.

Nuclear nonproliferation is another challenge on our agenda. Like the story of our prospering relations with Asia and the Pacific, the steady progress we have been making does not make the headlines.

Today, the number of states that have acquired the means to produce nuclear explosives is far lower than doomsayers predicted 20 years ago, though the potential dangers to world stability remain exactly as predicted. The United States is vigorously leading the international effort to establish a regime of institutional arrangements, legal commitments, and technological safeguards to control the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.

The Reagan Administration has approached the problem with a sophisticated understanding of its complexities. We see the growing reliance on peaceful nuclear energy, the security concerns that give rise to the incentive to seek weapons, and the need for broad multilateral collaboration among nuclear suppliers. We have made progress in restoring a relationship of confidence and a reputation for reliability with our nuclear trading partners; we have had fruitful talks with the Soviet Union on our mutual interest in cooperation in this field; we have encouraged international measures to promote comprehensive safeguards and stricter export controls. In the last 4 years, 10 additional countries have joined the Nonproliferation Treaty, making it the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement in history.

Consolidating and reinforcing the nonproliferation accomplishments of recent years is one of this Administration's top priorities. It is no easy task. There may have been a time when the United States could virtually dictate guidelines for international nuclear trade, but that is most assuredly not the case today. We will need the continued support and full cooperation of the other nuclear suppliers and the major nuclear consumers if our nonproliferation efforts are to continue on their present, successful course.

Promoting Human Rights and Democracy

Finally, and most importantly, among the broader objectives of American foreign policy in the coming years are goals that are not technical or material but moral. The United States has always stood for the rule of law as a civilizing force in international relations; our foreign policy has always embodied a commitment to foster democracy, freedom, and human rights.

A few years back, pessimists maintained that the democracies were doomed to permanent minority status in the world community. Today, there is increasing evidence that democracy is alive and well around the world, and the most encouraging signs are in our own hemisphere. One week ago I represented the United States at the inauguration of President Barletta of Panama, a significant step in the proud progress of a true friend of ours toward an even fuller democratic society. The remarkable fact is that more than 90% of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean today lives under governments that are either democratic or on the road to democracy, compared with only one-third in 1979. In noncommunist Asia, rapidly growing prosperity is increasing the opportunities and pressures for political pluralism. Obstacles remain. But on every continent, we see vivid demonstrations that the democratic idea is far from a culture-bound aspiration or possession of the industrialized West.

Certainly, the world still has far to go before it is "safe for democracy." The yearning for freedom in Poland and Afghanistan and human rights activity in the Soviet Union continue to be relentlessly suppressed. But we must not lose sight of the real advances that are now underway.

For the American people, these developments are an inspiring reminder of the vitality of the idea of freedom that we have championed for 200 years. These are the ideals that give meaning to our efforts abroad. When we contribute to the freedom of others, we vindicate our own freedom and enrich our own heritage of democracy. This, in the final analysis, is *why* we are engaged in the world.

As we look to the years ahead, I want to make sure that this Administration's approach is understood. Human rights policy, to us, is a commitment to active engagement in the world, not a

set of excuses for abandoning friends shirking obligations. When other nations fail to meet the standards we feel are right, when others are heedless of values we cherish, we do *not* intend to withdraw in righteous indignation. We do *not* intend to break our association with other nations on the grounds that we are pure and they are wanting. The human rights policy of the second Reagan Administration, as in the first will be to stay engaged, to be active, never give up, to continue to fight for adherence to the rights and values that we stand for and which are humanity's best hope for justice, freedom, and progress.

Looking Ahead

Therefore, as we look around and look ahead, there are many reasons for optimism about the state of the world and the future of our foreign policy. The structure of the global system is sound, stable, and secure. The trends are positive in many ways. Our adversaries are burdened; the democracies are united and recovering their vitality. The United States is strong and once again comfortable with its role of leadership. Today, time is on freedom's side.

Next year, we will celebrate the anniversary of the end of World War II. In the immediate postwar period, the United States faced a series of unprecedented new challenges and responded with an extraordinary burst of bipartisan creativity and energy: the Marshall Plan, the Greek-Turkish aid program, the North Atlantic alliance, the Food for Peace program, and other initiatives. We changed the world, for the better. In the 1960s and 1970s, the bipartisan spirit deteriorated, and we paid a price for it.

The challenges we face today are very different from the postwar years but just as great. I can assure you that a major goal of President Reagan in a second term will be to summon again the spirit of bipartisan cooperation. It will be time for a reaffirmation of unity. The two parties must come together as Americans, and the Executive and Congress must work together as partners.

Let us reforge a national consensus on foreign policy that will sustain America's leadership in the world over the long-term future. In unity, we already know, there is strength. And there is no limit to what a free and united people can accomplish if it sets its sights high and faces the future with confidence.

¹Press release 231 of Oct. 18, 1984.

Soviet Jewry and U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Secretary Shultz

*Remarks before the
National Assembly of
the National Conference on Soviet Jewry
on October 22, 1984.¹*

Thank you very much, Ken [Kenneth Adelman, National Chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the National Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations]. I'm very honored to have this award, and I'm privileged to work with you, Ken. Elliott Abrams [Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs]—people like Max Kampelman [Assistant Secretary for European Affairs], Assistant to the Department of State, Ambassador and chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 1980-83 followup of the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]—many, many others—who have the same view and who are trying to do the best in this great effort. I hoped sometime we might have a meeting in which we would have something really to celebrate. Unfortunately, we don't—other than to pledge our continuing and very strong efforts. I've always believed that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect not only our material and security interests but our moral values as well. These strands are completely intertwined, for as long as human rights are denied the citizens of other countries, the freedoms we enjoy in this country are ultimately in jeopardy. That is why freedom for Soviet Jewry and other human rights issues occupy such a prominent place in my concerns as Secretary of State.

At a time of prosperity and peace, we may be liable to take our own freedom for granted, it is good to remember Thomas Jefferson's observation. Those who expect to reap the benefits of freedom," he said, "must expect the fatigues of supporting it." I wish I could use this occasion to give you encouraging news about the situation of Soviet Jewry, but you know at least as well as I do, that their situation remains very grim. Soviet persecution of Jews and other minorities

has not only not diminished, it seems to be getting worse.

- Within the past 2 months, four well-known Hebrew teachers have been arrested in what appears to be an intensifying campaign of repression aimed specifically at Jewish cultural activities. In the Soviet view, apparently, promoting identification with one's religious and cultural heritage constitutes "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

- We cannot forget Anatoly Shcharansky, courageously clinging to his principles as his health is deteriorating in Chistopol Prison. He was imprisoned on the blatantly false charge of spying for the United States, but his real "crime" was to try to escape from Soviet tyranny so that he could lead a full Jewish life with his family in Israel.

- To discourage others from trying to leave, Soviet authorities are continuing to threaten many "refuseniks" with confinement in psychiatric hospitals, expulsion from their jobs, and internal exile.

While all this has been going on, there has been an alarming upsurge in officially sanctioned anti-Semitic propaganda. Scurrilous cartoons, broadcasts, and articles equate the study of Jewish culture with fanaticism and racism and compare the State of Israel to Nazi Germany.

Jews, of course, are not the only victims of Soviet persecution. Efforts to stamp out all independent thought have led to the victimization of Nobel Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner. Within the past 6 months, three prominent Ukrainian human rights activists died in Soviet labor camps. All three deaths can be attributed to the brutal conditions in Soviet labor camps and prisons. The small group of Soviet idealists who tried to monitor their government's compliance with its human rights obligations

under the Helsinki Final Act has been decimated by imprisonment and exile. Even foreign tourists and diplomats have been subjected to Soviet harassment.

Emigration, meanwhile, has come to a virtual standstill. Just over 1,300 Jews left the Soviet Union in 1983, approximately 2% of the peak year total of 51,000 in 1979. This year it looks like fewer than 1,000 Jews will leave the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities would have the world believe that almost all Soviet Jews who want to emigrate have already done so. But, clearly, this is not true. Thousands of Soviet Jews have applied for exit visas, only to have them denied. They are ready to leave on a moment's notice.

We debate the question of what to do among ourselves, as I am sure you do. We are all frustrated by the lack of progress and by the absence of any easy or ready solutions. But rather than argue inconclusively among ourselves, I am convinced that what we can and should do is to make clear to the Soviets what our own approach is and how it is related in our eyes to the U.S.-Soviet relationship as a whole.

That is what we have tried to do under this Administration. The Soviets know that we seek to put relations on a stable and constructive basis for the long term. But I think they also know that we will not stop our practice of calling them to account for their abuses of human rights. And among human rights issues, none has more urgency than the treatment of Soviet Jewry.

As a government, we would prefer to deal with these issues on a confidential basis, simply because it's more effective that way. But we understand and support the efforts of public interest groups to express their concerns, and we will not be silent when the Soviets act in a way we consider dangerous or irresponsible, as they so often do in the human rights area.

The United States, therefore, continues to speak out at every opportunity against Soviet human rights violations. We have vigorously denounced Soviet anti-Semitic propaganda and practices. We have consistently condemned denial of the basic right of Soviet citizens to emigrate. In the face of blatant intimidation, our Embassy in Moscow and our consulate in Leningrad have maintained contact with individual "refuseniks," and we have made numerous representations on behalf of Soviet citizens who have been denied permission to emigrate. We continue to consult with other Western nations on ways to improve human

rights performance. And in all our diplomatic discussions with the Soviets—including President Reagan's recent meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko—we have stressed human rights issues.

Soviet leaders may well be perplexed by our preoccupation with human rights. After all, they and many other governments throughout the world take the view that human rights are strictly an "internal affair." In this view, how a government treats its own citizens is not a matter of legitimate international concern or even discourse. Compassion, it seems, should stop at a country's borders.

In the aftermath and in the everlasting memory of the Nazi Holocaust, this attitude must be relentlessly exposed as a gross moral evasion. Numerous international covenants, conventions, and declarations—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the Helsinki accords—today attest to the fact that human rights are no longer regarded as an "internal matter." On the contrary, they are intimately linked to the issues of war and peace. We recognize that governments not at peace with their own people are unlikely to be at peace with their neighbors.

The people and Government of the United States are deeply and irrevocably committed to the rule of law in both domestic and foreign affairs. For this reason, we have insisted, and shall continue to insist, that the Soviet Union adhere to *all* its international obligations, including its human rights obligations. As I said last Thursday in an address on the management of U.S.-Soviet relations:

We can never let ourselves become so wedded to improving our relations with the Soviets that we turn a blind eye to actions that undermine the very foundation of stable relations.

A moment ago, I referred to the President's meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko at the White House. Every American hopes that this meeting marks the beginning of a new, more constructive period in Soviet-American relations. We look forward to the opportunity to build on our common interests and to help narrow the scope of some of our differences.

But I hope that no one, either in the Soviet Union or in this country, seriously entertains the idea that once negotiations are underway, the United States will refrain from raising our human rights concerns. If improvement in

Soviet human rights performance continues as in the past to be nothing more than the cynical manipulation of human lives for political purposes, then the Soviets cannot expect that international—and internal—pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn't the Soviet Union pay a price for this censure and for the isolation that goes with it? The price is large and steadily increasing. And let me add, ladies and gentlemen, that we shall continue to do all in our power to see that the price continues to increase.

From the experience of World War II and its aftermath, we have

learned that the issues of peace and human rights are joined and that attempts to separate them can bring on disaster. We have learned that it is not the advocacy of human rights but rather their denial that is a source of tension in world affairs. The issue of human rights is at the top of our agenda because we have learned the great lesson of the Scriptures: we truly are our brother's keeper.

Thank you. We'll keep struggling, and somehow, some way, we're going to succeed.

¹Press release 236. ■

Terrorism and the Modern World

by Secretary Shultz

*Address before the
Park Avenue Synagogue
in New York City on October 25, 1984.¹*

Someday terrorism will no longer be a timely subject for a speech, but that day has not arrived. Less than 2 weeks ago, one of the oldest and greatest nations of the Western world almost lost its Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to the modern barbarism that we call terrorism. A month ago the American Embassy Annex in East Beirut was nearly destroyed by a terrorist truck bomb, the third major attack on Americans in Lebanon within the past 2 years. To list all the other acts of brutality that terrorists have visited upon civilized society in recent years would be impossible here because that list is too long. It is too long to name and too long to tolerate.

But I am here to talk about terrorism as a phenomenon in our modern world—about what terrorism is and what it is not. We have learned a great deal about terrorism in recent years. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals. What once may have seemed the random, senseless, violent acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus. A pattern of terrorist violence has emerged. It is an alarming pattern, but

it is something that we can identify and therefore, a threat that we can devise concrete measures to combat. The knowledge we have accumulated about terrorism over the years can provide a basis for a coherent strategy to deal with the phenomenon, if we have the will to turn our understanding into action.

Meaning of Terrorism

We have learned that terrorism is, above all, a form of political violence is neither random nor without purpose. Today, we are confronted with a wide assortment of terrorist groups which alone or in concert, orchestrate acts of violence to achieve distinctly political ends. Their stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. Their methods may be just as diverse: from planting homemade explosives in public places to suicide bombings to kidnappings and political assassinations. But the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: they are

to impose their will by force—a kind of force designed to create a atmosphere of fear. The horrors they are not simply a new manifestation of traditional social conflict; they are depraved opponents of civilization aided by the technology of modern weaponry. The terrorists want people to be helpless and defenseless; they want people to lose faith in their government's ability to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both. The terrorists profit from the anarchy caused by their violence. They succeed when governments change their policies out of intimidation. But the terrorists can even be satisfied if a government responds to terror by clamping down on individual rights and freedoms. Governments that overreact, even in self-defense, may only undermine their own legitimacy, as they unwittingly achieve the terrorists' goals. The terrorist ends if a government responds to terrorism with repressive, polarizing policies that alienates the government from the people.

Path to Democracy

First understand, however, that terrorism, wherever it takes place, is a threat in an important sense against all democracies—against our most cherished values and often our fundamental economic interests. Because terrorism is based on brutal violence as its only tool, it will always be the enemy of democracy. For democracy rejects the indiscriminate or improper use of force and relies instead on the peaceful settlement of disputes through legitimate legal processes.

The moral bases of democracy—the principles of individual rights, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion—are powerful barriers against those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies, or their religious beliefs on others. Whether in Israel or Lebanon or Italy or West Germany or Northern Ireland, a terrorist has no place in the orderly processes of a democratic society, and, therefore, he must be destroyed. Indeed, terrorism must be destroyed what all of us here are trying to build.

The United States and the other democracies are morally committed to these ideals and to a humane vision of the future. Nor is our vision limited to our borders. In our foreign

policies, as well, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes beneficial change. We do not practice terrorism, and we seek to build a world which holds no place for terrorist violence, a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law.

And there is yet another reason why we are attacked. If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in totalitarian states is minimal, and those against their personnel abroad are markedly fewer than against the West. And this is not only because police states offer less room for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80% of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Terrorism in this context is not just criminal activity but an unbridled form of warfare.

Today, international links among terrorist groups are more clearly understood. And Soviet and Soviet-bloc support is also more clearly understood. We face a diverse family of dangers. Iran and the Soviet Union are hardly allies, but they both share a fundamental hostility to the West. When Libya and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] provide arms and training to the communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of communist ideology, they hope to shake the West's self-confidence, unity, and will to resist intimidation. The terrorists who assault Israel—and, indeed, the Marxist Provisional IRA [Irish Republican Army] in Northern Ireland—are ideological enemies of the United States. We cannot and we will not succumb to the likes of Khomeini and Qadhafi.

We also now see a close connection between terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Cuba and Nicaragua, in particular, have used narcotics smugglers to funnel guns and money to terrorists and insurgents in Colombia.

Other communist countries, like Bulgaria, have also been part of the growing link between drugs and terrorism.

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can exist in almost any society.

But in many countries, terrorism would long since have withered away had it not been for significant support from outside. When Israel went into Lebanon in 1982, Israeli forces uncovered irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union had been arming and training the PLO and other groups. Today, there is no reason to think that Soviet support for terrorist groups around the world has diminished. Here as elsewhere, there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet deeds, a gap that is very clear, for instance, when you put Soviet support for terrorist groups up against the empty rhetoric of the resolution against so-called "state terrorism" which the U.S.S.R. has submitted to this year's UN General Assembly. The Soviets condemn terrorism, but in practice they connive with terrorist groups when they think it serves their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

Moral and Strategic Stakes

The stakes in our war against terrorism, therefore, are high. We have already seen the horrible cost in innocent lives that terrorist violence has incurred. But perhaps even more horrible is the damage that terrorism threatens to wreak on our modern civilization. For centuries mankind has strived to build a world in which the highest human aspirations can be fulfilled.

We have pulled ourselves out of a state of barbarism and removed the affronts to human freedom and dignity that are inherent to that condition. We have sought to free ourselves from that primitive existence described by Hobbes where life is lived in "continual fear and danger of violent death . . . nasty, brutish, and short." We have sought to create, instead, a world where universal respect for human rights and democratic values makes a better life possible. We in the democracies can attest to all that

man is capable of achieving if he renounces violence and brute force, if he is free to think, write, vote, and worship as he pleases. Yet all of these hard-won gains are threatened by terrorism.

Terrorism is a step backward; it is a step toward anarchy and decay. In the broadest sense, terrorism represents a return to barbarism in the modern age. If the modern world cannot face up to the challenge, then terrorism, and the lawlessness and inhumanity that come with it, will gradually undermine all that the modern world has achieved and make further progress impossible.

Obstacles to Meeting the Challenge

The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes untreated. We need a strategy to cope with terrorism in all of its varied manifestations. We need to summon the necessary resources and determination to fight it and, with international cooperation, eventually stamp it out. And we have to recognize that the burden falls on us, the democracies—no one else will cure the disease for us.

Yet clearly we face obstacles, some of which arise precisely because we are democracies. The nature of the terrorist assault is, in many ways, alien to us. Democracies like to act on the basis of known facts and shared knowledge. Terrorism is clandestine and mysterious by nature. Terrorists rely on secrecy, and, therefore, it is hard to know for certain who has committed an atrocity.

Democracies also rely on reason and persuasive logic to make decisions. It is hard for us to understand the fanaticism and apparent irrationality of many terrorists, especially those who kill and commit suicide in the belief that they will be rewarded in the afterlife. The psychopathic ruthlessness and brutality of terrorism is an aberration in our culture and alien to our heritage.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists—our respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual—also make us particularly vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike at us. Terrorists seek to make democracies embattled and afraid, to

break down democratic accountability, due process, and order; they hope we will turn toward repression or succumb to chaos.

These are the challenges we must live with. We will certainly not alter the democratic values that we so cherish in order to fight terrorism. We will have to find ways to fight back without undermining everything we stand for.

Combatting Moral Confusion

There is another obstacle that we have created for ourselves that we should overcome—that we must overcome—if we are to fight terrorism effectively. The obstacle I am referring to is confusion.

We cannot begin to address this monumental challenge to decent, civilized society until we clear our heads of the confusion about terrorism, in many ways the *moral* confusion, that still seems to plague us. Confusion can lead to paralysis, and it is a luxury that we simply cannot afford.

The confusion about terrorism has taken many forms. In recent years, we have heard some ridiculous distortions, even about what the word “terrorism” means. The idea, for instance, that denying food stamps to some is a form of terrorism cannot be entertained by serious people. And those who would argue, as recently some in Great Britain have, that physical violence by strikers can be equated with “the violence of unemployment” are, in the words of *The Economist*, “a menace to democracy everywhere.” In a real democracy, violence is unequivocally bad. Such distortions are dangerous, because words are important. When we distort our language, we may distort our thinking, and we hamper our efforts to find solutions to the grave problems we face.

There has been, however, a more serious kind of confusion surrounding the issue of terrorism: the confusion between the terrorist act itself and the political goals that the terrorists claim to seek.

The grievances that terrorists supposedly seek to redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate. The terrorist acts themselves, however, can never be legitimate. And legitimate causes can never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorist means discredit their ends.

We have all heard the insidious claim that “one man’s terrorist is

another man’s freedom fighter.” When I spoke on the subject of terrorism this past June, I quoted the powerful rebuttal to this kind of moral relativism made by the late Senator Henry Jackson. His statement bears repeating today: “The idea that one person’s ‘terrorist’ is another’s ‘freedom fighter,’ ” he said, “cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don’t blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don’t assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word ‘freedom’ to be associated with acts of terrorists.” So spoke Scoop Jackson.

We cannot afford to let an Orwellian corruption of language obscure our understanding of terrorism. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, and as we look around the world, we have no trouble telling one from the other.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers the opportunity for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievance. We must oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

And we must not fall into the trap of giving justification to the unacceptable acts of terrorists by acknowledging the worthy-sounding motives they may claim. Organizations such as the Provisional IRA, for instance, play on popular grievances, political and religious emotions, to disguise their deadly purpose. They work through local political and religious leaders to enlist support for their brutal actions. As a result, we find Americans contributing, we hope unwittingly, to an organization which has killed—in cold blood and without slightest remorse—hundreds of innocent men, women, and children in Great Britain and Ireland; an organization which has assassinated senior officials and tried to assassinate the British Prime Minister and her entire cabinet; a professed Marxist organization which gets support from Libya’s Qadhafi and has close links with other international terrorists. The Government of the

United States stands firmly with the Government of the United Kingdom and Government of Ireland in opposing any action that lends aid or support to the Provisional IRA.

Moral confusion about terrorism can take many forms. When 2 Americans and 12 Lebanese were killed at our Embassy Annex in East Beirut last month, for instance, we were told by some that the mass murder was an expression, not an extreme expression, of Arab hostility to American policy in the Middle East. We were told that this bomb-attack happened because of a vote we cast at the United Nations, or because of our presence in Lebanon, or because of the overall state of our relations with the Arab nations, or because of our support for Israel.

We were advised by some that if we failed to stop terrorism—if we want to end to these vicious murders—then what we need to do is change our policies. In effect, we have been told that terrorism is in some measure our fault, and we deserved to be attacked. I can tell you here and now that the United States will not be driven away from our course or change our policy by terrorist brutality.

We cannot permit ourselves any uncertainty as to the real meaning of terrorist violence in the Middle East or anywhere else. Those who truly seek peace in the Middle East know that war and violence are no answer. Those who promote radicalism and support terrorism are themselves the target of terrorism, whether they are Arabs or Israelis. One of the great tragedies of the Middle East, in fact, is that the moderates on the Arab side—who are ready to live in peace with Israel—are threatened by the radicals and their terrorist henchmen and are intimidated in their own efforts for peace.

The terrorists' principal goal in the Middle East is to destroy any progress toward a negotiated peace. And the closer our policies succeed, the closer we move toward achieving our goals in the Middle East, the harder terrorists will work to stop us. The simple fact is, the terrorists are more upset about progress in the Middle East than they are about alleged failures to achieve progress. We must not forget that President Sadat was murdered because he made peace, and that threats continue to be issued against that region because of the peace—yes, fear—that others might favor a negotiated path toward peace.

Whom would we serve by changing our policies in the Middle East in the

face of the terrorist threat? Not Israel, not the moderate Arabs, not the Palestinian people, and certainly not the cause for peace. Indeed, the worst thing we could do is change our principled policies under the threat of violence. What we *must* do is support our friends and remain firm in our goals.

We have to rid ourselves of this moral confusion which lays the blame for terrorist actions on us or on our policies. We are attacked not because of what we are doing wrong but because of what we are doing right. We are right to support the security of Israel, and there is no terrorist act or threat that will change that firm determination. We are attacked not because of some mistake we are making but because of who we are and what we believe in. We must not abandon our principles, or our role in the world, or our responsibilities as the champion of freedom and peace.

Response to Terrorism

While terrorism threatens many countries, the United States has a special responsibility. It is time for this country to make a broad national commitment to treat the challenge of terrorism with the sense of urgency and priority it deserves.

The essence of our response is simple to state: violence and aggression must be met by firm resistance. This principle holds true whether we are responding to full-scale military attacks or to the kinds of low-level conflicts that are more common in the modern world.

We are on the way to being well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our principal allies; that is why these are the least likely contingencies. It is not self-evident that we are as well prepared and organized to deter and counter the "gray area" of intermediate challenges that we are more likely to face—the low-intensity conflict of which terrorism is a part.

We have worked hard to deter large-scale aggression by strengthening our strategic and conventional defenses, by restoring the pride and confidence of the men and women in our military and by displaying the kind of national resolve to confront aggression that can deter potential adversaries. We have been more successful than in the past in dealing with many forms of low-level aggression. We have checked communist aggression and subversion in Central America and the Caribbean and opened

the way for peaceful, democratic processes in that region. And we successfully liberated Grenada from Marxist control and returned that tiny island to freedom and self-determination.

But terrorism, which is also a form of low-level aggression, has so far posed an even more difficult challenge, for the technology of security has been outstripped by the technology of murder. And, of course, the United States is not the only nation that faces difficulties in responding to terrorism. To update President Reagan's report in the debate last Sunday, since September 1, 41 acts of terrorism have been perpetrated by no less than 14 terrorist groups against the people and property of 21 countries. Even Israel has not rid itself of the terrorist threat, despite its brave and prodigious efforts.

But no nation had more experience with terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it. By supporting organizations like the Jonathan Institute, named after the brave Israeli soldier who led and died at Entebbe, the Israeli people have helped raise international awareness of the global scope of the terrorist threat.

And Israel's contribution goes beyond the theoretical. Israel has won major battles in the war against terrorism in actions across its borders, in other continents, and in the land of Israel itself. To its great credit, the Israeli Government has moved within Israel to apprehend and bring to trial its own citizens accused of terrorism.

Much of Israel's success in fighting terrorism has been due to broad public support for Israel's antiterrorist policies. Israel's people have shown the will, and they have provided their government the resources, to fight terrorism. They entertain no illusions about the meaning or the danger of terrorism. Perhaps because they confront the threat every day, they recognize that they are at war with terrorism. The rest of us would do well to follow Israel's example.

But part of our problem here in the United States has been our seeming inability to understand terrorism clearly. Each successive terrorist incident has brought too much self-condemnation and dismay, accompanied by calls for a change in our policies or our principles or calls for withdrawal and retreat. We *should* be alarmed. We *should* be outraged. We *should* investigate and strive to improve. But widespread public anguish and self-condemnation only convince the terrorists that they are on the

right track. It only encourages them to commit more acts of barbarism in the hope that American resolve will weaken.

This is a particular danger in the period before our election. If our reaction to terrorist acts is to turn on ourselves instead of against the perpetrators, we give them redoubled incentive to do it again and to try to influence our political processes.

We have to be stronger, steadier, determined, and united in the face of the terrorist threat. We must not reward the terrorists by changing our policies or questioning our own principles or wallowing in self-flagellation or self-doubt. Instead, we should understand that terrorism is aggression and, like all aggression, must be forcefully resisted.

Requirements for an Active Strategy

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures. There should be no moral confusion on this issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly, the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.

A successful strategy for combating terrorism will require us to face up to some hard questions and to come up with some clear-cut answers. The questions involve our intelligence capability, the doctrine under which we would employ force, and, most important of all, our public's attitude toward this challenge. Our nation cannot summon the will to act without firm public understanding and support.

First, our intelligence capabilities, particularly our human intelligence, are being strengthened. Determination and capacity to act are of little value unless we can come close to answering the questions: who, where, and when. We have to do a better job of finding out

who the terrorists are; where they are; and the nature, composition, and patterns of behavior of terrorist organizations. Our intelligence services are organizing themselves to do the job, and they must be given the mandate and the flexibility to develop techniques of detection and contribute to deterrence and response.

Second, there is no question about our ability to use force where and when it is needed to counter terrorism. Our nation has forces prepared for action—from small teams able to operate virtually undetected, to the full weight of our conventional military might. But serious issues are involved—questions that need to be debated, understood, and agreed if we are to be able to utilize our forces wisely and effectively.

If terrorists strike here at home, it is a matter for police action and domestic law enforcement. In most cases overseas, acts of terrorism against our people and installations can be dealt with best by the host government and its forces. It is worth remembering that just as it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to provide security for foreign embassies in Washington, so the internationally agreed doctrine is that the security of our Embassies abroad in the first instance is the duty of the host government, and we work with those governments cooperatively and with considerable success. The ultimate responsibility of course is ours, and we will carry it out with total determination and all the resources available to us. Congress, in a bipartisan effort, is giving us the legislative tools and the resources to strengthen the protection of our facilities and our people overseas—and they must continue to do so. But while we strengthen our defenses, defense alone is not enough.

The heart of the challenge lies in those cases where international rules and traditional practices do not apply. Terrorists will strike from areas where no governmental authority exists, or they will base themselves behind what they expect will be the sanctuary of an international border. And they will design their attacks to take place in precisely those "gray areas" where the full facts cannot be known, where the challenge will not bring with it an obvious or clear-cut choice of response.

In such cases we must use our intelligence resources carefully and completely. We will have to examine the full range of measures available to us to take. The outcome may be that we will face a choice between doing nothing or employing military force. We now

recognize that terrorism is being used our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare. It is no aberration. We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.

What will be required, however, is public understanding *before the fact* of the risks involved in combating terrorism with overt power.

- The public must understand *before the fact* that there is potential for loss of life of some of our fighting men and loss of life of some innocent people.

- The public must understand *before the fact* that some will seek to cast an preemptive or retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will attempt to make our military and our policymakers—rather than the terrorists—appear to be the culprits.

- The public must understand *before the fact* that occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known—and the decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls.

Public support for U.S. military actions to stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act or in retaliation for an attack on our people is crucial; we are to deal with this challenge.

Our military has the capability and the techniques to use power to fight war against terrorism. This capability will be used judiciously. To be successful over the long term, it will require solid support from the American people.

I can assure you that in this Administration our actions will be governed by the rule of law; and the rule of law congenial to action against terrorists. We will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in a variety of ways, times and places of our own choosing. Clearly, we will not respond in the same manner to every terrorist act. Indeed, we will want to avoid engaging in a policy of automatic retaliation which might create a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control.

If we are going to respond or preempt effectively, our policies will have to have an element of unpredictability and surprise. And the prerequisite for such a policy must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action. We will need the capability to act on a moment's notice. There will not be time for a renewed national debate after every terrorist attack. We may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law. But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet

ons, worrying endlessly over
 other and how to respond. A great
 on with global responsibilities cannot
 d to be hamstrung by confusion and
 isiveness. Fighting terrorism will
 be a clean or pleasant contest, but
 ave no choice but to play it.

We will also need a broader interna-
 tional effort. If terrorism is truly a
 threat to Western moral values, our
 policy must not paralyze us; it must
 give us the courage to face up to the
 threat. And if the enemies of these
 values are united, so, too, must the
 democratic countries be united in de-
 feating them. The leaders of the in-
 ternational democracies, meeting at the
 summit in June, agreed in a
 declaration that they must redouble
 their cooperation against terrorism.

There has been followup to that initial
 meeting, and the United States is com-
 mitted to advance the process in every
 way possible. Since we, the democracies,
 are the most vulnerable, and our
 strategic interests are the most at stake,
 we must act together in the face of com-
 mon dangers. For our part, we will
 act whenever possible in close
 cooperation with our friends in the
 democracies.

Economic sanctions, when exercised in concert
 with other nations, can help to isolate,
 weaken, or punish states that sponsor
 terrorism against us. Too often, coun-
 tries are inhibited by fear of losing com-
 mercial opportunities or fear of provok-
 ing a bully. Economic sanctions and
 other forms of countervailing pressure
 have costs and risks on the nations
 that apply them, but some sacrifices will
 be necessary if we are not to suffer even
 greater costs down the road. Some coun-
 tries are clearly more vulnerable to ex-
 tortion than others, surely this is an
 argument for banding together in
 mutual support, not an argument for ap-
 arment.

As we truly believe in the values of
 civilization, we have a duty to de-
 fend them. The democracies must have
 the confidence to tackle this menac-
 ing problem or else they will not be in
 a position to tackle other kinds
 of problems. If we are not willing to set
 limits to what kinds of behavior are
 acceptable, then our adversaries will con-
 sider that there are no limits. As
 Thomas Jefferson once said, when we
 are confronted with the problem of
 a "an insult unpunished is the
 invitation to others." In a basic way, the
 democracies must show whether they
 believe in themselves.

We must confront the terrorist
 threat with the same resolve and deter-
 mination that this nation has shown time
 and again throughout our history. There
 is no room for guilt or self-doubt about
 our right to defend a way of life that of-
 fers all nations hope for peace, pro-
 gress, and human dignity. The sage
 Hillel expressed it well: "If I am not for
 myself, who will be? If I am for myself
 alone, who am I?"

As we fight this battle against ter-
 rorism, we must always keep in mind
 the values and way of life we are trying
 to protect. Clearly, we will not allow
 ourselves to descend to the level of bar-

barism that terrorism represents. We
 will not abandon our democratic tradi-
 tions, our respect for individual rights,
 and freedom, for these are precisely
 what we are struggling to preserve and
 promote. Our values and our principles
 will give us the strength and the con-
 fidence to meet the great challenge
 posed by terrorism. If we show the
 courage and the will to protect our
 freedom and our way of life, we will
 prove ourselves again worthy of these
 blessings.

¹Press release 242. ■

Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

by Secretary Shultz

*Address before the
 United Nations Association of the U.S.A
 in New York City on November 1, 1984.¹*

In the early 1960s, during the presiden-
 cy of John F. Kennedy, it was the con-
 sensus of defense policy experts that by
 the mid-1980s—today—between 15 and
 25 countries would have nuclear weap-
 ons. Serious commentators then ac-
 cepted, almost without question, the idea
 that the spread of nuclear weapons was
 inexorable, advancing like a Greek
 tragedy to some disastrous preordained
 conclusion.

Well, I'm happy to say they were
 wrong. It's 1984, and despite the steady
 and rapid development of nuclear energy
 around the world, the number of ac-
 knowledged nuclear-weapons states has
 held at five since China tested its first
 atomic bomb 20 years ago. Only one ad-
 ditional country, India, has carried out
 any kind of nuclear explosion—and that
 was 10 years ago.

Clearly, the potential danger is still
 with us. Regional rivalries and grandiose
 ambitions continue to tempt some coun-
 tries to flirt with the dangerous and
 misguided notion that their security
 could be enhanced by obtaining nuclear
 weapons or at least by creating the
 perception that they can do so.

But these temptations can and are
 being held in check. The prophets of
 gloom were wrong in their prediction
 that nuclear proliferation was inevitable,
 because they did not foresee the deter-
 mined efforts that would be undertaken
 by the international community to deter
 the spread of these deadly weapons.
 Without this undertaking, the nightmare
 of rampant nuclear proliferation might
 well have become reality.

While superpower negotiations to
 limit the growth of nuclear arsenals
 have garnered the headlines, the effort
 to prevent the spread of nuclear ex-
 plosives has gone on largely out of the
 glare of publicity. Through seven admin-
 istrations, the United States has led a
 concerted international campaign to con-
 trol this threat to world peace. The
 endeavor has fostered a web of institu-
 tional arrangements, legal commitments,
 technological safeguards, and alternative
 means for addressing security concerns.

The ongoing antiproliferation cam-
 paign is an example of constructive
 diplomacy and international cooperation
 at its finest. In this enterprise we have
 found common ground not only between

industrialized and developing countries, and between nuclear suppliers and nuclear consumers, but between ourselves and the Soviet Union. What we all share is the recognition that nuclear proliferation would aggravate political tensions among nations, heighten regional insecurities, and contribute to vastly greater instability in the world.

Since the day he took office, President Reagan has sought, as a fundamental objective, to reduce the dangers to world peace and global stability posed by nuclear weapons. The President's well-known efforts to achieve reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons have been one part of this enterprise. Prevention of nuclear proliferation has been another essential element.

In our efforts to control nuclear proliferation, like those directed toward reducing nuclear weapons, we must be guided by realism. We cannot wish the atom away, nor should we try to. Its secrets have been unlocked, and they have brought great benefit to mankind. Peaceful use of the atom has yielded not only an economical and reliable energy source but a wealth of applications in the fields of medicine and agriculture. We are only just beginning to realize the potential of peaceful nuclear technology for raising the living standards and improving the lives of millions of the world's people.

But we cannot be blind to the potential harm that misuse of this powerful force could bring. Diversion of nuclear technology to explosive purposes could pose a threat to peace and could at the very least undermine global stability.

Many of you undoubtedly saw press accounts of the Carnegie Endowment study on the nuclear proliferation problem that was released a couple of days ago. The study publicized a fact that those of us who deal with this issue have long been acutely aware of: that as long as international tension and conflict exist, there will be insecure or irresponsible leaders who seek to shift the balance of regional power dramatically by acquiring a "secret weapon."

We and other responsible members of the international community are ceaselessly at work to deter those who might be tempted to transform the promise of nuclear energy into the peril of nuclear weapons. Although we cannot be sure that further proliferation of nuclear explosives can be prevented for all time, there is a great deal we can do to retard its pace and make it much more difficult.

Nor can the United States realistically expect to deter proliferation all by itself. America no longer dominates the nuclear field—scientifically or commercially—as it once did. As mastery of the technology has spread, it has been harder to persuade others simply to follow our lead, let alone to dictate their actions and choices. Now more than ever, a successful nonproliferation effort requires cooperative undertakings involving both suppliers and users of nuclear technology, taking into account their energy needs, commercial interests, and concerns about their sovereignty.

Equally important, we must address the underlying causes of nuclear proliferation, not just its symptoms. Although the search for nuclear weapons might arise out of the simple megalomania of a national leader, a country is far more likely to "go nuclear" out of feelings of insecurity, usually arising from regional rivalries. The truth is that any "security" that might be gained by developing a nuclear-weapons capability is likely to be illusory. Proliferation begets proliferation; it is synonymous with instability and is destructive of everyone's security.

Nevertheless, as long as that sense of insecurity exists, the threat of sanctions, although an important deterrent, may not always suffice to discourage countries with the potential to build weapons from trying to do so. If the drive to acquire nuclear weapons is to be curbed, the sources of tension and insecurity also must be addressed. We can do this by providing political, economic, and security assistance to friendly countries anxious about their security. And we can continue to lend our efforts, as we have in the Middle East and southern Africa, for example, to resolution of the conflicts that are at the root of the problem.

In my experience as Secretary of State, I have found the problem of preventing nuclear proliferation to be as complicated and as challenging—intellectually, politically, and diplomatically—as any I've had to deal with. Just as we have discovered in dealing with other intricate, morally challenging foreign policy problems, like arms reduction and human rights, effective solutions often require us to make very tough choices.

Keeping our hands clean by trying to disengage from the problem, or by shunning all relations with potential offenders, is not the answer. We must deal with the causes of the problem and offer alternatives for its solution if we are to maintain our influence with

potential proliferators and not jeopardize the other, often critical, interests we may have in common. Balancing these diverse and sometimes contradictory policy considerations can involve difficult tradeoffs.

By the same token, if we are to maintain the cooperation of other nations whose participation is absolutely essential to any nonproliferation regime, we must respect their needs, their interests, and their sovereignty.

These are some of the considerations that have gone into shaping the nonproliferation policy of the Reagan Administration.

Evolution of Nonproliferation Policy

Over the last three decades, America's nonproliferation policy has benefited from a remarkable continuity and steadfastness of purpose. In 1953, soon after he was elected, President Eisenhower took a historic step in inaugurating the Atoms for Peace program. By this act the United States volunteered to share its peaceful nuclear technologies for the good of all mankind.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was also proposed by President Eisenhower, was established in 1957 as an international institution through which to pursue those same goals. The IAEA was given a dual mission: to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to effectuate a system of international safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials for nonpeaceful purposes. Through the intervening years, the IAEA has assumed even greater importance as an instrument in the nonproliferation regime. It is an agency that the United States ranks among the most important of the international institutions.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, provided a juridical framework for the same effort. In adhering to the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states undertook not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives and to accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities. At the same time, these states were assured access to peaceful nuclear technology, while nuclear suppliers committed themselves to ensuring that the nuclear exports were covered by IAEA safeguards. The parties to the treaty also agreed to make good-faith efforts to slow the nuclear arms race.

The early 1970s—particularly after the 1973 energy crisis—were perhaps the halcyon days for nuclear power.

ear generation of electricity was increasing rapidly, and the nonproliferation regime was expanding and appeared sound. But the explosion of a nuclear device by India in 1974, notwithstanding its "peaceful use" commitments under bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, shocked the nuclear suppliers and caused them to reassess their nonproliferation policies. Even before the Indian blast, there was a growing realization that variations in the export policies of the different nuclear suppliers made it difficult to develop uniform measures to deter proliferation. To close these gaps, the major nuclear suppliers convened in London in 1976 to discuss common multilateral export policies. Under the guidelines first adopted in 1976, members of the London Suppliers' Group agreed to transfer nuclear technology, equipment, and material only if the customer nation agreed to apply IAEA safeguards to the supplied and to ensure its peaceful

for nearly three decades, the United States and other nations that share our values have relied on this combination of economic incentives, international safeguards, bilateral export controls, and technological constraints to hold nuclear proliferation in check. But nonproliferation strategies have had to be continuously adapted to deal with evolving technologies and changing political circumstances.

When the Carter Administration took office, its policy was fundamentally shaped by the view that nuclear energy development worldwide created significant proliferation risks. Decisions were made to defer reprocessing and plutonium use in this country. These restrictive policies were paralleled by unilateral attempts to curtail the supply of nuclear technology abroad and particularly to discourage the use of plutonium-based technologies by other industrial nations.

Rather than "setting a good example" as it was intended to do, this restrictive attitude toward nuclear power was seen by some of our friends as a challenge to their desire for energy independence. Thereby it reduced our influence in the international nuclear arena and eroded trust in the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier. The enactment of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act during the Carter Administration represented a serious effort to promote a more stringent and uniform set of international standards for nuclear exports. At the same time, however, it precluded us from carrying

out certain supply contracts and agreements to cooperate in the nuclear area, thus impairing our ability to provide incentives for countries to act in ways consistent with nonproliferation goals. As a result, we were less able to win the support of those nations on critical supply, safeguards, and other nonproliferation issues.

Reagan Administration Policies and Achievements

President Reagan, therefore, shaped an approach that was designed to facilitate cooperation with our allies and friends and to ensure us an effective leadership role in international nuclear affairs.

Supporting Nuclear Power. As I said at the outset, we are realistic. In coming decades, nuclear energy will necessarily play a major role in providing environmentally safe and economically efficient electric power in the United States. Likewise, it is clear that nuclear-generated energy will be increasingly important for the economic development and energy security of many nations around the world. For these countries—Japan, for example, and much of Western Europe—nuclear power is critical to national well-being and energy security.

Making Rational Distinctions. We must make rational distinctions between close friends and allies who pose no great proliferation risk and those areas of the world where we have real concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. A policy of denial toward countries with excellent nonproliferation credentials would be arbitrary as well as counterproductive. On the other hand, we are determined to maintain stringent controls to ensure that our nuclear cooperation is not misused. We recognize, in particular, a clear need to restrict sensitive nuclear activities in regions of instability and proliferation concern, like the Middle East and South Asia.

At the same time, we are striving to reduce the motivation of some states to acquire nuclear explosives by working with them to improve regional and global stability. Our \$3.2-billion package of economic and security assistance to Pakistan is a case in point.

Closer Consultation and Cooperation. In light of the earlier criticism by our nuclear partners, and the recogni-

tion that America is no longer dominant in the field, we have sought to restore an emphasis on cooperation. It is not always possible, of course, to obtain full agreement on controversial issues. But we have tried, at least, to implement our nonproliferation policy with a maximum of consultation and agreement with other nations. Our approach is designed to give our closest nuclear-trading partners a firmer and more predictable basis on which to plan their vital energy programs, while at the same time furthering our nonproliferation objectives.

President Reagan has stated that the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder-reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear programs that do not constitute a proliferation risk. In keeping with this policy, the United States has been discussing with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community long-term arrangements on reprocessing and plutonium use. We all believe that such long-term arrangements will be mutually beneficial and will enhance the global nonproliferation regime.

Our negotiations with the People's Republic of China regarding an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy also have important implications for the strengthening of the worldwide nonproliferation regime. China's decision during the process of those negotiations to join the International Atomic Energy Agency was a significant step in this regard. Its determination to require IAEA safeguards on its future export commitments, and its strong statement that it would refrain from assisting any other nations to acquire nuclear explosives, are evidence of China's broadening commitment to the world's nonproliferation effort.

We are convinced that nuclear cooperation with China, grounded on an agreement that satisfies all the requirements of our law and policy, will advance our worldwide nonproliferation objectives, enhance our overall political relations with China, and benefit U.S. economic interests.

Although we have major differences with the Soviet Union on a wide range of arms control issues, we have broad common interests in the nonproliferation area. In the fall of 1982, Foreign Minister Gromyko and I agreed to initiate bilateral consultations on nonproliferation. Since then, three rounds of useful discussions have taken place, with

both sides finding more areas of agreement than disagreement. We expect to confer again on this subject later this month. It is clear that both countries consider the horizontal spread of nuclear explosives to be in no one's interest. Moreover, we agree that we both have major responsibilities in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.

Broadening the Dialogue. Some rapidly industrializing nations—such as Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa—also have active peaceful nuclear energy programs. Moreover, they are emerging as nuclear materials suppliers in their own right. We have restored a dialogue on the benefits of a strong nonproliferation regime with these countries, where our ties in the area of peaceful nuclear energy had been all but broken. We have sought their cooperation and support for our efforts to assure that nuclear exports are not misused for nonpeaceful purposes. At the same time, we have stressed that regional stability would be enhanced if they would broaden the application of international safeguards in their own nuclear programs.

We are pleased to note that the Government of South Africa has publicly undertaken to require IAEA safeguards on all of its future nuclear exports. South Africa has also reopened discussions with the IAEA on safeguarding a significant new semicommercial enrichment plant.

Our discussions with Brazil and Argentina, we believe, have led to an increased sensitivity on their part to our nonproliferation concerns. We attach great importance to the assurances of Brazil and Argentina that their nuclear programs are devoted solely to peaceful uses, and we look forward to continuing our dialogue both in multilateral fora and in bilateral discussions.

We continue to urge all of these countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in the case of the Western Hemisphere, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to place *all* of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

Improving U.S. Export Controls. I have talked mainly about this Administration's diplomatic and policy initiatives, but we have not neglected the technical side of the problem. In his 1981 statement on nonproliferation policy, the President affirmed that the United States would continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly

where the danger of proliferation required restraint.

We fully recognize the risks associated with reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear technologies because of their potential direct applicability to weapons production. We appreciate the need for great caution and restraint in dealing with these risks and the importance of limiting sensitive facilities and activities to as few locations as possible. Even then, reprocessing should only be done in places where no significant risk of proliferation exists.

A small but significant number of the world's states pose a real proliferation risk. In seeking to block these states—Libya, for example—from obtaining nuclear explosives, we have employed a range of political, economic, and security measures. And, of course, we have sought to persuade other suppliers to impose similar conditions and controls. This effort has been successful thus far in preventing acquisition of nuclear weapons by unstable and irresponsible regimes, in whose hands they could create a catastrophe. But unrelenting vigilance is necessary.

Strengthening International Safeguards. Our commitment to strengthened international safeguards remains constant and firm, for we recognize that this is one area in which we cannot allow inspection capabilities to be outpaced by advancing technology. Obviously, as advanced nuclear technologies come on line around the world, the International Atomic Energy Agency must have at its disposal the trained personnel and equipment required to apply adequate safeguards. Under our Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, we continue to contribute importantly to this effort.

In a major arms control speech last year, President Reagan called upon all nuclear suppliers to require recipient states to accept comprehensive safeguards on all their nuclear activities as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitments. Over the past 3 years we have worked through diplomatic channels to develop a favorable supplier consensus on this issue.

It was, for example, one of the topics discussed at the meeting of nuclear suppliers held earlier this year in Luxembourg. The nations represented there agreed that adoption of comprehensive safeguards remains a highly desirable nonproliferation goal. We are seeking to build on the Luxembourg results by examining concrete ways of

persuading additional consumer states accept comprehensive safeguards. As we pursue our dialogue with emerging suppliers, we will work to assure that they, too, come to understand and adopt the nonproliferation ethic that traditional suppliers have developed over the past quarter century.

Sharing Benefits With the Developing World. In our efforts to develop the atom for peaceful purposes—from medicine to nuclear power—we have not ignored the legitimate needs of those technological less advanced nations that wish to share in the peaceful benefits of the atom. We will continue to ensure, bilaterally and through the IAEA, that those benefits are made available on a reliable basis to nations that have good nonproliferation credentials.

In East Asia and Latin America, the IAEA has recently sponsored initiatives to promote enhanced cooperation in nuclear research, development, and training. We support such regional initiatives and are examining the feasibility of broadening the Latin American effort to involve other nations of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

NPT Review Conference. Over the past several years, we have worked to strengthen the treaty that is at the heart of the international nonproliferation regime. Ten new countries have been persuaded to join in the last 4 years, making the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with 125 parties, the most widely adhered-to arms control agreement history.

Preparations are now well underway for the 1985 conference to review the implementation of the NPT. For our part, we will work with all countries for a successful review conference in 1985. Indeed, we welcome a full debate, which, I am sure, will not overlook the treaty's critical contribution to international security and global peace.

The Continuing Priority of Preventing Proliferation

It is no exaggeration to say that controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world peace and, indeed, to human survival. It is a cause that deserves and receives a top priority in our foreign policy.

Security & Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace

September 1984

A little over a year has passed since the first edition of this publication on security and arms control appeared. In that time, the United States and its allies have taken a number of important positive steps to advance the arms control process. For its part, the Soviet Union has chosen to interrupt the crucial Geneva negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We and our allies have made clear that we want talks on these issues to resume at once without preconditions, and that we are prepared to engage in productive negotiations once they do.

During the year, a new East-West forum began in Stockholm, the product of Western initiative: the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Its objective is to negotiate measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. The West has put forward a set of imaginative and constructive measures that would concretely advance this end. In the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, the West has also advanced a concrete new proposal. In April, Vice President Bush traveled to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to present a new draft treaty to ban chemical weapons worldwide.

In June, the United States accepted, without preconditions, a Soviet invitation for talks on space arms control, including antisatellite weapons. The Soviets, however, have portrayed this acceptance as a rejection, while in effect insisting that we agree on the outcome before the talks could even begin. We remain ready to meet with them, both on outer space questions and on offensive nuclear weapons.

These and other U.S. arms control efforts are part of a long-term Western effort to enhance global security through balanced and verifiable agreements. This is a complement to maintaining a strong defense—not an alternative to it. Since World War II, the United States and its European allies have preserved the peace through a commitment to collective defense within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has been avoided; there has been no resort to nuclear weapons; and the industrialized democracies of Europe have enjoyed the longest period of peace and prosperity in their modern history.

For almost four decades, this peace has been based upon the twin pillars of defense and dialogue—the maintenance of Western strength, coupled with efforts to resolve differences peacefully and remove sources of conflict. The West has sought to use arms control to strengthen both pillars, to stabilize the military balance at the lowest possible level, and in so doing to enhance mutual confidence and expand areas of understanding.

Over the past year Western governments have recommitted themselves to this broad approach. At the Williamsburg summit the leaders of the world's seven largest industrial democracies affirmed the common nature of our security interests and called upon the Soviet Union to join us in reducing nuclear armament. This May, in Washington, the 16 NATO Foreign Ministers reviewed the course of East-West relations over the past two decades, and reconfirmed the validity of the alliance's dual approach of defense and dialogue.

But as fateful as the stakes are, our efforts have not been widely noted. For the struggle we are waging is not on the battlefield. It goes on in the quiet of diplomatic chanceries, at meetings of technical experts, and in safeguards laboratories. Success is measured not in acres of territory liberated or new allies gained but rather in terms of confidence established, restraints voluntarily accepted, and destabilizing military options gone.

By those measures, our nonproliferation policy has been a success. We have established a spirit of confidence, both with other nuclear suppliers and with the customers of nuclear technology who share our nonproliferation goals; we have deepened our dialogues on practical cooperation; we have successfully engaged some important countries to adopt new antiproliferation measures; and we have made significant progress toward the conclusion of new bilateral agreements that will further strengthen international nonproliferation efforts.

But these accomplishments, important as they are, must not lull us into complacency. Thus far, we have proven wrong the prophets of unchecked nuclear proliferation. But only with vigilance, realism, and unflagging effort can we continue to belie their dire prophecy and to ensure that the power of the atom will be exploited to threaten civilization but to serve

Press release 243 of Nov. 1, 1984. ■

The United States and its allies have on the table comprehensive proposals to reverse the arms buildup, establish a more stable military equilibrium at lower levels, strengthen deterrence, and reinforce world peace. These are goals which people of all nations support. They look to the United States and the Soviet Union, as the world's two most powerful nations, to take the lead. For our part, as the efforts outlined in this publication illustrate, we are doing so.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Summary

For nearly four decades, America and its friends and allies have preserved both peace and the fundamental values of personal freedom, human dignity, democracy, and respect for national independence and diversity. The pursuit of peace and freedom has never been easy, yet the West has succeeded because it has remained clear on its goals and united in the means for achieving them.

The responsibility to pursue peace and freedom often has forced the peoples of the West to make difficult decisions on security issues. They have had to bear the burden of maintaining large, modern military forces adequate to meet the threat from potential adversaries who seek political and military domination. The responsibility to maintain an effective defense imposes sacrifices and requires the West to use resources it would prefer to use otherwise.

In the nuclear age, any East-West conflict could have catastrophic consequences for participants and nonparticipants alike. Thus, while the United States and its allies have maintained a defense adequate to deter war, they also have sought to lower the level of these forces, to reduce the risk that a conflict might occur, and to establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility that will strengthen peace.

The United States and NATO are committed to maintaining the minimum nuclear forces necessary for deterrence and, therefore, over time have made substantial unilateral reductions in those forces. In the 1960s, the United States had one-third more nuclear weapons—with four times the explosive power—than it has today. Similarly, as a result of several NATO alliance decisions taken over the past 4 years, the U.S. nuclear stockpile in Europe will be one-third smaller than in 1979.

Thus the United States and NATO have been more than willing to undertake unilateral nuclear arms reductions when that could be done safely. Regrettably, this cannot be said for the Soviet Union. Far from taking comparable steps to lower its nuclear armaments, the Soviet Union has steadily expanded its stocks of strategic, intermediate-range, and short-range nuclear weapons. At the same time, it has continued to build up its numerically superior conventional forces and qualitatively improved many of its systems to reduce NATO's technological edge.

The United States and its allies, therefore, are seeking arms control

agreements that would genuinely enhance stability and security, reduce military capabilities, and ease the defense burden. Precisely because of the importance of arms control, it is the subject of intense public debate in the West. This study seeks to contribute to the discussion by reviewing the record of U.S. arms control efforts since the end of World War II and by providing a status report on the U.S. arms control agenda within the context of broader national security objectives. The study describes the factors that have shaped U.S. security policy and recounts past arms control efforts—those that have worked and those that did not. It sets forth the principles underlying U.S. arms control initiatives. It reports on eight critical arms control challenges and how the United States and its allies are addressing them. And finally, it summarizes the prospects for arms control.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

There is an inescapable relationship among all elements of security, including defense capabilities, political commitments, and arms control agreements. It is often argued that defense and arms control are separate and competing concepts. It is more accurate, however, to say that arms control and defense are mutually reinforcing: each bolsters the effectiveness of the other, in the interest of greater stability and security.

Western defense and arms control efforts support the same goal: to reduce the risk of war. One also can see the linkage between them in the apparent paradox—borne out by the history of arms control—that the West's defense modernization programs encourage rather than discourage progress toward arms reductions. As the Scowcroft commission noted in its April 1983 report

Arms control negotiations—in particular the Soviets' willingness to enter agreements that enhance stability—are heavily influenced by ongoing programs. The ABM Treaty of 1972, for example, came about only because the United States maintained an ongoing ABM program and indeed made a decision to make a limited deployment. It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated only new U.S. ICBM program that could to deployments in this decade.

The lesson to be learned is that the Soviet Union will accept equitable reductions that create a stable balance—essential for deterrence—at lower levels

only if convinced of the West's determination to maintain such a balance by its own efforts.

Security in the nuclear age means collective security. History demonstrates that the only way to preserve peace and protect the freedom of the Western democracies is through their unity and common purpose. This principle is clearly exemplified by NATO—committing 16 sovereign nations to common defense against aggression—and by similar commitments in which the United States has led in the Pacific region.

Collective security depends on the political will and military capabilities of participating states. Arms control can make a fundamental contribution to security, if equitable, verifiable agreements can be achieved that significantly reduce the level of forces helping to stabilize the military balance and strengthen confidence on all sides.

Arms control negotiations are complex. But beneath the technicalities, there are recurring political and strategic realities that must be recognized if arms control is to contribute to security. The most important of these are the common interests of the industrialized democracies, including the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and the global challenge to our interests posed by the Soviet Union.

Soviet power and aggressive behavior have led the United States, in conjunction with its allies, to organize collective security—to deter and, if necessary, to repel aggression. This arrangement has succeeded remarkably in protecting the freedom and security of the West for almost 40 years.

Collective security has been based on a policy of deterrence, which is clear to any adversary that the costs of aggression would far outweigh possible benefits. This policy, of which NATO is a central element, has prevented any direct U.S.-Soviet conflict and maintained stability in the North Atlantic area since 1945, a period that has witnessed more than 100 armed conflicts globally.

Collective security also provides the basis upon which the United States has maintained a dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at reducing tensions and promoting responsible international conduct. The pursuit of effective arms control has been an important part of that dialogue.

THE ARMS CONTROL RECORD

Since the end of World War II, the United States, working closely with its allies, has been the leader in serious arms control proposals, beginning with the 1946 Baruch Plan to eliminate nuclear weapons and place nuclear energy under an international authority. This proposal to share the benefits of nuclear technology, put forward when the United States held a nuclear monopoly, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

In 1955, President Eisenhower advanced his "open skies" proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and permitted aerial reconnaissance to monitor military maneuvers. The initiative was one of the first suggested "confidence-building measures" aimed at increasing mutual understanding and helping to reduce the chances of surprise attack. It, too, was rejected by the Soviet Union.

In 1963, the United States proposed, and the U.S.S.R. agreed, to establish a "hot line" to facilitate high-level communication during international crises and reduce the possibility of misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. That same year the Limited Test Ban Treaty—a U.S. initiative prohibiting participating states from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water—came into force.

In 1968, years of Western effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to provide for international safeguards on civilian nuclear activities resulted in the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since then, the United States has continued efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation while sharing the benefits of nuclear technology through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Other arms control agreements in which the United States has had a primary role in negotiating over the past 25 years include the: Antarctic Treaty (1959), which demilitarized the Antarctic Continent; Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1967), which prohibited stationing weapons of mass destruction in space; Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; "Accidents Measures" Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; Biological Weapons Convention (1972), which pro-

hibits the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons; ABM Treaty (1972), which imposed limitations on defenses against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive arms (1972), usually known as SALT I, which froze the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missile launchers.

The U.S. commitment to arms control has never wavered, even though the global security environment is rapidly changing, and Soviet behavior regarding arms control has been far from satisfactory. It is axiomatic that, if arms control agreements are to contribute to stability, all parties must comply with them. Yet, as the President reported to Congress on January 23, 1984, the United States has determined—after a careful review of many months and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union—that the U.S.S.R. has violated or probably violated several legal obligations and political commitments in the arms control field. Future agreements, therefore, must include effective verification provisions, and the Soviet Union must take a scrupulous and constructive attitude toward compliance.

In addition, the Soviet Government suspended both the negotiations on strategic and on intermediate-range nuclear arms in late 1983, following the arrival of U.S. longer range INF missiles in Europe in accordance with NATO's 1979 "dual-track" decision. The Soviet action was completely unjustified. The United States negotiated for 2 years and did not deploy a single LRINF missile, while the U.S.S.R. added over 100 missiles, with more than 300 warheads, to its already large SS-20 force. As of September 1984, that force numbered 378 SS-20 missiles with 1,134 warheads and is still growing. Moreover, the United States repeatedly made clear that—while NATO LRINF missile deployments would begin at the end of 1983 in the absence of an arms control agreement making them unnecessary—it wants to continue negotiations and is prepared to halt, modify, or reverse those deployments in accord with an eventual agreement.

The United States deeply regrets the Soviet suspension of START and the INF talks. It is convinced that equitable, verifiable nuclear arms reductions would be in the interest of both sides and is ready to resume both negotiations at any time without preconditions. At the same time, the United States is pressing ahead for progress in those areas where the Soviets are willing to negotiate.

Today, the challenge faced by those designing Western arms control policies is great. But the United States, together with its friends and allies, remains committed to genuine arms control that will enhance stability and sustain the framework of collective security that has guaranteed the peace throughout the post-World War II era.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL PRINCIPLES AND INITIATIVES

In underscoring his commitment to the pursuit of arms control agreements that will strengthen peace, President Reagan has stressed the essential principles guiding the U.S. approach.

- The United States seeks agreements that will enhance security while reducing the risks of war. Thus arms control is not an end in itself but a vital means to ensure a secure peace and international stability.
- The United States seeks to reduce weapons and forces substantially, not just freeze them at high levels or legitimize additional buildups, as has been the effect of some earlier agreements.
- The U.S. goal is mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. An agreement that establishes or codifies an unequal balance of forces creates instability and enhances the prospect for conflict.
- Arms control agreements must include provisions to ensure effective verification and encourage compliance.

Based on these principles, the United States is pursuing an arms control agenda of unprecedented scope. Today's efforts build upon more than three decades' experience, upon agreements already achieved, and upon lessons learned from past successes and failures.

In all areas, the United States has maintained close and fruitful consultations with its allies regarding arms control positions and the conduct of negotiations. This consultation grows out of the common recognition that arms control is an important instrument of Western policy and an essential element of world security.

The primary challenges for U.S. arms control efforts include:

Strategic Arms. The strategic arms reduction talks (START), dealing with the principal elements of the U.S.-Soviet intercontinental nuclear relationship. In these talks, the United States has been trying to achieve significant reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear systems

Acronyms

ABM—antiballistic missile
ALCM—air-launched cruise missile
ASAT—antisatellite weapons
CD—Conference on Disarmament
CDE—Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CSCE—Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile
INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces
GLCM—ground-launched cruise missile
LRINF—longer range INF
MBFR—mutual and balanced force reductions
MIRV—multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle
MV—miniature vehicle
NPT—Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
SALT—strategic arms limitation talks
SCG—Special Consultative Group (NATO)
SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile
START—strategic arms reduction talks

and to encourage movement toward a more stabilizing force structure. For example, the United States has proposed a one-third cut by both sides in the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads. Reductions would be accomplished through a "build-down" of ballistic missile warheads designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems and guaranteed annual reductions even in the absence of modernization.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. The talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), focusing on a crucial part of the Soviet threat to countries on its periphery. In these talks, the United States has proposed eliminating the entire category of U.S. and Soviet land-based, longer range INF missiles. The United States also has proposed that, as an interim agreement, the two sides agree to reductions to equal numbers of warheads on longer range INF missiles and has significantly modified its position to meet stated Soviet concerns.

Conventional Forces in Europe. The mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, dealing with conventional military power in central Europe, where there is a great imbalance in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The agreed goal of these talks is to

achieve reductions in both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe to parity at levels of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air force combined. The talks have long been deadlocked over disagreement on the current size of Eastern forces and Eastern unwillingness to accept effect verification provisions. In April 1984, the West submitted a proposal aimed at breaking this deadlock by focusing the talks initially upon only combat and combat support forces and leaving agreement on rear area forces until later.

Confidence-Building Measures.

Designed to promote mutual knowledge of military forces and activities and to prevent misunderstanding or miscalculation in a crisis, these measures can be applied to virtually all areas of arms control. The United States has advanced proposals for confidence-building measures relating to nuclear forces at the START and INF negotiations. The United States also has proposed further measures to improve communication with the Soviet Union on which the two sides began negotiating in August 1983. In July 1984, the United States and U.S.S.R. reached agreement on improving the "hot line," one of the measures proposed by the United States. This provides for the addition of high-speed facilities to the existing system. The United States and its allies also have advanced measures for notification and clarification of the activities of conventional forces in the MBFR talks at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which opened in Stockholm in January 1984.

Chemical Weapons. An immediate challenge is to ensure compliance with existing international agreements outlawing the use of chemical weapons and agreeing to new accords for a verifiable ban on the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical weapons. International attention has been drawn to violations of existing accords by the Soviet Union and its allies, who have employed chemical and toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos, and to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in its war with Iran. In April 1984, the United States introduced a draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons.

Nuclear Testing. Since conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which bans atmospheric testing, attention has focused on efforts to limit and ultimately ban underground nuclear testing. An obstacle has been the inadequacy of

asures to verify compliance. The United States repeatedly has proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union to strengthen the verification provisions of the unratified Threshold Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit size of underground nuclear explosions. Achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing—in the context of broad, open, and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and the maintenance of a credible deterrent—remains a long-term U.S. objective.

Nonproliferation. The United States is committed to effective implementation of the 1968 treaty on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States is working to strengthen international safeguards on nuclear material and to more tightly control ac-

cess to technology relating to nuclear weapons production.

Outer Space Arms Control. The United States has been studying and reviewing the whole area of space arms control, to identify what would be equitable, verifiable, and truly effective in limiting threats to satellites. The United States accepted, without preconditions, the Soviets' June 1984 proposal to meet in Vienna in mid-September to discuss this subject. Regrettably, the Soviet Union subsequently backed away from its own proposal.

The scope of the U.S. arms control agenda, the complexity of the issues, and the range of interests of the many countries involved, testify to the importance the United States attaches to arms control as an integral part of the effort to strengthen peace and security.

The Foundations of Western Security

The United States borders upon two great oceans and has important economic, political, and humanitarian interests throughout the globe. The principal threat to American security, and to that of our friends and allies around the world, comes from another continent-dominant nation, the Soviet Union, which, like the United States, faces eastward and has access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The keystone of U.S. security policy is close, cooperative ties with the world's industrialized democracies in Western Europe, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. We share more than a common threat with these nations; we share values and political principles that must be protected, fostered, and propagated. The maintenance of a stable world equilibrium and our ability to contribute to peace in other areas of the world depend upon the cooperation among this group of like-minded nations.

SECURITY IN ASIA

Because of the enormous size and diversity of the Asian region, its importance to American security, and the proximity of activities of the Soviet Union to it, American efforts to maintain an effective structure of security. The presence of U.S. land and air forces in Japan and of the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific give substance to the commitments the United States has undertaken in

bilateral and multilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The foremost American objective in the region is to preserve peace and stability. In that context, the United States maintains military forces to meet the growing Soviet military threat and supports its friends and allies against potential threats from North Korea and Vietnam. The United States also protects sealanes that are strategically important to the regional states and also crucial to the defense of the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and the Middle East, and to the maintenance of Western access to these regions. The United States also is working to build a long-term and constructive relationship with the People's Republic of China.

SECURITY IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIA

The United States also has vital interests and important relationships with friendly nations in the Near East and Southwest Asia. The significance of this region for world stability and the health of the global economy cannot be overstated. Our objectives are to deter further Soviet aggression in the region, to promote progress toward Middle East peace that will assure the security and recognize the legitimate rights of all parties, to preserve the independence of the states of the region, to maintain free-

dom for navigation in the contiguous waters, and to ensure Western access to the region's energy resources.

In view of the proximity of the Soviet Union and the number of Soviet military units stationed along the Soviet border just north of this region and in the surrounding waters, the task of deterring aggression is especially challenging. The occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 brought Soviet forces deeper into the region. In addition, Soviet access to South Yemen and Ethiopia and significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and equipment in Syria and Libya, compound the problem.

U.S. efforts to promote peace and stability have involved a number of political, economic, and security cooperation programs with regional states, including efforts to resolve the Palestinian question and the destabilizing presence of foreign forces in Lebanon. The United States has provided significant amounts of economic and security assistance to many states in the region and has cooperated in other ways to strengthen regional governments. It has participated in multinational peacekeeping activities in the Sinai and Lebanon.

The United States has developed the capabilities for the rapid projection of power into the region in order to deter aggression. This has involved improving mobility and service support forces and designating a pool of forces that can be quickly deployed if required. In conjunction with several governments, we are developing a number of facilities, both on route and in the region, that would be available for such rapid deployments, subject to host government concurrence.

SECURITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

America also has important security concerns in the Western Hemisphere, as do the other industrialized democracies that rely upon American strength. In the event of a European crisis, for example, about half of the U.S. resupply of its NATO allies would travel from American gulf ports through sealanes in the Caribbean Basin. The Rio treaty confirms the longstanding U.S. commitment to the security of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. objectives in the hemisphere are to maintain the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin, and the Panama Canal; to promote economic development and the strengthening of democratic institutions; to support the independence and stabili-

ty of friendly governments; to counter the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; and to strengthen U.S. political and defense relationships with friendly countries.

Historically, the Western Hemisphere has been secure enough to allow the United States to concentrate on its European, Asian, and other security commitments. However, the steady growth of Cuban military power and the recent involvement of communist-bloc countries, other radical states, and extrahemispheric movements in Central American instability have created serious problems. We are seeking to address these problems by promoting equitable social and economic development, by strengthening democratic processes, by supporting regional diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions, and by directly bolstering the ability of Caribbean Basin nations to defend themselves.

SECURITY IN AFRICA

Developments in Africa are important to the United States for many reasons. African—and Western—interests are best served in an atmosphere of political stability, economic growth, and physical security. The United States is thus concerned with Africa's political modernization, social progress, and economic development. In particular, the United States is concerned about those countries friendly to the West that are threatened by subversion and destabilization from various quarters. They need the help and support of the United States and other industrialized democracies. The Soviets and their surrogates have continued to supply arms and personnel to Africa and have attempted to exploit conflicts throughout the continent. American policy encourages negotiated solutions to these conflicts. What the United States and its allies are attempting to accomplish in southern Africa exemplifies this approach. At the same time, the United States will continue to provide assistance to friends whose security is threatened.

SECURITY IN EUROPE

Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a coalition of sovereign Western countries formed and sustained to defend the interests and values of the Atlantic democracies, is the centerpiece

of U.S. security efforts. NATO is based on the principle that Western security is indivisible and that the defense of the political independence and democratic systems of the European allies against the Soviet threat is vital to the United States.

Throughout the postwar period, NATO has had to cope with two fundamental geographic realities.

- The nations and defense resources of the West are divided by the Atlantic Ocean.
- The Soviet Union emerged from World War II in control of a contiguous landmass extending from Asia into the heart of Europe.

The United States is separated from Europe by more than 3,000 miles of open water. Even within Europe, the Western nations do not form a single contiguous landmass. Although the United States and its NATO allies together have more population, larger economies, and are more highly developed than the Soviet Union and the East European states, the geographic division has always posed special challenges to collective efforts to guarantee Western security. NATO has always had to contend with the risk that the Soviet Union, for military or political purposes, could bring superior forces to bear on a vulnerable point.

Not only does the Soviet Union maintain the largest single army in Europe, but its direct land lines of communication permit swift reinforcement of those forces from elsewhere on its own territory. Moreover, its internal lines of communication allow it to choose the point of potential attack or pressure.

For the United States and other Western nations, it was clear in the late 1940s that these geographic realities could be overcome only through a close alliance between Europe and North America. Memories of the 1930s—when the absence of effective solidarity prevented the democracies from checking the rise of aggressive dictatorships without war—were still fresh. The Soviets' seizure of Eastern Europe, their rejection of free elections in countries under their control, and their attempt to starve out the free city of Berlin were immediate reminders of the dangers faced by a prostrate Europe and a demobilized United States. It was evident that only a policy of collective security could preserve peace and protect the independence of the Western peoples. Only the commitment by the Western democracies to a common defense could deter military aggression or political pressure against any one of them.

Twice in this century the United States has joined with its allies to defend democracy in Europe and restore stable equilibrium of power. Since World War II, the Western goal in Europe has been to prevent a new conflict from occurring.

To this end, NATO was established in 1949 as the formal embodiment of security partnership of equals. From the beginning, NATO has been a defensive alliance, committed never to use force except in response to aggression. NATO's basic goal has been to demonstrate the political will and military strength needed to deter aggression and prevent intimidation.

NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Deterrence is the basis of U.S. and NATO security policy. It requires that potential aggressor be convinced that the costs of aggression outweigh any possible gains. Maintaining deterrence for almost four decades has been a difficult and dynamic process. The United States and the other NATO members have had to adapt to technological progress, to the growth and modernization of Soviet military power, and to political and economic change at home and abroad. In particular, they have had to offset repeated efforts by the Soviet Union to exploit its geographic advantages and divide NATO in order to dominate Western Europe.

At the outset, deterrence depended heavily on America's superior strategic nuclear power. The U.S. lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear capabilities allowed the West to offset substantial Soviet advantages in conventional strength, deter aggression, and insulate Europe from Soviet intimidation.

As the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear forces, however, it became apparent that the threat of nuclear retaliation alone was not sufficient to provide credible deterrence under all circumstances. Increasingly, on both sides of the Atlantic, it was recognized that stability could be assured only if the nuclear deterrent was supplemented by more robust conventional forces. Thus, in the 1960s, the alliance developed the strategy of "flexible response" which continues to this day.

The basic premise of this strategy is that NATO must deter and, if necessary, counter military aggression of varying magnitudes in any of its regions. To this, the alliance must maintain a wide array of forces. This balance of forces

mits a flexible range of responses capable of meeting any aggression at an appropriate level to defeat the attack. This strategy relies on having strong conventional and nuclear forces to convince the Soviet Union that NATO could counter any aggression and that the risks to the Soviet Union would outweigh any gains from an attack on any level.

THE NATO TRIAD OF FORCES

To complement this strategy, NATO fields an interlocking combination of forces:

- Conventional forces**, including armored and mechanized divisions, tactical aircraft, and naval forces;
- Intermediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons**, based in Europe, with delivery systems operated by the United States and its allies; and
- Strategic forces**, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, based in the United States.

All three elements of the triad of forces play an essential role in the maintenance of an effective deterrent. They provide NATO with the capability to counter aggression at a variety of levels and confront a potential aggressor with great uncertainty about the level and nature of a Western response. An aggressor must perceive that any attack on NATO could incur incalculable risks, including the risk of nuclear retaliation necessary to restore the peace and force the aggressor to withdraw. The effect of the three elements working together is more than the sum of the individual parts. Conventional defense alone would not provide political confidence or military deterrence against the Soviet Union. Similarly, a nuclear force alone would not be a credible deterrent in every situation and might, in some cases, invite political pressure and limited military adventure. Moreover, the availability of nuclear weapons for the defense of Western Europe complicates the task of the Soviet military planner. Together, NATO's combination of conventional and nuclear forces has proved to be extremely effective in preserving peace.

The key is the firm linkage among the elements. An aggressor must never get the impression that risks could be safely limited and that an attack on NATO might be an attractive proposition. Ultimately, the most important link is the linkage between forces in Europe—both

conventional and nuclear—and the U.S. strategic deterrent. It is this crucial "coupling" that gives concrete form to the indivisibility of American and European security and that ensures that the Soviets could not attack Europe without risking retaliation against their own territory. Thus, it is not surprising that over the years the way to maintain the linkage between Europe and North America has been the single most discussed element of NATO strategy and that weakening the link has been a consistent Soviet objective.

THE CURRENT DEBATE

In recent years, the U.S. and NATO strategy of deterrence has been criticized from a variety of perspectives. For some, the cost of maintaining conventional forces has seemed too great, particularly in a time of economic difficulty. To these critics, it has appeared far easier to move back to the simple strategy of an earlier era, relying on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation as an inexpensive deterrent.

For others, the risks of nuclear weapons have appeared too great. They believe that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is less important than their unquestioned destructiveness were they ever employed. Such critics argue that the answer lies in reducing the role of nuclear weapons and perhaps even in renouncing their first use. Some say they would be prepared to increase sharply the expenditures for conventional defense to offset this change.

The United States and its allies cannot return to a doctrine based solely on massive nuclear retaliation, such as existed more than two decades ago. In an era of reciprocal nuclear vulnerability, the threat of massive nuclear retaliation alone is not suited to all or even most contingencies. Relying on nuclear weapons alone would leave the West unable to respond only to one contingency—the worst one—with no credible means of dealing with all the other possibilities, from political and economic pressure to various forms of limited aggression.

Conversely, to remove nuclear weapons from the deterrent, or to declare a policy of no-first-use, would allow an aggressor to act with the certainty that risks could be limited. It would, in practice, make Europe safe for conventional war by appearing to guarantee to the Soviet Union that the West would not escalate to the nuclear level if faced with defeat by conventional

forces. Renouncing the nuclear component of the NATO triad would gravely undermine the West's ability to deter conflict or intimidation.

Such a renunciation also would profoundly damage the unity of the alliance. It would mean that the commitment to defend all areas of the alliance, including those most exposed to Soviet threats, could not be effectively implemented. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union has made the question of nuclear no-first-use a major propaganda theme over the years. And it is equally unsurprising that NATO has consistently rejected it while maintaining a broad, substantive arms control agenda.

Some in the West maintain that the defense of Europe is unnecessary or impossible. Those who hold the former view no longer consider the Soviet Union even a potential threat and do not believe that Soviet military advantage in Europe could be translated into political gains. Those who accept the latter view believe opposition to the Soviets to be futile and support, instead, a process of one-sided accommodation.

Neither view is justified. Recent history shows that the Soviet Union will not hesitate to translate military power into political pressure: witness, for instance, its behavior toward Poland since 1981. Nor are the Soviets averse to using force to achieve political objectives, as demonstrated in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. On the other hand, nearly four decades of peace in Western Europe demonstrate that through collective efforts, the Western democracies can secure both peace and freedom.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced the beginning of a research effort now known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—a program to explore the possibility of strengthening deterrence through recent advances in technologies that could, in the long term, provide an effective defense against ballistic missiles. The SDI will focus and, as appropriate, expand existing research efforts in order to develop sound technical options that could allow future Presidents and Congresses—perhaps in the early 1990s—to decide whether to proceed with the development of such a defense.

The SDI research program is fully consistent with U.S. treaty obligations.

Relevant treaties include the ABM Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviets, who maintain and are upgrading the world's only existing antiballistic missile (ABM) system, installed around Moscow, have for several years been actively conducting research on conventional and advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles.

The United States has expressed to the Soviets the view that a discussion about the defensive technologies that both countries are exploring would be mutually beneficial. For these discussions to be useful, they should be in a

government-to-government forum. The United States has provided the Soviets with a specific proposal for such talks, but as of September 1984, the Soviet Union has not agreed.

Since the Strategic Defense Initiative is an exploratory research program, it does not signal a shift in priority from the much needed modernization of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces which is essential to maintaining deterrence over the next decade or two. The United States intends to work closely with its friends and allies to ensure that the common deterrent remains strong.

The Role of Arms Control in U.S. Security

A fundamental tenet of U.S. security policy is that peace and security are best assured by following the dual paths of maintaining effective defense and deterrent capabilities and seeking, wherever possible, to increase cooperation with other nations and negotiate stabilizing and verifiable arms control agreements.

Given the rapid growth of Soviet military power, the United States and its allies have had a direct security interest in redressing, by their own defense efforts and through arms control if possible, current and emerging imbalances in conventional and nuclear forces. As democratic societies, they also have a basic responsibility to their people to maintain defense expenditures at the lowest level consistent with national and alliance security.

Western governments have developed and analyzed potential arms control agreements in terms of concrete security implications. They have engaged in extensive preparatory work, public discussion, and intra-alliance coordination to ensure that eventual agreements would strengthen security and stability and would enjoy public support. The results of this work are evident in today's negotiating agenda.

WESTERN ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

Over the years, Western peoples and governments have looked to arms control to achieve a number of objectives, including:

- Reducing the risk of war;
- Lessening political tensions;

- Decreasing the economic burden of armaments; and
- Ensuring a stable military balance.

Given the devastation that would result from a nuclear war, the priority for arms control clearly is to help ensure that such a conflict will never occur. Thus, the primary aim of American arms control policy has been to secure an equitable, stable military balance at significantly reduced levels of armaments.

To meet these objectives, arms control agreements must be based on the following criteria.

Security. Arms control agreements are not ends in themselves. Their primary objective is to enhance the security of the nations concluding the agreements. Although agreements may contribute to reduced tension and greater international understanding, those effects, desirable as they may be, cannot replace enhanced security as the benchmark for judging arms control.

Militarily Significant Reductions. To enhance security, arms control agreements should constrain the parties' military capability or potential. The benefits of agreements which provide only promises or statements of intent, without significantly limiting the parties' ability to undertake military action, are illusory and they are potentially destabilizing.

The United States and its allies seek agreements which actually constrain or reduce forces and make a concrete contribution to stability, rather than merely reiterating existing international law without adding any meaningful obligations, i.e., nonaggression pacts. If agreements are to strengthen stability and lower the level of military confrontation,

they must provide for more than token reductions or a freeze of forces at levels that perpetuate existing imbalances. Arms control should achieve a significant reduction in current force levels.

Equality. Arms control agreements should bring about mutual reductions equal levels in the comparable measures of military capability. Equality is essential if arms control agreements are to strengthen stability and preserve effective deterrence at reduced levels.

Verifiability and Compliance. Since arms control agreements are directly related to the security of participants, it is vital that they incorporate measures to permit effective verification and that all parties comply with the obligations of the agreements. Experience has shown that accords lacking such provisions become a source of suspicion, tension, and distrust, rather than reinforcing prospects for peace. The evidence of Soviet noncompliance with some provisions of existing arms control agreements amply demonstrates how essential effective verification and compliance are for all future accords.

THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

Despite strong rhetorical support for arms control, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries have rarely advanced concrete verifiable proposals to limit the forces of both sides. Instead they usually have preferred to react tactically to specific Western proposals: to Western efforts to establish a meaningful arms control framework. East initiatives characteristically feature sweeping and unverifiable proposals and unenforceable promises of good will.

The Soviet Union seems to approach arms control less as a tool for achieving stability and more as a political instrument to secure advantages either through actual agreements or through the negotiating process itself. This has been evident in Soviet conduct with respect to intermediate-range nuclear forces: Soviet proposals seem to have been designed not to narrow differences between East and West but to generate tensions among NATO members, to stimulate public concern, and to achieve limits on Western forces without reciprocal limits on Soviet forces.

The Soviet suspension of the INF talks and failure to set a date for resuming START clearly demonstrate the predominance of political objectives over genuine security concerns in the Soviet approach. Through 2 years of INF

negotiations, the Soviet proposals had an overriding goal: to maintain a large growing arsenal of forces to dominate Europe and Asia, while including any balancing NATO deployments. Thus, while the United States—with allied support—sincerely tried to negotiate an equitable agreement, the Soviet Union spurned all arms control proposals. The Soviet Union was determined to preserve a monopoly in this important category of missiles in order to weaken the credibility of the link between U.S. strategic forces and the defense of Europe, thereby undermining the basic foundation of NATO deterrent strategy.

NATO agreed in 1979 that it would deploy its own LRINF missiles beginning in late 1983, if the United States and U.S.S.R. had not yet reached an arms control agreement obviating the need for those deployments. That was five years after the U.S.S.R. began to deploy its new SS-20 missiles at an average rate of about one missile (with three warheads each) a week. In late 1982, in response to the deployment of the first NATO LRINF missiles, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF talks and then refused to agree to a date for resuming the next round of START. In effect, the Soviets appeared to be saying that they would not negotiate unless they possessed a veto power over NATO's security decisions.

The United States and its allies continued to believe that significant, measurable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals would be in the best interest of all parties. The United States prepared to return to the negotiations any time, without preconditions, and so informed the Soviet Union many times.

COMPLIANCE

Arms control agreements are to contribute to security, all parties must comply with them. Traditionally, the Soviets resisted including effective verification and enforcement provisions in such agreements. For years, the Soviets have avoided serious discussion in the MBFR talks of the size and composition of their forces in central Europe. They have also resisted introducing effective verification measures into an agreement banning chemical weapons and have worked to delay international investigation of chemical and toxin weapons use in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos.

In 1982, increasing concern in the U.S. Congress and within the Administration about Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements led the U.S. Government to undertake an in-depth examination of verification and compliance issues. After a careful review by a senior group of officials and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union, the United States determined that in seven areas initially studied the Soviets had committed violations and probable violations of legal obligations and political commitments.

At the request of Congress, President Reagan on January 23, 1984, reported on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. The report concluded that the U.S.S.R. has:

- Violated the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva protocol, by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and by their involvement in toxin and chemical warfare use in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia;
- Violated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act provision requiring full prior notification of certain military exercises, by their failure to provide full and timely notification of the ZAPAD 81 exercise in and around Poland;
- Violated the SALT II ban on telemetry encryption of ICBM tests that impedes verification, through heavy encryption, of SS-X-25 tests;
- Almost certainly violated the 1972 ABM Treaty through deployment of a large phased-array radar in central Siberia;
- Probably violated the SALT II provision limiting each party to one new type of ICBM, through testing of the SS-X-25 (or, if the SS-X-25 is not a new type as defined by SALT II, it violates permitted modernization criteria for a single-warhead ICBM);
- Probably violated the SALT II ban on deployment of SS-16 missiles; and
- Likely violated the unratified 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear tests.

After the U.S. findings were made public, the Soviet Union released a list of unsubstantiated countercharges of alleged U.S. noncompliance with arms control agreements. The Soviet publication of these countercharges appears to have been designed to deflect attention from the findings contained in the President's report, rather than an indication of real Soviet concern over U.S. arms control compliance. The United States continues to comply with all of its arms control obligations.

Soviet noncompliance undermines and can negate the security benefits deriving from arms control agreements and could create new security risks. It threatens the confidence essential to an effective arms control process and strengthens doubts about Soviet reliability as a negotiating partner.

The United States is proceeding with serious study of compliance problems, while continuing to press its concerns with the Soviets through diplomatic channels and to insist on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. Meanwhile, the United States is continuing to fulfill its own arms control commitments and seeking to negotiate effectively verifiable agreements to reduce armaments and diminish the risk of war.

CONCLUSION

The firm commitment to equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing arms control agreements by the United States and its allies requires a clear idea of common security needs, of the contribution that arms control can make to those needs, and of the kinds of agreement that can contribute to peace and security. When these elements have been present, the West was able to frame a constructive arms control agenda.

Obviously, equitable and effective arms control agreements are possible only if the Soviet Union is willing to accept such arrangements. The United States and its allies cannot deliver agreements alone. What they can do is to develop well-designed and equitable proposals, explain their rationale, and negotiate seriously.

The process may be long. But the West cannot fall victim either to excessive optimism or unwarranted pessimism. It must show resolve in upholding the requirements for effective arms control and convincing the Soviets that they will not be allowed to maintain or achieve unilateral advantage. The West must evaluate realistically the prospects for agreement, examining the issues at stake, the objectives of the Soviet Union, and its own goals. Only on this basis can the West craft an approach to arms control that will truly enhance the common security and promote international peace.

Eight Challenges for Arms Control

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS

The unique element in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the capability of both countries to destroy each other and much of civilization in the process. Strategic arms negotiations address this central fact of the nuclear age. Between 1969 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Although that process yielded some benefits, it failed to meet the hopes generated in the early 1970s. Indeed, in spite of an ongoing arms control process and the exercise of unilateral U.S. restraint, the Soviets have engaged in an unprecedented military buildup over the last 15 years.

The United States and the Soviet Union opened the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in June 1982. The United States proposed deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight that would create a more stable nuclear balance at much lower strategic levels. The Soviet side has proposed reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and bombers) but has not agreed to the substantial cuts in actual warheads that the United States is proposing.

START has been in hiatus since December 1983, when the Soviet Union declined to agree to a resumption date for a sixth round of negotiations. The United States has made clear that it is ready to resume the negotiations at any time without preconditions.

Background

The basic role of U.S. strategic forces is to maintain the peace by deterring attack or preventing intimidation against the United States or its allies. The strategic balance is critical to any calculation by a potential enemy of the costs of aggression against the West.

The strategic balance reflects an assessment of comparative capabilities as well as weapons numbers, command and control facilities, and overall force structure. In considering this balance, it is particularly important to weigh qualitative factors such as a system's survivability and its ability to reach defended targets. A stable deterrent requires diversified strategic forces to guarantee that sufficient numbers of weapons could survive a first strike and retaliate successfully against well-defended targets.

Strategic stability minimizes pressures to use strategic weapons in a crisis and is, therefore, an area of special emphasis by the United States. With their differing capabilities and characteristics, various weapons systems and force structures can either strengthen or undermine stability. Systems which, when deployed in large numbers, threaten the other side's strategic forces with preemptive destruction and undermine the other side's confidence in its deterrent, are considered destabilizing.

Ballistic missiles—particularly large land-based, multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, given their short flight times, high accuracies, and large yields—can undermine strategic stability if deployed in sufficiently large numbers to create the possibility of a disarming first strike. Bombers, in contrast, have long flight times, which make them inappropriate for a surprise, first-strike attack. Moreover, U.S. bombers face extensive Soviet defenses that are unconstrained by any treaty.

Thus the strategic balance is neither one dimensional nor static. Over the past 15 years, the cumulative effect of various political, military, and technological developments on the overall balance has favored the U.S.S.R. In particular, the increasing capability of Soviet forces to attack and destroy hardened targets (such as missile silos) provides the Soviet Union with a troubling margin of advantage in a critical area of the strategic equation.

Changes in the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance

In the mid-1960s, the United States held unquestioned superiority in strategic nuclear forces.

- Although the U.S.S.R. deployed a sizable ICBM force, it was far smaller than the American force of slightly more than 1,000 ICBMs.
- The United States had 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 41 nuclear submarines, while the Soviets were only beginning to deploy modern ballistic missile submarines.
- The U.S. strategic bomber force, numbering over 800, was numerically and technologically superior to the Soviet Bison/Bear bomber force.

By 1972—when the SALT I agreements were signed—the Soviet Union

had caught up to the United States in several measures of strategic capability and had taken the lead in the number of strategic ballistic missiles (2,000 to 1,700). At the time, however, the U.S. advantage in strategic bombers still provided for rough equality between the two sides in total numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Furthermore, because of its more advanced multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) program, the United States still held a substantial lead in the number of ballistic missile warheads as well as certain qualitative advantages.

The Soviet Union continued its military buildup, however, and, instead of accepting strategic parity, today equal or surpasses the United States in most quantitative measures of strategic capability.

- The Soviet Union has about 2,300 ballistic missiles, while the United States has about 1,650.
- The Soviets have not only closed the gap in ballistic missile warheads, but they now actually lead the United States, with about 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads to 7,600. Moreover, the Soviets far exceed the United States in the destructive power of their ballistic missiles.
- The U.S. B-52 bomber force has continued to age and to decline in number. The United States, as of September 1984, had about 245 deployed B-52s, which in a conflict would face massive Soviet air defenses unconstrained by any treaty. The Soviets have deployed more than 235 Backfire bombers, which have inherent intercontinental capability, and more than 160 long-range Bear and Bison bombers.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States decided not to respond to Soviet efforts to attain equality in strategic forces. American strategic thinking had concluded that superior would be difficult and costly to maintain, and, in any case, was not necessary to support a U.S. defense posture based on deterring war. It was believed that strategic parity could provide the basis for a more stable and mutually beneficial East-West relationship.

During the 1970s, therefore, the United States exercised unilateral restraint. Once the MIRV programs for the Poseidon SLBM and Minuteman ICBM were completed in the first half of the 1970s, the United States slowed or canceled a number of new strategic programs. Construction of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine was delayed. Development of the MX ICBM was

lved, and the B-1 bomber program was first slowed and then canceled. Unfortunately, U.S. restraint was reciprocated by the U.S.S.R. Since 1972, the Soviet Union has deployed 800 ICBMs involving at least three new ICBM types (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, all with MIRV capabilities); four SLBMs (the SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18, and SS-N-20); three Delta-class ballistic missile submarine types; one new large Typhoon ballistic missile submarine; and over 235 new Backfire bombers. The Soviets also have begun producing a new variant of the Bear bomber designed to carry cruise missiles.

By any objective measure, the Soviet Union achieved rough equality with the United States in strategic nuclear forces in the early to mid-1970s. The Soviet buildup, however, continued unabated. Day after day their testing and development programs for new classes of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) are moving forward with no evidence of diminished momentum. Thus the U.S.S.R. now has in various stages of testing and development two new ICBMs (SS-X-24 and SS-X-25), a new SLBM (SS-NX-23), long-range ground-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles, and the Blackjack strategic bomber. This massive, unrelenting buildup goes beyond any reasonable defense needs and raises serious questions about Soviet intentions.

Failed Promise of SALT

In October 1969, in an effort to bring strategic arms competition under some measure of control, the United States and the Soviet Union began the five-year series of strategic arms limitation talks known as SALT I.

After initial attempts to achieve a comprehensive agreement led to stalemate, the two sides agreed to concentrate on a treaty of indefinite duration limiting defensive antiballistic missile systems and a 5-year interim agreement establishing certain limits on strategic offensive weapons.

At their summit meeting in Moscow on May 26, 1972, President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed two agreements. The U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty set precise limits on the deployment of ABM systems, allowing each side two sites with 100 ABM launchers each (subsequently modified in 1974 to allow each side only one ABM site). The Interim Agreement reduced each side essentially to the number of strategic ballistic missile

launchers it then possessed or had "under construction," while permitting an increase in SLBM launchers if a corresponding number of older ICBM launchers were dismantled.

SALT I, however, was intended only as a stopgap, providing for some restraints until a more comprehensive agreement could be reached and deferring many difficult questions to later negotiation. SALT II, an effort to attain a longer term comprehensive treaty, began in late 1972. In November 1974, at the Vladivostok meeting between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, both sides agreed to a basic framework for a future agreement. This accord established equal aggregate limits on the overall numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (missile launchers and bombers) allowed each side. After Vladivostok, however, important issues remained to be settled, including how to handle emerging systems such as the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber.

In May 1977, shortly after the Carter Administration assumed office, the United States offered a new proposal calling for deep reductions in the numbers agreed at Vladivostok. The Soviets quickly rejected this proposal. Subsequent negotiations returned to the Vladivostok formula and eventually led to agreement on a general framework for SALT II, including:

- A treaty entailing equal aggregate ceilings on various categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles as well as some constraints on development and construction;
- A 3-year protocol with some temporary constraints on mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles; and
- A joint statement of principles for further negotiations.

This agreement was signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1979. It included a number of specific limits but little in the way of genuine reductions. Although the agreement did call for some reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, ballistic missile warhead and throw-weight levels were allowed to rise.

- Each side would be allowed a combined total of 2,400 (2,250 after 1981) ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.
- Each side accepted equal sublimits on launchers equipped with MIRVed ICBMs; on launchers equipped with MIRVed ballistic missiles; and on launch-

ers equipped with MIRVed ballistic missiles plus bombers armed with cruise missiles.

- Each side agreed to various constraints on modernization.

Senate consideration of SALT II was deferred indefinitely following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In the national debate preceding that event, considerable doubts were raised within the Senate and elsewhere about the degree to which the agreement could serve as an effective arms control measure, whether it could be effectively verified and whether it adequately addressed U.S. and Western security needs.

Although the SALT process brought certain benefits in the SALT I agreements, its final result as embodied in SALT II was a clear disappointment to the hopes generated in the early 1970s. The basic faults of SALT II were that it would have permitted substantial growth in the strategic forces of both sides, was unbalanced in its impact, and was inadequately verifiable in several provisions.

Evidence of the inadequacy of the SALT process lay in the fact that during the period of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, and in spite of the unilateral restraint demonstrated by the United States, the U.S.S.R. continued its massive strategic buildup. As a result, the adverse changes in the strategic balance accelerated. Far from inhibiting these developments, SALT II tended to codify the asymmetries. Thus:

- Limitations were applied to launchers but not to the growing number of warheads, a more meaningful unit of account;
- The Soviet Union was granted a unilateral right to deploy more than 300 heavy ICBMs; and
- The Soviet Backfire was not counted under the strategic delivery vehicle aggregate despite its intercontinental capabilities.

A New Beginning: The U.S. START Approach

When the Reagan Administration took office in January 1981, it undertook an in-depth review of U.S. security and arms control policies. President Reagan concluded that because of SALT II's inadequacies, it would be inappropriate to seek ratification. Renegotiation of SALT II was considered, but the President decided that it would be better to seek significant reductions in the existing numbers of strategic forces rather

than simply to make another attempt to limit further growth.

To this end, the United States proposed the strategic arms reduction talks or START. At the same time, in order to create a positive atmosphere for START and to build upon the SALT process, the United States affirmed that it would take no action to undercut existing agreements, including the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II agreement, provided the Soviets exercised comparable restraint. The Soviets have made statements reflecting a similar policy.

The START negotiations began in Geneva in the summer of 1982. The basic U.S. objective has been an agreement that would enhance stability and achieve major reductions in the level of strategic nuclear weaponry on both sides. This would be the first agreement of its kind in the postwar era.

In emphasizing significant reductions, the United States seeks an agreement that not only reduces the burden of armaments but, more importantly, reduces the risk of war. Given differing characteristics, certain types of strategic weapons can be more destabilizing than others. For this reason, the President decided initially to emphasize reducing ballistic missiles, particularly large ICBMs. In announcing the U.S. position in May 1982, the President made clear that nothing was excluded from the negotiations and that the United States would consider any serious Soviet proposal.

The U.S. approach to START reflects the judgment that the approach taken in SALT—limits focused primarily on the number of strategic delivery vehicles—failed to ensure real reductions in strategic forces or to redress dangerous asymmetries in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. Thus the U.S. START approach has adopted a broader set of units of limitation, including direct constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads, along with efforts to reduce the destructive potential of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. Central features of the U.S. proposals introduced in June 1982 include:

- Reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads by about one-third, to a level of 5,000 for each side;
- Additional restrictions to ensure substantial cuts in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems;
- Substantial reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability and potential (throw-weight);
- An equal ceiling on heavy bombers below the U.S. level in SALT II; and

- Equitable limits and constraints on other strategic systems, including limits on the number of cruise missiles that could be carried by bombers.

The Scowcroft Commission Report: Forging a New Consensus

In January 1983, President Reagan established the Special Commission on Strategic Forces to review the U.S. strategic modernization program, particularly the future of the land-based ICBM deterrent, and to provide specific recommendations for greater strategic stability. The commission, popularly known as the Scowcroft commission after its chairman, retired General Brent Scowcroft, delivered its report on April 6, 1983; President Reagan endorsed the commission's recommendations and sent the report to Congress on April 12, 1983. The commission submitted a final report to the President on March 21, 1984, in which it reiterated its previous recommendations.

The April 1983 report, which provided the basis for a revitalized bipartisan consensus on American strategic security policy, made three basic recommendations.

First, it urged continued improvements in U.S. command, control, and communications, and continuation of the U.S. bomber, submarine, and cruise missile programs.

Second, it urged modernization of U.S. ICBM forces, including deployment of 100 new MX/Peacekeeper missiles, and initiation of developmental work on a small, single-warhead ICBM that could be ready for deployment in the early 1990s.

Third, the commission recommended major research efforts in strategic defense and on ways to increase the survivability of U.S. land-based forces.

Equally important, the report underscored the need for negotiations leading to balanced arms control agreements that would promote stability in times of crisis and result in meaningful, verifiable reductions. The commission noted that, in time, the United States should try to promote an evolution toward forces in which each side would be "encouraged to see to the survivability of its own forces in a way that does not threaten the other." The commission said that its approach toward arms control was compatible with the basic objectives and direction of the Reagan Administration's policies.

President Reagan, in endorsing the commission's report, said that the

modernization effort recommended by the report "would provide clear evidence to the Soviet Union that it is in their best interest to negotiate with us in good faith and with seriousness of purpose." The President called on Congress to join him in supporting the bipartisan program set forth by the commission pursue arms control agreements that promote stability, to meet the needs of our ICBM force today, and to move to a more stable ICBM structure in the future."

New U.S. START Initiatives

In line with the Scowcroft commission recommendations, the United States began research and development on a new small, single-warhead ICBM and June 1983 relaxed its original proposal in START for limits of 850 on the numbers of deployed ballistic missiles. While the central elements of the U.S. START proposal remained unchanged, the United States made additional important revisions to its position which took into consideration several Soviet concerns about the original U.S. proposal. The United States presented a draft treaty in the START negotiation on July 7, 1983, which incorporated the U.S. START position.

In a further important initiative, taken after close consultation with the Congress, President Reagan in October 1983 added to the U.S. START position the principle of mutual, guaranteed, build-down of strategic forces. The build-down proposal is designed to channel modernization of strategic forces toward more stabilizing systems and to ensure regular annual reductions of strategic ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers. At the same time, President Reagan expressed U.S. willingness to explore with the Soviets possible trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest.

The Soviet START Proposal

In many respects the Soviet response was disappointing, but progress had been made before the Soviet suspension of the talks in December 1983. The Soviet START proposal has some positive elements, for example, proposed reductions in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles below SALT II levels. However, the Soviet proposal does not provide an adequate basis for the kind of far-reaching, stabilizing, and equitable agreement the United States seeks.

- The Soviet proposal retains most the basic faults of SALT II. Under the Soviet proposal, the United States and the U.S.S.R. each would be allowed an aggregate of 1,800 strategic nuclear warhead vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers). The Soviets also have proposed a combined limit on nuclear charges (by which they mean missile warheads and bomber weapons). In addition, they propose to ban all land- and sea-launched cruise missiles, to limit air-launched cruise missiles, in a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
- The Soviet START proposal does not provide for genuine reductions in the number of countries' forces. It would reduce strategic delivery vehicles by 25% from the high level of 2,400 that would have been established by SALT II, but it would permit substantial growth in the number of ballistic missile warheads to five current levels.
- In addition, the Soviet proposal does not link reductions to increased strategic stability. It does not distinguish between fast, accurate, MIRVed ballistic missiles and slow-flying systems such as bombers that face unstrained Soviet defenses.

START Proposals:

- Mutual, guaranteed build-down of ballistic missile warheads on bomber platforms.
- 5,000 ballistic missile warhead limit.
- Significant reductions in deployed ballistic missiles.
- Reduction in current disparity in ballistic missile destructive capacity and potential.
- Bomber and ALCM limits below SALT II.

Advantages:

- Reduce strategic ballistic missile warheads by one-third for each side.
- Encourage a more stable nuclear balance at lower force levels.
- Permit necessary and stabilizing modernization.
- Establish the basis for further reductions.

During negotiations in the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union did not discuss seriously the U.S. build-down proposal nor did it respond to the U.S. offer to explore tradeoffs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage and interest. The Soviets have publicly leveled several criticisms at the U.S. approach to START.

The Soviets charge that the U.S. proposal's focus on MIRVed ICBMs "discriminates" against the Soviet Union, which has a higher proportion of its nuclear warheads on MIRVed ICBMs. In fact, however, since rough equality now exists in the number of ballistic missile warheads, the U.S. proposal would force both countries to make approximately equal reductions in this area. Although the Soviet Union would have to make proportionally greater reductions in its land-based ICBM systems, because a larger proportion of their warheads are on them, the United States would have to make relatively greater reductions in warheads on SLBMs.

The Soviets also charge that the U.S. proposal would force them to restructure their strategic forces. Although the U.S. proposal does favor a shift away from land-based MIRVed ICBMs, such a shift would be in the interest of both countries because it would diminish the incentive and the ability to launch a crippling first strike.

START and NATO

The United States has kept its allies fully informed of its arms control approach and of the U.S. and Soviet START positions. The U.S. proposal was endorsed by the leaders of NATO governments at the June 1982 NATO summit in Bonn and since then has been repeatedly endorsed by NATO ministers.

The process of alliance consultations is traditional and vital. The START reductions the United States seeks would enhance the security of other Western nations as well as that of the United States. Since the opening of the talks in June 1982, the President's START negotiator has met periodically with the NATO ambassadors and briefed them on the course of the talks, a practice that will continue.

Conclusion

At the end of round V of START in December 1983, the Soviet Union—claiming "a change in the strategic situation" due to the initiation of limited NATO missile deployments in Europe under the alliance's 1979 decision—refused to set a resumption date for the talks.

START touches upon issues central to both U.S. and Soviet national security interests. The United States is committed to fair and balanced arms control and has made a good faith proposal, demonstrating considerable flexibility while remaining open to serious Soviet proposals. The United States is convinced that implementation of its START proposals would enhance not only U.S. and allied security but that of the Soviet Union as well and is prepared to resume the negotiations any time and any place.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The INF negotiations began in Geneva in November 1981; the Soviet Union unilaterally broke off the talks in November 1983. The talks centered on the intermediate-range nuclear systems of greatest concern to the two sides—land-based, longer range INF missiles. The United States proposed the elimination of this entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles or, as an interim agreement, substantial reductions to equal global levels for both sides of warheads on such missiles. In contrast, the Soviets have insisted on keeping their monopoly in LRINF missiles vis-a-vis the United States. Their approach suggests that they place much greater importance on the political goal of trying to split NATO than on addressing real security concerns.

Background

U.S. short- and intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe are essential to deterrence. These systems link NATO's conventional forces and the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent. They "couple" the United States to Western Europe and ensure that the entire spectrum of U.S. power is available to deter any potential aggressor.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles on its territory with sufficient range to strike targets in Europe but not the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S.S.R. deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted against Europe. Some 575 were in place by mid-1977. In contrast, the United States, in the early 1960s, deployed fewer numbers of roughly equivalent missiles—the Thor and Jupiter—in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey. The United States unilaterally withdrew and retired these systems in the 1960s.

Thus, from the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union held a monopoly over the United States in this type of missile. The Soviet lead was tolerable in an era when the imbalance in these intermediate-range systems was offset by superior U.S. strategic forces, which provided an adequate deterrent to Soviet aggression or intimidation.

Two critical developments—Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States and deployment of the SS-20—came together in the 1970s to alter the situation.

The SS-20 Buildup. As part of an unprecedented peacetime military buildup, the Soviet Union began strengthening its intermediate-range nuclear forces—an area in which it already was clearly superior to NATO—with the deployment in 1977 of the highly capable SS-20.

- The SS-20 is more accurate and has a greater range than the SS-4 and SS-5. From its bases on Soviet territory, it can strike targets throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and much of Asia and the Pacific.
- The SS-20's mobility and transportability allow it to be redeployed quickly to any part of the U.S.S.R.
- The SS-20 carries three independently targetable warheads, as opposed to the single warhead of the earlier missiles, and its launchers are capable of firing two, three, or more rounds of missiles.

The SS-20 has substantially improved the Soviet LRINF missile force both qualitatively and quantitatively. Soviet deployment of these missiles (at the rate of about one per week) continued throughout the INF talks, even after the Soviet declaration in 1982 of a "unilateral moratorium" on new missiles

in or within range of Europe, and it shows no sign of stopping. As of September 1984, the Soviets had deployed 378 SS-20 missiles with 1,134 warheads (not counting refires), as well as about 200 SS-4 missiles. Even though the obsolete SS-5s had been phased out, the Soviets still have increased the total number of warheads deployed on LRINF missile launchers to some 1,300.

By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union had attained parity with the United States in strategic nuclear forces, dramatically increased its lead in INF, and retained its conventional force advantages. Strategists and political leaders in Europe and America were concerned that these trends, if unchecked, might lead Soviet leaders to conclude, however mistakenly, that the evolving military balance made aggression feasible or intimidation worthwhile. The U.S. commitment to the defense of its allies had not changed, but it was feared the Soviet Union might perceive the linkage between European and North American security as less credible. Such a perception would undermine deterrence and threaten the peace.

European concerns were exacerbated by the SALT II process, which many believed did not take adequate account of European security interests. Specifically, the SS-20 was not limited by the SALT II agreement, yet cruise missiles, which offered a potential for countering Soviet SS-20 deployments against Europe, would have been constrained, at least temporarily.

The December 1979 "Dual-Track" Decision

These concerns—first expressed by European members of NATO—led to intensive alliance-wide consultations, culminating in the "dual-track" decision of 1979. On the modernization track, the alliance decided to redress the INF imbalance through deployment in Western Europe, starting in 1983, of 572 single-warhead U.S. LRINF missiles—108 Pershing II ballistic missiles, as a replacement for the shorter range Pershing I, and 464 ground-launched

cruise missiles (GLCMs). Deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs began in December 1983 in accordance with the schedule agreed to by NATO.

The second element of the 1979 decision was the arms control track, calling for U.S.-Soviet negotiations on INF. The alliance agreed that such talks should proceed step-by-step toward comprehensive limitations. It was, therefore, decided that the talks should focus initially on LRINF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides—the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 and the U.S. Pershing II and GLCM.

The dual-track decision also established criteria for INF arms control that were further developed by NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), the alliance forum for consultations on INF arms control. While in some cases the criteria are unique to the INF negotiations, they derive from and are fully consistent with the basic principles that the United States believes essential for sound arms control.

There must be equality of rights and limits. The principle of equality, ruling out unilateral advantage, is fundamental to sound arms control, stability and a U.S.-Soviet relationship based on reciprocity and mutual restraint.

The negotiations should encompass U.S. and Soviet systems only. In bilateral negotiations, it would be inappropriate to negotiate limits on, or discuss compensation for, the independent nuclear forces of any other country.

Limitations must be applied globally, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia. Because the range, mobility, and transportability of modern Soviet LRINF missile systems, regional limits alone would be insufficient. Soviet SS-20s based in central Asia can strike most targets in European NATO countries. Those missiles based farther east also could be moved readily to locations from which they could strike Europe as well. An agreement covering only missiles in Europe, therefore, could easily be undermined and would not be militarily meaningful, either to America's European allies or to those in Asia.

There must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability. NATO could not accept Soviet demands to eliminate from

Advantages of NATO INF Proposals:

- Eliminate entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles or reduce them to equal force levels.
- Constrain shorter range INF missiles capable of substituting for the class of missiles to be eliminated or reduced.
- Establish the basis for further reductions.
- Strengthen deterrence.

cope virtually all U.S. aircraft with important conventional missions. Any agreement must be effectively enforceable.

U.S. Decision to Begin Negotiations (1980-81)

In accordance with the dual-track decision, the United States immediately offered to begin negotiations with the U.S.S.R. The Soviets initially refused, demanding the condition that NATO must renounce the modernization track. The Soviets countered with a proposal for a bilateral "moratorium" on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO rejected this offer for three reasons.

- A moratorium would have codified Soviet advantage in INF, particularly its monopoly of LRINF missiles, and preserved the imbalance the 1979 decision had set out to redress.
- It would not have halted the SS-20 buildup in the eastern U.S.S.R.
- By preventing NATO's deployment, a moratorium would have reduced the very incentive the Soviets had to negotiate genuine reductions.

Prospects for talks thus remained stalemated through the first half of 1980. Only after Moscow recognized, in the summer of that year, that NATO was determined to proceed with deployments, did the Soviets agree to negotiations. A month of preliminary exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union took place in Geneva in the fall of 1980.

When President Reagan assumed office in January 1981, he ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. security and arms control policies. In March of that year, the Administration reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to pursue both tracks of the 1979 decision—arms control as well as modernization.

At the May 1981 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Rome, it was announced that the United States would open INF negotiations with the Soviet

Union in the fall. That summer, contacts between U.S. and Soviet officials took place regarding the arrangements.

At the same time, NATO's Special Consultative Group began intensive deliberations on the specifics of the U.S. negotiating position. The SCG continued to meet while the talks were going on and has done so regularly since the Soviet walkout. A second NATO body, the High Level Group of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, also met to address questions raised by the prospective deployment of U.S. LRINF missiles.

Taken as a whole, these activities represent the most intensive intra-alliance consultations in NATO's history. They have ensured that the U.S. negotiating position fully reflects allied views and that the implementation of both tracks of the 1979 decision proceeds on the basis of full coordination

Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and NATO Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles



among the allies. A comprehensive account of the INF talks is available in the SCG's "Progress Report to Ministers" of December 8, 1983.

First Year of Negotiations

Ambassador Paul Nitze, the U.S. INF negotiator, first met with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Yuli Kvitsinskiy, in Geneva on November 30, 1981.

Zero Option. At the beginning of the talks, President Reagan set forth the "zero-zero" option—an offer to forgo deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM if the Soviet Union would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The "zero option" would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons—longer range INF missiles. That remains the long-term U.S. objective. At the same time, the United States emphasized that it would negotiate in good faith and consider any serious Soviet proposal.

Soviet Position. The Soviet Union proposed that "NATO"—by which the Soviets meant the United States, United Kingdom, and France—and the U.S.S.R. each reduce to 300 "medium-range" missiles and aircraft in or "intended for use" in Europe. The Soviet proposal, while permitting the U.S.S.R. to retain a substantial number of SS-20s in Europe and to continue its buildup of SS-20s in Asia, would have prohibited deployment of any U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. It also would have removed from Europe hundreds of U.S. aircraft capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional weapons, essential to NATO's conventional deterrent.

Central Issues. As the negotiations progressed during 1982, several areas of disagreement between the two sides emerged.

LRINF Missiles. While the United States proposed the reciprocal elimination of all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles, the Soviet proposal would have legitimized a Soviet monopoly in these systems.

The Balance. The Soviets based their position on the assertion that a "balance" in "medium-range" forces in Europe already existed, a claim resting on a selective use of data. In fact, the Soviet Union holds an advantage in every category of INF systems. The Soviets include in their "balance" in-

dependent British and French systems and U.S. aircraft not located in Europe. They ignore missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. that can strike NATO targets and exclude thousands of their own nuclear-capable aircraft with characteristics similar to those of the U.S. aircraft they do include.

The Soviets first claimed that there was a balance in October 1979, when there were 100 SS-20s. They repeated this claim while they continued to deploy such missiles and NATO deployed nothing: in 1981, when there were 250 SS-20s, and early 1983, when 351 were in place, while NATO still had not deployed a single missile.

Geographic Scope. The United States wants global limits on LRINF missiles because of their range, mobility, and transportability. The Soviets have proposed binding limits only on those systems in or "intended for use in" Europe, leaving the ever-increasing systems in the eastern U.S.S.R. outside

U.S. Arms Control Proposals on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces:

- First U.S. proposal was to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles worldwide.

- Although zero-zero remains the ultimate goal, the United States also has proposed interim accord to limit each side to low, equal numbers of LRINF missile warheads worldwide.

- Subsequent U.S. initiative taken to meet several stated Soviet concerns:

- Not offset entire Soviet LRINF missile force of SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s with U.S. deployments in Europe.

- Discuss limits on LRINF aircraft.

- Apportion mix of GLCM and Pershing II.

the terms of an agreement. Soviet missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. pose a growing threat to U.S. friends and allies in Asia. Many such missile systems are still within range of NATO Europe, while all could be redeployed quickly to be within such range.

Aircraft. The original one-sided Soviet proposal to limit certain Western aircraft while excluding similar Soviet/Warsaw Pact aircraft was designed to undermine the alliance's conventional defense and deterrent capabilities, while leaving untouched a large number of Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft. The United States was concerned that introducing aircraft into the talks could delay agreement on LRINF missiles. Nevertheless, there was some progress in the aircraft issue in late 1983.

Third-Country Forces. The Soviet have sought to "take into account" the independent forces of the United Kingdom and France. NATO made clear from the outset that the INF negotiations should encompass limits only on U.S. and Soviet systems. If Soviet SS-20s are to be retained, only U.S. LRINF missiles can offset them and ensure the necessary link between American strategic power and European security. Moreover:

- Britain and France are sovereign countries, each with its own strategic security interests. The United States does not determine the composition or control the use of these independent forces;

- British and French forces represent minimum national deterrents, designed to deter attack against Britain and France, not against the other 13 non-nuclear members of NATO;

- British and French forces are different in role and characteristics from the U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles;

- British and French forces are small compared to the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Even if all Soviet LRINF missiles were removed from consideration, the Soviet Union would still have thousands of INF aircraft and other nuclear systems (including substantial strategic nuclear forces) arrayed against Britain, France, and other West European NATO allies;

- In essence, the Soviets demand that the U.S.S.R. be granted a legally sanctioned "right" to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. This is tantamount to a demand to legitimize global Soviet military superiority and political domination; and

- The Soviets sought compensation for U.K. and French forces in SALT I and SALT II. Like those talks, the INF negotiations are bilateral, and neither Britain nor France would permit its forces to be included. In SALT, it should be noted, the Soviets accepted agreements applying limits only to U.S. and Soviet systems.

The "Walk-in-the-Woods." In summer 1982, Ambassadors Nitze and Gromyko developed an informal package of proposals for consideration at their respective capitals. That package provided for equal levels of LRINF missile launchers in Europe (the United States to be allowed 75 GLCM launchers and 300 warheads, the Soviets 75 SS-20 launchers with 225 warheads), a Pershing II deployment, and a freeze on SS-20s in the eastern U.S.S.R. The package did not compensate the Soviets for U.K. and French forces. Although Washington had some problems with the package, Ambassador Nitze was authorized to pursue informal discussions. But Moscow rejected the entire package as well as further informal explorations.

Second Year of Negotiations

Interim Agreement Proposal. Following extensive discussions within the alliance and between the United States and Japan, on March 30, 1983, President Reagan announced a new proposal: scaling back NATO's planned deployments to as low a level as the Soviet Union would accept, provided that the U.S.S.R. reduced its own LRINF deployments to an equal global level of warheads. In advancing this proposal for an interim agreement, President Reagan reaffirmed that the zero-sum outcome remained NATO's long-term objective.


The Soviets rejected the interim agreement proposal even before they had a chance to study it. They also failed to consider a U.S. offer to discuss collateral constraints following a U.S. proposal that summer to make reciprocal constraints on shorter range INF systems. However, in August 1983, then Soviet General Secretary Yuriy Andropov for the first time indicated Soviet willingness to destroy SS-20s removed from Europe as part of an agreement, rather than reserving the right to redeploy them, as had been their position theretofore.

U.S. September Initiatives. On September 22, 1983, the United States produced three new proposals responding directly to what the Soviet Union described as important concerns.

- Within the context of an agreement providing the right to equal global levels of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, the United States was prepared to consider a commitment not to

U.S. and Soviet Longer Range INF Missiles

How the LRINF Imbalance Developed and Soviet Claims That a Balance Exists



¹Includes warheads on Soviet SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s, but does not include warheads on rifle missiles

offset the entire worldwide Soviet LRINF missile deployments by deployments in Europe, while retaining the right to such deployments elsewhere.

- The United States was prepared to apportion reductions under an agreement between Pershing IIs and GLCMs in an appropriate manner.

- The United States was prepared to consider equal limits on specific types of U.S. and Soviet land-based LRINF aircraft.

As President Reagan stated at the UN General Assembly in September 1983, with these initiatives "the door to an agreement is open." Nonetheless, the Soviets refused to explore the U.S. sug-

gestion. They said they could not discuss the geographic allocation or Pershing II reduction proposals, since these presupposed there would be some U.S. deployments. (Throughout the negotiations, in fact, the Soviets insisted that not a single U.S. cruise or Pershing II missile could be deployed.) They also declined serious discussion of the U.S. aircraft proposal.

Soviet Walkout. On October 26, 1983, Andropov announced a somewhat modified Soviet position, while threatening to end the talks when NATO deployments began. He said that the Soviets would reduce their SS-20s in or within range of Europe to about 140, with 420 warheads, to match British and French missiles. SS-20 deployments in the eastern U.S.S.R. would be frozen following entry into force of an agreement concerning missiles in the European area, as long as there was no change in the "strategic situation" in Asia. Andropov also suggested some flexibility on the aircraft issue. In November, the United States proposed agreeing to an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads, corresponding to Andropov's October number for Soviet warheads in Europe.

On November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks, citing recent parliamentary votes in Great Britain, Italy, and Germany reaffirming NATO's dual-track decision and the arrival of U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe. The Soviets, whose LRINF deployments had continued throughout 2 years of negotiations, argued that NATO's long-planned deployments created an "obstacle" to talks. NATO expressed its regret at the Soviet decision and called on the Soviets to return to the table. The United States remains ready to resume INF negotiations at once, without preconditions.

Reductions in NATO's Nuclear Stockpile

The 1979 decision explicitly stated that INF modernization would not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. One element of the decision was to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from the NATO stockpile in Europe. This withdrawal was completed in 1980. Moreover, the decision stipulated that one additional nuclear warhead would be withdrawn for each new LRINF missile deployed.

The High Level Group then undertook an extensive study of NATO's security needs, the results of which were presented to NATO defense ministers at the October 1983 meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group. At the meeting, the

ministers announced that, on the basis of the study, NATO would withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Europe.

When these actions are completed, NATO will have withdrawn at least five nuclear warheads for each LRINF missile deployed, and the total NATO nuclear stockpile will be at its lowest level in over 20 years.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

The negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) began in Vienna in 1973. These talks result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal levels of Eastern and Western military manpower in central Europe to equal but significantly lower levels. The negotiations are part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies to reduce the likelihood of conflict in central Europe and to strengthen East-West stability. Although the Warsaw Pact nominally accepts this goal, Eastern unwillingness thus far to address its present manpower superiority, or to accept adequate measures to ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main obstacle to progress. The West continues to seek ways to advance the negotiations.

The Origins of MBFR

Central Europe is the scene of the most massive concentration of conventional military power in the world: the ground forces of East and West in this area total some 1.75 million men. These forces constitute a burden on both sides that is in their mutual interest to reduce. Eastern superiority of some 170,000 ground force personnel in this region is an element of instability in the East-West balance. Reductions to equal levels of conventional forces would do much to strengthen political and economic stability and to decrease the burden of maintaining such large numbers of troops.

NATO's attempt through negotiations to reduce these troop levels began in 1967, with the adoption of the Harmel report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance." This report declared that relations with the Soviet Union should be based on a strong defense and deterrent capability as well as a readiness for dialogue and detente. The report examined the prospects for force reductions in central Europe and concluded that as long as balanced reductions in

Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe could be obtained, NATO could safely make limited cuts in its own conventional strength there.

At their June 1968 ministerial meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland, the NATO allies expressed interest in "a process leading to mutual force reductions" in Europe. "Balanced and mutual force reductions," the declaration stated "can contribute significantly to the lessening of tension and to further reducing the danger of war." (France, which is not a member of NATO's integrated military structure, did not participate in this initiative or in the subsequent MBFR negotiations.)

Negotiations were delayed, however, by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August 1968, just 2 months after the Reykjavik meeting, 32 Warsaw Pact divisions invaded Czechoslovakia. Five Soviet divisions remained permanently when the other forces departed. By increasing the number of Soviet divisions in central Europe from 22 to 27—an addition of some 70,000 Soviet soldiers—the invasion made an agreement establishing force parity harder to achieve.

At their Rome ministerial on May 27, 1970, the NATO allies renewed their offer to the Warsaw Pact. For 2 years, however, the Soviet Union insisted that the "reduction of foreign troops" could be considered only in the context of its own proposal for a European security conference. In May 1971 Soviet leader Brezhnev finally dropped this condition and agreed to begin exploratory negotiations. (The Soviet proposal for a security conference eventually evolved into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which convened at Helsinki in 1973.) That month, at the signing of the Interim Agreement on strategic arms limitation (SALT I), Brezhnev and President Nixon endorsed "the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe through reciprocal reduction of forces."

Representatives of 12 members of NATO and the 7 Warsaw Pact members met on January 31, 1973, to determine the terms of reference for the negotiations. The first MBFR negotiating round began on October 30 of that year.

The Nature of the MBFR Talks

The MBFR negotiations are the longest continuous multilateral arms control talks in history. They were 5 years in gestation and have been going on for more. The goal is to reduce each side's military manpower in the central Eur-

in "zone of reductions" to parity at a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900,000 air and ground force personnel combined. The zone of reductions consists of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Belgian countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern. In addition to these reductions, the West seeks certain associated measures" that would enhance stability and facilitate verification. These measures would give each side confidence that the other is observing the agreed manpower limits and is not assuming a threatening posture with dual forces.

Beyond the highly technical issues that have characterized the MBFR negotiations from the beginning is the more fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union is prepared to accept a verifiable agreement guaranteeing East-West manpower equality in the zone of reductions. Despite stated Soviet acceptance of the principle of parity, the Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted agreement on the data relating to its force levels. This has raised serious questions about Soviet willingness to accept genuine and verifiable reductions to equal levels.

Geographical Asymmetry of Force Disparity

Fundamental to the question of the conventional force balance in central Europe is the geographical asymmetry between the United States and the U.S.R., which works to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Union's western border is 360-420 miles from the eastern border of the Federal Republic of Germany. In the West, however, the Atlantic Ocean lies between the United States and the European allies. In the event of a re-tension or actual conflict, the Soviet Union, drawing on its vast manpower reserves, could quickly move forces forward over an excellent railway and paved road network. To reinforce NATO, the United States would have to transport troops by sea and air from over 3,500 miles away and would be to overcome serious logistical problems.

Western Europe's geographical closeness makes defense in depth difficult and undesirable; one-quarter of West Germany's industrial production and 30% of its population are less than 50 miles from the NATO-Warsaw Pact border.

The geographical realities of Western Europe and NATO's commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of its members make imperative a policy of "forward defense," but the distance separating Europe from the United States complicates the implementation of such a policy. The Soviet Union and its allies have used these geographic disparities to gain substantial military advantage.

Western Objectives in MBFR

NATO draws its strength from the fact that it is a coalition of free nations, joined together to ensure their common security. The Western position is based on consensus, arrived at in NATO headquarters in Brussels and transmitted to the allied negotiators in Vienna.

NATO is a defensive alliance not merely in declared policy but in its military posture and, most importantly, in the minds of its people and their leaders. What NATO seeks at Vienna is greater security from aggression and, by extension, a lessening of the risk of war for all of Europe. The keystone of this effort is the search for parity; the West has never sought in MBFR to alter the European conventional balance to achieve superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

The geographic, military, and political disparities between the two alliances have led NATO to set certain standards for an MBFR agreement.

Parity. The current force disparity threatens stability, poses a significant

threat to NATO security, and potentially lowers the nuclear threshold. The MBFR negotiations are intended to eliminate this disparity at least in the central European reductions area.

Reductions. In view of present inequality, parity can be achieved only through asymmetrical reductions, i.e., with the East reducing more than the West. But the West also seeks parity at a lower level and would thus make sizable reductions of its own.

Associated Measures. To be effective, arms reductions agreements must contain provisions to ensure and verify compliance and to inhibit assumption of a threatening posture by the forces still left in the area. The Western package of associated measures would serve these objectives.

The Course of the Negotiations: Eastern and Western Positions

In MBFR's 11-year existence, both East and West have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however, there has been a strong continuity in objectives.

The West has consistently sought parity of forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity. Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did so implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the size of reductions that would be needed to achieve parity.

On November 8, 1973, the East submitted a draft agreement calling for



overall reductions of about 17% for ground and air forces on both sides. The reductions were to take place in three consecutive phases; each side was to withdraw 20,000 forces, and those not indigenous to the area of reductions would be withdrawn to their national territories. The equal reductions called for by the East would have perpetuated the force disparity already existing in the East's favor.

On November 22, 1973, the West presented its proposal, calling for reductions in two phases to an equal level on both sides. The first phase would be limited to U.S. and Soviet personnel, involving 29,000 U.S. and 68,000 Soviet troops and withdrawal of 1,700 Soviet tanks. The Soviet reduction was to entail withdrawal of a complete Soviet tank army, representing the most threatening offensive force in the area. In the second phase, reductions would continue on both sides until a common ceiling of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air forces combined was reached.

By 1975 it was clear that the East was not prepared to accept the Western proposal. Following the December 1975 NATO ministerial, the West sought to give new impetus to the talks. In exchange for Eastern agreement to the basic principle of the Western proposal (two-phase asymmetrical reductions to parity, including withdrawal of a five-division Soviet tank army in the first phase), NATO offered to withdraw 54 nuclear-capable F-4 aircraft and 36 Pershing I missiles, together with 1,000 nuclear warheads.

The East again failed to agree.¹ It followed this Western move by introducing a new MBFR proposal in February 1976. Withdrawals were expressed solely in percentage terms; forces would be withdrawn in regiments and brigades; and—picking up the idea of including nuclear forces—each side would withdraw 54 nuclear-capable aircraft and ballistic missile systems. The latter offer ignored the Western call for reductions in Soviet tanks.

In June 1976, the East changed its tactics but yielded nothing of substance. Hitherto, it had tabled no figures for the size of its forces. Now, it declared that it had 987,300 ground and air force personnel, 805,000 of them ground troops. These figures were designed to suggest that the East had a numerical superiority over the West of no more than about 14,000 troops in the zone of reductions.

From this point on, the Soviet Union shifted its position to accept, for the first time, the principle of parity, but it

contended that, given the alleged rough equality of forces, almost equal reductions of the two sides would suffice to reach parity. The East followed up its data figures with a new proposal in 1978 calling for equal ceilings of 700,000 for ground forces arrived at through substantially equal reductions: 105,000 from the Warsaw Pact and 91,000 from NATO.

The West's quarrel with the Eastern position was not with the proposed common ceiling of 700,000, which had been the centerpiece of its own proposal of 1973; rather, it objected to the Eastern contention that the current level of forces on the two sides was roughly equal and that the common ceilings could thus be reached by roughly equal reductions of the kind the Soviets had proposed. In fact, the West has consistently estimated that Eastern ground forces were larger by some 170,000 men than the Eastern figures.

The Soviet Union has refused ever since to cooperate with Western efforts to identify the source of the manpower discrepancy. Eastern negotiators allege that Western probing is designed to extract secret information about Eastern forces that the Soviet General Staff considers essential to national security and to gain a unilateral military advantage for NATO by demanding large, asymmetrical Eastern force reductions. Comparable information on Western forces is publicly available.

The actual level of Soviet and other Eastern forces in the area has been one of the most important unresolved issues in MBFR; since 1976 the data dispute has been the central stumbling block in the negotiations.

Despite Soviet unwillingness to resolve the data question and accept genuine parity, the West was committed to making progress toward an agreement. In 1978, the West offered to guarantee that European NATO forces would be reduced following initial U.S. and Soviet reductions. In December 1979, the West scaled back demands for initial reductions in the hope that this would facilitate early progress. Under this new Western proposal, the first phase would entail reductions of 13,000 U.S. and 30,000 Soviet soldiers (three divisions)—a considerable modification of the original Western demand for the first-phase removal of a complete Soviet tank army. The West also proposed a comprehensive package of associated measures designed to ensure that a treaty would be effective and verifiable.

Speaking to the West German Parliament in June 1982, President

Reagan reaffirmed that an MBFR agreement was an important objective of his Administration. A month later, the West presented a new draft treaty that represented another major effort to address Eastern concerns while preserving the Western requirement for parity and adequate associated measures.

In some respects the 1982 draft treaty was a significant departure from previous Western approaches, although the fundamental principle—reductions to equal ceilings of 700,000 ground force personnel and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined—remained unchanged.

The major innovation of the Western draft was that it would bind all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the reductions required to reach the ceiling. This provision sought to address the frequently expressed Soviet concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO allies.

Consistent with previous Western approaches, the draft treaty called for associated measures intended to give each side confidence in the other's compliance. These measures provided for:

- Prenotification of activity by one or more division formations outside the division's garrison area;
- Provisions to permit observers to such activities;
- Prenotification of major movements of ground forces into the area of reductions;
- An annual quota of on-call inspections;
- Designation of permanent entry and exit points into and from the area of reductions, with observers stationed at these points;
- Exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn and continuing periodic exchanges of information on residual forces; and
- Noninterference with national technical means of verification.

In February and June 1983, the East made new proposals, the principal elements of which were:

- U.S.-Soviet reductions by "mutual example," that is, outside the context of an agreement;
- An agreed freeze on all forces and armaments in the MBFR area subsequent to the U.S.-Soviet reductions; and
- Subsequent negotiation of a treaty binding all direct participants to reductions in a single phase. The East suggested that such a treaty be based on the 1982 draft.

In this proposal and others, the East agreed in principle with some key Western verification measures such as inspection, but the agreement has been bogged down with restrictive conditions, and the East has been reluctant to discuss details.

Although there are some positive elements in the East's approach, it is clearly inadequate because it fails to address the crucial question of data and to resolve the problem of verification. In April 1984, the West presented a MBFR initiative aimed at breaking the impasse over data and verification issues. The heart of that initiative is a proposal of Western flexibility on data exchange for Eastern flexibility in limiting Western verification requirements.

The new proposal modifies previous Western data requirements in two ways.

- Data are required before treaty signature only for ground combat and combat support forces (roughly 60% of total forces and 75% of the ground forces in the reductions area).
- Precise agreement on these data is not required, only that they fall within an acceptable range of Western estimates.

In return, the East is asked to accept the Western package of verification measures (outlined in the 1982 Western draft treaty) with the following modifications:

- Increased numbers, duration, area, and site inspections and increased size of inspection teams;
- Observation of the process of redeployments, vacating garrison, and departure of the area; and
- Exchange of a more detailed breakdown of information on individual force components.

Limiting the initial data exchange to combat/combat support forces focuses negotiations on forces most responsible for the combat potential of the sides. Those having more apparent structure and more predictable maneuver. Therefore, the prospect for agreement on the current levels of ground combat/combat support forces could be better than for total forces. Determining the numbers of other forces in the reductions area would be deferred for years, pending onsite verification through reciprocal, cooperative measures.

The full schedule of reductions to be achieved would not be established until agreement on all forces is agreed. But the proposal requires the United States and the

Soviet Union to commit to a schedule of major reductions in their ground combat/combat support forces on the basis of the pre-treaty data exchange.

Requirement for Progress

The new Western treaty proposal contains the necessary elements to break the impasse. The initial Soviet reaction, however, has not been positive, and until the East demonstrates a willingness through concrete actions to accept the necessary asymmetrical reductions to reach parity, progress almost certainly will continue to be curtailed.

Although the lack of concrete results thus far has been disappointing, the West has made some progress. The principles of collectivity and parity seem finally to be established; associated measures have been proposed that would contribute substantially to stability and confidence in Europe; and a better understanding of the two sides' security concerns has evolved.

The MBFR talks began because the United States and its NATO allies believed that a satisfactory solution to the problem of Eastern conventional force superiority is a negotiated agreement leading to force parity at lower overall levels. The West remains committed to that goal and convinced that such an agreement would ultimately increase the security of all the peoples of Europe.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Nature and Purpose

Confidence-building measures—unlike arms reductions provisions, which seek to constrain the size, weaponry, or structure of military forces—are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding about military forces and activities. Their overall purpose is to reduce the possibility of an accidental confrontation through miscalculation or failure of communication, to inhibit opportunities for surprise attack, and to enhance stability in times of calm or crisis.

Confidence-building measures are an important part of U.S. efforts to achieve greater security and stability. Although they do not themselves reduce forces or armaments, by providing for more effective and timely exchange of information and greater reciprocal understanding of intentions and actions, they can help reduce the possibility of an East-West confrontation arising by accident or miscalculation.

U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include the "Hot Line" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" and Incidents at Sea Agreements. Multilateral measures in force are contained in the CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal confidence-building feature of the Final Act is the agreement of both East and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers. This concept has been incorporated into the Western proposal at the MBFR negotiations. The allies have also presented a package of confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) talks in Stockholm.

In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of forces data. These proposals were submitted at the START and INF negotiations. In addition, President Reagan in 1983 proposed an important set of measures to improve the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate rapidly and urgently. Those proposals, on which the United States and the U.S.S.R. began negotiating in August 1983, include improving the hot line, establishing a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military Communications Link, and improving Embassy-capital communications. In July 1984, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to improve the hot line by adding a high-speed facsimile capability to the existing teletype equipment. This will enable both countries to send charts, photos, and other graphic materials almost instantaneously.

Bilateral Agreements: Nuclear Forces and Crisis Stability

Over the last two decades, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on several measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

- The "Hot Line" Agreement, signed in 1963, established a direct teletype communications link between Washington and Moscow. A second agreement, signed in 1971, provided for upgrading the hot line by adding satellite circuits which began operation in 1978. Further agreement to add high-speed facsimile capability was reached in July 1984.

- The "Accidents Measures" Agreement, signed in 1971, requires each side to maintain safeguards against the ac-

cidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other side before planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party in the direction of the other party; and to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.

- The Incidents at Sea Agreement, signed in 1972, enjoins the two sides to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; to refrain from provocative acts at sea that could increase the risk of war; and to notify mariners of actions on the high seas representing a danger to navigation or to aircraft.

- Article XVI of the SALT II agreement contained a provision requiring advance notification of all multiple ICBM launches (more than one ICBM in flight at the same time) or single ICBM launches planned to extend beyond the national territory of the notifying side, regardless of direction.

Confidence-Building Measures in the START and INF Talks

In his Berlin speech of June 11, 1982; at the UN Special Session on Disarmament on June 17, 1982; and in his speech of November 22, 1982, the President pledged to leave no stone unturned in the effort to reinforce peace and lessen the risk of war. Recognizing the need to improve mutual communication and confidence, he suggested various ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union could deal with this problem. These included reciprocal exchanges in such areas as advance notification of major exercises, an expansion of agreed advance notification of ICBM launches, and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data. As the President stated in Berlin:

Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity.

After thorough study of ways to implement and expand the President's proposals, the United States proposed to the Soviet Union at the START and INF talks in Geneva those measures mentioned by the President in Berlin as well as two additional ones: advance notification of launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and of land-based,

longer range INF ballistic missiles. At U.S. initiative, a Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures was established within the START negotiations in the fall of 1983.

Notification of ICBM Launches.

Several U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreements provide for advance notification of certain ICBM launches. None, however, covers all ICBM launches, since none covers single launches that impact within the territory of the launching nation. Because any launch could in some circumstances create uncertainty, the United States proposed in START that the sides provide notice of all ICBM launches, whether they occur singly or in multiples, whether their flights remain within national boundaries or extend beyond them.

Notification of SLBM Launches.

At present, the United States and the U.S.S.R. do not notify each other of sea-launched ballistic missile launches; they do issue standard notices to airmen and mariners, announcing "closure areas," if an SLBM is expected to impact in international waters. To reduce any possibility of misinterpretation, the United States has proposed that both sides provide advance notification of all their SLBM launches, including those impacting within national territory. Along with the ICBM notification measure, this would mean that for the first time advance notification would be required for all launches of strategic ballistic missiles in the arsenals of both sides.

Notification of Longer Range INF Ballistic Missile Launches. The United States also proposed in the INF negotiations that advance notification be provided for all launches of LRINF ballistic missiles. These include the Soviet Union's SS-20 and SS-4 missiles, and the U.S. Pershing II.

Prior Notification of Major Nuclear Force Exercises. Each year U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces conduct large-scale military exercises intended to develop, perfect, or refine plans, procedures, or operations, and to provide training. The United States has proposed that each side provide notification in advance of those major exercises to avoid raising the concerns of the other side. This would complement the reciprocal notifications on conventional maneuvers covered by the Helsinki Final Act and those which are currently being negotiated in the CDE.

Expanded Exchange of Forces

Data. The United States also proposed in the START and INF talks that both parties agree to an expanded exchange of information on their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. This detailed exchange of information would help reduce the risk of misinterpreting actions involving such forces and enhance understanding of each other's capabilities. Moreover, such exchanges are important to the successful negotiation of any START or INF agreement, since those agreements would entail substantial reductions and restrictions on many systems. The expanded data exchange would be an important step in the verification of those agreements.

U.S.-Soviet Communications Improvements

In May 1983, the President strongly endorsed a Department of Defense report to Congress recommending additional proposals to strengthen stability and reduce the risk of accident or miscalculation. The proposals resulted from more than a year's study, in close consultation with Congress. The specific proposals are:

- Addition of a high-speed facsimile capability to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. hot line (on which agreement was reached in July 1984), which will permit transmission of more complex data, including full pages of text, maps, and graphs. This capability will increase the speed and reliability of communications, thereby improving both sides' ability to clarify ambiguous situations;

- Establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, a high-speed facsimile link that would supplement the hotline and existing diplomatic channels. Its primary purpose would be to facilitate rapid communication regarding the military aspects of nuclear or other military crises; and

- Establishment by the U.S. and Soviet Governments of improved communications with their embassies in each other's capitals. These improved communications could supplement both the hotline and the Joint Military Communications Link. Each government would install and control its own system.

Each of those measures would increase our ability to resolve crisis situations and prevent military escalation. Taken together, they would mark a substantial advance toward further reducing the risk that accident or misinterpretation could ever lead to war.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement to improve the hotline in July 1984, the Soviet Union has not expressed any interest in the two other U.S. proposed communications improvements.

Multilateral Negotiations: Confidence-Building Measures for Conventional Forces

CSCE. Certain confidence-building measures are now in effect throughout Europe as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Negotiated between 1973 and 1975 at the 35-nation CSCE, they provide for notification of major maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops; voluntary notification of smaller scale maneuvers; and invitation of observers to these activities. The Final Act also states the value of notification of other large-scale troop movements, below the 20,000 level, but does not require such a step.

As arms control devices, the confidence-building measures in the Final Act have made only a modest contribution. They are limited in the activities covered, in the specificity of their provisions, and in their geographic applicability. Furthermore, the Soviets violated the Helsinki Final Act by failing to give adequate notification of one major exercise in 1981.

MBFR. The next phase in the evolution of Western thinking on the potential of confidence-building measures centered on the MBFR negotiations. During the late 1970s, the West began considering in greater depth the military and verification implications of an MBFR agreement that would reduce the limit NATO forces. In particular, concerns arose about a possible situation following conventional force reductions in which the activities of residual Warsaw Pact forces might appear so threatening as to unravel MBFR constraints against a military buildup. These concerns prompted an exhaustive discussion among NATO's MBFR participants on ways in which provisions similar to confidence-building measures might contribute not only to verification of troop cuts and limitations but also to greater military stability following reductions.

The result was a NATO initiative in 1979 to negotiate, concurrently with an MBFR reductions agreement, a package of stringent new verification and stabilization measures. These measures included for a detailed inspection regime, controls on exit and entry of manpower to the zone of reductions, exchanges of

information on the size and structure of military forces, and notification of movements of major military formations into and within Europe. Since then, there has been some progress on clarifying the issues involved, but the Eastern participants have resisted key elements of the Western package.

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The next stage in the evolution of Western efforts to develop confidence-building measures resulted from the French proposal in May 1978 for a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The Madrid CSCE review conference, which concluded in September 1983, agreed to a CDE within the overall CSCE process and directed it to take the first steps to negotiate a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The CDE, at least initially, is concerned not with force or arms limitations but rather with how such forces are used. The measures to be negotiated must be militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and applicable to the whole of Europe—including Soviet territory as far east as the Ural Mountains.

Implicit in the Helsinki CSCE Final Act, and reaffirmed in the November 1983 Helsinki CDE preparatory conference decision document, is that CDE will not interfere with other, ongoing negotiations—such as MBFR and the Geneva-based UN Conference on Disarmament—and that its future schedule and agenda will depend on the CSCE review conference in Vienna in 1986. The CDE began on January 17, 1984, in Stockholm and will continue with brief recesses until the next CSCE review conference in Vienna in 1986.

The Western Position

From the Western perspective, the CDE is primarily a conference about surprise attack in Europe. Its purpose is to promote greater openness and predictability in military activities. Measures proposed by the West are intended to:

- Reduce the risk of conflict by surprise attack or miscalculation;
- Inhibit displays of force for purposes of intimidation; and
- Enhance communications among participating states.

With these objectives in mind, the United States and its allies have developed a coherent package of confidence-

and security-building measures. These measures, frequently referred to as "openness measures" and introduced by the West on January 24, 1984, call for:

- Information exchange on ground and air forces in the CDE zone;
- Forecasts and notifications of military activities in the zone, including amphibious operations, mobilizations, and alert activities, as well as regular out-of-garrison activities;
- Mandatory invitations to observers at these activities;
- The right of onsite and aerial inspection by challenge; and
- Facilities for improved communication between participants.

Consistent with the CDE mandate, the Western proposals call for concrete actions that can contribute meaningfully to peace and stability. They represent a significant advance over the confidence-building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act because they will all be mandatory, verifiable, applicable to the whole of Europe, and cover more military activities. The Western approach to the CDE also complements efforts in other arms control forums (START, INF, MBFR, and the Conference on Disarmament), and other security negotiations such as upgrading the U.S.-U.S.S.R. hotline.

The Eastern Position

The East, led by the Soviet Union, has promoted six proposals at Stockholm featuring a proposed agreement or treaty on the non-use of force, linked to a proposed agreement on non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The other four proposals call for establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones, reductions of military budgets, a ban on chemical weapons in Europe, and an expansion of the Helsinki confidence-building measures.

These proposals were presented in Stockholm at the beginning of the second round on May 8, 1984. Many have been featured in the Eastern agenda for some time. All appeared in the Prague declaration issued at the Warsaw Pact summit in January 1983. Except for the last measure, they are generally inconsistent with the conference mandate. The Soviets contend that the Western package of "openness measures" is a cover for spying and that in any event the Western package of confidence- and security-building measures is too technical. The West, by contrast, will continue to insist on measures that contribute specifically to European security

rather than merely repeat existing promises of good behavior.

In his speech before the Irish Parliament on June 4, 1984, President Reagan affirmed U.S. willingness to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force "if discussions on reaffirming the principle not to use force, a principle in which we believe so deeply, will bring the Soviet Union to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. . . ." The Soviet Union had not taken up that offer by the time the negotiating session adjourned in July 1984.

The Soviet Approach to Confidence-Building Measures

The Soviet Union has expressed support in principle for progress in confidence-building measures both in the CSCE context and in START. However, experience suggests that the Soviets have a different view of these measures than the West. The Soviet concept in many cases emphasizes voluntary expressions of good will rather than concrete contributions to stability. Thus, the West often has encountered difficulty in turning expressed Soviet interest into specific measures. Frequently, Soviet proposals have involved declaratory devices, such as non-use of force pledges, which would add nothing to European security or to commitments already undertaken in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. In other instances in which the Soviets have advanced proposals that would restrict specific military activities, the measures have been vague or designed to inhibit U.S. and allied military flexibility critical to maintaining an effective deterrent, while leaving Soviet forces and activities relatively unaffected.

Conclusion

The United States has taken the initiative in proposing in START, INF, and other forums a broad range of bilateral measures aimed at strengthening mutual confidence and reducing the risk of nuclear conflict as the result of accident or miscalculation. The United States has continued to work closely with its allies in the MBFR talks and the CDE to identify and negotiate agreements on concrete measures to decrease the dangers of conventional conflict.

The success of these efforts will depend largely on the readiness of the Soviet Union to move beyond simple declaratory gestures to the negotiation of meaningful and effective confidence-building measures.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The use of chemical weapons in warfare is prohibited by the Geneva protocol of 1925 and by customary international law, but there are no restrictions on the production and stockpiling of such weapons. Moreover, the Geneva protocol lacks provisions for verifying or enforcing compliance—a deficiency highlighted by use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies since the mid-1970s in Southeast Asia; in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion in 1979; and more recently by Iraq in its conflict with Iran. The United States is seeking to improve compliance with existing agreements and to negotiate a more effective prohibition. On April 18, 1984, in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the United States introduced a draft treaty calling for a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. Progress depends largely on whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept effective provisions for verification and compliance.

Background

Chemical weapons were first used in World War I. By the time the war ended, chemical warfare had claimed more than 1 million casualties. To prevent a recurrence of this tragedy, the 1925 Geneva protocol, one of the oldest arms control agreements still in force, was negotiated. This treaty prohibits the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous materials, liquids or devices," as well as "bacteriological methods of warfare."

Although outlawing the use of both chemical and biological weapons, the Geneva protocol places no limits on production and stockpiling. Moreover, it has no provisions to ensure verification and deal with issues of compliance. It has proven tragically inadequate to prevent use of chemical weapons against defenseless people.

The United States is committed to a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production and stockpiling and to ensuring the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. This goal is being pursued in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the United States has presented a draft treaty banning chemical weapons. Central to the U.S. proposal are strong verification and compliance provisions, including automatic and unimpeded onsite challenge inspections of military and

government-owned or -controlled facilities in the event of a suspected treaty violation.

The Soviet Union, though stating that it, too, seeks a complete ban on chemical weapons, has not shown itself willing to accept such measures. It maintains a large chemical weapons production and military training program, and more than 80,000 chemical weapons specialists are in the Soviet ground forces alone. This far exceeds the chemical weapons posture of all other states together and, combined with the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia, raises serious questions regarding Soviet intent to comply with a chemical weapons ban.

Chemical Weapons Use

Reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons began to emerge from Laos nearly 9 years ago. Five years ago similar reports started coming from Afghanistan. Early reports were infrequent and fragmentary, reflecting the remoteness of the conflict and the isolation of the victims. In the summer of 1979, the U.S. Department of State prepared a detailed compilation of interviews with refugees from Laos on this subject. That fall, a U.S. Army medical team visited Laos to conduct further interviews. By the winter of 1979, the United States felt it had sufficient evidence to raise the matter with the Governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

Dissatisfied with their responses, the United States began raising the issue publicly in the United Nations, before the Congress, and in other forums. In 1980, U.S. experts initiated a review of all reporting back to 1975. In mid-1981 these experts began testing physical samples from Southeast Asia for the presence of toxins—biologically produced chemical poisons whose production, stockpiling, and use are prohibited by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

On March 22, 1982, the Secretary of State submitted a report to Congress (Special Report No. 98) setting forth the results of the U.S. investigation. This report was updated by Special Report No. 104, issued in November 1982. Subsequent reports were issued in August 1983 and February 1984. These reports drew upon the following evidence:

- Testimony of those who saw or experienced chemical weapons attacks;
- Testimony of physicians, refugee workers, journalists, and others who had opportunity to question witnesses or victims;
- Testimony of those who had engaged in chemical warfare or were in a position to observe those who did;
- Scientific analysis of physical samples taken from sites where attacks took place;
- Documentary evidence from open sources; and
- Intelligence derived from national technical and other means.

In the words of Special Report 98:

... taken together, this evidence has led U.S. Government to conclude that Lao Vietnamese forces, operating under direct supervision, have since 1975 employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos; Vietnamese forces have, since 1978, employed lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kam-mer; and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979.

In December 1980, the UN General Assembly initiated an international investigation into the use of chemical weapons. In December 1982, the Experts Group, directed by the General Assembly to conduct the investigation, issued its report. The report supported claims in more than a dozen specific technical areas and faulted in strong language the Soviet "scientific explanation" for the presence of toxins in physical samples from Southeast Asia. The Experts Group concluded that it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances." The General Assembly was sufficiently concerned that it established permanent UN machinery to permit further investigation of allegations of chemical weapons.

In March 1984, the United Nations investigated charges of Iraqi chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war. The investigation concluded that both mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun had been used against Iranian forces. The United States has confirmed these reports independently and has condemned such chemical weapons use. In addition, the United States and several other Western countries have placed additional export controls on selected chemicals that have been used by Iraq to produce chemical weapons.

Arms Control Implications of Chemical Weapons Use

Soviet involvement in the use of chemical and toxin weapons violates the 1925 Geneva protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. It highlights the limitations of treaties lacking effective provisions for verification and compliance. Use of chemical weapons by Iraq—a party to the Geneva protocol—heightens these concerns.

This illegal use of chemical weapons underlines the importance of effective verification and compliance mechanisms in any chemical weapons ban. The Soviet Union has consistently described U.S. insistence on such mechanisms as an attempt to block progress toward prohibiting chemical weapons use. In fact, this U.S. insistence reflects a desire to ensure that a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons production and stockpiling could be effective.

Soviet use of toxin weapons also demonstrates the need to strengthen the inadequate compliance mechanisms contained in the Biological Weapons Convention. In late 1982, the UN General Assembly, by a vote of 124-15 (with 1 abstention), supported convening a conference of the states' parties to the convention to discuss ways to make the convention more effective. The initiative came from a number of neutral and nonaligned nations, led by Sweden; virtually its sole opponents were the Soviet Union and its allies. The United States strongly supports the proposal for a conference.

The United States and Control of Chemical Weapons

U.S. opposition to chemical warfare is as old as such warfare itself: in May 1915, a month after the first use of poison gas in World War I, President Wilson proposed the discontinuance of its use. The belligerents rejected the proposal. In 1922, chemical warfare was on the agenda of the U.S.-sponsored Washington Disarmament Conference. At American initiative, a prohibition on "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" was included in the text of a treaty negotiated at the conference but which never entered into force due to the failure of other states to ratify.

This prohibition was repeated in the 1925 Geneva protocol, with the inclusion of language prohibiting bacteriological warfare as well. The protocol grew out of a U.S. suggestion that the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Supervision

of the International Traffic in Arms address the task of banning chemical weapons. Unfortunately the protocol, lacking any provisions for ensuring compliance, did not offer adequate guarantees against the threat of illicit chemical weapons use.

During World War II, it was not the Geneva protocol which prevented use of chemical weapons, but deterrence. The United States and Great Britain made clear they would not use chemical weapons first but would retaliate against military objectives if the Axis Powers employed them. In 1943, President Roosevelt stated that the United States would regard a chemical attack upon any of its allies as an attack upon itself. As a result, poison gas was not used.

In 1969, the United States reaffirmed that it would not be the first to use chemical weapons and that it would not use, under any circumstances, biological and toxin weapons. Subsequently, the United States played a leading role in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (a forerunner of the Conference on Disarmament) in negotiating the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.

From 1977 to 1980, the United States engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to further progress toward a chemical weapons treaty. That effort proved fruitless due to Soviet unwillingness to accept effective verification and compliance measures.

U.S. policy on chemical warfare seeks an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban and, as both a negotiating incentive and a hedge against negotiating failure, to maintain a limited deterrent capability. Deterrence is, of course, fundamental to NATO's defense strategy. Under present conditions, faced with a significant Soviet offensive chemical warfare capability, the United States must maintain a limited chemical weapons retaliatory capability.

U.S. efforts to ban chemical weapons are concentrated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. For the past 4 years, the United States has been active in the conference's chemical weapons working group, helping focus attention on the necessary elements for an effective chemical weapons prohibition.

The draft treaty presented by Vice President Bush on April 18, 1984, contains detailed provisions to ensure compliance with a ban, including:

- Declaration and systematic international onsite inspection of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and declaration of plans for destruction of the stocks;

- Systematic international onsite inspection of the destruction of both chemical weapons stocks and production facilities;

- Declaration and onsite inspection of the operation of other facilities for legal production of chemicals posing a high risk of diversion to chemical weapons production; and

- An "open invitation" challenge inspection provision whereby suspected treaty violations in military or government-owned or -controlled facilities would be investigated within 24 hours of a complaint.

Prospects

As Vice President Bush made clear in his April 1984 address, the United States is fully committed to working toward a verifiable prohibition on chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use. Such a prohibition must include effective means of verifying compliance and investigating suspected cases of noncompliance. Provision for onsite inspection of facilities, stocks, and the destruction process must be among them. "National means" suggested by the Soviets are equivalent to self-inspection, and "national technical means," such as reconnaissance satellites, cannot alone guarantee that we could detect cheating.

This is because clandestine production of chemical weapons could take place in a factory with no special outward characteristics, while clandestine chemical weapons stocks could be stored almost anywhere. The U.S. "open invitation" inspection proposal is, therefore, designed to provide confidence that an eventual ban will not be violated.

The United States, together with other Western and developing countries, will continue to press in the Conference on Disarmament for an effective chemical weapons ban. The draft treaty presented in Geneva will help keep efforts concentrated on the issues of verification and compliance. The United States is working to ensure that this effort will result in a treaty that will permanently abolish the practice and the threat of chemical weapons use.

SPACE ARMS CONTROL

The United States has played a lead role in negotiating international agreements governing space activities, including the Outer Space Treaty, Limited Test Ban Treaty, and ABM Treaty. These and other agreements constitute an extensive body of international law pertaining to military activity in space. At U.S. initiative, bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on antisatellite arms control were held during 1978-79. The United States supports formation of a committee to address a broad range of space arms control issues in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In June 1984, the Soviets proposed talks on outer space arms control, including antisatellite weapons (ASATs), to take place in September in Vienna. The United States accepted at once, without preconditions. The Soviets have subsequently hardened their position, set forth preconditions, and rejected coming to the Vienna talks which they themselves had proposed. The United States remains ready for serious talks at any time.

Outer Space Treaty

Background. The Soviets launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite of the Earth, October 4, 1957. Earlier that year, developments in rocketry had already led the United States to propose international verification of the testing of space objects. The development of an inspection system for outer space was part of a Western proposal for partial disarmament put forward in August 1957. The U.S.S.R., in the midst of testing its first ICBM, did not accept these proposals.

Between 1959 and 1962 the Western powers made a series of proposals to bar the use of outer space for military purposes. Their successive proposals for general and complete disarmament included provisions to ban the orbiting and stationing in outer space of weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the UN General Assembly on September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower proposed that the principles of the Antarctic Treaty—which internationalized and demilitarized that continent and provided for its cooperative exploration and future use—be applied to outer space and celestial bodies.

Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament between 1960 and 1962 included provisions for ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The Soviet Union, however, would not

separate outer space from other disarmament issues. The Western powers objected to the Soviet approach, which was tied to unacceptable demands in other areas and designed to upset the military balance.

UN Resolution. After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Soviet Union's position changed. On September 19, 1963, Foreign Minister Gromyko told the UN General Assembly that the U.S.S.R. wished to conclude an agreement to ban placing nuclear weapons in orbit. U.S. Ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States had no intention of orbiting weapons of mass destruction, installing them on celestial bodies, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. The General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on October 17, 1963, welcoming the Soviet and American statements and calling upon all states to refrain from introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space.

The United States supported the resolution. Seeking to sustain the momentum for arms control agreements, the United States pressed for a treaty to give further substance to the UN resolution.

Treaty Negotiated. On June 16, 1966, both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft treaties. The American draft dealt with celestial bodies; the Soviet draft covered the whole outer space environment. The United States accepted the Soviet position on the scope of the treaty, and by September, agreement had been reached in discussions at Geneva on most treaty provisions. By December, differences on the few remaining issues—chiefly involving access to facilities on celestial bodies, reporting on space activities, and the use of military equipment and personnel in space exploration—had been satisfactorily resolved in private consultations.

On December 19, the General Assembly approved by acclamation a resolution commending the treaty. It was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967. On April 25, the Senate gave unanimous consent to its ratification, and the treaty entered into force on October 10, 1967.

The substance of the treaty's arms control provisions is in Article IV, which restricts military activities in two ways:

- First, it contains an undertaking not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer

space, nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction.

- Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications; testing weapons of any kind; or conducting military maneuvers.

In addition, the treaty explicitly enjoins states to observe existing international law, including the UN Charter, in their activities in the exploration and use of outer space.

S. Space Policy

U.S. national space policy was stated by President Reagan on July 4, 1982, and reaffirmed in his March 31, 1984 Report to Congress Concerning U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control. Its basic goals are to strengthen the security of the United States; maintain U.S. leadership in the exploration of space; obtain economic and scientific benefits through the exploitation of space; expand U.S. private-sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-related activities; promote international cooperative activities that are in the national interest; and cooperate with other nations in maintaining the freedom of space for all activities that enhance the security and welfare of mankind.

The United States will conduct its space program in accordance with important principles, among which are: a commitment to the exploration and use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes and the benefit of mankind; rejection of any claim to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies; recognition that space systems of any nation are national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference; implementation of two types of U.S. space programs—national security and civil; pursuit of activities in space in support of the U.S. right of self-defense; and a continuing study of further space arms control options.

In that regard, the President made clear that:

... the United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security.

ASAT Arms Control

Current Soviet Capabilities and Threat. Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational co-orbital interceptor system, ground-based test lasers with probable ASAT capabilities, nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptors with residual ASAT capabilities, and the technological capability to mount electronic countermeasures against space systems. The co-orbital interceptor system—deployed for over a decade and the world's only operational ASAT—represents a threat to low-altitude U.S. satellites.

The United States currently has under development its only ASAT system, a miniature vehicle (MV) system which will be launched from an F-15 aircraft. The MV is designed to operate only at low altitudes, thereby offsetting the existing Soviet system.

The MV would be able to deter threats to U.S. and allied space systems by providing the capability to respond in kind to a Soviet ASAT attack. It would also help deter war by being able, within the limits of international law, to deny any adversary the use of some space-based systems that provide support to hostile military forces. These include satellites which would provide targeting intelligence to Soviet weapon platforms for attacking U.S. and allied naval and land forces. The MV cannot and need not attack Soviet early warning satellites at high altitudes.

Previous Negotiations. At the initiative of the United States, bilateral negotiations between the United States and U.S.S.R. on the control of ASATs were held in 1978-79. These talks involved an extensive discussion of some of the problems of space arms control and revealed major differences between the two sides. Further U.S. study since then has brought the whole topic of space arms control into sharper focus.

Soviet Activities. Although the Soviets have periodically tested their operational ASAT interceptor, they regularly advance space arms control measures such as moratorium proposals in international fora, without acknowledging their own ASAT capabilities. In August 1983, they submitted a draft treaty to the UN General Assembly calling for the elimination of existing ASAT systems, for a ban on the development of new ASATs, and for a ban on attacks on satellites. At the same time, they also announced a "unilateral moratorium" on launching of ASAT weapons so long as other countries refrained from putting ASAT weapons into space.

The wording of these proposals had major ambiguities and loopholes. The Soviet initiatives pose profound verification problems, as in the case of their draft treaty, and, in the case of both the treaty and the moratorium offer, would leave the U.S.S.R. with a deployed system and thus a destabilizing advantage.

Considerations Affecting U.S. Policy. The United States has been studying a range of options for further space arms control measures with a view to possible negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations, if such negotiations could lead to equitable and verifiable agreements compatible with U.S. national security interests. Attention has particularly focused on possible ASAT arms control measures.

The potential benefits of any ASAT control regime would depend on both its framework and its details. The spectrum of possible space arms control measures includes bans on specialized ASAT weapons and much less ambitious undertakings. To be acceptable, any measure must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and compatible with our national security. Any space arms control measures that met these criteria, and were complied with, would have a number of potential benefits. For example, depending on the scope and effectiveness of any agreement, it might:

- Limit specialized threats to satellites and constrain future threats to such key satellites as those for early warning. Such limitations on specialized threats to satellites, together with satellite survivability measures, could help preserve and enhance stability;
- Raise the political threshold for attacks against satellites. Restricting threatening activity and/or prohibiting attacks on satellites would add to existing international law aimed at lowering the likelihood of conflict in space; and
- Meet some international concerns regarding the use of space for military purposes.

The U.S. review of space arms control possibilities thus far suggests a number of difficulties which must be overcome if effective arms control measures on ASATs are to be achieved. Those difficulties include:

Verification. A ban on all ASAT systems would require elimination of the current Soviet ASAT interceptor system, but no satisfactory means has been found to verify Soviet compliance effectively. Cheating on ASAT limitations, even on a small scale, could pose a disproportionate risk to the United

States, so verification would be particularly important.

Breakout. This is the risk that a nation could gain a unilateral advantage if the agreement ceased to remain in force for any reason—for example, through sudden abrogation—and obtain a head start in building or deploying a type of weapon which has been banned or severely limited.

Definition. Defining what constitutes an ASAT weapon for arms control purposes is very difficult. This problem is compounded because even non-weapon space systems, including civil systems, may have characteristics difficult to distinguish from those of weapons. Furthermore, many systems not primarily designed to be ASAT weapons have inherent (or residual) ASAT capabilities.

Vulnerability of Satellite Support Systems.

An ASAT ban would not ensure survivability of other elements in a space system. Ground stations, launch facilities, and communications links may be more vulnerable than the satellites themselves.

Soviet Nonweapon Military Space Threat.

As noted, examination of space arms control needs to include consideration of the growing threat posed by current and projected Soviet space systems which, while not weapons themselves, are designed to support directly the U.S.S.R.'s terrestrial forces in the event of a conflict.

U.S. Accepts Soviet Offer of Vienna Talks

The President's March 1984 report to Congress on ASAT arms control policy made clear that the door was not closed to ASAT arms control and that the United States was seeking to develop effective measures to limit specific systems. On June 29, 1984, the Soviets proposed talks on "preventing the militarization of outer space" to begin in Vienna in September. They specifically put ASATs on the agenda. The United States accepted without preconditions, explicitly stating that it intended to discuss and seek agreement on feasible negotiating approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective limitations on ASATs, as well as any other arms control concerns of interest to both sides.

At the same time, the United States noted that the "militarization of space" began when the first ballistic missiles were tested and when such missiles and other weapons systems using outer space began to be developed. Thus, the problem of weapons in space cannot be

considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship. Accordingly, the United States made clear it would seek to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be resumed.

In the weeks following the initial Soviet offer, the United States sought to make necessary arrangements for the Vienna talks through confidential diplomatic channels. However, the Soviets insisted on making the diplomatic exchanges public and, in doing so, repeatedly misrepresented the U.S. position, obliging the United States to respond in public. They inaccurately portrayed the U.S. view on the need to reduce offensive nuclear forces as a precondition for the talks, while making acceptance of their own suggestion of a mutual moratorium on ASAT tests itself tantamount to a precondition. The United States made clear that possible mutual restraints would be an appropriate subjects for the negotiations; however, neither this outcome nor any other should be prejudged before talks begin. The United States remains ready to begin talks without preconditions, at whatever time is agreeable to the Soviets.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Restraint in nuclear testing has long been considered an important step toward controlling nuclear arms competition. Since the 1950s, successive U.S. Administrations have sought verifiable limitations on nuclear testing that would contribute to arms control while providing the ability to maintain an adequate deterrent. These efforts have been pursued in a variety of channels, including UN bodies and tripartite negotiations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

In 1963, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed to halt nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. In 1974 and 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union also signed the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties limiting the size of underground nuclear explosions. Agreement on a more comprehensive test ban, however, has been inhibited by concerns about the proper relationship of such a ban to other arms control issues as well as to the overall East-West military balance and the need to

maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. East and West also disagree over how best to ensure compliance with specific testing limitations and prohibitions. The United States is, therefore, seeking to strengthen two of the existing treaties.

Introduction

Except for negotiations on limiting nuclear forces, no arms control endeavor since World War II has generated such sustained international interest as the issue of nuclear testing. Concern about radioactive fallout in the 1950s spurred efforts to halt testing, as the nature and effects of fallout became better understood and as it became apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive debris.

Efforts to negotiate an international agreement ending nuclear tests began in the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955. Since then, a comprehensive test ban, or related issues, have been pursued in various forums and in trilateral negotiations involving the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. In all of these efforts, however, a central and persistent barrier to a treaty limiting tests has been the issue of verifying compliance to ensure against testing in secret. Another important factor has been the role of testing in maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent.

The Soviet Union historically has taken the position that national technical means, combined with mutual pledges that limits would be observed, are sufficient to verify compliance. The United States consistently has sought negotiated means of assuring that any nuclear testing agreement would not be vulnerable to clandestine violation. Given the difficulties of detecting underground tests and distinguishing such tests from other seismic events, these means have included the use of seismic instruments and onsite inspections.

Testing Moratorium

The danger—both to Western security and to progress toward genuine arms control—of failing to provide for effective means of verification in arms control agreements was underscored by the fate of an international testing moratorium. Implemented unilaterally by the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in 1958, the moratorium held until 1961. During that time, however, the Soviet Union began preparing secretly for the largest series of nuclear explosions ever conducted. On

August 20, 1961, the Soviet Union announced that it would resume testing and, on the following day, began the first of 40 atmospheric tests conducted over a 2-month period. The United States and the United Kingdom protested on September 3, 1961, that all atmospheric tests be ended without any requirement for international control. On September 15, with Soviet tests continuing, the United States declared that it would resume testing.

These Soviet tests ended the moratorium and represented a clear breach of faith, prompting President Kennedy to state: "We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Nevertheless, efforts to achieve a test ban continued. A three-power (United States, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R.) conference met in almost continuous session over 3 years, beginning in October 1958. It adjourned in January 1962, unable to complete drafting of a treaty because the Soviets insisted that national means of detection were sufficient to monitor testing. Further efforts in the 18-nation Disarmament Committee—a forerunner of today's Conference on Disarmament—also ended in frustration. Nevertheless, three-party negotiations resumed in the summer of 1963. The Soviets began to shift toward a Western proposal, advanced the year before, for a ban on testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space—environments in which both sides agreed that existing verification technology was adequate. Because long years of discussion had clarified the issues, a treaty was negotiated within 10 days and ratified in October 1963.

The parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty—originally the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union—agreed not to carry out any nuclear explosion test or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would send radioactive debris beyond the border of the country conducting the test. The treaty of unlimited duration and has been joined by nearly 125 nations.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

An important follow-on to the Limited Test Ban Treaty came with the negotiation in the 1970s of the U.S.-Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in

1972. In this treaty, both parties agreed not to conduct nuclear weapons tests of any type with planned yields exceeding 150 kilotons. The 150-kiloton threshold was designed to help maintain the strategic balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. by inhibiting the development of new, high-yield warheads that could be fitted to new, highly accurate missiles.

The United States and the Soviet Union also agreed to apply a similar threshold of 150 kilotons to their underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This agreement was formalized in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1974, which also set various aggregate limits on multiple underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is a necessary complement to the threshold test ban, because there is no essential distinction between the technology used to produce a nuclear weapon and that used for explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were submitted to the U.S. Senate on July 29, 1976, for advice and consent to ratification. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted hearings on them during the summer of 1977, but the treaties have never been acted upon by the full Senate. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union have declared their intention to abide by the 150-kiloton testing threshold of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty provided that the other side does so as well.

Monitoring estimates of a number of Soviet nuclear tests since 1976 have indicated yields in excess of the permitted 150-kiloton limits. In response to formal U.S. queries, the Soviets repeatedly have claimed that they are observing the 150-kiloton limit. Although a definitive conclusion cannot be reached—given the ambiguities in the available evidence—Soviet threshold violations are likely for a number of tests. President Reagan communicated that finding to Congress in his January 1984 report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.

The United States is seeking verification improvements that would significantly enhance our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. On numerous occasions, the United States has sought unsuccessfully to engage the Soviet Union in talks on such improvements. The Soviets claim that if the United States ratifies both treaties and implements their verification provi-

sions, U.S. verification and compliance concerns would be resolved. But there is clear reason to doubt such claims. For example, no provision exists in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty for independent validation of the data to be exchanged upon ratification. The United States, therefore, continues to believe that verification procedures for the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties need strengthening.

Comprehensive Test Ban

From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met periodically to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The three parties failed to reach agreement on several major issues, including verification. The specific verification issues involved the conditions for carrying out onsite inspections and the use of seismic equipment on the territory of each monitored party.

The United States has decided not to resume trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at this time. In order to secure progress in this area, however, the United States agreed in 1982 to the formation of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva with a mandate to discuss issues related to verification and compliance with any future comprehensive test ban.

Conclusion

Achieving a ban on all nuclear weapons tests remains a long-term U.S. goal. A test ban by itself cannot end the nuclear threat. It is important that such a ban be verifiable and that it come into force in circumstances in which it can contribute to peace and stability. A complete cessation of nuclear tests must be viewed in the context of broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions; improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; and the maintenance of an effective deterrent. The United States has, therefore, given arms control priority for now to achievement of significant, equitable, and verifiable arms reductions, and to strengthening verification measures for existing agreements on the limitation of nuclear testing.

Limitations on underground tests pose a difficult verification challenge. Efforts to improve our ability to verify a ban on underground nuclear explosions have continued since the Limited Test Ban Treaty entered into force, and the

United States has invested more than \$300 million in research and development to improve seismic and other monitoring techniques. Even so, the need for effective verification measures beyond national means was underscored by a report of the UN Secretary General on a comprehensive test ban to the Committee on Disarmament (March 24, 1980). The report noted that:

... secret underground testing may provide a military advantage to a violator, and it may not be possible to obtain, through the parties' own means alone, assurance that the prohibition is being observed. Provision for verification by both national and international means must, therefore, be made in a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

The international community long has recognized that an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons could lead to greater risks of conflict. For this reason, just as the United States has long been committed to stemming the "vertical" proliferation of nuclear weaponry (that is, the increase in the arsenals of states already possessing nuclear weapons), it has since 1945 been dedicated to preventing the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear-weapon states.

Origins of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

No arms control agenda could effectively limit the risk of conflict and the danger of nuclear escalation if it did not include a well-thought-out program to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus the United States and many other nations have worked to promote peaceful nuclear programs while preventing, to the extent possible, the spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, halting the spread of nuclear weapons and guiding nuclear development toward peaceful ends have been central policy objectives of every U.S. Administration since 1945.

As early as 1946, the United States, then the world's only nuclear power, proposed the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear technology. Under this plan, the United States would have given up all its nuclear weapons. However, the Soviets rejected this initiative. U.S. efforts today center on strengthening the international non-proliferation regime in several ways: through the institutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the legal framework of the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the treaty of Tlatelolco; cooperation among major nuclear supplier countries; and the legislative and policy structure of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. President Reagan underscored his Administration's commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons—and to working with all other nations toward that end—in his March 31, 1983, arms control speech in Los Angeles, as well as his July 1, 1983, statement marking the 15th anniversary of the NPT.

Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

At the end of World War II, the Truman Administration and the American scientific community understood that the Manhattan Project to develop atomic weapons was based upon concepts in theoretical physics known by scientists for some time. Thus the highly dangerous prospect of nuclear proliferation became a priority item on the political agenda of the United States and all other nations.

As a result, the United States in 1946 proposed the Baruch Plan, which offered to surrender U.S. nuclear technology to an international authority that would develop its peaceful applications and prohibit military uses through a system of control and inspections. The Soviet Union rejected this offer. Faced with the need to address the dangers of proliferation, the United States imposed strict controls on nuclear exports with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

President Eisenhower made a dramatic innovation in this policy in December 1953, when, in a famous UN speech, he inaugurated his "atoms for peace" program. The President offered to assist other countries in developing nuclear energy in return for pledges to use nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes. U.S. assistance took the form of research reactors, hardware, technical assistance, and training for thousands of scientists and engineers. Subsequently, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 eliminated the U.S. Government monopoly on nuclear technology and opened the way for the domestic use of nuclear energy for generating electricity and for private industrial and medical applications under a formal licensing process.

Key Elements of the Nonproliferation Regime

International Atomic Energy Agency. The "atoms for peace" proposal was the precursor of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which the United States worked hard to establish and through which the ideas contained in President Eisenhower's initiative were developed. The IAEA, formed in 1957, has two complementary purposes:

- To promote the peaceful application and uses of atomic energy; and
- To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that these technologies are not used for military purposes.

IAEA safeguards are now being applied to civil nuclear facilities in 50 non-nuclear-weapon states. These states agree to file regular reports with the agency about their use of nuclear materials and equipment and to allow the use of containment and surveillance devices, such as seals and cameras, at the safeguarded facilities. Periodic on-site inspections are conducted by international officials employed by the IAEA to confirm that nuclear materials are not being diverted to nonpeaceful applications.

The United States regularly contributes about one-third of the IAEA's operating budget through voluntary assessed contributions. In September 1982, after an illegal vote denied the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the IAEA general conference, the United States withdrew from participation and reassessed its role in the agency. The Reagan Administration decided to resume participation in February 1983, while making clear that it expected the IAEA to conduct itself in accordance with the provisions of its charter, including the principle of universality. The U.S. goal is to strengthen the IAEA and make its safeguards system comprehensive and universal.

Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1961 the Government of Ireland, reflecting growing concern about the dangers of proliferation, proposed at the United Nations an international agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. With U.S. and Soviet support, this initiative evolved into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was completed in 1968 and went into force in 1970.

To date, the treaty has been ratified by 124 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Nuclear-weapon states that

tify are pledged to give no aid to non-nuclear-weapon states to develop nuclear explosives. In turn, the non-nuclear-weapon states renounce manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosives and agree to place all of their nuclear facilities under international safeguards and to open them to international inspection. The United States continues to encourage nonparties to adhere to the treaty. Every 5 years a review conference is held to examine the operation of the treaty; the next will be in August-September 1985. The U.S. objective is to ensure that this conference reaffirms the importance of the NPT to international security.

Nuclear Supplier Cooperation. Although the combination of NPT and IAEA safeguards worked satisfactorily, the mid-1970s technological developments led to heightened concern about the adequacy of the existing safeguards regime. Together with the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974, this concern led the United States to begin discussions with other nuclear suppliers (including the Soviet Union, several Western European countries, Canada, and Japan) to tighten the rules and procedures for the export of nuclear supplies, components, and technology. In 1978, the 15 nations involved in what became known as the London Suppliers' Group agreed to permit the IAEA to publish a set of general principles governing their future nuclear exports. These norms, although imperfect, have continued to be refined and broadened, and much progress has been made in their coverage and specificity in recent years. The United States is determined to continue consultations with other supplier countries to develop rules and restraints for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, material, and equipment.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). In addition to the NPT, the treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in Mexico City in 1967, is a mainstay of the international nonproliferation regime in Latin America and the Caribbean. The treaty, the only one to provide for a nuclear-weapons-free zone in a populated region, is now in force for 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. In addition to the main provision prohibiting development or use of nuclear weapons by regional states, two additional protocols call on states outside the region to respect the nuclearization provisions of the zone.

- Protocol I applies to nations outside the treaty zone having possessions within it. It is currently in force for the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

- Protocol II applies to nuclear-weapon states. They undertake to respect the denuclearized status of the treaty zone, not to contribute to violations by other parties to the treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty. It is the only nuclear arms control agreement in force to which all five nuclear-weapon states are parties.

The United States fully supports the goals and objectives of the treaty of Tlatelolco and hopes that those few states which have not yet adhered to it will do so.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was signed into law by President Carter on March 10, 1978. It established specific criteria for nuclear exports and strict procedures for the approval of exports. It also provides a stronger congressional role in U.S. export policy. Under the act, non-nuclear-weapon countries seeking U.S. reactors or nuclear fuel must accept IAEA safeguards on all of their peaceful nuclear facilities—so-called full-scope or comprehensive safeguards.

Current U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

On July 16, 1981, President Reagan outlined the U.S. approach to international nuclear cooperation and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. The United States would:

- Seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries as a basic national security and foreign policy objective;
- Strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear explosives by improving regional and global stability and promoting understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states;
- Continue to support adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty of Tlatelolco by countries that have not accepted them;
- View a violation of those treaties or of an international safeguards agreement as having profound consequences for international order and U.S. bilateral relations and view any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear-weapon state with grave concern;

- Cooperate with other nations to strengthen the IAEA and its safeguards system;

- Work with other nations to combat the risks of proliferation; and
- Continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation exists, and seek agreement requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states as a condition for any significant new nuclear supply commitment.

At the same time, the President announced that the United States would not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear power programs where this would not constitute a proliferation risk. He also ordered an intensive interagency review of policies under which the United States exercises its consent rights over reprocessing of U.S.-origin fuel and plutonium use in other countries. As a result, the United States is attempting to work out procedures with Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community for advance long-term consent to retransfers, reprocessing, and use of nuclear material over which the United States has consent rights.

The President underscored the linkage between arms control and nuclear nonproliferation in a March 31, 1983, address in Los Angeles:

For arms control to be truly complete and world security strengthened . . . we must also increase our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Every country that values a peaceful world must play its part.

He then renewed his call for comprehensive safeguards by all nuclear suppliers as a condition for future nuclear exports. The United States continues to consult closely with other nuclear suppliers on this key question.

Conclusion

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will remain one of the U.S. Government's most urgent national security priorities. Through the maintenance and strengthening of the existing international nonproliferation regime, the United States is working to secure this objective. The United States will continue to seek the cooperation and support of the Soviet Union and other countries in the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Road Ahead: Prospects and Problems

The history of arms control efforts provides ample basis for hope and caution. Major strides have been achieved over the last 30 years in securing international agreements restricting the development, stockpiling, and use of various forms of armaments. These include the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1970, and the SALT I agreements of 1972.

However, the growth of nuclear and conventional arms continues, and some dangerous quantitative and qualitative imbalances have arisen. Arms control negotiations designed specifically to avert or correct this process have either been disappointing, as in SALT II, or, as in the negotiations on conventional forces in central Europe and on chemical weapons, failed so far to produce substantive results. In November 1983, the Soviet Union suspended the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear force reductions and in December 1983 refused to set a resumption date for START. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. has violated or probably violated several of its existing legal obligations and political commitments in the arms control field.

Success in achieving balanced and verifiable arms control agreements that make a real contribution to global stability and security requires Western patience, persistence, and unity. Failure or disappointment has resulted when Western governments succumbed to confused objectives, divided counsel, and pressure for quick results.

The Soviet Union is a closed society depending heavily on military force to sustain its international position. This makes meaningful arms control difficult. At the same time, the enormous destructive capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union makes arms control all the more necessary. We cannot assume, however, that the Soviet Union shares our perceptions or our objectives.

Careful, patient negotiations directed toward specific, well-defined ends can lead to constructive agreements that enhance the security of the parties to these accords and mankind as a whole. The United States and its allies have led in these endeavors for more than 30 years. We are making serious and far-reaching efforts today to reduce nuclear and conventional arms, to achieve a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and to forge new bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures. The pursuit of a more stable peace through a vigorous arms reductions program is an essential part of collective efforts to strengthen Western security and will remain among the highest priorities of the U.S. Government.

¹The Western proposal eventually was superseded by NATO's 1979 decision to offer separate negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces while unilaterally withdrawing 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe before those negotiations began. ■

Arms Control Glossary

ABM system—Antiballistic missile, system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements during flight.

Ballistic missile—Any missile that does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. Ballistic missiles typically operate outside the atmosphere for a substantial portion of their flight path and are unpowered during most of their flight.

Biological warfare—Employment of living organisms or toxic biological products to produce death or casualties.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)—Measures designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities, to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication, and to increase stability in times of both normal circumstances and crisis.

Cooperative measures—Measures taken by one side in order to enhance the other side's ability to monitor and/or verify compliance with the provisions of an agreement.

Counterforce—The employment of strategic nuclear forces in an effort to destroy, or disable, selected military capabilities of an enemy force.

Crisis stability—A strategic relationship in which neither side has an incentive to initiate the use of force in a crisis.

Cruise missile—A guided missile using aerodynamic lift that sustains powered flight through the atmosphere to its target.

Dual-capable weapons—Those systems capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Encryption—The encoding of communications or other data (e.g., telegraphic data) for the purpose of concealing information.

Equivalent megatonnage—A measure used to compare the potential destructive force of different nuclear warhead yields.

Escalation—An increase in scope or intensity of a conflict or crisis.

Flexible response—A strategy to deter and, should deterrence fail, to counter aggression at varying levels with appropriate forces.

Hardened site—A site constructed to withstand the blast and associated effects of a nuclear attack.

Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—A land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges defined in SALT I and II as ranges in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)—Land-based missiles and aircraft with ranges/combat radius between short-range nuclear forces and 5,500 km that are capable of striking targets beyond the general region of the battlefield but not capable of intercontinental range.

Kiloton—Nuclear yield equal to that of 1,000 tons of TNT.

Megaton—Nuclear yield equal to that of 1 million tons of TNT.

Monitoring—Function of collecting, analyzing, and reporting data on the activities of the parties to an arms control agreement.

Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)—Multiple reentry vehicles carried by a ballistic missile, each of which can be directed to a separate target.

Multiple reentry vehicle (MRV)—The reentry vehicle of a ballistic missile which is equipped with multiple warheads but which does not have the capability of independently directing the reentry vehicles to separate targets.

National technical means (NTM)—Assets under national control for monitoring compliance with the provision of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry.

Payload—The weapons and penetration aids carried by a delivery vehicle.

Qualitative limitations—Restrictions on capabilities or characteristics of a weapons system as distinct from quantitative limits (e.g., on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles).

Quantitative limitations—Limits on the number of weapons systems in certain categories, as distinct from qualitative limits on weapons capabilities.

Reentry vehicle (RV)—That portion (or portions) of a ballistic missile, containing a nuclear warhead, which re-enters the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile's trajectory.

Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF)—Land-based missiles, rockets, and artillery that are capable of striking only targets in the general region of the battlefield.

Special Consultative Group (SCG)—The NATO forum for review of the course of the INF negotiations and for consultation on any U.S. steps in those talks.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)—A permanent U.S.-Soviet commission established in accordance with the SALT I agreements. Its purpose is to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the various treaties and agreements achieved between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to which it is assigned responsibility.

Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—A ballistic missile carried in and launched from a submarine.

Telemetry—Data transmitted by radio during a weapons test, reporting functions and performance.

Throw-weight—The useful weight placed on a trajectory toward the target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile.

Verification—The process of determining whether parties to an agreement are in compliance with their obligations.

Warhead—The part of a missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition containing either the nuclear or the thermonuclear system, high explosive system, chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage.

Yield—The energy released in an explosion. The energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon is generally measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT required to produce the same energy release. ■

Visit of Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney



(White House photo by Pete Souza)

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., September 24-25, 1984, to meet with President Reagan.

Following are remarks made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney after their meeting on September 25.¹

President Reagan

It was with great pleasure that we welcomed Brian Mulroney back to the White House. He was here this past June and now returns as Prime Minister of Canada—America's neighbor, ally, and most important economic partner, and great friend.

I congratulated Prime Minister Mulroney on winning a decisive and historical electoral mandate from the people of Canada. As the other North American Irishman, I also wished him well in his new responsibilities.

The Prime Minister and I exchanged views on a broad range of global issues, reviewed our common search to advance our agenda for peace, particularly the search for real and equitable reductions in the levels of nuclear arms. I told him that in our efforts to build a lasting structure of peace and security, we shall continue to value the experience, the counsel, and the participation of our Canadian allies.

A healthy North American economic relationship is essential to the prosperity of our two countries. We discussed some potential ways of increasing trade and investment between us. The Prime

Minister impressed upon me the importance his government attaches to environmental concerns, and we intend to pursue these issues together.

Frequent consultations are one of the hallmarks of the relationship between Canada and the United States, and I look forward to continuing the fruitful dialogue that we had today. In addition, I've asked Secretary Shultz to continue the series of very productive regular meetings that he has had with his Canadian counterparts.

Even the closest of partners and allies may not always see things in exactly the same way. But we agree to keep each other's interests in mind, to keep one another informed, and to hear one another out on the issues which may arise between us. We, too, intend to give our neighbor the benefit of the doubt.

So, I thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for coming here today. And, once again congratulations on your decisive victory and *a la prochaine* [until the next time].

Prime Minister Mulroney

An hour ago you and I had the great pleasure of meeting Canadian and American astronauts soon to be launched into space. No endeavor better underscores our friendship or so dramatically indicates the potential for cooperation by our two countries in the service of mankind than the peaceful use of space. Such an effort, it seems to me, demonstrates to us all the tremendous potential for improved cooperation in joint development of our two countries.

Yesterday in the United Nations, you reached out to the Soviet Union with a message of peace, and you invited the leaders of the world to join in what we can accomplish together. We commend you for this appeal and for your leadership in this vital area.

For our part, we intend to continue to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European countries. We will continue to contribute, as we have in the past, ideas which may help yield results in our common search for peace and security.

Our two countries have much to offer each other and, I believe, together, to the world. President Kennedy once said that "Geography has made us neighbors, history has made us friends, economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies."

[At this point, the Prime Minister spoke in French. He then resumed his remarks in English.]

The principal task of our new government is economic renewal—to expand trade, to attract new investment, and to seek new markets. By establishing a climate for vigorous economic growth, we wish to create the new jobs that our people need and, we believe, deserve. We wish to mobilize our very best talents at home and to seek out new partners abroad. We feel a strong external voice is based on a vigorous domestic economy.

Our talks today have focused on strengthening and, indeed, intensifying consultation between the executive arm of our two governments and also between the Congress and the Parliament of Canada. We want more coherence in the management of our relationship and more action in regard to our shared priorities.

And so, we must deepen our understanding of what we share together and of the distinctive interests we have in international affairs. And I thank you, Mr. President, for your generous hospitality and for a most satisfying exchange of views.

¹Made to reporters assembled at the South Portico of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 1, 1984). ■

Secretary Visits Canada

Secretary Shultz visited Toronto on October 15-16, 1984. Following are his arrival statement and toast given at a dinner hosted by Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark on October 15, and a joint news conference held by Secretary Shultz and Secretary Clark on October 16.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, OCT. 15, 1984¹

I appreciate very much our warm welcome, not only its warmth, but the thoughtful comments that you made about the contents of the talks we will be having and their objective. You notice that this is the 150th anniversary of the founding of Toronto, and I think it does make a particularly appropriate setting for the first meeting between the foreign ministers of our two countries under your new government.

As it happens, I have been to Toronto more times than I can count, so I'm certainly glad that I have a chance to come back again to see the skyline and feel of the excitement of Toronto. I look forward very much to going through with you the bilateral problems that we have, the stake we have in many international issues—economic issues, arms control issues—the problems around the world in which we share joint interests; comparing notes and benefiting from that kind of consultation.

I am very interested in your quotation from President Ford, that we can agree without being disagreeable, and believe in that very much. At the same time, it seems to me that in our discussions we should aspire to be ready to recognize differences when we have them, but set about the processes that will help us resolve those differences and put them behind us. And I am sure that the supply of differences is very large and we will have lots to do. I also think about the assignments that your Prime Minister and my President have given to us to try and help manage this relationship between our two countries, is of great importance. And it has always been the view of President Reagan, and certainly mine over a long period of time, that our most important relationships are right in our own neighborhood from the standpoint of the United States.

It is quite obvious to everybody by its time, I think, that our most impor-

tant trading partner is Canada, not just by a little bit, but by a tremendous amount. So we have a gigantic stake in the United States in having a constructive, thoughtful, and well-working relationship, and President Reagan has sent me here with that objective very much in mind. So I look forward to these discussions with keen anticipation and the prospect of real success.

DINNER TOAST, OCT. 15, 1984²

This has been a wonderful evening for me. This gathering has a great feeling. I don't know how, in your experience, you have done, but you can go to dinners and they are often pretty dead, you know. But this has life, and I remarked to my wife we are never going to get people through the receiving line; they all want to talk to each other. There's a spirit, and I was asking Mr. Clark [Canadian Secretary of External Affairs] a little bit about people who were here, and what I discovered was that there is a tremendous diversity here. There is Alex Colville representing, in a sense, painting; there are people here from the world of journalism; there are people from the performing arts; there are people in the sports world; there are people in the professions; there are businessmen; and of course politicians. So there is a great sense of diversity. And I suppose, in a way, the diversity gives a sense of the Canadian identity. And in that sense, your identity is different from ours, and of course in that respect nevertheless, that is a similarity. We are very diverse in the United States, and somehow, out of this diversity, we think we have a more interesting identity than many countries that you see that are very homogeneous and where everything is pretty much the same. So I appreciate the diversity of your Canadian identity.

Now, having said that there is diversity and difference, there are obviously many things that we share. And it is because of the things that we share that, in our separate ways, we find so much to do with each other. It isn't simply that we have the world's longest boundary and live next door to each other. But we do have common values, we do have common interests, of course we have this gigantic amount of trade between our countries that out-distances the trade between our two countries, and, in a different way from the way

you put it, Joe, our largest trading partner for the United States is Canada and our second largest trading partner is the Province of Ontario. [Laughter]

So you can see how close to you we feel. And I support the celebrated feature of our relationship, that tremendous border, could be remarked upon, but last week the geographic significance kind of seemed to fade as Marc Garneau and his American colleagues voyaged in the trackless realms of space together. That was really quite a dramatic thing.

I had the privilege of meeting Joe Clark in New York at a little meeting there as part of the UN go-around. All the foreign ministers gather and we spend our time meeting with each other, and everybody's place is like a dentist's office. But we managed to have a pleasant extra dinner together and I met him again on this trip. And he's tough. I got here on an airplane at about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon, drove into the hotel, got unpacked. Somebody knocked on the door—"Mr. Clark says it's time to start the meeting."—so off we went for a couple of hours or so of very strong exchange. And while it was pleasant, the pleasantries were quickly done away with, and we got right into the content of the things we had decided in advance we should exchange views upon. And we started in on economic issues; U.S. situation; Canadian situation; international problems that both of us look at and worry about. And we will go on tomorrow and talk about our common interests in reduction in armament, and East-West relations, and Central America, the Middle East, and so forth. And then I suspect we will spend a good part of our time tomorrow morning reviewing the many bilateral issues that we have that just are nobody's business but ours.

And we have issues of the environment, we have trade issues of one kind or another. I suspect fish will come up. I found that you spend more time on fish in the foreign relations business than on anything else. In Japan our greatest problem right now is whales. We don't have that problem, but we do have lots of fish to fry.

But there are a great many bilateral issues and, as I reflect on them, having worked at this to some extent when I was in the government before, kept track of it, and then coming in again and working at it some more, it's almost as though there is a constant inventory of problems, but they keep changing. That's a story, but I hope it's more and more on the basis of first in first out (to

use a business term). As we cycle through and we look at these problems and try to surround the problems with a process that leads to solutions; as you said, disagreeing without being disagreeable, but nevertheless adding on to that a process that seeks to solve the problems that we have and then go on to the next ones.

We know that we are always going to have issues between us because there is so much traffic, there is so much going on. The job of the foreign ministries, I think, is to try to monitor that, and to keep track of what the issues are, keep them under control and get them solved and keep going on to the next thing so this relationship can continue to flourish and flourish and flourish to the mutual benefit of both our countries.

I look forward to our continuing relationship there, to our meetings, but more than that, to having the kind of contact not only ourselves but in our governments, but more than that—the people of Canada and the people of the United States, to have such fabulous intimate relationships that we can do everything we can to see that it continues to be as strong and warm and worthwhile as it has been for so many years.

So I, in turn, would like to ask you to join me in a toast to Joe Clark and Maureen Clark, and as he did, to a warm, productive, and constructive relationship between Canada and the United States.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, OCT. 16, 1984³

Secretary Clark. We had, from my perspective, a very warm and positive discussion. I appreciated Secretary Shultz's coming to Toronto, and I think that we were able, today and yesterday, in the extensive discussions we carried forward, to maintain the spirit that was established by President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney during their meeting at the White House in September. In my judgment, we are embarked upon the opening of a new chapter in Canadian-U.S. relations. The responsibility of Secretary Shultz and myself is to deal with some of the matters of detail, of important detail, that exist between our two countries, and also to keep in close contact regarding international questions which are of concern to us both.

You will not be surprised to know that I gave a very heavy emphasis to

some of the economic questions that are facing Canada and the world, and particularly the importance to us of establishing and maintaining Canadian access to markets, which is going to be key to our economic strength in the future. I also, of course, raised, and we discussed, the continuing Canadian concern about the problem of acid rain, which is a multi-partisan concern in this country. A colleague of mine, the Honorable John Fraser, when he was Minister of the Environment in my government in 1979, raised that question with some vigor at that time, and it remains a very major concern of the new Government of Canada. I think that I had known before coming to the first of these quarterly meetings that the process was valuable in theory; I have certainly found it to be valuable in fact, in terms of establishing ability to work together as very close neighbors.

Secretary Shultz. First I'd like to thank Secretary Clark for this warm reception and for the high quality of the meetings. I think the meetings that we have, and that our Prime Minister and President have, and that other ministers have, are part of a continuing discussion. And perhaps these meetings for us are kind of a high point, but they don't represent the whole story by a long shot. They represent the tip of the iceberg of this relationship. It is kind of an interesting and perhaps symbolic fact that President Reagan's first visit to another country as President was to Canada; and Prime Minister Mulroney's first visit to another country as Prime Minister was to the United States; and my first visit to another country as Secretary of State was to Canada; and your first visitor from another country was from the United States; so there is a message in those facts.

When I arrived at the airport, you said that your motto was that it would be possible to disagree without being disagreeable, and I would have to say that you have delivered on that undertaking. On the other hand, he gave me a hard time, frankly, on a lot of subjects, particularly acid rain, and I would like to point out to you that acid rain is a problem in the United States, too. At the same time, as I said in our meeting, we feel that it's important to really understand this phenomenon better before you commit gigantic sums of money to it, but this is only replaying some of our discussions. And I do acknowledge that you were able to disagree without being disagreeable, and I appreciate it.

Q. [In French, partially translated.] The Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, said that on June 18 in Rhode Island, the Governor had said that acid rain was the most contentious question between the two countries. Do you think that there will be action taken, as Mr. Mulroney has said after his visit to President Reagan?

Secretary Clark. Today we had an extensive conversation about acid rain, and Canada's position was well indicated, well articulated, and I underlined that for our part, acid rain is a bipartisan question. It is not a question of one government or one party; it involves all of Canada and all our political parties. It was accepted by the Secretary of State. We are agreed as to the importance of the problem, but we have discussed various means of dealing with the problem. There will be a meeting involving our respective ministers of environment. And let me say it is important for us to maintain the priority of this question that will be under discussion between the Secretary of State and myself and between the President and the Prime Minister when they next meet.

Q. [Inaudible].

Secretary Clark. American policies will always influence our policies, and Canadian policies can have an influence on American policies. That is a North American reality. It hasn't changed and will not change. Insofar as specific questions that we discussed, there have been two types of questions, the first being our priority as a government to attract foreign investment to Canada to help bring about further Canadian development. The Americans, for various reasons, have often been in disagreement with our past policies, the past policies of the former government. We disagree also with certain aspects of the national energy policy, or certain measures of implementation of FIRA [Foreign Investment Review Agency]. So this question of investments was certainly discussed. There was another question discussed, that of international trade and our access to traditional and new markets and the necessity for us to improve and to keep the access that already exists.

Q. A domestic question but it's the first time we've had a chance to meet with you. Since last week you rescinded the appointments of three Canadian Ambassadors appointed by the Trudeau government, could you tell us why? Was it because they were

beral appointments, or were they t qualified?

Secretary Clark. I think, since I've only got half an hour here, rather than detain the Secretary of State with domestic problems, I'll restrict my comments to matters that were discussed in the bilateral meeting.

Secretary Shultz. I'd be fascinated to know how you deal with ambassadorial appointments. [Laughter.]

Q. The Canadian Peace Caravan, which is bent on keeping the Canadian government aware of the disarmament issue, is in Toronto today stirring up a lot of a—not stirring up, but fostering public opinion with regards to disarmament. I wonder if Mr. Shultz has any words of encouragement for the Canadian Peace Caravan.

Secretary Shultz. The policy of the Reagan Administration is to seek reductions in armaments on an equitable and verifiable basis, and there are proposals on the table involving the complete elimination of armaments considerations, from chemical warfare to confidence-building measures, from conventional weapons to the overriding questions of nuclear armaments. Our emphasis in all these matters is reduction—not control, not freeze, but reduction. And we continue to work for those objectives. And we wish for more positive responses from the Soviet Union in order that progress could be made.

Q. Over the last 2 days we've seen a lot of comments about the special relationship, the strength of the relationship, number one trading partner, America's great stake in maintaining a close relationship with Canada. I think, with your long relationship with this country, both in public life and private life, you understand that there are some Canadians who have reservations about just how we get to the United States or other country—that we lose our identity in the process. What is the *quid pro quo* from the United States in terms of this new initiative from the new Canadian Government? Is there a guarantee for access to those markets, and that the Administration resist domestic political pressure from the United States in a protectionist sense, that the Administration will resist those pressures as a result of, in keeping with, this new special relationship?

Secretary Shultz. Well, the United States has to follow policies that it feels are in the interests of the United States, as Canada follows policies that you consider to be in the interests of

Canada. We think it's in the interests of the United States to have a good working relationship with Canada, and we think it's in the interests of the United States to have open trading, not only with Canada, but on a world basis, because that gives our consumers a broad access to what's available on the world market. It helps to control inflation and gives us many other advantages. So I think that if the focus of your questions is whether or not you can expect the Reagan Administration to continue its pursuit of an open trading regime in the world, the answer is to be found in what the interests of the United States are; and they are in maintaining open markets and in having a good flow of trade between Canada and United States.

Q. I understand that you have agreed that Mr. Ruckelshaus [Environmental Protection Agency Administrator] and our Minister of the Environment should meet on a regular basis. Could you tell us how often they'll be meeting, when the first one might be, and where it would be held?

Secretary Clark. We haven't reached that level of detail. And I want to emphasize that, while that is going to be an important meeting, discussing acid rain and other questions, and there will undoubtedly be some regularities to those meetings, on the question of acid rain in particular, we consider it sufficiently important, as well as being dealt with by the ministers directly concerned, certainly from Canada's perspective I intend to keep raising it at these quarterly meetings, and I would imagine that the Prime Minister would intend to keep raising that question at the level of his meetings with the President. We were very encouraged by the expressed willingness of the President at the White House meeting to work together with Canada to resolve environmental questions generally.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we were told that Mr. Clark gave you assurance that Canada would no longer play a role as a mediator in the East-West issues. I wonder what concerns you have about that role, and what Mr. Clark said Canada would offer in place of the role of mediator?

Secretary Shultz. As far as the role of Canada is concerned, I look on it myself much like our role or the role of other friends and allies. Countries have their ideas; we see that in this broad struggle for our values we have a very strong common stake and that we need to pursue a kind of combined policy of

being strong and being able to defend the interests and values that we share and being ready to negotiate about them—not about the values, but about the problems we have with the Soviet Union.

Now, as people from each country get around and make visits or receive people in their own country or meet them in other places, that's a valuable form of interaction; and I know in my own case, when I have meetings, I share the content and the impressions I get with my counterparts, including Mr. Clark. I sent him a long cable following the meetings that the President and I had with Mr. Gromyko, and I'm sure he will do the same. I think this kind of collaboration enables all of us to have a better understanding of what is going on and be more effective in the joint endeavor that we have.

Q. Mr. Clark, you said that we're seeing a new chapter in U.S.-Canada relations. Is this a change in style and in tone in the dealings between the two governments, or is there a change in substance as well?

Secretary Clark. My view is that the election of the 4th of September in Canada changed more than a government here; that it allowed to be expressed a greater sense of Canadian self-confidence that meant that we were freer to be able to play a full role with the United States in the pursuit not simply of common values and the defense of common values, but also in the development of this neighborhood. And I think that that development, that change, that maturing has been occurring for some time. I think it has been rather hard to notice it, because there has been so much discussion about internal matters, whether they were the constitutional debate of the national energy program or other matters. Some of you who have suffered through my speeches before will know that I have spoken on this process of maturing that I see occurring in this country on previous occasions. I interpret the election of the 4th of September as indicating that the country has moved into a new chapter in its life, and part of that movement has been to allow us to develop a new chapter in relations between Canada and the United States. Obviously, there will be some changes of substance as time evolves. Tomorrow, I guess, will be my first month anniversary of being sworn into office, so I'm not able to speak with much precision about what those changes will be, but I was very encouraged by the attitude and the sen-

sibility, the sensitivity of the Secretary of State to the Canadian situation as we began to discuss those problems.

Q. Can you tell me if you have set any kind of a timetable for coming to a management agreement on Georges Bank, beyond the fact that you want to set the process in motion?

Secretary Clark. We have set no firm timetable in terms of days that we can give you. The United States requested, and we agreed, prior to the court decision to an extension of the grace period to 14 days that would allow the boats now in place to stay in place.

We've both got to study the decision more minutely than we've had an opportunity to do, but we are agreed that we want to move just as quickly as possible, after we understand the full implications of that decision, to begin to put in place a management system that will accept and build on the court decision and serve the best interests of the fisherman and the countries involved. Naturally, there will be consultation, at least on our part and I'm sure on the American part, with affected fishing groups, both industry and fishermen, and in our case, provincial governments.

Q. The Office of Science and Technology Policy has advised the President that it's time to move on acid rain without waiting for further research. There's been similar advice from the National Academy of Sciences. Why has this advice not been followed, and how much more research is it going to take? It is going to be 2 years, 5 years, or 10 years? And why has this advice not been followed at the moment?

Secretary Shultz. There is a considerable difference of opinion and I think a genuine broadness of view that additional research will be necessary.

ICJ Rules on Gulf of Maine Case

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, OCT. 12, 1984¹

On October 12, 1984, a chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, the Netherlands, announced its decision in the Gulf of Maine area boundary dispute between the United States and Canada. The case was brought before the court pursuant to a boundary settlement treaty between the United States and Canada. Under the statute of court, and in accordance with the treaty, the parties are bound to accept the boundary line established by the court. The court has considered extensive written and oral submissions presented by both Canada and the United States during the past 2 years.

The court, at the request of the parties, established a special chamber of five judges to hear the case. The members of the chamber included: Judge Roberto Ago of Italy, President of the chamber; Judge Andre Gros of France; Judge Herman Mosler of the Federal Republic of Germany; Judge Stephen Schwebel of the United States; and Judge *ad hoc* Maxwell Cohen of Canada.

At stake in the case was maritime jurisdiction over an area between 13,000 to 18,000 square nautical miles in size. At the center of the dispute was jurisdiction over the northeastern half of Georges Bank, one of the world's richest fishing grounds. The area may also contain oil and natural gas. During the dispute, the United States maintained that it was entitled to a boundary line that would retain all of Georges Bank under U.S. jurisdiction, whereas Canada sought a boundary that would divide the bank in half, leaving all of the north-


eastern portion under Canadian jurisdiction.

The court found that neither side's boundary position was justified. It established a line that crosses Georges Bank essentially midway between the claims of the two states. The line the court established is shown on the map.

The two governments have agreed to a 14-day grace period to allow the fishermen of both countries to return to their respective sides of the new boundary.

The implications of the decisions for management of the Atlantic fisheries are highly complex and will require detailed study in consultation with New England fishing industry and congressional interests. We anticipate that implementation of the new boundary will take place in the atmosphere of cooperation that generally characterizes U.S.-Canadian relations.

¹Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman John Hughes. ■



here are huge sums of money involved, and to commit such sums before you see clearly where you're going can wind up spending an awful lot of money for the wrong thing, and we don't want to do that. And we think it should be—it is desirable to take a little bit more time and be a little more sure of what you're doing, especially in light of the large sum involved. The meetings that were described between Mr. Ruckelshaus and his counterpart will not only be between them, but the scientists on each side will be brought in so that there will be opportunities for scientific exchange, and we'll certainly be ready to learn as much as we can from those exchanges.

Q. Could you clarify any more what was talked about yesterday: this report from Israel that they have received an offer and accepted with attitude an offer for a moratorium on paying \$500 million in debt. The indication yesterday was that there was such offer, but it does seem rather strange. Israel is accepting an offer the United States has not made.

Secretary Shultz. I can't really clarify it very much. It does seem strange.

Q. You have a vocally small group of New England fishermen who are very unhappy about the Georges Bank agreement. It seems to feel that the State Department shares their point of view. What is the U.S. position on this question?

Secretary Shultz. First, on this question, I think it's important to register that here are two countries, Canada and the United States, with an important issue involving a boundary. And you set a boundary and it's set. And our relationship is strong enough that our confidence that we can work out subsequent problems is high enough, so that we were willing, these two countries, to put this matter before an international court and agree in advance that we would abide by whatever the decision is that they set down. So we are going to do that. And I'm sure the Canadians will see some problems for them in this decision. So each side sees problems, each side has people who are complaining and no doubt feeling quite justified in doing so. The implications of the decision are complicated, and we need to study them. We need to consult with those whose interests are most directly affected, and as soon as we have done that to try—and Mr. Clark and I agreed that this should be done—to try to get to the top of this issue and resolve some of

these managerial problems, you might say they are, in a satisfactory way. Of course, a lot of the issue arises because, while we respect the international boundary, the fish don't and so we have to cope with that fact and that presents a managerial problem, but I'm sure that in one way or another we'll be able to resolve it.

Q. Since your time was occupying economic questions and questions regarding economic matters, in particular sectoral free trade between your two great countries. I am a newcomer to the Canadian scene; I was based in your country for a while. I have read a lot. What is the situation now? Are the two governments pushed, so to speak, by certain branches of industry, for instance, on the U.S. side where many industries regard Canada—let's not kid ourselves—as the 51st state of the union, so to speak, in economic terms, or in Canada, bombardier or whoever might be the player: or is it rather the push by the two governments to get forward with sectoral free trade?

Secretary Shultz. In responding to your question, I don't want any implication to be left that I accept any of your wording. The United States has benefited a great deal from an open trading world and from our really quite open trading border with Canada, and so we like to see that extended where it is seen to be mutually beneficial. There have been some discussions about additional free trade zones that might be modeled, say, after the auto agreement or something on that line. Whether there is something more ambitious that's possible, I just don't know. But the trade legislation that was passed just, I guess, a week ago in our Congress gives us some running room to explore this with some confidence. And we discussed it in our meeting, and I think a fair summary of where we left it is that the new government in Canada will be studying this carefully itself. It has the same predispositions that we do, and as soon as it's ready, we'll start to have a more definitive kind of discussion about what's the right agenda and where to go.

Secretary Clark. Why don't I just add very briefly, the reality of Canada is that our future depends upon an open trading system, and that is a reality that is guiding our government. There have been, as Secretary Shultz indicated, discussions between his country and the former Government of Canada regarding specific approaches. My colleagues

and I are looking at those and looking at other avenues, and we expect that before too long we will be in a position to become involved in discussions with the United States regarding the application of that open trading system to our two countries directly. I should make the point that, so far as I am concerned, the interest in that kind of system is impelled neither exclusively by governments nor by businesses, but is understood as being necessary to the future of this country and, in our judgment, to the future of successful world economic development by all parties concerned.

Q. We're told that you and Mr. Clark discussed the situation in Central America. Could you share with us your assessment of yesterday's meetings in El Salvador with President Duarte?

Secretary Shultz. I think the results of the meeting justify fully President Duarte's bold initiatives. He took a risk for peace, and I think he has gotten at least a small downpayment on that element of risktaking. He had his meeting. You have seen the announcement of the results. There will be a commission that will look into how to bring the guerrilla war to a halt and to bring peace to El Salvador within the framework of the democratic institutions established under their constitution. There has been a statement issued in my name from the State Department, and it's available here. That's a little fuller statement of all this, and it's available to you.

¹Press release 232 of Oct. 17, 1984.

²Press release 240 of Oct. 24, 1984.

Opening remarks omitted here.

³Press release 238 of Oct. 19, 1984. ■

International Energy Security: The Continuing Challenge

by E. Allan Wendt

Statement before the Oxford Energy Seminar in Oxford, United Kingdom, on September 12, 1984. Mr. Wendt is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Energy and Resources Policy.

Ten years ago, the Western world was thrown into a dramatic economic crisis by the loss to the world market of less than 4 million barrels of oil per day. In the decade since then, world oil production has declined by about 2 million barrels per day (b/d). OPEC production has declined 13 million b/d. As much as 12 million barrels of oil production capacity is idle. We face frequent attacks on oil transportation in the Persian Gulf and threats to tankers and pipelines elsewhere. Who would have believed 10 years ago that such events would leave the oil market undisturbed? What has happened to enable the oil market to respond not with price increases but with stability, and even a small price decline? And what lessons does our present situation hold for the future?

I believe the answers lie in two areas: the long-term trend toward energy conservation and toward diversification of Western energy sources and increased preparedness for energy emergencies. I would like to talk first about these developments and then about how they can be continued in the future.

Past Successes

The oil embargo of 1973 revolutionized the way the West thought about its energy supply. Before 1973, cheap, plentiful energy—much of it from Middle Eastern oil—was taken for granted. After 1973, increased prices and security concerns led us to reduce dependence on imported oil through conservation and use of alternative fuels and to increase our preparations for an energy emergency.

The reliance of IEA [International Energy Agency] countries on imported energy has fallen sharply. In 1973, energy imports of IEA members as a group totaled 23.5 million b/d of oil equivalent from non-IEA sources. In 1983, IEA energy imports had fallen 35% to the equivalent of about 15 million b/d of oil.

The first reason for our reduced dependence on imported oil is increased energy production by IEA members. Between 1973 and 1982 IEA countries increased their output of oil by 20%, coal by 29%, nuclear energy by 270%, and hydroelectric power and other energy sources by 21%. Only natural gas output decreased (by 7%). Oil now provides about 43.5% of total energy requirements of IEA member countries, compared to 51.4% in 1973. We have thus substantially diversified our energy supplies.

The second reason for our reduced dependence on imported oil is energy conservation. While producing more energy, we are also producing more goods and services with less energy input. In 1973, the IEA countries required about nine-tenths of a ton of oil equivalent to produce \$1,000 of gross domestic product (GDP). In 1983, we required only three-quarters of a ton of oil equivalent to produce the same GDP, a reduction of about 17%. Total energy demand was about the same in 1983 as it was in 1973. The IEA countries have not only diversified their energy supplies but have realized fundamental, structural changes in our economic systems to make them less energy intensive.

We have also made great progress in emergency preparedness since that first oil shortage in 1973. The existence of the IEA and its International Energy Program (IEP) is the clearest evidence of our desire and ability to prepare for emergencies. Emergency stocks and a standby oil-sharing program provide a safety net for the world oil market. The recent IEA decision on oil stocks, which I shall discuss later in some detail, is clear evidence that we are serious about being prepared and that the IEA remains a vital, forward-looking organization—one that is essential to our energy security.

Our commitment to the IEA and the IEP remains firm. The United States and other IEA members regularly test their procedures for an emergency through the IEA's allocation systems tests. Four such tests have been held, and a fifth is scheduled to be held in October and November of 1985. Each test has provided valuable training to government and industry participants in the procedures that would be followed if the sharing system were to be activated in a major supply disruption.

In addition to the existence of a scheme for sharing oil during crises, the IEA considers the use of oil stocks to an essential element of preparedness under the International Energy Program. At present, IEA members hold available stocks equivalent to about 47 days of consumption or 1,400 million barrels. More than half of these available stocks are private—they are neither government owned nor controlled.

IEA members have been building stocks that are government owned or controlled. These are strategic stocks, reserves that can be made available in an emergency. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which was insignificant in the 1970s, now holds more than 430 million barrels of oil and is growing daily. We expect to reach our goal of 750 million barrels by 1990. Other major oil users, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, also hold sizable strategic stocks. Oil stocks controlled by IEA governments other than the United States now amount to over 300 million barrels. We estimate that, were a crisis to occur today, IEA member governments could supply from stocks they control as much as 3.0–3.7 million b/d for the first 2 months, declining to perhaps 2.5–3.0 million b/d for up to 6 months. While not adequate for every conceivable eventuality, we are clearly in a position to cushion the economic impact of a major crisis and to provide time for the necessary adjustments.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Conservation, diversification, and greater preparedness for an energy emergency have been the themes of the past decade. We have come to a crossroads now where we need to examine our accomplishments and adapt them to the future.

The reduction in IEA reliance on imported oil is the central fact of today's oil market. There is growing evidence, however, that this trend is coming to an end. Oil imports by OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries increased 13% in the first quarter of 1984 compared to the same period in 1983. This is the first year-to-year increase in the first quarter since 1979. Preliminary evidence indicates that the upward trend in oil im-

ports has continued in recent months. In the United States, average daily imports of oil through mid-August are up 11% over 1983. Nothing is certain in the oil market, however, and we may see some fluctuations in oil imports over the next few years. But at current oil prices it seems reasonable to say that the decline in IEA oil imports is at an end. If nothing happens to upset the market, it looks as if the long-term trend now is toward greater reliance on imports.

It may be a long time before increased IEA oil imports have a significant impact on oil prices. If there is no loss of production capacity, we can look forward to at least another 5 and perhaps as many as 10 years before strong upward pressure on oil prices resumes. It is even possible that in the interim we will see temporary price decreases. But it is likely that by the 1990s we will be faced with the need to expand oil production and that real upward pressure on prices will return. By then, IEA oil production, especially from the United States and from the North Sea, is expected to be declining, and indigenous alternatives will be more expensive (if they are available at all). Our problem today is to lay the basis for confronting the new era of scarce oil that seems likely to enter in the 1990s.

Let me put the matter another way: we may rightly feel a sense of security that comes from our past efforts. But if that sense of security lulls us into inaction it can lead to insecurity within the next decade. I submit that the basic approaches of the past 10 years—conservation, diversification, and preparedness—were needed also in the next 10 years. The IEA, which has helped to free the 1980s of oil crises, must continue its good work.

Conservation and Diversification

Energy conservation, IEA members could expect much slower gains in the decade ahead than in the one just ended. The simplest and cheapest improvements in energy efficiency have already been made. The rate of gain in energy efficiency is expected to fall by almost 50%. With moderate economic growth, total IEA energy demand by the end of the century will be about 30% higher than it is today.

In addition to conservation, we will need to continue to diversify away from oil. Oil demand will continue to grow in absolute terms, but IEA forecasts call for oil's share to fall to about one-third

of total IEA energy demand by the end of the century. Coal and nuclear energy will be the primary substitutes.

But this will not happen automatically. We face major environmental obstacles to expanded use of both coal and nuclear energy. These will have to be faced in a pragmatic way, with due attention paid to economic feasibility. No one can predict how the competition between nuclear energy and coal will turn out. The essential point is that both options must be kept viable. We must not revert, because of soft prices and environmental concerns, to oil-fired boilers in industry or in electrical generation.

I am convinced that the environmental obstacles can be overcome. Great gains have already been made in clean burning of coal, and new technologies can make coal even cleaner. But we must move cautiously. It would be a great mistake to impose an expensive pollution control technology only to discover later that it did little to control the emissions that are causing environmental problems. For nuclear energy the problems are more fully understood, but we still lack proven solutions for disposal of high-level radioactive waste, for responding to the small risks of major accidents, and for satisfying public concerns. I expect no single, magical solution to these problems. What counts is steady progress and the will to keep the nuclear option alive.

Natural Gas

In addition to coal and nuclear energy, natural gas will play an important role in the future as an alternative to imported oil. Gas is a clean and efficient fuel that is attractive for many uses. It has helped reduce the use of oil—notably in home heating and, to a lesser extent, in industrial applications. Gas is especially attractive in residential and commercial uses, an area in which its share is likely to increase.

Gas, however, raises its own security concerns, particularly as its importance in the sensitive residential and commercial sector grows. Industrial users can, and do, switch between fuels much more easily than homeowners and other small users can. In the immediate aftermath of the 1973-74 crisis, IEA members tended to equate improved energy security exclusively with reduced imports of oil. In the early 1980s, there came a new realization that non-oil sources of imports could no longer be

necessarily considered as "better" or more secure than oil and that excessive dependence on any single external source of gas could create serious problems.

IEA and OECD ministers have agreed on the importance of working actively and cooperatively to enhance Western natural gas security in the policy conclusions reached at the May 1983 ministerial meetings. Energy security requires that we limit undue dependence on any single external supplier of energy. We need in gas, as in oil, to develop indigenous energy resources to the maximum economically feasible extent.

The time is approaching for major decisions on natural gas supply for the 1990s and beyond. In order to build the necessary infrastructure, we must make decisions within the next couple of years that will determine the availability during the next century of natural gas from secure sources. We must not let our long-term need for secure sources of energy be obscured by temporary surpluses at the moment of decision. We are living with the consequences of overreaction to market conditions by gas buyers and sellers a few years ago. At that time, the gas business was driven by the need to ensure adequate supplies, and a number of large, expensive contracts were signed that seem uneconomic now. This turn of events has naturally encouraged caution on the part of those who must invest in the resources on which our future security depends. But if we now overreact by refusing to take the steps necessary to ensure supplies, we will not have the gas when we need it.

Increased Preparedness

No matter how successful we may be in conserving energy and diversifying away from oil, we will need to continue to prepare for a possible disruption of oil imports, which remain essential to our economic well-being. Despite the progress we have made, our reliance on imported energy—especially oil—remains high. More than half the oil used in IEA countries—or almost a quarter of our total energy supply—still comes from outside the IEA, primarily from the member countries of OPEC. We value our good trading relations with our oil suppliers, but at the same time we must recognize that, for many reasons, normal trade flows can be and have been

disrupted. Such disruptions, whatever the cause, can be enormously costly to our economies.

We believe that the enhancement of energy supplies in an emergency could discourage panic-induced reactions and mitigate these economic consequences. In the United States we have, therefore, set forth a general policy of drawing down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in large volumes early in a crisis. We believe that, if we do, it will have the effect of supplementing and enhancing the collective capacity of the member states of the International Energy Agency to respond effectively to serious oil supply disruptions and will benefit all oil consuming countries.

Last July 11, the IEA Governing Board reached a decision on the use of stocks in supply disruptions. This decision, in our view, is a key element in preparedness for possible future oil shocks. The member states have agreed that the early drawdown of emergency stocks in the case of an oil supply disruption and other mutually supportive actions to restore the supply and demand balance are vital elements in minimizing economic damage. In time of crisis, the decision envisages that a consultative group of those nations in a position to contribute meaningfully will meet to work toward "timely, coordinated stock draw." This group, which is open to all OECD members, provides an opportunity for key energy consumers to meet quickly and informally. Although the IEA Governing Board fully retains all of its institutional responsibilities, the smaller group would be free to decide on and implement a coordinated stock draw by its participants, starting before activation of the IEA's emergency allocation system.

President Reagan has long stressed the need for international cooperation on energy security and was very pleased with the results of the July 11 meeting. Secretary of Energy Hodel characterized the decision as "exceptionally significant." The Chairman of the IEA Governing Board, Mr. Alan Woods of Australia, described it as "one of the most significant achievements in the IEA's ten-year history." IEA Executive Director Mrs. Helga Steeg emphasized the flexibility of the new arrangement and the potential of timely, coordinated action for calming psychologically induced fears and the prevention of panic buying in an emergency.

Economic predictions are notoriously unreliable. They are said by some to have only one purpose: making astrology respectable. Predictions of the economic impact of a hypothetical future oil crisis have to be regarded as doubly uncertain—both the disruption of oil supply and its economic impact are likely to follow unpredictable courses. But we can, from economic modeling, get some idea of the order of magnitude of possible economic damage and of the benefits of drawing on oil stocks during a crisis.

To illustrate why we think this July IEA decision is so important, let me assume that a major net loss of oil to the world market occurred in the first quarter of this year. The early drawdown of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve at a rate of 2.1 million b/d could have limited the resulting rise in prices. This might have mitigated something like one-third of the resulting economic damage. What further difference would a coordinated stockdraw have made? Assuming that stocks controlled by Western Europe and Japan could be drawn down at 2 million b/d, it has been estimated that the economic impacts would have been less than half of what was estimated without any drawdown of strategic stocks. The impact of such a disruption would be dramatically less severe than that of the disruption of 1973-74, even though the initial net loss of oil to the world market might be substantially larger. And, I might add, the proceeds from the sale of oil stocks would have largely—perhaps completely—defrayed the costs of buying and holding them. Oil stocks, in our view, are insurance, and the premiums we pay today are reasonable.

We might still face the need, even with this coordinated stock drawdown, to activate the IEA's existing emergency allocation system. Let there be no doubt about it: The United States is prepared to fulfill its obligations under this system. The coordinated stock drawdown would make the need for activation of the IEA allocation system less likely, but it would also—and here is the key point—make the allocation system more likely to succeed once activated. No one imagines that activation of the IEA allocation system in a shortfall of 5 million b/d would be without problems. If that shortfall were, in effect, reduced to 1 million b/d by a coordinated stockdraw, our odds of success would be much better.

Future IEA Work on Preparedness

The July 11 decision of the IEA Governing Board signals not the successful conclusion of our efforts in this area but only the beginning. It constitutes a very important policy commitment, but much remains to be done. The followup phase to the decision is of fundamental importance. Numerous questions must be answered if the new agreement is to have clear, practical consequences. This was recognized explicitly in annex 2 to the July decision, which outlines work that we plan to pursue within the IEA to give practical embodiment to the general idea of an early coordinated reaction to an oil supply disruption.

There are two fundamental requirements at present: building stocks adequate levels and ensuring that they can be drawn down quickly and effectively. Stocks may look sufficient on paper, but the situation can be very different in practice. In the United States we have found that about half of our commercially held stocks cannot, in fact, be used because they constitute what is termed "minimum operating requirements," i.e., they are needed for the proper operation of our oil supply system or are otherwise unavailable (oil in heavy tank bottoms, for example). In Western Europe and Japan, there is uncertainty about how much of the stocks would, in fact, be available for use in an emergency.

There are also doubts that arise from institutional and legal problems. In some countries, emergency stocks are held by oil companies. Would these stocks be made available early in an emergency, or would commercial interests, which may favor holding stock prevail? Do national laws permit governments to order companies to use emergency stocks early in a disruption perhaps before an official emergency has been declared? In the United States we believe that government-owned stocks are the best approach, though we respect the desire of other IEA members to rely on privately held stocks. We want to be sure, however, that stocks—whoever owns them—can in fact, be readily used early in a disruption.

I could go on about other aspects of emergency preparedness that require attention in the months and years ahead. Some of our friends and allies believe

NATO and the Challenges Ahead

by Michael H. Armacost

Address before the 30th meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Toronto on October 10, 1984. Ambassador Armacost is Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

May I begin by thanking the Atlantic Treaty Association and the Atlantic Council of Canada for the opportunity to be with you as we celebrate the achievements of the North Atlantic alliance. Viewed from Washington, the alliance is stronger than ever, and we now have the momentum to seize new opportunities—the altogether appropriate theme of this conference.

The NATO alliance remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. It not only embodies a fundamental security interest; it represents a community of moral and political values. It is no accident that one of America's most durable peacetime alliances is with our fellow democracies of the Atlantic world.

This afternoon I would like to speak to you on three issues of continuing concern to all of us: first, the security of Europe following the successful commencement of intermediate-range nuclear missile deployments; second, the outlook for East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations following Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz; and third, the importance to NATO security of maintenance of a favorable balance of forces in other geographic regions. I have been asked, in particular, to comment on the security situation in the Asia/Pacific region. This is especially appropriate in Canada—a country with the closest of ties to Europe and which also looks increasingly toward the Pacific Basin.

European Security After the INF Deployments

Let me begin with some thoughts about European security. In recent years allied governments and their publics have focused special concern on how best to control nuclear weapons and further diminish the risk of nuclear conflict. Our success in implementing NATO's 1979 two-track decision on INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] has bolstered the

deterrent posture on which the maintenance of peace depends, increased Soviet incentives to negotiate real restraints on these weapons, denied the Soviet Union a significant political and psychological victory, and strengthened NATO's cohesion. The alliance can be justifiably proud of this accomplishment.

Our conventional military capability, however, continues to lag behind that of the Warsaw Pact, and Moscow continues to build up its conventional forces. This leaves NATO reliant to an uncomfortable degree on the threat of nuclear escalation. Today, therefore, our top priority within the alliance should be to reduce this reliance by strengthening our combined conventional defense capabilities.

Some argue that Warsaw Pact advantages in conventional forces are so overwhelming that NATO has no hope of implementing an effective conventional defense: NATO would have to respond to a conventional attack by the early use of nuclear weapons, so the argument goes, thus making improvements in conventional defense capabilities an expensive exercise in futility. Others argue that even if NATO were to mount a successful conventional defense, any conflict would spell disaster for Europe.

Rather than accepting these pessimistic prognoses, we should focus on the main point: stronger, modernized conventional forces will reduce the risk of aggression, and preventing conflict has always been the fundamental purpose of the alliance. Effective deterrence in a period of nuclear parity requires those conventional capabilities necessary to implement the flexible response strategy. This objective, moreover, is within our reach. NATO has a technological lead over the Warsaw Pact, as well as superior industrial, economic, and manpower resources.

Thus, there are several reasons for undertaking a serious effort at this time to modernize NATO's conventional defense.

First, to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrence, we must respond to the sustained Warsaw Pact conventional military buildup, which far exceeds the pact's legitimate defense needs.

that they can cope effectively with a disruption by reducing demand for oil rather than by drawing on stocks. These "demand restraint" measures need to be looked at carefully and their contributions quantified. In a disruption, we prefer demand restraint that comes from price increases. We have doubts whether government regulation can do the job, whether government action would not cause additional economic losses, and whether governments will be willing to suffer the resulting political pain. We also need to look more closely at the potential contribution of switching fuels quickly in an oil disruption. How much oil can be backed out and how quickly? But I hope already to have made my point: we have more to do to prepare, and we would be wise to use the time we have to prepare well. While there are many problems to overcome, solutions are available if we are willing to make the necessary effort and commit the needed resources, as one would pay an insurance premium. There are grounds for neither complacency nor complacency. We have learned the real lessons over the past decade, and we now have an opportunity to take advantage of this experience. All countries, consumers and producers alike, have an interest in preventing the highly disruptive, unpredictable turbulence in the market we saw on occasion in the 1970s. It is especially important for the consuming countries to provide the secure energy supplies our economies require. In our view, this means investing in stocks in the short run and conserving and diversifying energy supplies in the longer term. Security is cheap when compared to the huge costs we have paid in the past. ■

Second, public debate in Europe and North America over the dangers of nuclear weapons provides a powerful argument for raising the nuclear threshold; that is, strengthening our defenses in ways that reduce dependence on nuclear weapons.

Third, technologies are emerging that offer us new possibilities of more effective conventional defense, as well as better battlefield tactics.

Fourth, there is deep concern among knowledgeable American supporters of NATO about the ability of the alliance to withstand a conventional attack and about the adequacy of allied contributions to the common defense. Senator Nunn's recent amendment regarding U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe—an amendment which the Reagan Administration vigorously and successfully opposed—is only the tip of that iceberg.

These considerations have prompted a great deal of reflection, inside and outside governments, on ways to improve

NATO's conventional defenses. It will take strong political leadership within each country—and concrete, effective, coherent programs—to develop and nurture the necessary public support. At NATO headquarters, we are confident that Lord Carrington, like his distinguished predecessor Dr. Luns, will provide the vigorous moral and intellectual leadership that is required.

Our expanded efforts cannot be the product of any one nation. Collective security requires collaborative endeavor. Improvements in NATO's conventional forces will require increased defense resources, which raises again the question of the equitable sharing of these burdens within the alliance. It is no secret that some members of the alliance, and not always the richest, invest far more heavily in defense than some others, not always the poorest. I recognize that the picture changes over time. The allied share of the overall defense effort increased relative to that of the United States during the 1970s because of a steady increase in allied

defense budgets during a period of decline in real terms in U.S. defense budgets.

In the last 4 years, however, the United States has increased its defense spending much more rapidly than most of its allies. And while some allies have maintained very substantial defense programs in the face of economic difficulties, others' efforts appear inadequate to the threat and less than what is affordable. Without a more substantial and balanced effort, the alliance will be able neither to maintain an adequate deterrent nor sustain the crucial political consensus on which our partnership is based.

We must clearly focus on specific objectives and requirements—not just money spent but the specific results which are needed. To show that results can be achieved promptly, we need to look for some short-term remedies for the most urgent deficiencies. One such requirement is for additional facilities to receive and sustain reinforcements that the United States and Canada might transport across the Atlantic. Another high priority is expanding the reserve forces that could be mobilized by our European allies in an emergency. In addition, the augmentation of ammunition stocks—a crucial component of readiness—merits high priority attention.

There are other critical deficiencies that can be addressed effectively only through sustained effort over an extended period. But we must not yield to the temptation to substitute still more studies for a program of concrete actions. Given the economic constraints under which all the allies labor, real improvement in alliance conventional defense will almost certainly require major efforts to make more efficient use of defense resources.

There will have to be better transatlantic cooperation and a more open exchange among national defense industries, while at the same time protection against diversion of militarily significant technology must be sustained. The United States recognizes that many allies are concerned about achieving access to our own defense market. We want to help, and we have moved against restrictive provisions in our legislation. By the same token, we believe other members of the alliance must ease their own restrictive laws and practices and increase their investment in defense technology. Overall, we can stimulate greater cooperation among defense industries on a more competitive basis if we show the political will to create a larger and more open market in

Under Secretary for Political Affairs



He was an instructor of government (1962-65) and assistant professor of government (1965-68) at Pomona College in Claremont, Calif. In 1968-69 he was visiting professor of international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo. He was then lecturer at Johns Hopkins University (1970-71) and at Georgetown University (1971-72).

Ambassador Armacost was a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department in 1969-72 and 1974-77. During 1972-74 he was special assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. In 1977-78 he was senior staff member for East Asia at the National Security Council and in 1978-80 served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. In 1980-82 he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines from 1982 until his present appointment. He was sworn in as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on May 18, 1984.

Ambassador Armacost includes among his awards the State Department's Superior Honor Award and the Department of Defense's Distinguished Civilian Service Award. He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister Counselor. ■

Michael H. Armacost was born April 15, 1937, in Cleveland, Ohio. He is a graduate of Carleton College (B.A., 1958) and Columbia University (M.A., 1961; Ph.D., 1965).

defense products and in high technology in particular.

I have already mentioned that one of the arguments for looking now at the improvement of NATO conventional defense is the emergence of new technologies, which provide additional advantages to the defense and enhanced opportunities for industrial collaboration. Both would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NATO's conventional defense efforts.

The rapid buildup of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces is NATO's greatest current challenge. We must move quickly to reinforce our conventional defense capabilities and thereby maintain our deterrent, which is a precondition for progress on East-West relations.

Prospects for Improved East-West Relations

The ultimate goal of our defense efforts is to enhance security and lay the foundation for a reduction of East-West tensions. Deterrence is necessary but not sufficient. Peace, as E.B. White once put it, is not merely "nothing bad happening" but "something good happening." While continuing to strengthen our defenses, we must also redouble our efforts to improve our relations with the East. And that is precisely what the Reagan Administration has been attempting to do.

U.S. relations with the Soviet Union have persistently reflected elements of conflict and cooperation. We are, after all, natural geopolitical rivals, and we are engaged in a long-term competition of political values—a struggle the Soviets themselves say is inevitable. Yet we are also necessary partners in the tasks of limiting the arms race, averting and managing crises, and preventing regional conflicts from becoming great power confrontations.

We Americans take some satisfaction from our relative position in the geopolitical competition. Our defenses are improving. Our economy is robust. Our alliances are in sound condition. A solid domestic consensus on foreign policy is reemerging in the United States. The West has the diplomatic initiative in dealing with regional conflicts in southern Africa, Central America, China, and the Middle East. We can also take satisfaction from the growing appeal of democratic values and the growing respect for human rights in many areas of the world. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union faces economic difficulties, increasing restlessness among its East

European allies, and a steady decline in the appeal of its ideology.

Even as we respond to the competitive challenge, we are prepared to expand areas of cooperation with Moscow. We have no illusions that Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings with the President and the Secretary of State herald an imminent breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations. But while Mr. Gromyko did not reveal changes in well-known Soviet positions, his visit was significant because it marked a Soviet willingness to renew a higher level of dialogue.

We welcome the prospect. We have much to discuss. It is important, and in the interests of both countries, and, indeed, of the world:

- To resume the nuclear arms control process and make significant progress in ongoing arms control negotiations;
- To discuss regional problems to reduce the risks of confrontation or miscalculation;
- To resolve bilateral issues in a businesslike and productive manner; and
- To make progress on human rights questions.

We have placed many arms control proposals on the table over the past several years. Regarding strategic arms, our goal is to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war through significant reduction in U.S. and Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly the most destabilizing systems. We are prepared for an agreement reducing INF missiles to lower, equal levels or eliminating them altogether. We have proposed a complete ban on chemical weapons. The West has made concrete proposals to limit conventional forces in Europe and to create a system of confidence-building measures to reduce the risks of a European war. We have urged improvements in verification techniques to ensure compliance with the unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. We remain prepared to negotiate on what the Soviets call the militarization of space and had, indeed, accepted without preconditions the Soviet proposal for talks in Vienna last month.

When he met with Foreign Minister Gromyko, President Reagan made a number of suggestions for further contact, including a regular pattern of U.S.-Soviet consultations. We hope Moscow will respond positively, and I believe the prospects are reasonably good that a serious and substantive U.S.-Soviet dialogue will resume after our elections. For our part, we are

prepared to address the outstanding problems between us and to seek to surmount them. We shall approach this task with realism, with patience, and with an awareness that negotiated agreements must embrace the interests of both parties.

The Asia/Pacific Region

Regional issues are among the subjects we have proposed to include in an expanded dialogue with the Soviet Union. While we will have no part of any attempt to promote a superpower condominium, we are also aware that regional hostilities can lead to wider conflict. The purpose of such exchanges would be to increase understanding of our respective interests and policies and to diminish risks of miscalculation.

The Soviet Union has become a global power with a global strategy. The security of Europe and of the NATO treaty area is now, more than ever, directly affected by events and challenges in other areas: for example, the Persian Gulf, which is the West's oil lifeline; Central America, which directly affects the security and overall role of the United States; and East Asia, the Soviet Union's eastern front.

Thus far, I have been speaking of NATO as a formal alliance with an identifiable structure and specific geographic limits. In considering challenges to our respective security interests outside the treaty area, we may, however, identify opportunities to cooperate as allies even though the alliance *per se* may not be the appropriate instrument for managing that cooperation.

In this regard, important opportunities in East Asia deserve great attention from NATO allies. Why? Because the dynamism of East Asia makes the area increasingly important to the security and prosperity of the West.

This proposition is readily understandable to Americans. Twice in the postwar period, American military forces have been directly engaged in Asian conflicts. Our security continues to require an equilibrium in Asia, and no such equilibrium is foreseeable without American participation.

Secondly, Asian economic dynamism has made the region an increasingly important source of Western prosperity. As former Prime Minister Trudeau said during his visit last year to Japan:

I can see the Asian Pacific region in the 21st century being the engine of global economic and cultural development that Europe was in the 19th century. The potential is in their resources, a vast population, the dramatic chemistry of Eastern culture and Western technique. . . .

Today, following their own economic "miracle," the nations of the Asia/Pacific region account for one-sixth of total world trade. Over one-third of total U.S. trade is now conducted with the region. European trade with Asia has also expanded rapidly.

For all these reasons, too, the West has an interest in preserving the independence of our partners in Asia. We have a stake in the region's continued economic development, in the strengthening of Asian political institutions, and in the protection of those sea routes over which vast trade flows now move between East Asia and the Persian Gulf and Europe and the United States.

Japan and China, in particular, figure as increasingly weighty elements in the global configuration of forces. Any joining of the military power of the Soviet Union with either the vast manpower of China or the industrial prowess of Japan would have the most profound consequences for the global balance. Happily, there is little prospect of such developments.

A spirit of cooperation and common identity with the West has developed rapidly over the past decade in Japan. Tokyo's foreign policy has developed from a nearly exclusive emphasis on the protection of its economic interests to a more diversified focus—which includes strategic considerations—appropriate to Japan's emerging global role. This evolution reflects a Japanese decision to define itself, in Prime Minister Nakasone's words, as "a full member of the West."

The Williamsburg summit declaration manifested recognition of the increasing closeness among Japan, Europe, and North America. Japan has supported the allies on sanctions toward Poland; it has devoted increased economic assistance to countries of strategic importance to the West; it has financed a large proportion of the UN costs for Indochinese refugees; and it has endorsed joint allied statements on arms control and security.

China also has a pivotal role. Surrounded by Soviet and Soviet-backed forces on three sides, China has long demonstrated its resolve to oppose external pressures. Beijing's diplomatic emphasis on Cambodia, Afghanistan, SS-20s, and Soviet border forces derives directly from this strategic concern and the prospect of long-term Sino-Soviet competition in Asia.

This reality of Sino-Soviet rivalry has important consequences.

20th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, OCT. 17, 1984¹

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am submitting herewith a bimonthly report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question.

Since my previous report to you, United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar met August 6 and 7 in Vienna with representatives of the two Cypriot communities to launch a new initiative in the search for a settlement to the Cyprus question. Those meetings resulted in the sides agreeing to enter into proximity talks in New York under the Secretary General's auspices. President Kyprianou and Mr. Denktash were in New York from September 10 through 20 for those meetings.

Upon the completion of that first round of proximity talks the parties agreed to return to New York for a second round beginning in mid-October. We understand the talks produced a clearer understanding of the respective positions of the parties and that in the second round the Secretary General will attempt to secure agreement to an outline of general points for eventual direct discussion between the parties.

High-ranking Administration officials have kept in close contact with both Cypriot sides, with United Nations officials, and with other interested parties throughout this period. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick met with United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on September 19, and Secretary Shultz saw President Kyprianou, as well as the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, on September 27. In addition, Special Cyprus

Coordinator Richard Haass met September 25 with Mr. Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, following the end of the first round of proximity talks in New York.

At these bilateral meetings we urged the Cypriot parties to use this important series of proximity talks to establish the basis for a fair and final settlement, and we reiterated our support for the Secretary General in his good offices role. I made this clear to the Secretary General when I met him on September 23 as well as in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24 when I stated: "the United States supports the Secretary General's efforts to assist the Cypriot parties in achieving a peaceful and reunited Cyprus."

We have been pleased to see that both Cypriot parties have taken a serious approach to the Secretary General's initiative and have foregone actions that might damage the process. We will continue to strive for an environment conducive to serious discussions between the Cypriot parties and the Secretary General, away from the glare of publicity. We remain convinced that quiet diplomacy and a mutual spirit of compromise represent the best means of eventually achieving a reunited Cyprus in which all Cypriots can live in peace and security.

RONALD REAGAN

¹Identical letters addressed to Thomas H. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 22, 1984). ■

- It has complicated Soviet strategic calculations.

- The West no longer has to plan for the contingency of a conflict with both major communist powers simultaneously.

- It has established a climate in which we are able to maintain close relations with both China and Japan at the same time—a fact of no little consequence to the global balance of power.

China is conscious that it has some parallel security interests with the West. We have a corresponding interest in a strong, secure, outward-looking China that can protect its independence. We should continue to respond positively to Chinese interest in closer relations with the West. A dialogue with Beijing provides the opportunity to resolve bilateral problems and to develop closer economic and cultural ties from which both China and the West will benefit.

There are other encouraging trends:

- On the Korean Peninsula the Republic of Korea enjoys increasing advantages in the North-South competition and is a growing force in world trade.

- The ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] nations—Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines—display that combination of internal resilience, economic development, regional cohesion, and empathy toward the West which makes them increasingly valuable partners in a variety of cooperative endeavors. Their strategic location astride the searoutes between the Persian Gulf, Japan, and the U.S. west coast lends added importance to such cooperation.

- Traditionally close ties with ANZUS [Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States] allies continue, and these are of

special importance in assisting the development of newer island states of the South Pacific.

Alongside these favorable trends, we do see a steady Soviet military buildup in Asia and the Pacific. The Soviets have divisions facing China and Japan—forces which, if diverted westward, could transform the military balance in Europe. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan poses a potential threat to Pakistan and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf—and thereby to the economic well-being of the West. Soviet-supported Vietnamese forces in Cambodia bring direct pressure on the ASEAN states and the sealanes. The over 400 SS-20 warheads targeted on Asia can be used to pressure governments in the region, a tactic with which we in the alliance are only too familiar and a point of common security interest between the West and our friends and allies in Asia.

The objectives in Asia of the Soviet military buildup appear to include bringing pressure to bear on Beijing, Tokyo, and other Pacific capitals, countering U.S. air and naval deployments in the Pacific, achieving the ability to threaten sea and air lines of communication linking East Asia and the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America, and facilitating in general the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia and the Pacific.

The remarkable fact is that the Soviets have pursued these objectives neither at the expense of Soviet capabilities in Europe, nor of Soviet central reserves, nor, since 1979, of Soviet deployments in Afghanistan. The Soviet buildup in Asia has taken place as part of the steady enlargement of all Soviet forces. It is this process upon which depends the U.S.S.R.'s status as a global military power. And we have no choice but to view our strategic interests from a global perspective.

At times these interests may be submerged by economic considerations. Lately, there is nervousness in some quarters about the vigor of Japan and the emergence of the newly industrializing countries of Asia as formidable trading competitors. China, too, may play comparable competitive prowess as its modernization unfolds. But the nations have always understood that the expansion of global trade is the underpinning of our common prosperity. That premise underlay the U.S. response to the establishment and growth of the European Community. The West as a whole benefited from the spur of competition, and we have all undertaken

to manage our economic disputes with an eye to the common political and security interests we share.

Given the increasing significance of East Asia from the global strategic perspective, this same spirit should mark the approach of the Atlantic allies to developments in the Asia/Pacific region. The resilience of our friends in Asia clearly contributes to a favorable global balance of power. North America, Western Europe, and our friends in Asia have sufficient common interests to warrant a wider framework of cooperation in many spheres.

I am not proposing a new institutional structure for U.S./Europe/Pacific coordination. Nor am I suggesting an enlarged military role in the Pacific for our NATO partners. With their remarkable economic development, the Asian states can assume more responsibility for their own defense.

Rather, we in North America and in Western Europe should strengthen our economic and political ties with the region to develop habits of cooperation and to nurture among Asian countries and the Pacific island nations a greater sense of common identity with the West. Such close ties can contribute to the maintenance of a balance of power from which we all stand to benefit.

For example, we are continuing to seek to strengthen Tokyo's identification with the West; dialogue with Beijing on global issues helps inform the Chinese about Western thinking—and us about their perspective. At the same time, the West should encourage Asia's awareness of the broader community of interests that link it with both North America and Western Europe. With a shared understanding of our broad interests, the people of the three regions will be in a better position to master the economic, political, and security problems that we will confront in the years ahead.

Let me reiterate: I am not proposing that we extend the geographic limits of the NATO area, nor suggesting that we seek to develop formal cooperative arrangements for dealing with security problems outside the NATO area through the alliance. But it is equally illusory to imagine that NATO's security can be ensured without cooperation among key allies in other particular cases.

I call on our European friends to recognize the importance and dynamism of Asia and the importance of stability and prosperity of that region to European security.

Looking Ahead

Let me conclude by observing that overall trends in world politics today appear favorable to Western interests if we conduct ourselves wisely. The new mood of self-confidence and the spreading economic recovery afford an opportunity for a deepening of cooperation among the democracies. A consensus within NATO for modernizing conventional forces would strengthen our common security and enhance the prospects for arms control and other talks with the Soviet Union. With wisdom, creativity, and political will, I am convinced that the Western democracies can find opportunities to deepen their relationships with Asia, as well as with other regions. Thereby we will better promote our economic well-being and strengthen our security over the long term. ■

U.S.-Soviet Relations

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
OCT. 17, 1984¹

We agree with President Chernenko that there is no sound alternative to constructive development in relations between our two countries. We are pleased to see the emphasis he puts on positive possibilities for U.S.-Soviet relations. We will be studying his remarks carefully, and, as was agreed during Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko's recent meeting with President Reagan, we will be pursuing our dialogue with the Soviet Union and exploring the possibilities for progress through diplomatic channels.

President Reagan has repeatedly demonstrated that we are ready for cooperation with the Soviet Union. In April 1981, he sent a handwritten letter to President Brezhnev describing his feelings about the issue of war and peace and to ask President Brezhnev to join him in removing the obstacles to peace. Since then, the United States has made practical proposals for forward movement in all areas of the relationship, including arms control.

Over the past year, for instance, the United States and its allies have put forward new proposals for limits on strategic weapons, on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, on chemical weapons, and on conventional forces. On June 4 in Dublin, President Reagan stated our willingness to discuss the Soviet proposal for a mutual non-use-of-force commitment, if this would lead to serious negotiation on the Western proposals for practical steps to enhance confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. This summer we accepted a Soviet proposal to begin space arms control negotiations in Vienna without preconditions. At the United Nations last month President Reagan reiterated his desire to move forward in these fields and put forward a number of concrete new proposals for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. In his subsequent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, the President emphasized our strong desire to move to a more productive dialogue across the board and put forward specific suggestions as to how we might do so.

We cannot agree with President Chernenko's version of recent history. It is the Soviet Union which has broken off negotiations on nuclear arms and backed away from its own proposal to begin space arms control talks. The United States stands ready to negotiate on these and other issues, but we cannot concur in the apparent Soviet view that it is incumbent upon the United States to pay a price so that the Soviet Union will come back to the nuclear negotiating table.

President Chernenko has stated that improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship depend on deeds, not words. We agree. When the Soviet Union is prepared to move from public exchanges to private negotiations and concrete agreements, they will find us ready.

¹Read to news correspondents by the principal deputy press secretary to the President, Larry Speakes (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 22, 1984.) ■

U.S. Relations With Poland

by Kenneth W. Dam

Remarks at the opening of the foreign policy briefing for Polish-American leaders on October 11, 1984. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State.

I should like to welcome you to the State Department for an afternoon of briefings on our foreign policy. It is a pleasure for me to have an opportunity to meet with you again. I remember with great fondness the dinner and the parade in honor of the 40th anniversary of the Polish American Congress. On behalf of the President, I should like to thank you for your support for our Polish policy. I should also like to compliment you for your generosity in providing over \$50 million in humanitarian aid to the people of Poland since the end of 1981.

It is, of course, entirely appropriate that we meet on General Casimir Pulaski Day. As the President noted in his proclamation declaring October 11 as General Pulaski Day, Casimir Pulaski "... was a patriot for two countries. The United States and Poland share the noble legacy of a hero who gave his life so that the torch of freedom would remain lit."

I would now like to tell you where we stand in our relations with Poland. The step-by-step approach to relations with the Polish Government set out by President Reagan remains our policy. You will recall that the President pointed out that the restrictions adopted in protest against the imposition of martial law are reversible. On Human Rights Day, December 10, 1982, the President reiterated: "... if the Polish Government introduces meaningful, liberalizing measures, we will take equally significant and concrete actions of our own."

Pursuant to the President's policy, we have responded to certain improvements within Poland. For example, in January 1984, in reaction to the release of many political prisoners, the successful visit of Pope John Paul II, and an appeal by Lech Walesa for the relaxation of certain sanctions, we undertook two steps. We lifted the suspension of fishing rights in U.S.

waters for the Polish commercial fishing operations. The Polish fleet is now catching its quota of fish, just like the other nations that cooperate in fishing with us. Also in January we permitted the Polish authorities, on a reciprocal basis, to operate 88 charters through the Christmas season this year. Charter planes are now flying in both directions.

The amnesty declared last July was a positive move. After careful deliberation, the President decided to lift the suspension of landing rights for regularly scheduled flights by the Polish national airlines LOT. Of course, a bilateral civil aviation agreement is necessary before regularly scheduled flights can resume. This is normal international practice. We have proposed dates for negotiations through diplomatic channels, and we hope to begin formal discussions of a new agreement soon.

In addition, the President authorized the resumption of full-scale scientific exchanges. In the past, the scientific exchange program with Poland was the most active of its kind in Eastern Europe. Despite martial law and the baseless expulsion of our science attaché from Warsaw, scientific cooperation has continued, although at a relatively low level. Since the President's decision, we have undertaken a number of measures to restore the program. A distinguished scientist, Joseph Loferski, will go to Warsaw within the next few months as our new science attaché. Mr. Loferski speaks excellent Polish and has past experience in Poland as an exchange scientist himself.

We are moving with deliberate speed on a new science and technology agreement with the Government of Poland. We hope to have a draft agreement to submit to the Polish Government for its consideration shortly.

In addition to LOT flights and scientific exchanges, the White House announcement of August 3 stated that:

... the President has indicated that complete and reasonable implementation of the amnesty decision will create a positive atmosphere that would allow the reactivation of Poland's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund.

We have not yet made a determination on the implementation of the necessary decisions, but the question is for active consideration.

The President hopes that his August decision will encourage the Polish authorities to take further steps toward genuine national reconciliation. Both the bishopate of the Roman Catholic Church and prominent Solidarity leaders, such as Lech Walesa, have expressed the hope that the amnesty will be the prelude to more positive developments.

Although most segments of Polish society regard the amnesty favorably, a gap separating government and society remains. As official Polish newspapers have noted, youth in particular remain disaffected. In addition, the Solidarity members have reported encountered difficulty in reclaiming jobs or finding suitable new jobs. The Polish economy has improved somewhat in the past year, but production and the standard of living are still below 1979 levels. Shortages continue to plague both production and consumption in Poland.

President Reagan said in his Christmas speech of December 23, 1981, "... we in America would gladly do our share to help the shattered Polish economy" if commitments to human rights were honored. The President's message still stands.

In the meantime, the U.S. Government has supplemented the generous humanitarian assistance that you have provided the Polish people. Since the imposition of martial law, the United States has distributed more than \$130 million in surplus food to the Polish people through voluntary agencies cooperating with the Catholic Church in Poland. An additional \$30 million in surplus food will be distributed in fiscal year 1985. This aid will continue as long as the need is great.

The President believes that the congressional initiative to fund an outpatient clinic attached to the American Children's Hospital in Krakow is an exceptionally worthwhile project. The clinic will be a fitting memorial to the Congressman Clement Zablocki, who meant so much to the American Polish peoples.

On August 17 at the White House, the President announced his support for the plan of the Episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church to funnel private and public contributions from the West

World Food Day, 1984

PROCLAMATION 5260, OCT. 16, 1984¹

The United States has a long tradition of sharing its rich agricultural abundance and technical expertise with those in need, and of leading the worldwide effort to eliminate hunger. All nations are not equally endowed with food potential, and the struggle against hunger continually presents us with challenges which sometimes appear overwhelming. However, we will not be diverted from our intention to achieve victory over world hunger.

The United States is dedicated to the proposition that real progress in eliminating hunger will be realized when more nations are able to produce or purchase enough food for their own people. It is heartening that the resurging economy of the United States is helping other nations toward new economic expansion, with lower rates of inflation and rising output in many countries.

This Nation—indeed, all nations—should move forward with domestic policies that encourage growth. At the same time we must vigorously resist policies which inhibit growth or discourage free and equitable international trade in food products.

Since the enactment of the Eisenhower Food for Peace Program in 1954, the American people have provided more than \$33 billion in food aid to 164 nations. Thousands of technical experts have been sent to Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East to assist in the development of agricultural projects. We have trained tens of thousands of agriculturalists from developing nations to help them in building a sound economic foundation in their countries.

These efforts by other industrial countries and the United States have yielded promising results. Food production per person has increased 21 percent in the develop-

ing countries since 1954. Consumption of calories per capita has increased 7.5 percent since 1963. Unfortunately, Africa's progress in food production or the consumption of calories per capita have not shown equally encouraging results.

This year, the United States supports efforts by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to recognize the role of women in agricultural development in the Third World. In some less developed countries, women and children constitute 80 percent or more of the agricultural work force—yet, rarely aided by modern agricultural technology, research or adequate training. We strongly support efforts to improve the efficiency of their agricultural techniques.

In recognition of the need to increase public awareness of world hunger, the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 332, has proclaimed October 16, 1984, as "World Food Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of that day.

NOW THEREFORE, I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby call upon the people of the United States to observe October 16, 1984, as World Food Day with appropriate activities to explore ways in which our Nation can further contribute to the elimination of hunger in the world.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixteenth day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and ninth.

RONALD REAGAN

¹Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 22, 1984. ■

through an autonomous foundation closely associated with the church to private family farms in Poland. The program is designed to give private farmers access to machinery, fertilizer, and other agricultural materials that are hard to obtain within Poland. The President said that he would seek \$10 million from the Congress to contribute to the pilot phase of the project. This has been done. We hope that other private and public institutions will make similarly generous donations. If the pilot phase is a success, we will consider continuing our support because we think that private agriculture is the key to abundance.

Before closing, I should like to address one problem that I know greatly interests you. That is the question of the status of Polish citizens in the United States who want to stay but do not have legal status. As you know, the President formed a task force several months ago to look into the problem. I cannot announce a final position today, but I can assure you that we understand your concerns, we have by no means forgotten them, and we will do our utmost to respond to them in a humanitarian, equitable fashion.

I should like to wish you a successful board meeting here in Washington. ■

Change and Continuity: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s

by Kenneth W. Dam

Address before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on October 15, 1984. Mr. Dam is Deputy Secretary of State.

The last 4 years have been marked by a change in the climate of international affairs. The Reagan Administration has restored our national self-confidence and America's leadership of the free world. New threats to peace and new challenges to freedom, however, are constantly arising. Military technology evolves, and economic forces act in unpredictable ways. Our policies for meeting these challenges must keep up with this dynamic process.

The foreign policy agenda for the next 4 years will not look like that of the past four. In the security sphere, nuclear arms control will continue to be a priority. Joining it, however, will be the urgent issue of conventional defense. In the economic sphere, the focus of our attention will shift from providing a few key debtor countries with sufficient liquidity to promoting self-sustaining growth throughout the Third World. And in the political sphere, we will see a redoubling of our efforts to achieve negotiated settlements of conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Central America.

In the next 4 years we will thus have to strike out in new directions in some areas, while consolidating our gains in others. I should like today simply to highlight for you a few of those areas of change and continuity in our foreign affairs.

Security Sphere

In the security sphere, attention in recent years has been focused on intermediate-range nuclear forces or INF. In the late 1970s the Soviets began deploying SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, threatening our allies in Europe and Asia. In response to West European concerns, the NATO countries in December 1979 decided to seek to negotiate limits on INF missiles and to deploy counterbalancing NATO forces if negotiations failed to remove the Soviet threat.

Following this "dual-track" decision, the United States, through 2 years of intense negotiations, sought reductions in INF missiles to an equal level—preferably zero—on each side. All Soviet proposals, however, would keep a Soviet monopoly of such forces. They used political pressure and military threats in an attempt to undermine the dual-track decision and to divide the United States from Europe; but the alliance held firm. After the Soviets walked out of the talks last November, NATO began counter-deployments.

Although the "year of the missile" is behind us, INF is not a closed issue. The Soviets now have more than 375 SS-20 missiles in place, with three warheads apiece, and deployments continue. For our part, we are still ready to negotiate reductions—with no preconditions. But in the absence of an agreement, NATO deployments will also continue.

In the coming years, nuclear arms reductions will continue to be our first priority. As you know, the Administration has proposed deep cuts—up to one-third—in strategic missile warheads. The President's recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko demonstrates our determination to find a way to begin negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. At the same time, we will be emphasizing—and you will be hearing more about—conventional defense, an issue that is closely linked to nuclear arms. Conventional defense in Europe serves the critical function of reducing the risk of nuclear war. The greater NATO's ability to repel aggression through the use of conventional forces, the higher the nuclear threshold will be.

Improving NATO's conventional defense has thus always been on our security agenda. For several reasons, however, the time is now right for an increased effort on conventional defense.

First, the Warsaw Pact continues to build up conventional forces on a scale that far exceeds its own defense needs.

Second, concern exists in the Congress and the public about the fairness of allied contributions to the common defense.

Third, with the INF debate largely behind us, our European allies are in a better position to address conventional defense issues.

Fourth, new technologies and tactics now offer creative solutions to conventional defense problems.

Let me cite a few figures to illustrate the threat we face from the Soviet conventional force buildup opposite Western Europe.

In manpower, the Warsaw Pact now has some 4 million men facing Western Europe, almost twice the number of NATO standing forces.

In main battle tanks, the Warsaw Pact has almost 27,000, twice the NATO figure.

In combat aircraft, the Warsaw Pact has about 300 more fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft than NATO, and leads NATO by 5 to 1 in interceptor aircraft (4,000 to 800). We believe we have a qualitative edge in aircraft, but the Soviets are narrowing the gap.

Some critics argue that these Warsaw Pact advantages are so great that NATO should abandon its conventional defense efforts and rely solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation for the defense of the alliance. Others, concerned about the real horrors of nuclear retaliation, argue, on the contrary, that NATO should rely solely on conventional defense. Both arguments are flawed. NATO's strategy remains valid—a strong conventional defense capability backed up by the threat of nuclear retaliation.

What NATO needs today is not a new strategy but more and better resources. NATO needs the equipment at the manpower to provide conventional defenses strong enough to frustrate an attack in Europe. Such defenses would enhance deterrence and reduce the risk that the alliance would have to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Strengthening conventional defense as I noted earlier, is a global challenge. The Soviet military buildup in Asia and the Pacific is every bit as great and menacing as their buildup in Europe. For this reason, we continue to encourage a steady improvement in Japan's self-defense capability. In recent years the Japanese have expanded their defense budget by almost 7% a year (though from a very low base). They have also undertaken to defend the sea and airplanes leading to their country out to 1,000 miles. As the Japanese themselves recognize, much more needs to be done, but a promising start has been made.

NATO and Japan unquestionably have the economic strength, the population, and the technological base to field

equate conventional forces. The problem has always been how to generate political support for strengthened conventional defense in peacetime. Moreover, controversy exists over the respective contributions that we and our allies make to the common defense. This is a complex issue. How we assess whether one country has contributed its fair share" depends on what we are counting. The United States, for example, ranks high in terms of the percentage of GNP [gross national product] devoted to defense. The European countries, most of which have military cuts, rank high in terms of active duty and reserve troops. One thing is clear: all have to do more.

Economic Sphere

Just as a new issue—conventional defense—will receive increasing attention in the security sphere, so, too, will a new issue—*self-sustaining growth*—receive increasing attention in the economic sphere.

In the last several years, our international economic agenda has been dominated by the \$700 billion Third World debt. The debt crisis that erupted in 1982 threatened the viability of the international economic system. To manage the crisis, we and the other major industrial democracies undertook extraordinary financing programs in several of the largest debtor countries. Our strategy focused on ensuring liquidity supporting economic reform and short-term stabilization.

Those actions have produced some short-term successes. The total current account deficits of the seven major Latin American debtors (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela) were reduced from \$34 billion in 1981 to just \$3 billion in 1983. In the same period, the combined trade balances of these countries jumped from a total surplus of less than \$1 billion to a surplus of \$31 billion. Mexico and Brazil should record positive growth this year after several years of stagnant or negative output. Mexico's impressive performance enabled it to sign an agreement last month with its commercial bank advisory committee to reschedule debt payments over a multiyear period.

The United States contributed to the progress achieved by Mexico and the other Latin debtors by keeping its markets open to their exports—even when those countries were forced to restrict their imports. Overall, Latin American exports grew 16% in the first

quarter of 1984—and the United States took four-fifths of that increase. These Latin goods certainly contribute to our projected \$100-billion-plus trade deficit. But access to our markets provides those countries with the hard currency needed to service their debts and buy our exports. In turn, imports from abroad help keep inflation down in the United States and improve the standard of living of U.S. consumers.

The major liquidity problems are now increasingly under control. Consequently, the focus of our efforts is shifting from ensuring adequate financing for some key debtors to promoting self-sustaining growth throughout the Third World. Without growth, debtor nations may reel from short-term crisis to short-term crisis.

Achieving sustained economic growth presents challenges that are more complex than those of imposing the belt-tightening measures needed to deal with balance-of-payments problems. Belt-tightening can be sold politically as a short-term necessity. Sustainable growth, on the other hand, requires structural adjustment. Such adjustment demands permanent shifts in income distribution, resources, and political power—often between city and countryside, labor and management, consumers and exporters. Shifts of this sort can strain the social and political fabric of a nation. Two important factors, however, can help ease the adjustment process—first, greater cooperation between the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank and, second, increased foreign direct investment.

IMF programs aim primarily at improving a country's balance-of-payments position in the short to medium term. World Bank programs, however, focus more on long-term economic changes. The bank's structural adjustment loan program, for example, has committed over \$4 billion to some 16 countries since it began in 1980. These loans, together with the World Bank's sectoral and project lending, can help developing countries carry out reforms at a time when slow growth and tight credit make such reforms as difficult as they are necessary. We believe that there is scope for strengthening cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank. Such cooperation can help foster the long-term economic reforms needed to promote sustained growth in the debtor countries.

Restructuring an economy also requires direct investment from abroad. Like corporations, countries cannot grow by borrowing alone. Rather, local savings must be encouraged and private

foreign investment attracted. Ample room exists for increasing the equity share of total LDC [less developed country] financing: in 1970, foreign direct investment accounted for almost 20% of net long-term capital flows to developing countries; by 1982, however, that figure had fallen to just over 10%.

To reverse this trend, developing countries will have to adopt policies that attract foreign direct investment. Such policies should entail a realistic exchange rate that permits free currency convertibility and a legal environment that allows owners of capital to earn an attractive, risk-adjusted rate of return. These steps will, in turn, curb capital flight and stimulate local savings.

The issues of structural adjustment, IMF-World Bank cooperation, and direct investment will receive increasing attention in the years ahead. Indeed, at last month's IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington, those institutions endorsed Treasury Secretary Regan's proposal that they tackle these and other subjects in an effort to find ways in which the industrialized and developing countries can better pursue the goal of worldwide noninflationary growth.

As we seek to promote such growth, two sets of countries will receive increasing attention: the resource-poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa and a strategically important set of smaller debtors, especially in Latin America.

Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are among the poorest in the world and have benefited less than others from the global recovery. That region's gross domestic product has fallen every year since 1980. With population increasing at over 3% annually, per capita income in 1983 is projected to be about 4% below the 1970 level. And the long-term decline in agricultural output has been exacerbated by the recent drought. The number of hungry and sometimes starving people is in the millions.

The figures are staggering. But as the World Bank recently noted in a new report on Africa ("Toward Sustained Development: A Joint Action Program for Sub-Saharan Africa"), the potential for economic growth does exist: domestic reform coupled with donor support *can* revitalize sub-Saharan Africa. The United States strongly supports the report's emphasis on policy reform and donor coordination. Moreover, we are committed to doing our part. The United States now provides over half of all food aid to Africa. In addition, in response to the President's request for a special program to encourage economic policy re-

forms in Africa, Congress has provided \$75 million for this purpose in the budget resolution passed last week.

Smaller Debtors. The second category of countries that you are sure to be hearing more about in the near future are the smaller debtors—countries such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Peru. These countries are small debtors in comparative terms. The Dominican Republic, for example, has slightly more than \$3 billion in external obligations, whereas Mexico has almost \$100 billion. The small debtors, however, are beginning to receive—and will continue to receive—much of our attention.

The social fabric of many of these countries has been dangerously strained by necessary but politically unpalatable adjustment measures. Such strains threaten the prospects for economic reform in these countries and, in some cases, U.S. strategic interests as well.

The Peruvian Government, for example, has made successive commitments to the IMF to impose painful austerity measures to reduce its \$13 billion debt. But intense opposition—from political parties, labor, business and interest groups—has undermined efforts to implement these reforms. A year ago a Marxist was elected mayor of Lima; a nationwide general strike was widely effective in March; and guerrilla agitation and violence persist. These developments now represent a serious challenge to Peru's Government, which was restored to civilian democratic control only in 1980.

Clearly, the strains produced by adjustment must be carefully monitored. In the pursuit of growth, we must remain sensitive to the tradeoffs Peru and other Third World governments are being forced to make between long-term economic recovery and short-term political stability.

Political Sphere

The evolving conditions of the late 1980s, then, will see the emergence of conventional defense as a security issue and self-sustaining growth as an economic issue. In the sphere that can be loosely called "political," no intrinsically new issues will be added to our agenda. Rather, we will see a redoubling of the efforts that we have already begun.

Promoting Negotiations in Regional Conflicts. In Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, regional conflicts continue. We have used our resources to promote resolution of these conflicts at the bargaining table rather than on the battlefield. In so doing, we

have reduced the potential for confrontation between the major powers.

The area where our diplomatic efforts have been most productive is southern Africa. In that region, the United States has stimulated a dialogue between South Africa and its neighbors. This dialogue has lowered the level of cross-border violence and has fostered a welcome improvement in relations between the United States and Mozambique which, since independence, had associated itself with the Soviet bloc.

For more than 20 years, the international community has been searching for a formula under which South Africa would relinquish its administration of Namibia, or South-West Africa. Since 1977, the United States and some of its closest allies have worked with all the African states in the region to find a solution to this problem. A multifaceted agreement that will bring independence to this last African colony is now within reach. But before it can be achieved, both Pretoria and Angola will have to make difficult decisions. The most important of these is the removal from Angola of 30,000 Cuban troops that constitute a major intrusion of Soviet power in the region.

We continue to believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict can yield to patient, persistent diplomacy just as southern Africa is yielding. The parties to the dispute must soon realize that there is no substitute for direct negotiations. President Reagan's initiative of September 1, 1982, remains the best and most workable basis for such negotiations. When the parties are ready to resume the active pursuit of peace, the United States will be there. No threat, no intimidation, no amount of random terror will prevent us from participating as a full partner.

The regional conflict of greatest direct concern to the United States is, of course, Central America. The popular and democratically elected Governments of El Salvador and Honduras continue to be threatened by communist guerrillas supported and trained by Nicaragua and Cuba. The aim of these guerrillas is to replace constitutionally elected democratic governments with Marxist-Leninist regimes. Our economic, military, and diplomatic support has helped democratic forces throughout the region to gradually turn the tide in their favor.

This conflict, however, will not be solved by military means alone: diplomatic initiatives are necessary. The efforts of the Contadora group (composed of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) to negotiate a comprehensive, verifiable regional peace are central

to our policy. The United States fully supports the objectives of the Contadora process and believes that they offer the best chance for a stable peace in the region. At the request of the Contadora Group, Secretary Shultz initiated bilateral talks with Nicaragua last June. Since then, our special envoy for Central America, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, has met six times with high-level Nicaraguan officials. These talks are designed to enhance the Contadora process. Any agreement reached will be incorporated into the Contadora framework: there will be no separate agreement.

Promoting Democracy and Human Rights. Resolving regional conflicts helps minimize opportunities for Soviet intervention around the world. So, too, does our commitment to democracy and human rights, for autocracy and oppression breed the instability that our adversaries seek to exploit.

Our policy has been not merely to shun human rights violators but to work actively with friendly governments to seek improvements in human rights practices: release of political prisoners, more freedom of emigration, reduction of official brutality.

In the final analysis, however, we know that democracy and the rule of law provide the only enduring guarant of human rights. And, wherever we look, democracy is on the move. In Southeast Asia, rapidly growing prosperity is paralleled by increasingly open political systems. Last May's elections in the Philippines, and growing popular patience with autocratic rule, represent progress toward a return to that nation's democratic traditions.

Democracy has made its most striking gains right here in our own hemisphere. The figures are impressive.

- Over the last 5 years, elected civilian presidents have replaced military rulers in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru. Next January, Brazil will elect its first civilian president in 20 years. Uruguay is on a firm timetable for return to democracy, and Guatemala is in the early stages of transition. We are especially pleased that elections in Grenada now scheduled for December, will return that country to democracy. The result that 90% of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean now live under governments that are either democratic or heading there.

- Not a single country that was democratic 4 years ago has lost its freedom. Not one guerrilla movement has taken power since 1979, when the Sa-

Terrorism in the Middle East

by Kenneth W. Dam

Remarks to leaders of the National United Jewish Appeal at the White House on October 1, 1984. Mr. Dam is Acting Secretary of State.

Eleven days ago the number of innocent lives lost in the search for peace in the Middle East increased again. The suicide terrorist attack on the American Embassy annex in east Beirut cost two American lives and an unknown number of Lebanese. That attack was another grim reminder of the obstacles we face to a diplomatic solution in the Middle East.

As the east Beirut bombing shows, terrorism is on the increase. It is a fact that more people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records.

It is a fact that there is a trend toward increasing involvement of foreign states in terrorist acts. Attacks supported by what Qadhafi calls the "holy alliance" of Libya and Iran and attacks sponsored by North Korea and others have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more incidents in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

And it is a fact that the United States is the favorite target of terror. Although the French, Saudis, Kuwaitis, and others have also been targeted, 200 of the 500 terrorist attacks in 1983 were against the United States.

Some people here and in the Middle East have concluded from these statistics that the United States has been singled out because we have failed to follow an evenhanded policy in the Middle East. We are told that our Embassy annex was bombed because of a vote we cast in the United Nations, or because of our policies in Lebanon, or because of our support for Israel. In short, we are told that we *deserve* these attacks because of our refusal to capitulate to extremism and to forsake our obligations to Israel. These critics advocate a simple solution: if you want to stop terrorism, abandon your principles and change your policies.

But it's not that simple. Those who advocate such a solution misunderstand both the nature of terrorism and the thrust of U.S. policy.

We have watched terrorism grow over the decades. We are learning, pain-

fully, about terrorists, their methods and their motives. We are learning who supports them; who gives them sanctuary, guns, and money; and who benefits from their violent deeds.

Above all, we are learning their goal. Simply put, it is to impose their will by force. Terrorism is a form of political violence. It is directed against any and all who believe in the rights of the individual and who seek peace through the nonviolent give-and-take of diplomacy.

The blast in east Beirut destroyed many innocent lives. And in destroying those lives, the terrorists sought not to change a policy but to destroy diplomacy itself. For it is not the content of our—or any—particular diplomacy that is their target but the process—a process that seeks through negotiation to address the legitimate grievances of *all* parties; a process that, above all, seeks to prevent one party from imposing its will on another.

If we examine the statistics again, we see that the instruments of diplomacy are the prime targets of terror. And while the United States has been singled out, all those within the region and without who share our goal of a peaceful settlement have been targets as well.

- The French have seen their troops, who helped bring a measure of stability to Beirut, attacked in their barracks (November 4, 1983) and have seen their Embassy bombed (May 24, 1982).

- The United Arab Emirates have seen their Ambassador to France assassinated (February 8, 1984).

- The Israelis have seen their soldiers bombed at Tyre (November 4, 1983).

- And the Saudis have seen their Embassy bombed in Beirut (June 7, 1984) and their consul kidnaped (January 27, 1984); the Saudis have now withdrawn all their diplomatic personnel from Lebanon.

These are just some of the 23 recent attacks for which the self-styled Islamic Jihad has claimed credit or been responsible. Anyone who thinks that we can stop these suicide bombings by cozying up to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], or by walking away from Israel, is dead wrong. Terrorists feed on instability; they are the scavengers of strife and conflict. No moderate state or individual is safe from them. No change

stas replaced Somoza—and then neged on their promises to hold free elections, to seek a nonaligned foreign policy, and to develop an open market economy.

- Since November 1980, when the United States last went to the polls to elect a president, our southern neighbors have cast some 150 million votes in 33 elections in 24 countries. That's more votes in more elections in more countries than in any previous 4 years in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean.

We should not allow these encouraging statistics to go to our heads. The dictatorships have been swept aside because they could not solve their nations' severe economic and social problems. Democratic governments, if they are to survive, must prove they *can* solve these problems.

I spoke earlier of the measures we are taking to assist the major debtor nations of Latin America to restore economic growth. In my opinion, dealing with this problem in a manner that has sensitive political ramifications in account is probably the most important contribution we can make to the strengthening of the new democracies of Latin America.

Conclusion

se, then, are the issues that you will be seeing when you open your newspaper next week, next month, and next year: conventional defense and the need for raising the nuclear threshold, economic growth and the need to implement reforms, negotiated settlement of regional conflicts and the need to support the march of democracy around the globe.

All of these issues will demand U.S. resources and U.S. commitment. But other nations must do their part. The United States already accounts for the majority of the NATO defense budget; we supply one-half of all food aid to Africa; we absorb one-half of all the world's manufactured exports to the industrialized world; we alone are trying to resolve conflicts on three continents simultaneously.

Improved defenses, economic growth, and the resolution of regional conflicts will benefit the United States and our allies alike. We are prepared to meet these new challenges—and, in turn, challenge our allies to face them with

in policy will appease them. Only an implacable desire for peace can stop them.

We believe that the best hope for peace is embodied in the President's September 1 initiative. That initiative, which the President reaffirmed in his recent speech to the UN General Assembly, is balanced and fair. It rejects the extreme positions of all parties. It is designed to bring about a just and lasting peace that will both recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and, at the same time, assure the security of Israel (our commitment to which remains "ironclad"). Those goals are not incompatible. Indeed, neither can be truly achieved without the other.

Let me underscore something about this initiative. Because our positions are balanced, because they are fair, because they can point the way to a just solution, the President is committed to them as they are. They will not be changed. Those who seek a different solution must seek it not through terror but at the negotiating table.

The United States will continue to be a terrorist target so long as we adhere to this commitment to negotiations. Whenever we have taken the initiative to bring peace to the Middle East, terrorism has increased. That is no coincidence. The terrorists know that the United States alone has the power, the will, and the confidence of the parties to give peace a chance in the Middle East. It is for that reason that the avowed goal of the terrorists is to drive us from the region. And it is for that reason that we will not surrender and we will not leave.

In taking this position, some have accused the United States of not following an evenhanded policy in the Middle East. And they are right—they are right if what they mean is that we stand against violence and for diplomacy; that we stand against extremism and for moderation; that we stand against the Islamic Jihad and their radical backers on the one hand, and for Israel and the moderate Arabs on the other. In short, they are right insofar as the United States stands—and will continue to stand—against fear and for freedom in the Middle East. ■

Visit of Israeli Prime Minister



Prime Minister Shimon Peres of the State of Israel made a working visit to Washington, D.C., October 8-10, 1984, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.

Following are remarks made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Peres after their meeting on October 9.¹

President Reagan

We've just completed an intensive round of discussions with Prime Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir. And may I say that our discussions reconfirm the close friendship, the mutual respect, and the shared values that bind our countries. Our ties remain unbreakable, continue to grow stronger.

It's been a particular pleasure for me to welcome Mr. Peres to the White House in his new capacity as Prime Minister. Mr. Shamir, of course, has been a frequent visitor to Washington, and I'm very pleased that we were able to meet with him again.

I want to pay special tribute to the leadership qualities of Prime Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir. Both have shown courage and determination to put aside partisan politics and join together in a government of national unity in order to deal with Israel's most pressing problems. This demonstration of unity reminds us of

democracy's great strength and the hope it offers for all the people of the world.

In our talks, we focused on several issues. We discussed in some detail the plans of Prime Minister Peres and his partners in the new unity government for revitalizing the Israeli economy and putting it on the road to sustained recovery. And I'm impressed by the bold and wide-ranging steps the Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues are planning.

I know from our own experience how difficult the problem of economic readjustment is, yet how vitally important a strong economy is to national security. We've made clear our willingness to continue our dialogue and to cooperate with Israel in the best way possible as Israel proceeds with its plans.

The new Government of Israel has already taken some steps to reduce inflation and increase economic growth and is working to develop additional steps. The economic support funds and other funds that the Congress has appropriated for Israel come at an opportune time, for they will enable Israel to develop its programs without having to divert undue attention to balance-of-payments problems. Should such problems arise, the U.S. Government will work closely with the Israeli Government to avert them.

Looking ahead, Prime Minister Peres has described a bright vision of Israel's economic future as a dynamic competitor in world markets. We have agreed to explore with Israel ways to enhance its growth and development prospects through structural adjustment, increased trade and investment, as well as American aid.

And Prime Minister Peres and I have decided to establish a joint economic development group of economic officials from our two governments and private economists to discuss Israel's economic recovery and development program. And this group will be an important forum for exchanging views on the full range of economic issues and examining ways to help support Israel's efforts.

The establishment of a free trade area between our two countries also offers great promise to Israel's economic future and to the United States. This will be the first such agreement that we've entered into with another nation. Prime Minister Peres and I have instructed our delegations to conclude negotiations within 30 days. I'm confident that this unprecedented agreement, expanding Israel's exports markets to the United States, will be important in helping Israel on the way to economic recovery, and it will also boost U.S. exports to Israel.

We also discussed the situation in Lebanon. The Prime Minister made clear the firm Israeli determination to withdraw fully from Lebanon as soon as security arrangements can be put in place to ensure the safety of Israel's northern border. I reassured him that the United States stands ready to help, provided the parties concerned want us to play this role and are committed to finding answers to the difficult issues involved. We agreed to stay in close touch on this subject in the days ahead.

And, finally, I reaffirmed our fundamental commitment to Israel's national security. I'm pleased that we've agreed to consult in a systematic way on U.S.-Israel security assistance programs, a way that contributes most effectively to Israel's overall national security and the maintenance of its qualitative edge. Secretary Weinberger will be discussing this process and other security matters when he visits Israel next week.

I made clear to the Prime Minister and his colleagues our firm commitment to the goal of a just and lasting peace between Israel and all its Arab neighbors. Outstanding steps in that direction are UN Security Council Resolution 242, the Camp David accords, and the historic Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

I reaffirmed today my initiative of September 1, 1982. At that time I set forth U.S. positions designed to bring the parties to the negotiating table, presumably with their own positions. The Prime Minister stressed that his government is also determined to move the peace process forward, and I join him in this great and common objective. In partnership, Israel and the United States will continue to work toward a common vision of peace, security, and economic well-being.

Prime Minister Peres

I want to thank the President of the United States for his understanding, his friendship, his hospitality, and may I say, Mr. President, that in our meetings the relations between the United States and Israel have reached a new level of harmony and understanding, which I am very grateful for.

I would like, from the outset, on behalf of all of the people of Israel, to thank the President, the Congress, and, first and foremost, the people of the United States, for the lasting friendship existing between our two peoples and countries.

Vice Premier Shamir and myself have had a series of most rewarding discussions with the President, Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and their colleagues. I found in the White House a true friend of Israel and I understand—who understands our problems and dilemmas, is aware of our difficulties, and closely follows our efforts to face them.

I'm grateful to the President for his warm and detailed statement and consider it an important contribution to the process of rebuilding the Israeli economy. Equally significant is my hope that the United States will continue to play an important role in reducing tension in our region and revitalizing the peace process.

I detailed to the President the position of our government of national unity on a wide range of issues in the political, security, and economic areas. The government of national unity was formed in the united city of Jerusalem in the spirit and the words of Prophet Ezekiel, who said, "And I shall give them an undivided heart and a new spirit."

Despite the differences between the policies of this government, we are all united in our thankfulness and confidence in the United States of America. We are all united in our desire for peace. We are all united in the desire to bring our boys back from Lebanon, provided that the security of the northern part of Israel will be guaranteed. We are determined to tackle our economic difficulties head on.

Our land is not a land for skeptics, but a cradle for believers, and this is more important than any passing economic difficulty. While we certainly build a primary responsibility for dealing with these problems and we have demonstrated our resolve with regard to each, nevertheless, the support of the President, the U.S. Government, and the American people is a source of strength and inspiration to all of us.

Again, I thank you from the depths of my heart for your understanding, friendship, and support in the long and short range of the destinies of Israel.

¹Made from the Rose Garden at the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 15, 1984). ■

Freedom and Opportunity: Foundation for a Dynamic Oceans Policy

by James L. Malone

Address before the Law of the Sea Institute in San Francisco on September 24, 1984. Ambassador Malone is Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss the position of the United States on the Law of the Sea (LOS) as well as our view of the future of oceans law and policy. Our position with regard to the UN convention, as you know, is well settled. I believe it is a very sound one, based on long-recognized principles of international law and upon a deep conviction of our responsibility to promote and protect America's vital interests. And, I must say, our vision of the future is a very positive one. In essence, it is a vision of freedom and of all that freedom both demands and offers. It is a vision of order, of stability, of opportunity, and of prosperity—not only for Americans but for all people who share these goals and who would commit themselves enthusiastically to their pursuit. For that vision—and the policy in which it is embodied—reflects the very ideals and principles that are fundamental to economic growth for all countries, developing and developed alike.

U.S. Position on the Law of the Sea Convention

Perhaps, however, before discussing both the conception and implementation of our national oceans policy it would be helpful—without dwelling on affairs long-since settled and explained—to glance briefly at the past.

As you know only too well, over the past decade we, as a nation, have gone through a period of intense soul-searching and agonizing debate over the role America should play in multilateral efforts to build consensus and reach universal agreement on a comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty: what national interests were to be recognized and given priority, what were the means by which we would best be able to protect those interests either within the framework of such a convention or in its wake.

It was not an easy period for us by any means, but we have now emerged from it with what I strongly believe is a

highly disciplined and widely respected position. We have a firm sense of where we are headed. We have identified and enunciated clearly for all the world our own national priorities and have made equally clear our responsibility to stand by them. At the same time we have expressed our willingness to cooperate with other nations in all ocean-related activities of mutual benefit. I believe that our sincerity in this is recognized, our determination is admired, and our leadership appreciated.

This was not the case prior to 1981. When Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency in January of that year, the United States was on the verge of accepting a treaty which presented a serious threat to its own security, economic, and political interests. The treaty's provisions establishing a deep seabed mining regime were intentionally designed to promote a new world order—a form of global collectivism known as the new international economic order—which ultimately seeks the redistribution of the world's wealth through coercive organizational means. Those provisions were predicated on a distorted interpretation of the noble concept of the Earth's vast oceans as the "common heritage of mankind." Rather than recognizing the seas as belonging to no nation or individual but open to those willing to take the risk and invest the labor necessary to derive benefit from the abundant resources they contain, many countries sought, instead, to build a regime upon the assumption that every nation shares ownership of the oceans as an undivided property interest. Claiming for themselves the right to be the primary beneficiaries of the seabed regime so constructed, they asserted that each is entitled automatically to a proportionate share of the profit gained by those whose efforts produce wealth from what would otherwise be economically valueless. And to enforce that claimed right, they built into the treaty a regulatory vehicle which permits them to exert virtually unrestrained control over all future deep seabed mining operations.

It has been suggested that the United States agreed to the basic common heritage "principle" during the early stages of the conference and that the Reagan Administration reneged on that agreement. In fact, the actual position of all U.S. Administrations involved in

UNCLOS III [Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea] remained consistent on this issue. While the United States agreed in general on the merit of the concept of a common heritage, it steadfastly maintained that such a concept had not become a legal principle and could not become one until developed and clearly defined as part of a generally accepted Law of the Sea Convention. That convention, having received to date only 12 of the 60 ratifications needed to enter into force, has not been so accepted. Indeed, the United States and other key industrial states have not signed and do not accept the treaty, nor does the United States accept the interpretation of the common heritage that reflects.

President Reagan correctly viewed the deep seabed mining provisions in the LOS Convention as inimical to our national interests and was unwilling to compromise those interests for the sake of world or domestic public opinion. He could not consent to American participation in a regime structured with an inherent bias against the interests of the United States and its allies; a regime which denied fundamental principles of political liberty, private property, and free enterprise.

Particularly offensive among the articles in part XI of the convention were provisions that:

- Would enable a future "review conference" to adopt key changes to the treaty over the objection of member states, thus denying to the U.S. Senate its constitutionally mandated role in the treaty process;
- Would intentionally deter rather than promote economic development with the establishment of an ostensible "parallel system" that would, if implemented, discriminate against private operations, thereby restricting U.S. access to minerals of strategic importance;
- Would create a bias against the production of mineral resources as set forth in article 150 of the convention;
- Would impose unconscionable financial and regulatory burdens on American industry and government, requiring, by the best estimates of U.S. Government officials, a potential liability for the United States of \$1 billion in direct costs and loan guarantees for both initial expenses and continuing

operations of the Enterprise and the International Seabed Resource Authority itself;

- Would effectively enjoin the mandatory transfer of private and possibly sensitive technology to an international seabed authority dominated by countries often unsympathetic to U.S. interests as the price of its use in private mining operations; and

- Would establish a potential source of funding for the terrorist activities of national liberation organizations.

Nevertheless, the President remained committed to efforts to correct such flaws through the multilateral negotiating process and, in complete good faith, pursued such efforts with vigor and imagination throughout the later sessions of UNCLOS III in 1981 and 1982. Unfortunately, the conference proved incapable of accommodation in any of the six basic areas just identified as critical to the United States. Serious compromise proved impossible. Intransigence, prompted to a significant degree by a pervasive view of the convention as a means to promote the new international economic order, was adeptly exploited by some in an effort to condate their influence with the "non-aligned nations" and to isolate further the United States and its allies within the "world community." This rendered the conference essentially incapable of achieving consensus. This, of course, has been peculiar to UNCLOS III. Similar ideological confrontations have disrupted many other multilateral negotiations and rendered various technical agencies of the United Nations ineffectual.

Ultimately, the United States was left with no acceptable alternative but to vote against adoption of the treaty. Consequently, on July 9, 1982, after a further searching review, President Reagan announced his decision to refuse to sign the treaty, expressing his intention to put behind us a decade of well-intentioned but often less than fruitful negotiations and turn America's vision to the future.

Oceans Law and Policy in the Wake of UNCLOS III

Recognizing that the peaceful uses of the world's oceans and the management and conservation of marine resources remain a matter of fundamental concern—as well as a potential source of endless opportunity—to all maritime states, President Reagan set forth on March 10, 1983, the principles upon which the United States would base its

future oceans policy and, consistent with those principles and the rule of law, proclaimed the establishment of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

In order to fully grasp and appreciate that policy, however, a key principle underlying it—namely, that the nonseabed sections of the treaty reflect customary law in distinction to those prescribing the mining regime—must be understood.

Of paramount importance in assigning the proper meaning to the various sections of the LOS Convention is the need to recognize that unlike all former oceans-related conventions, UNCLOS III does two things: it codifies existing law and prescribes new law. The attempt was made to both set out present and developing law in familiar areas in light of circumstances since 1958 as well as to provide new regimes for unregulated activities. Navigation rights, as seen in the very wording of the LOS Convention articles on navigation, were frequently drawn from the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and that on the High Seas, which embodied customary law as it had developed to that time. As such, it is void of merit to argue that only parties to the LOS Convention enjoy customary international legal rights of longstanding status.

Similarly, it is without legal foundation to maintain, on the basis of the so-called contractual theory, that the convention is a package and that for a non-party all rights are lost if a state does not become a party to it. Absent a peremptory norm to the contrary, customary rights of sovereign states remain inviolate and cannot otherwise be denied. I do not subscribe to the views of critics of the U.S. position who accuse nonsignatories of "picking and choosing" among sections of the convention. The "package deal" concept was, it must be remembered, nothing more than a procedural device, based on a December 1973 "gentleman's agreement" and designed to further the achievement of consensus. As such, the concept died upon the conclusion of the LOS negotiations. It has no continuing merit whatever.

States certainly are free to continue to apply customary international law and ignore *de novo* prescriptive provisions which have neither been tried nor admitted by wide practice to be a source of recognized international law.

It is the position of the United States then that, despite its shortcomings, the Law of the Sea Convention

does reflect a successful effort to articulate and codify existing rules of maritime law and actual state practice with respect to the traditional uses of the oceans, such as navigation and overflight. Indeed, the United States believes that most of the provisions of the treaty, apart from the seabed mining text in part XI, fairly balance the interests of all states and are fully consistent with norms of customary international law. Hence, it is prepared to accept and act in accordance with these provisions on a reciprocal basis.

But, since the seabed mining portions of the convention establish wholly new law and new obligations, which are contractual in nature and not part of customary international law, the provisions will be binding only on parties to the convention and, then, only when and if it enters into force. The provisions in part XI of the convention are predicated on the establishment of a new international organization, the International Seabed Resource Authority, and on the acceptance by parties of that organization's jurisdiction and of their own obligation to act in accordance with its mandates. Such obligations must be willingly assumed by states and cannot be thrust upon them. The United States does not and will not accept them and is not bound by them.

In nonseabed areas, however, as I have said, the United States does recognize the existence of an international law of the sea entirely independent of—though reflected in—the Law of the Sea Convention and based upon accepted principles of customary international law. The United States will continue to honor those principles and will assert its rights consistent with those principles on a global basis.

In essence, all this is the legal foundation for the national oceans policy announced by President Reagan on March 10, 1983. The United States will recognize the legitimate rights of all coastal and maritime states and will expect that its own rights and those of other states are recognized in return. In his statement, the President stressed the importance of the traditional rights of navigation and overflight to the United States. Unimpeded commercial and military navigation and aviation are crucial to our national security and economic interests. The right of transit through straits and archipelagic sealanes, freedom of the "high seas" within and beyond coastal state exclusive economic zone jurisdiction, and the right of innocent passage within territorial seas must be protected and will

be respected by the United States within its own jurisdiction.

The importance of the rule of law to the regulation of peaceful uses of the oceans is critical, and the United States will further those acceptable provisions of the convention which are based on customary law as consistently as possible in order to assure other states of U.S. intentions and in order to promote certainty and stability. As a major maritime power and large coastal state, the United States is in a preeminent position to do so.

At the same time we have sought to address the difficulties and dangers that the unsettled future of the LOS Convention imposes. After almost 2 years since the convention was opened for signature, only 20% of the ratifications requisite to the entry into force have occurred. Consequently, global reliance on the convention as a conventional source of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the ICJ [International Court of Justice] is uncertain at best. The convention may not enter into force for many years—perhaps a decade—or, just as likely, not at all. Given the rapid rate of change in ocean law, much will happen in the coming 10 years which could render many sections of the convention obsolete. Responsible states must, therefore, in the interim comply with and promote the customary law it embodies. Fortunately, this has already proven to be the case.

A perfect example of such practice is the almost universal acceptance of the EEZ as customary law. With enactment of EEZ legislation by 60 coastal states and the acceptance of these zones by user states as evidenced by bilateral agreements—such as governing international fisheries agreements—it is clear that the EEZ, a concept which had not existed prior to the LOS Conference negotiations, derives its contemporary validity from state practice and not the convention, as the latter is not in force.

Similarly, state practice applies to navigational freedoms. The tortuous negotiating history associated with the convention's EEZ provisions reflected in no small measure a balancing of coastal state and navigational interests. I find it telling that state EEZ practice has resulted in very few encroachments on traditional navigational freedoms, notwithstanding earlier approaches, such as 200-mile territorial and patrimonial seas in which freedom of navigation was denied. In the most vital navigational areas, straits used for international navigation, there has, to my knowledge,

been no incident in which a straits riparian state has denied or restricted passage of U.S. vessels in any way inconsistent with the straits transit passage regime.

In furtherance of the President's March 10 statement, the U.S. Navy has and shall continue to exercise these navigational rights and freedoms globally. In those instances in which coastal state claims are inconsistent with customary law, exercises are openly carried out. If a coastal state protests, the United States by reply note stipulates the navigational right or freedom involved, the manner in which it has been circumscribed, and the U.S. resolve to continue to exercise such rights and freedoms. Two recurring areas subject to challenge have been:

First, requirements of advance notification to or receipt of advance permission from a coastal state as a prerequisite to the exercise of the right of innocent passage by warships through the territorial sea; and

Second, claims to historic bays.

It is imperative that this program be executed regularly in order to prevent arguments of acquiescence or prescription.

Such challenges are, however, by far the exception rather than the rule. Our negotiations with select archipelagic states which are in the process of drafting archipelagic state legislation are gratifying—in no instance has there been any indication of inconsistencies with the archipelagic states' transit passage articles of the convention. As in the case of EEZ navigational practice, here also there is abundant evidence of good-faith application of applicable LOS Convention provisions pending its uncertain entry into force.

U.S. policy in the area of international law and the orderly regulation of the traditional uses of the oceans is firmly established. But our policy is built, as well, upon a recognition of the opportunities to wisely utilize the resources of the oceans both within and beyond the EEZ and a commitment to pursue those opportunities energetically in a manner which realistically promotes economic development.

Recognizing this, the United States is conducting a deep seabed mining policy pursuant to statutory authority and presidential directive. In accordance with Section 118 of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, the President is authorized to negotiate agreements with foreign nations necessary to achieve reciprocal recognition of deep seabed mining licenses and

permits, priorities of rights for applications for commercial recovery licenses, and prohibition of activities which conflict with licenses or permits already issued. The President's March 1983 oceans policy statement directed effort to work with "like-minded" countries to develop a framework, free of unnecessary political and economic restraints, for exploration and exploitation of the deep seabeds when conditions warrant.

Accordingly, the United States has concluded two significant agreements. The first agreement, an "Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed," signed on September 2, 1982, by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, had three primary purposes:

- To avoid overlaps and conflicting claims and to ensure that activities are carried out in an orderly and peaceful manner;
- To ensure that the agreement would not prejudice the decisions of the parties with respect to the LOS Convention; and
- To ensure that adequate deep seabed areas containing nodules remain available for operations by other states in accordance with international law.

The 1982 agreement has served the parties well. Numerous negotiations were held among the parties and in coordination with private consortia leading to a successful resolution of overlapping claims and avoidance of conflicts. These negotiations fostered a positive climate, establishing the proposition that those states possessing the requisite technology and having over years expended the greatest sums in developing the possibility of deep seabed mining exploration and exploitation could resolve their sovereign differences.

Negotiations since September 1982 have led to the successful conclusion of a second agreement, the "Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters" signed on August 3, 1984, which entered into force on the second of this month. This agreement—consistent with the primary objectives of the September 2, 1982, agreement—is exactly the type of agreement envisioned in Section 118 of the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. The provisional understanding constitutes an agreement among the major industrialized nations with interests in deep seabed mining, aimed at avoiding conflict over deep seabed mine sites and

viding for regular consultations with respect to deep seabed mining.

The provisional understanding—sponsored by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States—includes two appendixes which constitute an integral part of the agreement. There are a number of salient features, including provisions to avoid conflicts of registration or operations to require notification and consultation prior to the application for registration, the issuance of authorizations, or conduct of operations. The parties to the provisional understanding have agreed that no exploitation shall occur prior to January 1, 1988, and to settle disputes by appropriate means. In addition, provision is made for additional parties to accede to the agreement.

It must be stressed that the agreement is without prejudice to, nor does it affect, the positions of the parties, or the obligations assumed by any of the parties, in respect to the LOS Convention. A memorandum attached to the agreement also ensures that operations by the parties shall be conducted with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas, will protect the quality of the marine environment, prevent waste, and preserve future opportunities for the commercial recovery of the unrecovered balance of the hard mineral resources in the authorization areas.

It has been suggested that the agreement is illegal and contrary to international law. Such a suggestion is untenable. I find irreproachable and entirely consistent with international law the proposition that sovereign states may conclude an agreement the purpose of which is to avoid conflict and waste, promote rational and orderly development of the seabeds, further the rule of law, and be controlling among them in the absence of any other binding international instrument in force to which they are parties and which treats the same issue. I believe the conclusion of a provisional understanding is a significant and responsible step forward in the field of international affairs and conduct of foreign relations. I also believe the understanding to be the only realistic and workable approach to deep seabed mining beyond the limits of national jurisdiction which has, to date, not been achieved or which is likely to be achieved within the coming decade.

A Look at the Future

I believe that the oceans policy of the United States, given real world conditions, is the only viable means of dealing with circumstances in which consensus is not possible. That policy admirably protects U.S. interests and will undoubtedly shape the course of oceans affairs for many years to come.

Let me state very emphatically that the United States cannot—and will not—sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The convention is fatally flawed and cannot be cured. It took a decade of continuous negotiations to arrive at the text and the last such substantive session showed how difficult it was to achieve amendments, no matter how small, in that, under the conference procedure, achievement of consensus was so friable a creature.

Furthermore, and a feature often overlooked, the convention is open for signature only until December 10, 1984, after which it is open for adherence or accession only. This Administration, whether reelected or not, will be in office through January and has no intention of altering its stance on signature. After December 10, a two-thirds majority of the Senate will be required to achieve U.S. advice and consent. Given the fact that more than one-third of the current Senate membership disapproves of the convention, and that U.S. industry is officially on record as being irrevocably opposed to its mining regime, adherence or accession to the convention in its present form is not possible.

Let me speculate. In my experience, as a general rule, it is legally virtually impossible to amend a convention prior to its entry into force. It is also tremendously difficult to amend after its entry into force as between parties and those who have signed but not ratified it.

Further, in the case of the LOS Convention, given the present political climate among the convention's proponents, even if these legal facts of life were somehow miraculously overcome, I do not believe the political will exists at present for serious amendment of the convention. However, since the convention was opened for signature in December 1982, the political climate has become, if not less hostile, certainly more realistic.

Given this country's resolute and clear stand on the convention and our provisional approach to deep seabed mining matters, I believe that perceptions will become increasingly realistic. This process will be gradual—it will not come about within the next year, or two, or even four, but I expect it will in the next six or eight, during which time the United States and its like-minded allies are resolved to stand firm. At such a stage, I feel the political will may well develop to reopen the conference and to give serious consideration to the minimal needs of the United States and the industrialized world. I believe that ensuing years will demonstrate to those who espouse the common heritage concept that too much of lasting benefit and promise will be lost if they do not come to grips with such realistic expectations. When that realization and the will to execute it are rekindled, the Law of the Sea will again become an effective negotiating forum. I look forward to that day.

In the interim, President Reagan has set us on a dynamic course into the future. The truly historic significance of his national oceans policy may not be fully comprehended for generations to come. Referring to the sheer size of the area included within the President's EEZ proclamation, Secretary of the Interior William Clark has recently pointed correctly to the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase as the only comparable event in our national experience. The exclusive economic zone, he noted, "increased by one and two-thirds the size of the territory controlled by the people of the United States," and to date we know remarkably little of the abundant wealth of resources this territory might hold. As the Secretary pointed out, it is an incredible challenge—and opportunity—that this "newest frontier" holds out for America and for the world. To meet that challenge will require a policy which taps the energy, the imagination, and the initiative of the American people—a policy which offers them the freedom, the incentive, and the stability to put those attributes to work and set out to develop the resources of the oceans for the benefit of all mankind. ■

Population Conference Held in Mexico City

The International Conference on Population was held in Mexico City August 6-14, 1984. Following is the plenary statement made by Ambassador James L. Buckley, head of the U.S. delegation, on August 8 and the text of the declaration adopted by the conference on August 14, as well as President Reagan's message of May 30.

**AMBASSADOR BUCKLEY,
AUG. 8, 1984**

We thank the Government of Mexico, under its distinguished President, Miguel de la Madrid, for its hospitality in hosting this important gathering of the international community.

This conference has been called to review the World Population Plan of Action adopted in Bucharest 10 years ago. As we do so, it is important to keep in mind that the subject of population is part of a larger objective. In its own words, the Plan of Action is "an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedom."

In short, population goals and policies must be considered not as ends in themselves but in the context of social and economic strategies designed to enhance the human condition in a manner consistent with basic values.

Over the past 20 years, the United States has played a leading role in focusing attention on population issues, in urging international cooperation, and in the design and implementation of population strategies based on voluntary family planning. In the current year, we will be contributing \$240,000,000 for these purposes, or 44% of the total population assistance provided by developed nations; and the Reagan Administration has requested an increase for 1985. U.S. support for these programs has increased by more than 30% since 1980.

The Need for a Sharper Focus

At the same time, the experience of the last two decades not only makes possible but requires a sharper focus for our population policy.

Given the dramatic success achieved by developing nations over the past 30 years in reducing mortality rates, there is no question that many of them find it difficult to cope with the resulting surge in their populations. Moreover, major increases are destined to continue well into the next century even with significant reductions in birth rates.

Small wonder that so many have reacted to this dramatic phenomenon by concentrating more on how to control the surge in human numbers than on how expanding populations might be accommodated.

We believe, however, that in the superb address welcoming us to Mexico on Monday, President De la Madrid placed the problem in context when he said:

Our planet, inhabited today by 4.8 billion human beings, has the natural resources, production capacity and different administrative and political skills it needs to fully meet the basic needs of its future population. To that end, let us make reason our guide in our efforts to prepare for the future.

Let us follow the advice of President De la Madrid and place the population problem in proper perspective.

First, and foremost, population growth is, of itself, neither good nor bad. It becomes an asset or a problem in conjunction with other factors, such as economic policy, social constraints, and the ability to put additional men and women to useful work. People, after all, are producers as well as consumers.

Hong Kong and South Korea are cases in point. They have few natural resources. Over the past 20 years, they have experienced major increases in population, yet few nations have experienced such rapid economic growth. We believe it no coincidence that each of these societies placed its reliance on the creativity of private individuals working within a free economy.

Some developing nations chose a different path, that of a controlled, centrally planned economy. In such cases, the concentration of economic decisionmaking in the hands of planners and public officials tended to inhibit individual initiative and sometimes crippled the ability of average men and women to work toward a better future. In many cases, agriculture was devastated by government price controls that wiped out the rewards for labor. Job creation in infant

industries was hampered by confiscatory taxes. Personal industry and thrift were penalized. Under such circumstances, population growth became a threat.

One of the consequences of "economic statism," and the lagging development such an approach implies was the disruption of the natural mechanism for slowing population growth. The world's developed nations have reached a population equilibrium without compulsion. The controlling factor has been the adjustment, by individual families, of reproductive behavior to economic opportunity and aspiration. Historically, as opportunity and the standard of living rise, the birth rate falls. Fortunately, a broad international consensus has emerged since Bucharest that economic development and population policies are mutually reinforcing.

This conference offers a unique opportunity for all of us to reflect on the interaction between economic development and population in the light of experience so that we may develop more effective strategies for the years ahead. Our thinking, however, must not be limited to a consideration of economic and population factors alone. Any policy adopted must be consistent with a respect for human dignity and fundamental freedom.

U.S. Policy

As President Ronald Reagan stated in his message to this conference:

We believe population programs can and must be truly voluntary, cognizant of the rights and responsibilities of individuals and families, and respectful of religious and cultural values. When they are, such programs can make an important contribution economic and social development, to the health of mothers and children, and to the stability of the family and of society.

In preparing for this conference, the United States has issued a carefully developed statement of policy, a copy of which has been distributed to each delegation. It does not represent a radical shift in its past position. Rather it reflects a sharpening of focus to make its foreign assistance programs more responsive to true needs and more reflective of fundamental values.

The United States will continue its longstanding commitment to development and family planning assistance to other countries. By exercising greater care in determining how those contributions are used, the United States expects to increase the effectiveness of its economic assistance while ensuring that

Family planning funds are used in a way consistent with human dignity and family values.

The UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) recognizes the right of children to protection before birth as well as after. In keeping with this affirmation, the United States does not consider abortion an acceptable element of family planning programs.

Over the past decade, the United States has not allowed its population assistance contribution to be used to encourage or promote abortion. The present policy tightens this existing restraint in three ways.

First, where U.S. funds are contributed to nations which support abortion with other funds, the United States contributes to such nations through segregated accounts which cannot be used for abortion.

Second, the United States will never contribute to separate nongovernmental organizations which perform or solely promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations.

Third, before the United States will contribute funds to the UN Fund for Population Activities, (UNFPA), it will insist that no part of its contribution be used for abortion and will also first receive concrete assurances that the UNFPA is not engaged in, and does not intend funding for, abortion or coercive family planning programs. Should such assurances not be possible, and in order to maintain the level of its overall contribution to the international effort, the United States will redirect the amount of its intended contribution to other, non-UNFPA family planning programs.

When efforts to lower population growth are deemed advisable, U.S. policy considers it imperative that such efforts respect the right of couples to determine the size of their own families. Accordingly, the United States will not provide family planning funds to any nation which engages in forcible coercion to achieve population goals.

Our support of family planning programs serves two basic purposes, both of which require ready access to the knowledge and services that will enable couples to exercise their right to determine when they will conceive a child.

The first concerns health. The availability of effective family planning services will enable couples to better protect the health of mother and child by enabling them to control the spacing of children and avoid pregnancies among women who are too young or too old to have one with safety.

The second end of family planning is to facilitate parental control over the size of families. An effective voluntary family planning program will result in substantial decreases in family size only to the degree that couples desire fewer children and that safe, acceptable, effective, and affordable methods are available.

Here again we can benefit from recent as well as historical experience. So long as the great majority of couples sees an economic advantage in having a large number of children, they will tend to have them. This desire is prevalent in the least developed countries where children begin to contribute to family income at an early age and are the main source of support for parents too old to work. Once a society achieves a certain level of real economic development, however, the incentives to childbearing will change—especially where women have achieved higher education and broader economic opportunities and are able to attain their rightful place in society.

South Korea and the ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] countries are cases in point. Between 1970 and 1982, they experienced an average annual rate of economic growth of over 7%, well above that of any other part of the world. At the same time, through a combination of signifi-

cant family planning efforts and the decline in the desire for children historically associated with economic growth, they reduced their average crude birth rate by more than 30%. While some of these nations are richly endowed with natural resources, others have none. What they do share in common are marketplace economies and policies which encourage private investment and initiatives.

Unfortunately, the current situation in many developing countries is such that relief from population pressures cannot be achieved overnight even under optimal economic policies. In the meantime, rapid population growth compounds already serious problems and increases the costs and difficulties of economic development. Slowing population growth, however, is not a panacea. Without sound and comprehensive development policies, it cannot in itself solve problems of hunger, unemployment, crowding, or potential social disorder.

By helping developing countries through support for effective voluntary family planning programs in conjunction with sound economic policies, U.S. population assistance contributes to stronger saving and investment rates, speeds the development of effective markets and related employment opportunities, reduces the potential resource

President Reagan's Message, May 30, 1984

I am grateful to Mexico, under the leadership of President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, for its gracious hospitality in hosting the International Conference on Population.

World leaders have come to recognize that the historically unprecedented growth of population now occurring in many countries affects economic and social development and presents a unique set of challenges and opportunities. It is for these reasons that the United States provides bilateral and multilateral assistance in population programs.

Recognizing the seriousness of environmental and economic problems and their relationship to social realities, the United States places a priority upon technological advancement and economic expansion which hold out the hope of prosperity and stability for a rapidly changing world. That hope can be realized to the extent nations respond to problems, whether economic or ecological, in ways that respect and enhance the freedom and dignity of the individual.

We believe population programs can and must be truly voluntary, cognizant of the

rights and responsibilities of individuals and families, and respectful of religious and cultural values. When they are, such programs can make an important contribution to economic and social development, to the health of mothers and children, and to the stability of the family and of society.

Our concern over the dimensions of demographic change is inseparable from a concern for the welfare of children—who are the ultimate resource of any society. Together we must strive for a world in which children are happy and healthy. They must have the opportunity to develop to their full mental and physical potential and, as young adults, be able to find productive work and to enjoy a decent and dignified existence.

I wish the participants in this Conference good counsel and inspiration in addressing these issues. I am confident they will fulfill their responsibility to produce recommendations for action by the international community which will improve the well-being of generations to come.

RONALD REAGAN

requirements of programs to improve the health and education of the people, and hastens the achievement of each country's graduation from the need for external assistance.

These are our goals and expectations as we take advantage of the experience of the last two decades to provide our population assistance policy with a sharper focus.

We urge this conference to do the same as it reviews the World Population Plan of Action. We hope in examining alternative models, it will seek out those that have proven the most successful.

Much remains to be done, but we can take heart from the extraordinary progress already achieved. Over the past 30 years, for example, fertility rates and birth rates in the developing world have fallen more than halfway toward a goal of population stability; human life expectancy has increased dramatically, caloric intake per capita has improved, literacy rates have increased significantly, disease is on the decline, and per capita income in most countries has risen substantially.

This record of accomplishment should be encouragement enough as we proceed with the work of this conference. At the same time, we should be neither surprised nor disturbed by the inevitable differences we will encounter.

We here today represent a rich diversity of cultures and historical experience. Our ethical and moral perspectives have been shaped by a variety of religious and secular traditions. We govern ourselves in different ways in accordance with fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of man and the purpose of nations.

When all this diversity is brought to bear on two of the most profoundly sensitive of all human subjects—namely, human reproduction and the rights of the family—it should surprise no one that there will be differences among us on a number of important issues.

We can all benefit from the sharing of experience, insights, and perspectives on family planning, population policy, and economic development. But we cannot expect agreement on every item that has a necessary place on our agenda.

This said, we do look forward to working with all other nations represented here in identifying areas in which the international community can work in concert and in determining how common goals can best be achieved.

DECLARATION ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AUG. 14, 1984

1. The International Conference on Population met in Mexico City from 6 to 14 August 1984, to appraise the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action, adopted by consensus at Bucharest, ten years ago. The Conference reaffirmed the full validity of the principles and objectives of the World Population Plan of Action and adopted a set of recommendations for the further implementation of the Plan in the years ahead.

2. The world has undergone far-reaching changes in the past decade. Significant progress in many fields important for human welfare has been made through national and international efforts. However, for a large number of countries it has been a period of instability, increased unemployment, mounting external indebtedness, stagnation and even decline in economic growth. The number of people living in absolute poverty has increased.

3. Economic difficulties and problems of resource mobilization have been particularly serious in the developing countries. Growing international disparities have further exacerbated already serious problems in social and economic terms. Firm and widespread hope was expressed that increasing international co-operation will lead to a growth in welfare and wealth, their just and equitable distribution and minimal waste in use of resources, thereby promoting development and peace for the benefit of the world's population.

4. Population growth, high mortality and morbidity, and migration problems continue to be causes of great concern requiring immediate action.

5. The Conference confirms that the principal aim of social, economic and human development, of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve the standards of living and quality of life of the people. This Declaration constitutes a solemn undertaking by the nations and international organizations gathered in Mexico City to respect national sovereignty to combat all forms of racial discrimination including apartheid, and to promote social and economic development, human rights and individual freedom.

6. Since Bucharest the global population growth rate has declined from 2.03 to 1.67 per cent per year. In the next decade the growth rate will decline more slowly. Moreover, the annual increase in numbers is expected to continue and may reach 90 million by the year 2000. Ninety per cent of that increase will occur in developing countries and at that time 6.1 billion people are expected to inhabit the Earth.

7. Demographic differences between developed and developing countries remain striking. The average life expectancy at birth, which has increased almost everywhere, is 73 years in developed countries, while in developing countries it is only 57 years and families in developing countries tend to be much larger than elsewhere. This gives cause for concern since social and population

pressures may contribute to the continuation of the wide disparity in welfare and the quality of life between developing and developed countries.

8. In the past decade, population issues have been increasingly recognized as a fundamental element in development planning. To be realistic, development policies, plans and programmes must reflect the inextricable links between population, resources, environment and development. Priority should be given to action programmes integrating all essential population and development factors taking fully into account the need for rational utilization of natural resources and protection of the physical environment and preventing its further deterioration.

9. The experience with population policy in recent years is encouraging. Mortality and morbidity rates have been lowered, although not to the desired extent. Family planning programmes have been successful in reducing fertility at relatively low cost. Countries which consider that their population growth rate hinders their national development plan should adopt appropriate population policies and programmes. Timely action could avoid the accentuation of problems such as overpopulation, unemployment, food shortages and environmental degradation.

10. Population and development policies reinforce each other when they are responsive to individual, family and community needs. Experience from the past decade demonstrates the necessity of the full participation by the entire community and grassroots organizations in the design and implementation of policies and programmes. This will ensure that programmes are relevant to local needs and in keeping with personal and social values. It will also promote social awareness of demographic problems.

11. Improving the status of women and enhancing their role is an important goal in itself and will also influence family life and size in a positive way. Community support is essential to bring about the full integration and participation of women into all phases and functions of the development process. Institutional, economic and cultural barriers must be removed and broad and swift action taken to assist women in attaining full equality with men in the social, political and economic life of their communities. To achieve this goal, it is necessary for men and women to share jointly responsibilities in areas such as family life, child-caring and family planning. Governments should formulate and implement concrete policies which would enhance the status and role of women.

12. Unwanted high fertility adversely affects the health and welfare of individuals and families, especially among the poor, and seriously impedes social and economic progress in many countries. Women and children are the main victims of unregulated fertility. Too many, too close, too early and too late pregnancies are a major cause of maternal, infant and childhood mortality and morbidity.

13. Although considerable progress has been made since Bucharest, millions of people still lack access to safe and effective family planning methods. By the year 2000 some 1 billion women will be of childbearing age, 1

on of them in developing countries. Major rights must be made now to ensure that all peoples or individuals can exercise their basic rights to decide freely, responsibly without coercion, the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so. In exercising this right, the best interests of their present and future children as well as the responsibility towards the community should be taken into account.

4. Although modern contraceptive technology has brought considerable progress into family planning programmes, increased funds are required in order to develop new methods and to improve the safety, efficacy and acceptability of existing methods. Extended research should also be undertaken in order to solve problems of infertility and subfertility.

5. As part of the overall goal to improve health standards for all people, special attention should be given to maternal and child health services within a primary health care system. Through breast-feeding, adequate nutrition, clean water, immunization programmes, oral rehydration therapy and birth spacing, a virtual revolution in child survival can be achieved. The impact would be dramatic in humanitarian and fertility terms.

6. The coming decades will see rapid changes in population structures with marked regional variations. The absolute numbers of children and youth in developing countries continue to rise so rapidly that special programmes will be necessary to respond to their needs and aspirations, including productive employment. Aging of populations is a phenomenon which many countries will experience. This issue requires attention particularly in developed countries in view of its social implications and the active contribution which can be made to the social, cultural and economic life in their countries.

7. Rapid urbanization will continue to be a dominant feature. By the end of the century, one billion people, 48 per cent of the world's population, might live in cities, frequently large cities. Integrated urban and rural development strategies should therefore be an essential part of population policies. They should be based on a full evaluation of the costs and benefits to individuals, groups and nations involved, should respect basic human rights and use incentives rather than restrictive measures.

8. The volumes and nature of international migratory movements continue to undergo rapid changes. Illegal or undocumented migration and refugee movements have gained particular importance; labour migration of considerable magnitude occurs in many regions. The outflow of skills remains a serious human resource problem in many developing countries. It is indispensable to safeguard the individual and social rights of persons involved and to protect them against exploitation and treatment not in conformity with basic human rights; it is also necessary to guide these different migration movements. To achieve this, the co-operation of countries of origin and destination and the assistance of international organizations are required.

19. As the years since 1974 have shown, the political commitment of Heads of State and other leaders and the willingness of Governments to take the lead in formulating population programmes and allocating the necessary resources are crucial for the further implementation of the World Population Plan of Action. Governments should attach high priority to the attainment of self-reliance in the management of such programmes, strengthen their administrative and managerial capabilities and ensure co-ordination of international assistance at the national level.

20. The years since Bucharest have also shown that international co-operation in the field of population is essential for the implementation of recommendations agreed upon by the international community and can be notably successful. The need for increased resources for population activities is emphasized. Adequate and substantial international support and assistance will greatly facilitate the efforts of Governments. It should be provided wholeheartedly and in a spirit of universal solidarity and enlightened self-interest. The United Nations family

should continue to perform its vital responsibilities.

21. Non-governmental organizations have a continuing important role in the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action and deserve encouragement and support from Governments and international organizations. Members of Parliament, community leaders, scientists, the media and others in influential positions are called upon to assist in all aspects of population and development work.

22. At Bucharest, the world was made aware of the gravity and magnitude of the population problems and their close interrelationship with economic and social development. The message of Mexico City is to forge ahead with effective implementation of the World Population Plan of Action aimed at improving standards of living and quality of life for all peoples of this planet in promotion of their common destiny in peace and security.

23. In issuing this Declaration, all participants at the International Conference on Population reiterate their commitment and rededicate themselves to the further implementation of the Plan. ■

The Challenge of Refugee Protection

by James N. Purcell, Jr.

Statement before the Executive Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva on October 9, 1984. Mr. Purcell is Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs.

May I begin by joining in the expressions of support and commendation we have heard for the High Commissioner [Poul Hartling]. Under his direction, the office of the High Commissioner has continued its excellent record of helping refugees throughout the world. The responsibilities of the High Commissioner are among the most important of those entrusted to the UN system. He deserves our recognition and appreciation.

Usually, our statement is a broad review of the High Commissioner's activities. The Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities with the proposed budget for 1985 deserves our full attention, as does the work of the Subcommittee on Protection and that of the Subcommittee on Administration and Finance. We will be following and participating fully in the discussion of these subjects.

The Importance of Protection

In the time available to me today, however, I wish to stress the paramount importance of refugee protection. While most of UNHCR's resources are applied in one form or another to vital assistance activities, and while governments continue to shoulder substantial burdens in support of refugee assistance and resettlement, protection is the essential underpinning of the international community's concern for refugees.

Without protection, no amount of material aid will be effective. It is the *sine qua non* of all other refugee programs: voluntary repatriation, where possible; assistance, including durable solutions; and third-country resettlement, where that is the only available alternative.

In today's troubled world, protection must encompass both the traditional norms of legal protection and the equally urgent need for physical protection of refugees.

For generations, legal protection has been the cornerstone of refugee status. UNHCR and its predecessor bodies have played a lead role in establishing the legal framework for refugee protection. The convention and the protocol set forth a basic structure of rules by which

refugees can establish their rights and, in the name of law, seek the protection of law. It is a noble structure, one which has served refugees and governments well.

In recent years, it has become increasingly—often tragically—evident that physical protection is an equally vital part of the High Commissioner's responsibilities. It does little good to inform a refugee of his rights and status if he is physically assaulted, mistreated, or is a victim of pirate attacks.

In short, protection undergirds all help for refugees. Without protection the refugees will not survive, assistance will not be viable, resettlement cannot begin. Protection is a responsibility that challenges all of us.

- It is a challenge to the UNHCR. Protection must draw on the full range of UNHCR's capabilities. We applaud the protection process for which UNHCR's leadership has major responsibility—especially in specific voluntary repatriation achievements and in other instances of patient, persistent maintenance of first asylum under difficult conditions.

- Protection is especially a challenge to the governments of countries in regions where refugees are concentrated. These countries must reconcile the urgent, often life-or-death needs of refugees with the traditional and fully justified requirements of their own populations. We must support particularly the many developing countries that have accepted this difficult responsibility in the humane spirit of the convention and protocol.

- The list of countries carrying substantial refugee responsibilities is a long one. It includes Pakistan, with millions of refugees from Afghanistan; Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, and the many other countries sheltering refugees in Africa; Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, which for many years have given asylum to refugees from Indochina; and the People's Republic of China, where over 250,000 refugees have been resettled.

- Some countries, like my own, are in a position to contribute the vital material resources that care for refugees and support the development of durable solutions. The same countries have accepted large numbers of refugees for third-country resettlement. We have long been engaged in the efforts to establish the framework for legal protection, and we recognize our obligation to act in defense of the legal and physical protection of refugees.

We also recognize the vital role of voluntary agency workers who are in closest contact with refugees and whose presence in troubled areas can often help ensure that refugees are safe.

At this time, I would like to pay personal tribute to the three men—my countrymen—who were awarded the Nansen Medal yesterday, in recognition of their exceptional heroism and courage in rescuing refugees in distress at sea. We honor the selfless actions of Captain Hiller and his crewmen, Mr. Kass and Mr. Turay, who shared in the award of the medal, and the rest of the crew members of the *Rose City* who came to the aid of 85 refugees lost in a storm at sea. We share in the hope, expressed by Captain Hiller and his men, and by those responsible for the award of the medal, that this public recognition will encourage others to come to the aid of refugees wherever and whenever they are in distress. The award of the Nansen Medal for 1984 symbolizes the vital need for physical protection for refugees.

The Need for Viable Solutions

Heroic acts are one way in which people who care can help. There is also a need for systems to assure the necessary followup and to seek viable, durable solutions for the refugees once their physical safety is assured.

Particularly relevant is the Rescue at Sea/Resettlement Offers or RASRO program, to provide assurances in advance that refugees rescued at sea will have onward resettlement opportunities and will not add to the refugee population of the first-asylum countries. The United States has announced its readiness to participate fully in RASRO. We are concerned that the initiation of RASRO has not yet occurred, and we urge other governments to join in making RASRO a viable refugee protection program.

The Disembarkation/Resettlement Offers or DISERO program provides resettlement offers for refugees rescued by ships of countries that are not themselves able to resettle refugees. Both these programs represent direct, creative responses to a specific protection-related need. They deserve the continued support and engagement of the international community.

A program in which my government has played an active role is the orderly departure program from Vietnam. Since its initiation following the boat refugee conference in Geneva in 1979, it has become established as a safe, legal alternative to the hazards of flight by sea.

We appreciate especially the important efforts of the High Commissioner and his office in facilitating the operation of this humanitarian program. We also appreciate the role UNHCR has played in arranging for resettlement countries to meet here in Geneva with representatives of the Vietnamese Government in order to resolve problems relating to orderly departure program. The results of such meetings over the past 3 years have led to significant improvements in the operation of the program.

Secretary of State Shultz announced on September 11 of this year two initiatives that we regard as significant steps toward the expansion of the orderly departure program as a means to a persons of special humanitarian concern.

- The Secretary declared that the United States will accept all Amerasian children and their close family members from Vietnam. This group is of particular concern to us, and we hope they will be permitted to come to the United States, if they so wish, over the next years.

- The Secretary also announced our intention to receive for admission to the United States the prisoners who have been confined in so-called re-education camps because of their past association with the former Republic of Vietnam and with U.S. programs in support of that government. This initiative has as its goal the departure from Vietnam of 10,000 of these persons, including the close family members, over the next 2 years. This group also is of special humanitarian concern to us, and we have expressed the hope that the authorities of Vietnam will respond positively to these appeals.

In our judgment, the orderly departure program continues to serve a useful purpose in offering a safe, legal alternative to the risks of flight by land or sea. A program such as this does not come to grips with the root causes of refugee flows, but it does serve the humanitarian function of easing their consequences. It is our hope and expectation that the orderly departure program will contribute, at least to some extent, to reducing the continued movement of refugees into the first-asylum countries of the region. That problem by no means resolved and will require continued international burdensharing for the resettlement of these refugees in third countries.

We call on UNHCR and concerned countries to make a special effort at this time regarding both protection for the refugees in Southeast Asia and lasting solutions for the refugee problems in the region. While support for third-country resettlement must continue, there must also be renewed efforts to develop other appropriate solutions—including voluntary repatriation. We suggest that the High Commissioner give consideration to appointing a permanent representative for the region: a respected senior person who will work full time to build confidence and achieve progress toward effective long-term solutions.

My government is gratified to note that there have been some limited attempts to come to grips with what has existed as a tragic and desperate political protection problem—pirate attacks against boat people in the South China Sea. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the actions of governments which cause the refugees to flee. I speak for all, I am sure, in condemning attacks on refugees—including many helpless women and children. We commend the governments of the region for cooperating with UNHCR in enforcement efforts which have resulted in the arrest and conviction of pirates. We hope these actions will continue and that they will have a deterrent effect. Donor countries, on the whole, have recognized the value of this vital effort and have kept up the level of their contributions. For those who have not rendered their contributions, I hope they will reconsider and participate in this vital protection program.

I have mentioned that refugee protection is a key component for any successful program of lasting solutions. The Second International Conference for Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) defined an approach to durable solutions in Africa which the United States supports fully. The success of the ICARA II process is highly dependent on the protection of refugees in Africa. The High Commissioner and staff, together with the other international agencies and governmental participants in ICARA II, are to be commended for having taken this large step forward in achieving durable solutions for refugees in Africa. We are encouraged that the momentum of the conference is being sustained through effective followup procedures. It is, indeed, time for solutions in Africa. But we can take heart that there is also ripe for solutions elsewhere. We look to the future, we may en-

visage a growing role for UNHCR in that most satisfactory of solutions—safe and voluntary repatriation. For voluntary repatriation to succeed, this may call for a more assertive role by the UNHCR, such as it undertook with respect to repatriation from Djibouti to Ethiopia. In Central America, it will mean establishing a presence in receiving countries and helping to build the confidence necessary for a viable returnee program—for example, from Mexico and from Honduras. We encourage the High Commissioner to respond positively to the signs of promise which we continue to see in Africa, which we begin to see in Central America, and which I hope we may see elsewhere—including Southeast Asia—and to seize the opportunities to which these signs may point.

Although the solution of preference for refugee problems is voluntary repatriation, the solution *de facto* in many instances is local settlement. The convention and protocol provide considerable codification of the practical measures which are essential for refugee settlement to succeed, such as access to land, social services, and professional and business licenses. Since international resources are increasingly being shifted from care and maintenance of refugees to durable solutions, we hope that, at the same time, full regard will be given to these kinds of refugee rights which are so important to successful settlement.

Although all refugees are needy people, not all needy people are refugees. Receiving countries should avoid, on the one hand, the extreme of denying refugee status to those who have a well-founded fear of persecution or of lightly providing the mantle of refugee status, on the other hand, to those who are fleeing economic or climatic situations, criminal prosecution, and other conditions which may warrant material assistance but which do not warrant refugee status.

Indiscriminate extension of refugee status, often on a group basis, to such people weakens both the international community's support and the role of the High Commissioner. Such actions also jeopardize the safety and well-being of true refugees who are fleeing persecution.

Turning briefly to some other aspects of the High Commissioner's programs, we must face the reality that, for large numbers of refugees, care and maintenance will continue to be required for long periods. In these situations there may be opportunities for more

thorough evaluations of cost effectiveness, sharing of lessons learned, and improved coordination of the activities of implementing partners. We have seen examples where such evaluations have led promptly to good results. Performance standards for implementing agencies as detailed in UNHCR handbooks should be the criteria for continued involvement of agencies. It should also provide the basis for UNHCR quality control and direction with respect to these private agencies. We look to the UNHCR as the responsible agency to ensure that camp management and camp operations, as well as the related assistance and protection operations, go well.

My delegation notes with approval the continued devolution of responsibility from UNHCR headquarters to the field, with improved support to field operations. Enhanced incentives should encourage UNHCR's most able personnel to seek field postings where much of the most important refugee work is done. It is hoped that the new Director for Field Affairs will help to establish the primacy of field operations, as recommended by the Administrative Management Study. It is essential that strong performers of all ranks be attracted by the opportunities and challenges of field service.

Another area of progress over the last year for which the High Commissioner should receive special recognition is the improvement in his emergency response capability. A promising system has been put in place. We are not yet convinced that UNHCR is using its new emergency response capability to the best advantage. We still see the need for a clear definition of how the emergency unit fits into UNHCR's regular structure during a crisis. Questions remain about standard procedures to determine in emergencies how many refugees need help and what their needs are. We call on the High Commissioner to resolve these issues and to ensure the fullest use of his emergency response capability.

Conclusion

I have dwelt at length on assistance, but I am drawn back to my underlying theme—the core of effective assistance and viable solutions is protection. If refugees are not safe from danger of whatever kind, material assistance will be little consolation and durable solutions are made more difficult.

Perhaps too often in those meetings, we are unable to make the real connection between frightened, desperate people whom we seek to help and the means which we have to help them. This year's Nansen award reminds us of the reality of refugees' need for protection. Permit me to close with the words of a crew member of the *Rose City* who made that connection. Here is what was written.

On the night of September 23rd the refugees were disembarked into the hands of the United Nations in Singapore. We watched the refugees walk down our gangway to the waiting launches and the first day of their new lives, knowing they had given us as much as we them. They owed us nothing; the ledger of human gratitude was balanced. For it is rare in this profession that one is touched by something warm, fundamentally human; memories are seldom cherished as the various ships, ports, shipmates, and voyages collectively blur in the passing years. But for us the memory of the night of September 21, 1983 will remain with crystal clarity. For what we all saw and felt and did transcends the "best tradition of the sea." It made us proud of our fellow man, and bathed us in the love of one human for another. Even the ship herself, the *Rose City*, displayed her compassion for these courageous refugees as she nudged her enormous bulk alongside a swimming child so that one of her crew could pluck him from the sea to begin a new life.

One of the final entries in the deck logbook of the *Rose City* for September 23, 1983, reads, "2350—All refugees disembarked, God bless them." ■

1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, OCT. 19, 1984¹

I have today signed into law H.R. 6311, the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism. This act will provide resources and authorities essential in countering the insidious threat terrorism poses to those who cherish freedom and democracy. International terrorism is a growing problem for all of us in the Western world—not just the United States. While we in the Western democracies are most often the targets, terrorist attacks are becoming increasingly violent and indiscriminate. Since the first of September, there have been 41 separate terrorist attacks by no fewer than 14 terrorist groups against the citizens and property of 21 nations. Sixteen of these were attacks against individual citizens, and 18 of these were bombings or attempted bombings in which innocent third parties were victimized.

This nation bears global responsibilities that demand that we maintain a worldwide presence and not succumb in these cowardly attempts at intimidation. In several important ways, this act will enable us to improve our ability to pro-

tect those who serve our country overseas.

- It authorizes payment of reward for information concerning terrorist acts.
- It provides for the authorization of \$356 million of urgently needed security enhancements for U.S. missions abroad.

I am grateful that the Congress responded swiftly to my request for these authorities and resources. This is an important step in our multiyear effort to counter the pervasive threat international terrorism poses to our diplomatic personnel and facilities overseas. The act complements other actions now under review and separate measures taken with our allies aimed at significantly improving our ability to thwart this menace to mankind. While none of these steps guarantee that terrorism acts will not occur again, we be certain that the measures made possible by this act will make such attacks more difficult in the future.

¹Made on signing H.R. 6311 into law which, as enacted, is Public Law 98-533 from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 22, 1984). ■

Secretary Shultz Visits Central America and Mexico

Secretary Shultz departed Washington, D.C., October 10, 1984, to visit El Salvador (October 10), Panama (October 11) where he headed the U.S. delegation at the inauguration of President Blas Arditio Barletta, and Mexico (October 11-12). On his return to Washington on October 12, he stopped in Juan, Puerto Rico, to meet with John Paul II.

Following are the Secretary's remarks made on various occasions during his trip.

INITIAL REMARKS. EL SALVADOR, OCT. 10, 1984¹

Minister, thank you so much for greeting. It is very generous of you to come out here to the airport to greet me and my wife, along with your wife. It is an act of friendship that I deeply appreciate. You referred to momentous events, and I want to read to you a statement that President Reagan has made within the hour.

Congratulate President Duarte for his courage and foresight. His offer to meet with me next week with the guerrillas without preconditions and without arms, to discuss their participation in the democratic system in El Salvador is an act of friendship. I applaud his leadership and his decision. It appears as though the guerrillas have accepted President Duarte's offer. If only the comandantes in Nicaragua would make the same offer to the resistance there, we would all be much closer to peace in Central America.

Now we are here at the time of momentous events in the history of this country. President Duarte has offered to meet with La Palma to meet, without preconditions and without arms, the guerrillas who have plagued this country. This is an act of great courage and in pursuit of peace and national reconciliation. His initiative has our united support. President Duarte has demonstrated that his purpose is peace; his cause is the future of his country, and in the service of that cause it is shown that he is prepared to take risks.

We have every reason to rejoice in the course of events in this nation. The current situation contrasts dramatically with the situation which prevailed in the past and I think back to the time when I became Secretary of State. Two

years ago many still doubted that democracy had a future in Central America, and some even thought communism was the wave of the future. Today thinking citizens in my own country and around the world have seen in El Salvador what hard work and a dedication to democratic ideals can accomplish.

President Duarte has been elected the constitutional President of all Salvadorans in the most open and honest elections in Salvadoran history. I might say, with a turnout that would be startling if it occurred in the United States. General Vides Casanova has brought new standards of probity and professionalism to the armed forces and security organizations.

Today no one disputes the progress that has been achieved and, although many hurdles remain, this is a moment of great promise and you have shown the initiative, the will, and the courage to prevail. Through democracy, justice, and the tenacity of courageous patriots, you have achieved what few thought possible and you have our admiration and support as you move forward toward the most difficult but attainable goal—a lasting peace for El Salvador.

JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE. SAN SALVADOR, OCT. 10, 1984²

Q. What are the terms or objectives of the La Palma meeting next week?

President Duarte. First of all, it is to present the guerrillas with an opportunity to incorporate themselves into the democratic process, according to the Constitution. This—and I want to make sure that everybody understands—has nothing to do with the participation of power, because power belongs to the people and only through a democratic electoral process is there a method to obtain power, not through guns and violence. This has to be very clearly understood.

Second, I guarantee personally—and I have ordered the commander of the region to keep all the soldiers of the area in the fort—that I will go without any protection; whether the guerrillas have arms or not, I will go to La Palma.

Third, I declared many months ago that I was ready to propose a solution on a national basis to discuss the problem in the country among and between

Salvadorans with no one else involved. Therefore, on this basis, I have asked the church, the Archbishop—Monsignor Rivera y Damas—and Monsignor Rosas to be the intermediaries for the arrangement of the details of this first meeting. For this first meeting, the guerrillas have asked that I should go with the whole high command of the army. Let me say that I am the Commander General of the army. Therefore, according to the Constitution, I represent the army. I will select the people who will accompany me in this discussion. They have also established certain other conditions—for example, that they will select their own guerrillas and people representing the FDR [Revolutionary Democratic Front], thinking that I will be against that. I am not against anybody who wants to participate, if they select them themselves, because that is also part of the democratic process.

Next is the participation of the press and the people. I have said that I will go by myself without any protection whatsoever. If you want to come along with me, I welcome you to come along. Also if the people want to go to the town, the town is part of our territory and is open to everybody. I think I have given you the overall picture. Specifically, I will ask the guerrilla people to make a total declaration whether they stand for violence or whether they stand for democracy. This is the main thing.

Q. Who will be accompanying you from the high military command?

President Duarte. I will select the people who will go along with me. I will make the decision later on.

Q. Have you spoken with any of the guerrilla representatives, either here or in Mexico, before or after your decision to meet with them?

President Duarte. No. I have not spoken with anybody. I have already asked the Bishop to do whatever is necessary to establish the contact.

Q. Have there been contacts with the Bishop?

President Duarte. I don't know.

Q. Did the U.S. Government recommend this meeting with the guerrillas in La Palma, Mr. Shultz? And for Mr. Duarte, did the armed forces and the high military command know about your plans to meet with the guerrillas, and will there be military representatives?

Secretary Shultz. This decision, as far as the United States was concerned, was a decision of President Duarte's. We are delighted to support him in what he has decided to do because we think it is a move toward peace—and peace and stability and justice are what we seek, just as he seeks it.

President Duarte. In reply to the second part of your question, I want you to know that 2 days before I notified the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defense that from that moment on they should begin informing the military commanders. The day of my speech, at 3:00 a.m., I called the Minister of Defense so that by 7 o'clock that morning he would be at my house to read it half an hour before he was scheduled to leave the country. In this way, my statement was passed on, and I assumed the full responsibility of this decision.

In addition, I should tell you that besides the military, I also informed the political parties and the Cabinet so that they too would know about this matter. The other part of the question, about whether the high command will be accompanying me to La Palma—just as the guerrillas have asked in their proposal—the answer is no.

I will choose my own personal representatives; it may be that among them military personnel will be present, but they will not go as members of the armed forces, only as my own advisers in these proposals, which are political proposals, and for which I assume the entire responsibility.

Q. Do any preconditions exist in your talks with the guerrillas?

President Duarte. As I have already explained, as President of the Republic, I cannot accept any conditions concerning the sovereignty of the country. Within this context, what I have done is given the appropriate orders to the Chief of Staff, General of the Joint Armed Forces, and to the Minister of Defense, to instruct Commander Colonel Ochoa so that his troops will remain in their barracks on that day and thus leave the area in total liberty so that I can go there without any protection.

Q. The United States has contributed enormously in El Salvador's fight to eradicate the guerrillas. The United States has also affirmed that there are problems of injustice. Therefore, will the United States put pressure on El Salvador to sanction the death [sic] squads which are still at large?

Secretary Shultz. President Duarte has spoken very clearly many times on the importance of a strong system of justice and law and against death squads, and we will support President Duarte fully in his effort to improve and perfect the system of justice and to eliminate death squads.

ARRIVAL REMARKS. PANAMA CITY, OCT. 10, 1984³

On behalf of President Reagan and of the people of the United States, I am happy to be here in Panama to witness the inauguration of Dr. Barletta as Panama's President. My pleasure is all the greater because President-elect Barletta is a long-time and respected friend. His inauguration offers to Panamanians of all political persuasions a new opportunity for progress and national development.

We intend to work closely with Dr. Barletta as he strives to strengthen the democratic process at home, to address Panama's economic needs, and to continue Panama's contributions to the search for peace throughout Central America.

The destinies of our two countries have long been bound together. Having just successfully passed the 5-year mark laid down in the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, we can take pride in the enduring relationship that has developed over the years between our peoples. We are partners in operating a canal that is a vital link in our international transportation network. We are two neighbors who have shown the world that we can successfully resolve the most complicated and important of issues by means of skillful negotiation and full implementation of agreements.

For a region troubled by conflict and violence, this message—negotiations work—is an important message. Only serious and thorough negotiations protecting the fundamental interests of all the parties involved will bring genuine and abiding peace to Central America. As the founding host of what is now known as the Contadora process, Panama has played a central role in efforts to achieve a strong and abiding settlement. We support the efforts of Panama and its colleagues. We are confident that, over time, regional peace and development can be achieved by democratic means and by cooperation in the defense of democracy.

Again it is with a sense of person warmth and friendship that I look forward to witness the inauguration of Dr. Barletta.

NEWS CONFERENCE. PANAMA CITY, OCT. 11, 1984⁴

I want to say what a great pleasure it has been for me personally to be a witness at the inauguration of President Barletta, and I might say that I was stirred by his address this morning. It seems to me that he has set out a program and a standard for this country. As far as the United States is concerned, we look forward to working closely with the Government of Panama, and, of course, we encourage very strongly the movement in the direction of democracy and the establishment of democracy here as in other parts of the hemisphere.

I also had the occasion while here, of course, to have a private meeting with Dr. Barletta and with General Mejia this morning with President Betancur [of Colombia] and President Monge [of Costa Rica]. And you know in these meetings, in addition to discussions about matters of interest between the respective countries and the United States, we talked about the importance of the Contadora process and our mutual concern to see that it move forward to a successful conclusion and give us a result that will truly work. And I think it has been quite worthwhile, at least from my standpoint, to have had those discussions with those gentlemen and I look forward to continued work with them.

Q. Do you believe that the draft treaty as written is imbalanced in Nicaragua's favor? And if so why?

A. I think from my conversation with the other Central American countries involved, it's clear that they think that improvements are desirable and possible. I think we all share the view that a tremendous amount has been accomplished and so, with all of that accomplishment behind us, it is only sensible to try to bring about those improvements that will make the document into something truly workable. And I'm expressing what seems to us to be sensible but really also reflecting what people from the other countries involved have said.

Q. How would you describe the opinion of some of the regional leaders you've talked to concerning recommendations the United States has to change the current draft treaty?

A. We've made some general comments, but basically the countries involved in the Contadora process are the ones that are shaping this, so it isn't so much a question of us putting out something and people reacting to it but rather a question of people discussing together and then each country expressing its views, and then each country has to decide for itself what it wants to say about this proposal. After all, it's a proposal that was put forward and comments were asked for and so, at least as I understand it, each of the countries is probably making some.

Q. Could you tell us whether President Betancur was able to give any indication of a change in position by the guerrillas in El Salvador that would indicate that next week's meeting would produce some concrete results?

A. We discussed the meeting and he talked about some of his perceptions about some of the ideas that he has about it should be conducted. And I talked with him what President Duarte said publicly yesterday about the meeting, and I am sure that both of us will support the initiative that President Duarte has taken. We hope it will be successful and, to the extent that anything either country can do as individuals can do to help bring that about, we'll do. But, of course, as President Duarte has emphasized, this is essentially something that he is doing within the framework of El Salvador, and he is determined to do his best to bring this out and he will have our full support.

Q. Do President Betancur and the Guatemalan President agree that the Contadora agreement can be negotiated over a long period of time, or do they believe that it should be quickened, with just a little adjustment?

A. I don't want to try to speak for them as individuals, and they'll say what they believe. But I think that someone that I've talked to shares the view that we need to see a workable *acta* produced as soon as possible, because peace and stability are needed and wanted, and the sooner we can get there the better. At the same time, I think there is a recognition that it's important, particularly having come this far, that anything that is agreed upon be genuinely work-

able so that it produces the results that everyone seeks and doesn't turn out to be just a piece of paper. We want something that works, and we share that point of view very strongly. The sooner peace and stability can come to Central America, the better we're all going to like it.

Q. Would you describe the controls and the proposed mechanisms that would satisfy your government, and would you propose the involvement of the Organization of American States (OAS)?

A. There are various proposals to strengthen the general idea that seems to be agreed on that there must be a verification process. Now there are lots of different ways to do that, and people are trying to find and describe the kind of detail that would do the job. I don't want to particularly try to put forward any approach to that, except that you have to go beyond the general principle of agreeing on verification—into the sort of detailing of precisely how it would work, how it would get set up, agreeing to do it that way—so that you can see that the general principle will really become a reality. That's the real point.

NEWS CONFERENCE. MEXICO CITY, OCT. 11, 1984⁵

It's always a privilege to meet with President De la Madrid, and this evening we've had a couple of hours of very constructive and worthwhile discussions. I would say a good portion of the total amount of time was spent in discussing the Contadora process and the balance in discussing various aspects of the bilateral relations between the United States and Mexico.

I think I can say very clearly at the end of a searching discussion and sharing of views about developments in Central America that we both agree that a great deal has been accomplished in the Contadora process, that there are some additional things that need to be done, and that we both believe that it's important to work on these things with a real sense of thrust and with an effort which we both feel is important to try to bring things to a conclusion, because we both want to see, and we all want to see, of course, peace and stability in this region. So that is what we are pledged to do. And Ambassador Shlaudeman was present and took part in the discussion—and, of course, he is the key individual

as far as actually getting out and around the working on this from the standpoint of the United States.

On the bilateral side, we discussed certain trade and investment issues. We took note of the fact that there is a meeting of experts to take place—I think it's October 19 in Mexico—and we both will try to give a little push to those processes and try to see if some of the issues in that field can be resolved. We took notice of the very good collaboration that's taken place in the field of finance between our respective finance ministries and central banks. I think it's been a very fruitful association. We sort of cruised over some of the border issues, and we'll discuss them tomorrow at breakfast with Secretary Sepulveda and other colleagues.

And so we examined quite a wide variety of such issues and I think both feel that, recognizing that there are always outstanding problems, nevertheless, that we have developed a good capacity to work on them and resolve them and take up new ones. The relationship between the United States and Mexico is receiving a lot of priority in both countries. I must say the respect of President Reagan for President De la Madrid—and it seems vice versa—is very strong. On this basis of mutual respect of two great and large countries that live right next to each other, it's a very good thing to be able to say that these relationships are in fine shape.

Q. I would like to ask why the United States has objected to the "acta" of Contadora.

A. The U.S. view is not to object but, quite to the contrary, to observe that the present *acta* represents a tremendous achievement: to have gone through a set of principles—21 principles—and start to get them turned into something operational. We do think, and from the discussions that I've had with practically all the countries involved here in the last week and a half, that there are some further things to be done. But there's a tremendous amount already achieved, and so that gives hope that perhaps a conclusion can finally be reached. We'd like to see that.

Q. I would like to know what the United States is really prepared to do to support the pacification process of Contadora?

A. First we're giving the whole process and the area a tremendous amount of attention; and one of the most outstanding diplomats, U.S. Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, has been given the assignment of working on this—spending all of his time on it.

Second, we have devoted a great deal of attention, President Reagan has, to this set of issues—it is the only set of issues outside his times of addressing our Congress at the annual State of the Union time, that he's addressed a joint session of Congress on this issue. He has appointed a bipartisan commission to look into it, headed by Henry Kissinger, and their report, which was a unanimous report, has been put forward by the President in the form of legislation. And not in all the detail, but to a very broad extent, the Congress has now voted general support for the ideas involved. And among the things that are involved are: number one, what has been called the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which provides unusual access to the U.S. market for countries in the region and, in terms of economic support through the appropriations process, very large sums of money that are available to help in the process of economic development. We think that social reform and economic development are the heart of solving the problems of Central America. And we've been seeking to do everything we can to bring about democratic participation in government, the operation of the rule of law, and opportunities for economic development in the region.

Q. You said that there was an agreement on both sides that there was a need for additional changes in the draft of the Contadora proposal. Can you tell us on what specific issues you agreed that there should be changes? In other words, what did you and Mr. De la Madrid agree should be changed?

A. We observed that the countries of Central America are in the process of making comments and some of them have sent in comments, so those are matters that need to be dealt with. And we talked about the general nature of the comments and, broadly speaking—and I don't want to try to speak for President De la Madrid on this—we think they fall under the general categories of verification and simultaneity.

¹Press release 222 of Oct. 15, 1984.

²Press release 225 of Oct. 16. Some questions have been paraphrased, as noted in original.

³Press release 223 of Oct. 15.

⁴Press release 233 of Oct. 17.

⁵Press release 234 of Oct. 12. ■

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Buenos Aires July 7, 1981.¹
Notification of acceptance: Chile, Oct. 17, 1984.

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S., Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited: Panama, Oct. 10, 1984.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1983, with annexes. Done at London Sept. 16, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1, 1983.
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, Oct. 2, 1984.

Commodities

Agreement establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules. Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.¹
Signature: Djibouti, Oct. 9, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Bhutan, Sept. 18, 1984.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978; for the U.S., Mar. 18, 1982.
Accession deposited: Iran, Aug. 16, 1984.

Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. TIAS 9614.
Ratification deposited: Brazil, Oct. 12, 1984.

Financial Institutions

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1–22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1–22, 1944. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptances deposited: Mozambique, Sept. 24, 1984.

Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.²
Signature: Argentina, Feb. 2, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Argentina, Sept. 5, 1984.³

International Labor Organization

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Adopted by the International Labor Conference at Montreal, Oct. 9, 1946. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1948. TIAS 1.
Acceptance deposited: Solomon Islands, May 28, 1984.

Judicial Procedure

Inter-American convention on letters rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 1975. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976.²
Ratification deposited: Venezuela, Oct. 4, 1984.³

Law, Private International

Statute of The Hague conference on private international law. Done at The Hague Oct. 9–31, 1951. Entered into force July 1955; for the U.S. Oct. 15, 1964. TIAS 5.
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 8, 1984.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Notification of succession deposited: Dominica, Aug. 10, 1984.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, Nov. 1, 1984.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Sept. 5, 1970, except for Arts. 1–1 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 7727.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, Sept. 28, 1984.

Property—Industrial-Classification

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the U.S., Feb. 29, 1984.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, Aug. 9, 1984.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S., Aug. 25, 1971. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Venezuela, Aug. 25, 1984.

d Cross

Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3362.

Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3363.

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3364.

Geneva convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war. Done at Geneva Aug. 12, 1949. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; for the U.S., Feb. 2, 1956. TIAS 3365.

Reservations deposited: Angola, Sept. 20, 1984;¹ Belize, June 29, 1984; Guinea, July 11, 1984.²
Notification of succession: Western Samoa, Aug. 1, 1984.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.²

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.²

Reservations deposited: Togo, June 21, 1984.
Reservations deposited: Angola, Sept. 20, 1984;¹ Belize, June 29, 1984; Central African Republic, July 17, 1984; Guinea, July 11, 1984; Western Samoa, Aug. 23, 1984.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S., Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

Reservation deposited: Haiti, Sept. 25, 1984.

Satellites—Program-Carrying Signals

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974. Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979.²
State advice and consent to ratification: U.S., Dec. 12, 1984.

Unarmed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7777.
Reservation deposited: Mexico, Mar. 23, 1984.⁵

Seals—North Pacific

1984 protocol amending the interim convention of Feb. 9, 1957, as amended and extended, on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948, 5558, 8368, 10020), with statement. Signed at Washington Oct. 12, 1984. Enters into force on the date on which instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited by all the signatory governments.

Signatories: Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R., U.S.

BILATERAL**Bangladesh**

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 8, 1982, for the sale of agricultural commodities (TIAS 10483). Effected by exchange of letters at Dhaka Oct. 3, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1984.

Brazil

Agreement amending agreement of Mar. 31, 1982 (TIAS 10369), as amended, relating to trade in cotton and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Oct. 19 and 24, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1984.

Canada

Agreement concerning an experimental transborder air service program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 21, 1984.

Costa Rica

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 22, 1983, for the sale of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose July 3 and 27, 1984. Entered into force July 27, 1984.

Dominican Republic

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1983, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 24 and Oct. 3, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 3, 1984.

Egypt

Grant agreement to promote economic and political stability. Signed at Cairo Sept. 26, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1984.

Project grant agreement concerning wastewater collection and treatment system (Cairo Sewerage II). Signed at Cairo Sept. 26, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1984.

European Economic Community

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annex and agreed minute. Signed at Washington Oct. 1, 1984. Enters into force upon an exchange of notes following completion of the internal procedures of both parties.

Guatemala

Agreement for the sales of agricultural commodities, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Guatemala Aug. 1, 1984. Entered into force: Sept. 28, 1984.

Italy

Agreement concerning taxation of income by some U.S. Navy employees in Italy. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome July 24, 1982. Entered into force: Sept. 28, 1984; effective Jan. 1, 1982.

Japan

Agreement amending the arrangement of Aug. 17, 1979, concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles, as extended and amended with record of discussion (TIAS 9564, 10484). Signed at Washington Sept. 28, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1984.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26, 1979, as amended and extended (TIAS 9419, 10324, 10446), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Sept. 26 and 28, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1984.

New Zealand

Memorandum of understanding concerning international express mail service, with detailed regulations. Signed at Wellington and Washington Aug. 1 and 20, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1984.

Norway

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Oslo and Washington July 5 and Aug. 10, 1984. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1984.

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 26, 1970 (TIAS 6836), relating to safeguarding of classified information. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo Sept. 27, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1984.

Peru

Project agreement for disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction projects. Signed at Lima July 20, 1983, as amended Sept. 30 and Oct. 17, 1983, and Mar. 30, 1984. Entered into force July 20, Sept. 30, Oct. 17, 1983, and Mar. 30, 1984, respectively.

Loan agreement to provide foreign exchange to relieve balance-of-payments pressure. Signed at Lima May 11, 1984. Entered into force May 11, 1984.

Romania

Agreement extending the agreement of June 4, 1976, as amended, on maritime transport (TIAS 8254, 9531). Effected by exchange of notes at Bucharest Aug. 30 and Sept. 20, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 20, 1984; effective Aug. 30, 1984.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement extending the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13, 1975 (TIAS 8072), as amended and extended. Signed at Washington Sept. 25, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1984; effective Feb. 13, 1985.

Sweden

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates, inheritances, and gifts. Signed at Stockholm June 13, 1983. Entered into force Sept. 5, 1984.
Ratifications exchanged: Sept. 5, 1984.

Thailand

Memorandum of understanding for technical cooperation in agricultural development. Signed at Washington Sept. 19, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1984.

Uruguay

Administrative arrangement for a visa system relating to trade in certain textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo Aug. 24 and Sept. 13, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 13, 1984.

Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 30, 1983, and Jan. 23, 1984, concerning exports of certain textile products manufactured in Uruguay to the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo Aug. 24 and Sept. 13, 1984. Entered into force Sept. 13, 1984.

Zambia

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Lusaka July 17, 1984. Entered into force July 17, 1984.

¹Not in force.

²Not in force for the U.S.

³With reservation(s).

⁴Angola acceded, with reservations, to Protocol I only.

⁵With statement. ■

Correction: The entry under United Kingdom in the November 1984 issue of the BULLETIN should read as follows:
Agreement concerning the Cayman Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of letters at London July 26, 1984. Entered into force Aug. 29, 1984.

October 1984

This monthly chronology is being discontinued. Beginning with the January 1985 issue, it will be replaced by a listing of some of the significant official U.S. foreign policy actions and statements during the month not reported elsewhere in the *Bulletin*, under the heading "End Notes."

October 1

The U.S. Supreme Court upholds a ruling allowing the U.S. Government to bar U.S. business companies from complying with an Arab boycott of Israel.

October 2

Lebanese Prime Minister Karami asks Secretary Shultz for U.S. assistance in removing Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.

October 3-4

At Geneva consultations on the UN's orderly departure program, U.S. officials present Vietnam with President Reagan's proposals for accepting Asian-American children and "re-education camp" prisoners into the U.S.

October 3

Ambassador Shlaudeman and Assistant Secretary Motley meet with Nicaraguan leader, Daniel Ortega, in New York.

October 8-10

Israeli Prime Minister Peres makes an official working visit to Washington, D.C., to meet with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, and Secretary Shultz.

October 9

President Reagan pledges U.S. cooperation for Israeli's economic revitalization plan.

Congress approves an international trade bill that renews tariff benefits for 140 developing countries and authorizes President Reagan to negotiate a U.S.-Israel free-trade agreement.

AID Administrator McPherson announces the establishment of a special task force to coordinate the U.S. response to a continuing food "disaster" situation in Africa.

The U.S. calls on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to conduct a special international effort to help refugees in Southeast Asia.

October 10-12

Secretary Shultz travels to El Salvador (Oct. 10) to meet with President Duarte, Panama (Oct. 10-11) where he headed the U.S. delegation at the inauguration of President Barletta, and Mexico (Oct. 11-12) for discussions with President De la Madrid. On his return to Washington on Oct. 12, he stopped in Puerto Rico to meet with Pope John Paul II.

October 12

The International Court of Justice rules on the maritime boundary dispute between the

U.S. and Canada over the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank. The Court awards each side about half of the disputed area.

UN Security Council votes to extend U.S. forces in southern Lebanon for 6 months. The vote was 13 to 0 with the U.S.S.R. and Ukraine abstaining.

October 14

Libya makes an official protest to the U.S. concerning the arrest of two Libyan students. The U.K. also receives a protest from Libya regarding one Libyan student under arrest.

October 15-16

Secretary Shultz visits Toronto to meet with Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Clark.

October 16

President Reagan issues a proclamation observing Oct. 16, 1984, as World Food Day. South African Bishop Desmond Tutu is awarded the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize.

October 17

The U.S., Canada, France, and Soviet Union sign an agreement to continue until 1990 a satellite system used in air and sea rescue.

UN General Assembly votes 80 to 41, with 22 abstentions and 15 members not participating in the vote, to reject Iran's third attempt in 3 years to challenge the credentials of Israel's delegation in the Assembly.

October 19

President Reagan signs the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism. The act authorizes payment of rewards for information on terrorism and provides \$356 million to enhance security at U.S. missions abroad.

State Department acting spokesman Romberg confirms that all U.S. dependents have temporarily departed from Beirut.

U.S. gives 32,000 tons of additional disaster relief food aid to drought-stricken Ethiopia.

VOA celebrates its 25th anniversary of its special English programs broadcast worldwide seven times a day, 7 days a week. News and features are the most popular of these programs which are designed for listeners learning English or for whom English is a second language. China has the largest audience for the special English programs.

October 20

U.S. reduces the size of its U.S. Embassy staff in Beirut as a result of continuing security threats. These temporary measures are pending security enhancement and embassy reorganization.

October 22

U.S. gives \$1 million to UNICEF for assistance to drought victims in Ethiopia.

October 23

President Reagan designates Oct. 23, 1984, as "A Time of Remembrance" for victims of terrorism worldwide.

PRESS RELEASES

UN Security Council adopts a resolution ending the immediate end to apartheid and unconditional release of all political prisoners in South Africa. The vote was 14 to 1 with the U.S. abstaining.

October 24

President Reagan designates Oct. 24 as United Nations Day.

October 26-27

Foreign and defense ministers from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the U.K., and West Germany meet in Rome. On Oct. 27 the European members of the Atlantic alliance announce plans to reorganize the Western European Union in hopes of increasing European influence with NATO on issues of disarmament and weapons procure-

October 26

Secretary Shultz meets with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department to discuss matters of mutual interest. The UN General Assembly adopts, by consensus, a resolution calling on the five major American governments to speed up negotiations with the Contadora group and to make a treaty.

October 29-30

U.S. Ambassador Shlaudeman meets with Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Manzanillo, Mexico, for the seventh day of bilateral talks in support of the Contadora process.

October 29

Secretary Shultz meets with Dr. Arturo Cruz and other members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator Group.

October 30

President Reagan signs the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. A vote of 110 to 22, with 18 abstentions, the UN General Assembly calls on Cambodia to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.

October 31

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is assassinated by two Sikh members of her personal bodyguard. Her son Rajiv Gandhi is sworn in as India's sixth Prime Minister. The Department spokesman Hughes announces a travel advisory to U.S. citizens regarding travel to India due to reports of violence following the assassination. At the UN General Assembly's First Committee, the U.S. restates its call on the Soviet Union to begin talks for a totally verifiable ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons. U.S. Deputy Director Emery, U.S. Representative to the committee, says the U.S. is "willing to do whatever is necessary to successfully conclude an effective and verifiable chemical weapons ban, a ban which will advance the cause of peace, of human rights, and the security of all nations." ■

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
208	10/1	Shultz: interview on "This Week With David Brinkley," Sept. 30.
*209	10/4	South Pacific prospecting to continue under agreement signed Sept. 19 by Australia, New Zealand, and U.S.
*210	10/4	U.S.-China meeting on fisheries, Sept. 24-25.
*211	10/4	Program for the official working visit to Washington, D.C., of Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Oct. 8-10.
*212	10/9	Shultz: remarks following Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's address before UN General Assembly, Sept. 27.
213	10/9	Shultz: news conference, New York, Sept. 28.
*214	10/11	Shultz: remarks at luncheon for Latin American and Caribbean officials, New York, Oct. 5.
*215	10/11	Carl E. Dillery sworn in as Ambassador to Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Kiribati, Oct. 5. (biographic data).
*216	10/12	J. Stapleton Roy sworn in as Ambassador to Singapore, Oct. 11 (biographic data).
*217	10/12	Shultz: remarks at luncheon for Gulf Cooperation Council officials, New York, Oct. 1.
*218	10/12	Shultz: remarks at luncheon for ASEAN officials, New York, Oct. 2.
*219	10/12	Shultz: remarks at luncheon for OAU officials, New York, Oct. 4.
*220	10/12	Protocol extending the Convention of North Pacific Fur Seals signed by Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R., and U.S.
*221	10/15	Shultz: news conference, New York, Sept. 24.
222	10/15	Shultz: arrival remarks, San Salvador, Oct. 10.
223	10/15	Shultz: arrival remarks, Panama City, Oct. 10.
*224	10/15	Shultz: interview on "The Today Show."
225	10/16	Shultz, Duarte: joint news conference, San Salvador, Oct. 10.
*226	10/16	Charles R. Carlisle named special negotiator with the rank of Ambassador, Oct. 10 (biographic data).
*227	10/17	Dam: remarks on behalf of the Secretary at the opening of the Grenada documents collection at the National Archives.
*228	10/18	Shultz: remarks (and question-and-answer session) before the Chamber of Commerce International Forum, Oct. 17.
229	10/18	Shultz: address before the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Los Angeles.
*229A	10/22	Shultz: question-and-answer session following Rand/UCLA address, Oct. 18.
*230	10/18	Shultz: interview for <i>Biznet</i> , Oct. 17.
231	10/18	Shultz: address before the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Oct. 19.
*231A	10/22	Shultz: question-and-answer session following World Affairs Council address, Oct. 19.
232	10/17	Shultz: arrival statement, Toronto, Oct. 15.
233	10/17	Shultz: news conference, Panama City, Oct. 11.
234	10/12	Shultz: news conference, Mexico City, Oct. 11.
*235	10/22	Shultz: interview on "Meet the Press," Oct. 21.
236	10/22	Shultz: remarks before the National Assembly of the Soviet Union, Nov. 9.
*237	10/22	U.S. officials to meet with ITU Secretary General R.E. Butler, Oct. 24.
238	10/19	Shultz, Clark: joint news conference, Toronto, Oct. 16.
*239	10/16	U.S. telecommunications delegation to visit Mexico City, Oct. 30-31.
240	10/24	Shultz: toast, Toronto, Oct. 15.
*241	10/26	Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, Nov. 9.
242	10/25	Shultz: address before the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York.
*242A	10/29	Shultz: question-and-answer session following Park Avenue Synagogue address, Oct. 25.

*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

PUBLICATIONS

Department of State

Free **single** copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Free **multiple** copies may be obtained by writing to the Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

President Reagan

Promoting Global Economic Growth, IMF and World Bank joint annual meeting, Sept. 25, 1984 (Current Policy #616).

Secretary Shultz

Terrorism and the Modern World, Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, Oct. 25, 1984 (Current Policy #629).

Soviet Jewry and U.S.-Soviet Relations, leadership assembly of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, Oct. 22, 1984 (Current Policy #628).

A Forward Look at Foreign Policy, World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Oct. 19, 1984 (Current Policy #625).

Managing the U.S.-Soviet Relationship Over the Long Term, Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Los Angeles, Oct. 18, 1984 (Current Policy #624).

Africa

An Update of Constructive Engagement in South Africa, Assistant Secretary Crocker, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 26, 1984 (Current Policy #619).

Ethiopian Famine (GIST, Oct. 1984).

Arms Control

A Short Guide to U.S. Arms Control Policy (pamphlet), Oct. 1984.

Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace (pamphlet), revised Sept. 1984.

Economics

Commercialization of Outer Space, Deputy Assistant Secretary Marshall, International Astronautical Federation and the International Institute of Space Law, Lausanne, Oct. 9, 1984 (Current Policy #622).

Europe

U.S. Relations With Poland, Deputy Secretary Dam, Polish-American leaders, Oct. 11, 1984 (Current Policy #621).

NATO and the Challenges Ahead, Under Secretary Armacost, Atlantic Treaty Asso., Toronto, Oct. 10, 1984 (Current Policy #620).

General

Change and Continuity: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Deputy Secretary Dam, Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Oct. 15, 1984 (Current Policy #623).

Middle East

Terrorism in the Middle East, Acting Secretary Dam, National United Jewish Appeal leaders, Oct. 1, 1984 (Current Policy #618).
Plight of the Iranian Baha'is (GIST, Oct. 1984).

Oceans

Freedom and Opportunity: Foundation for a Dynamic National Oceans Policy, Assistant Secretary Malone, Law of the Sea Institute, San Francisco, Sept. 24, 1984 (Current Policy #617). ■

Background Notes

This series provides brief, factual summaries of the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of about 170 countries (excluding the United States) and of selected international organizations. Recent revisions are:

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Burma (Aug. 1984)
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